Seventy-Fifth Year
EDITED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
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Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily ex press the individual opinions of staff writers
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TURDAY, AUGUST 7, 1965 NIGHT EDITOR: BARBARA SEYFRIED
Language Issue Threatens
T AT . 1' T *
indan rNatii
THE ONE YEAR OLD government of
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of
India has been forced to face three phe-
nomenal problems-the worst food crisis
since independence, a fierce Pakistani
assault on Rann of Kutch and the cru-
cial language issue.
Of the three, the language issue has
been most explosive and vulnerable to the
national integrity. Fortunately, anti-Hin-
di demonstrations have ceased in Madras
and elsewhere, yet the volcano of oppo-
sition feeling may erupt once again if
slightlysparked.
Under the pressure of staunch opposi-
tion to Hindi as the official language of
the .country, the central government had
to introduce a slight amendment in the
language act of 1963 to read, "English
shall continue to be used" in addition to
Hindi.
Meanwhile Congress, the ruling party,
in its recent Bangalore session has adopt-
ed all the major 14 languages as the media
for examinations in the Union Public
Service Commission (UPSC).-
R EGARDING LANGUAGE policy, the
educational institutions will have a
three-language formula. In view of the
vital importance of English in language-
chauvinistic India, the central govern-
ment's decision to allow English as an
associate official language for an indefi-
nite period is commendable. However,
one fails to understand why all 14 ma-
wor languages are to be media for the
UPSC examination. Any such decision is
bound to create complex administrative
problems, as well as resulting in a seri-
ous impact on national integration.
India has a total of 856 languages and
dialects among which 14 are recognized in
the constitution as the major languages
of India. Hindi. was adopted as India's
future official language since it was spok-
en by the largest segment of the popula-
tion. Today more than 250 million peo-
JoUDITH WARREN............Co-Editor
ROBERT HIPPLER............... Co-Editor
EDWARD HERSTEIN... ......Sports Editor
JUDITH FIELDS.................Business Manager
JEFFREY LEEDS .............Supplement Manager
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Published daily Tuesday thryugh Saturday morning.
nalism, umty
ple, over half of India's population, speak
Hindi, while millions more understand it.
Furthermore, unlike English, it is an
Indian language.
Non-Hindi speaking people have, how-
ever, profoundly opposed establishing
Hindi as the only national language. Their
greatest fear is that this will place them
at great economic, political and educa-
tional disadvantages compared to those
whose mother tongue is Hindi. In the
same way retention of English will han-
dicap everyone. English has been in use
for quite a long time for central adminis-
tration and as the link language. Further-
more, being an international language
and also highly developed, its replace-
ment will retard India's growth as a mod-
ern nation.
However, the language policy announc-
ed by the Congress Party in its Banga-
lore session is not a final solution to the
problem for it is full of contradictions.
The three-language formula (continua-
tion of English, Hindi at the national
level and the regional language at the
state level) is to be compulsorily follow-
ed. The Hindu, a daily newspaper in Mad-
ras, presents this contradiction in a
straightforward manner.
"IF ALL THE REGIONAL languages are
to become media of all-India exami-
nations, what is the purpose of three-
language formula which is to be com-
pulsory? If a student answers the UPSC
examination in Telugu, he must have his
university education also in the Telugu
medium. If he passes a competitive exam-
ination in Telugu, how does he fit him-
self into central administrative machin-
ery? If at the center, English and Hindi
are to be used ,how will he become pro-
ficient in these languages and what will
he do with his own knowledge of Telugu?
Surely there must be some relationship
between the language in which a stu-
dent appears for an all-India examina-
tion and the language used for an all-
India purpose."
This self-evident contradiction has, un-
fortunately, not been realized by the In-
dian leaders. Granting of regional lan-
guages in the national competitive exam-
inations will not only create administra-
tive problems such as judging standards,
in various languages, but would also give
rise to regional bias and narrow consid-
erations.
A number of educators and leaders
have suggested that a quota system of
recruitment be implemented if it becomes
necessary to insure each state proper
representation. But the central govern-
ment and the Congress Party have re-
jected the idea.
-SHREESH JUYAL
EDITOR'S NOTE: Lawrence Bat-
tistini is a professor of social sci-
ence at Michigan State University.
The article, reprinted here, was
written for the War/Peace Report.
By LAWRENCE H. BATTISTINI
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, in a
memorandum on Indochina in
January of 1944, wrote to Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull:
"France has had the country-
30 million inhabitants-for near-
ly 100 years, and the people are
worse off than they were at the
beginning. France has milked it
for 100 years. The people of In-
dochina are entitled to some-
thing better than that."
President Roosevelt actually
proposed to Stalin and Chiang
Kai-shek that at the end of the
war Indochina should be placed
under an international trustee-
ship to prepare it for independ-
ence. But events were already in
motion that would bring a far
different future to Indochina.
The Japanese began moving in-
to Indochina as early as 1939, and
the French colonial administra-
tors there collaborated with them,
IN THAT YEAR Ho Chi Minh
organized a coalition, the Viet
Nam Doe Lap Dong Minh (the
Vietminh Independence League),
known as the Vietminh for short.
In December, 1940, the Vietminh
engaged in open rebellion in Coch-
in-China. Ho Chi Minh proclaim-
ed that the aim of the Vietminh
was to fight both Japanese and
French "Fascist imperialism" for
the attainment of national inde-
pendence.
In the closing months of World
nese forces south of the 16th par-
with supplies and equipment by
units of the United States Office
of Strategic Services based in
Kunming, China. Later they were
joined by OSS collaborators.
With the collapse of the Japa-
nese war effort, Bao Dai, who had
been collaborating with the Japa-
nese, on August 29, 1945, abdicat-
ed and transferred his powers to
the Vietminh who were in effec-
tive administrative control of most
of Viet Nam.
ON SEPTEMBER 2, Ho Chi Minh
proclaimed the independence of
Viet Nam in the name of the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
On that same day, ironically
enough, General Vo Nguyen Giap
spoke of "particularly intimate re-
lations" with the U.S. and China.
Perhaps he said this because
many U.S. officers in Viet Nam
had implied in speeches that the
Vietnamese could count on U.S.
support.
With the Democratic Republic
of Viet Nam in administrative
control of most of the country,
the Indochinese problem might
have been settled then and there,
had not the French been assist-
ed in returning, with transport
service and military supplies.
AT THE POTSDAM Conference
of July, 1945, the military deci-
sion was made for the British to
take the surrender of all Japa-
nese forces south o fthe 16th par-
alel in Indochina and for the
Kuomintang Chinese to take the
surrender of all forces north of
that parallel.
The occupation forces of Kuo-
mintang China recognized the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam
(the DRV) in their zone and co-
operated with it. This was not so
in the southern zone, where the
British occupation forces under
General Gracey from the very be-
ginning paved the way for the re-
turn of the French to power.
At first the French were very
weak, but with British support
they even rearmed Japanese
troops and employed them in oper-
ations against the Vietminh.
HEARING ABOUT THIS, Gen-
eral MacArthur in Tokyo angrily
declared to an American journal-
ist: "If there is anything that
makes my blood boil it is to see
our allies in Indochina and Java
deploying Japanese troops to re-
conquer these little people we
promised to liberate."
What General MacArthur may
not have known was that the
"little people" who were resisting
reconquest were the Vietminh un-
der the leadership of Ho Chi
Minh.
Early in 1946 the French made
a deal with Kuomintang China,
which then withdrew its occupa-
tion troops. With the complete
withdrawal of the British and
Kuomintang Chinese troops, the
French, now heavily reinforced,
proceeded to restore their colonial
dominion.
FRANCE MADE a pretense of
making an accommodation with
the DRV and engaged in some dis-
cussions, but in bad faith. Fight-
ing broke out in December, 1946,
and what French writers on the
subject call "The First Indochin-
ese Colonial War" got underway.
With the war going badly
against them, the French in 1949
granted nominal independence to
Viet Nam, as well as to Laos and
vened with direct military partici-
pation. Secretary of State Dulles
proposed massive U.S. air and
naval support, but this was re-
jected as impractical in a study
made by General Ridgeway.
Then Dulles offered Bidault, the
French foreign minister, the use
of two nuclear bombs, which Bi-
dault rejected for fear their use
would escalate the war and bring
Communist China and the Soviet
Union into the conflict.
In the spring of 1954 the
French were at last willing to go
to the conference table with the
Vietminh. Dulles tried desper-
ately to keep France in the war.
Failing in that, he refused to take
a direct part in the armistice ne-
gotiations that ensued at Geneva.
JUST AS the Indochinese dis-
cussions started, news came of
the great French disaster at Dien-
bienphu.
The Geneva conference got un-
derway on May 8, 1954. At that
time the military map strongly
favored the Vietminh, who con-
trolled nearly everything north
of the 17th parallel and probably
40 per cent of that parallel.
Four agreements were conclud-
ed at the Geneva conference:
-A cease-fire agreement for
Viet Nam,
-A cease-fire agreement for
Laos,
-A cease-fire agreement for
Cambodia, and
-A Final Declaration of the
Participating Powers.
The Viet Nam cease-fire agree-
ment was signed by Ta Quang
Buu, vice-minister of defense for
the DRV and by General Delteil
for the French' Union Forces in
Indochina.
AMONG ITS provisions were
the following:
-A "provisional military de-
marcation line" was to be estab-
lished at approximately the 17th
parallel,
-Military forces of the two
sides were to regroup in their
respective zones within 300 days,
-National elections were to be
held in both zones on July 20,
1956, under the supervision of an
International Supervisory Com-
mission composed of Indian, Ca-
nadian and Polish representatives,
-Compliance with the cease-
fire provisions was to be super,-
vised by international control com-
mission, chaired by the Indian
member, and
-The introduction of new mili-
tary equipment or the establish-
ment of foreign military bases was
-Associated Press
THE PLIGHT OF THE Vietnamese first came to the attention of President Roosevelt early in 1944.
Since then the United States has become increasingly involved in the politics and economy of the
Southeast Asian nation. Above, American soldiers of the First Infantry Division land in South Viet
4
Nam soon to be followed by many more.
prohibited. A "Final Declaration ing achievements of the postwar
of the Powers" in general reaf- era." The Soviet Union appeared
firmed these agreements. to be somewhat indifferent, glad
mainly that the war was over
A SOUTH VIETNAMESE dele- and that there had been no esca-
gation representing the Bai Dai lation.
government made a'protest dec- Secretary Dulles, however, was
laration, in which it objected to bitterly disappointed and regarded
the division of the country, the the Geneva agreements not as a
date of the elections, and some settlement, but merely as a battle
other matters, lost. He was determined that
It specifically wanted the Unit- South Viet Nam would under no
ed Nations to exercise temporary circumstances come under the
control over all of Viet Nam and control of a Communist regime.
to supervise compliance with the Ho Chi Minh made several pro-
cease-fire agreement. posals for talks, as provided for
On July 21, the last day of the in the cease-fire agreement, on
conference, Walter Bedell Smith, questions relating to trade, com-
acting for the U.S., declined to munications, etc., between the
accept the agreement and instead North and the South. All his
issued a unilateral declaration in overtures were rebuffed by Ngo
which he stated the U.S. "will re- Dinh Diem, who now exercised,
frain from the threat or use of power in the South with the sup-
force to disturb" the agreement, port of the U.S.
and. that the U.S. would continue
to work for unification of Viet HE ALSO MADE several, pro-
Nam "through free elections su- posals for the holding of talks
pervised by the UN to insure that for the elections. These were also
they are conducted fairly." rebuffed or ignored by Diem.
There was little doubt that Ho
PRIME MINISTER Nehru of In- Chi Minh would have won the
dia, speaking for the neutralist elections in the South as well as
nations, hailed the Geneva agree- in the Northh.
ments as "one of the outstand- With the defeat of the Binh
Xuyen and the armed sects which
had challenged his authority,
Diem became confident of his pow-
er. He stepped up his authoritar-
ianism and repressions, encourag-
ed by certain American activist
elements.
In 1957, with the encourage-
ment of Washington, Diem
launched a series of veritable man
hunts. The police, under brother
Ngo Dinh Can, greatly augmented
in numbers, employed the most
brutal methods. The police drive
was ostensibly aimed against Com-
munists but liberals, democrats,
socialists and all who disagreed
with Diem openly were affected.
HUNTED DOWN like wild ani-
mals the Communists began to
fight back and to return brutal-
ity for brutality. Informers, vil-
lage chiefs who had presided over
the man hunts, were shot.
Peasants began giving assist-
ance to the Communists and the
sects. Increasing numbers began
deserting the villages to take up
arms.
At the end of March, 1959,
Diem candidly admitted that"at
the present time Viet Nam is a
nation at war."
DANGERS INHERENT:
The Limits of Self-Determination
4
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is
reprinted from the York, Pa.,
Gazette and Daily.
By WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS
THE PRINCIPLE of self-deter-
mination, when strictly inter-
preted and honored, provides an
ethical and workable basis for
the conduct of foreign affairs.
It cannot prevent all wars, or
solve all the problems of a nation.
At its best, however, it is capable
of suppgrting, and even strength-
ening, the self-control and mu-
tual respect which limit violence
in human affairs.
But American action in the
Dominican Republic and Viet Nam
makes it clear that the principle
of self-determination can also
lead a nation into making very
militant efforts to impose its par-
ticular conception of self-deter-
mination upon other countries.
THIS CAN BE explained in a
number of ways. The leaders can
be hypocrites, knowingly using the
language of self-determination,
while knowingly acting on other
axioms. This is a relatively rare
thing, however, and there is no
significant evidence that Ameri-
can leaders qualify as hypocrites.
It is far more likely that
American policy is the result of a
dangerous tendency inherent in
the principle and the logic of self-
determination. The philosophy of
self-determination is a particular
and partial statement of a broader
outlook usually known as individ-
ualism.
It emerged, along with the eco-
nomic doctrine of free enterprise,
as part of the modern attack on
the earlier Christian ideas of
community.
THIS PHILOSOPHY of indi-
vidualism arose primarily in
Western Europe, and hence that
principle of self-determination be-
came intimately linked with a
kind of geographical and cultural
egotism.
It was considered valid only for
the nations that emerged from
the ruins of the medieval church
and the Holy Roman Empire. The
rest of the world was thought of
ON THE OTHER hand, the
principles of self-determination
do not provide a clear or strong
definition of limits on one's own
action.
The reason for this is theystress
placed on achieving success and
dignity by fulfilling one's own
self - determined objectives. The
philosophy of self - determination
says very little about cooperation
or mutual determination.
The projection of one's self as
the key to dignity and meaning
leads to assertiveness and aggres-
siveness. It also defines being ac-
cepted largely in terms of other
people consenting to act on one's
own terms, rather than on terms
worked out by co-determination.
THESE ASPECTS of individ-
ualism a n d self - determination
create a strong momentum toward
sustained conflict and violence.
This momentum is the key to un-
derstanding American policy in
Viet Nam and in Latin America.
We have demanded the accept-
ance by others of our particular
self-determination and have de-
fended that claim by saying that
we are defending the principle it-
self.
But the central axiom of self-
determination provides no support
for what we have done or for what
we are doing. For, if we are to
honor the principle of self-deter-
mination, then we have to treat
Viet Nam as a political, social and
economic unit.
THIS MEANS that we have to
recognize the Viet Cong as a legi-
timate force in that society. We
cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally
outlaw the Viet Cong (or Castro's
Cuba) without violating the prin-
ciple that we say we are defend-
ing.
Recognizing the legitimacy of
the Viet Cong will open the way
to end the war and allow the
Vietnamese to reunify their own
country under a coalition govern-
ment as an equal rather than
treating Viet Nam as an area in
which we exercise our right of
self-determination by determining
other people.
We are responsible for our
dangerous predicament in . Viet
Nam. We have failed to exercise
the restraint and self-control that
are necessary if the principle of
self-determination is to lead us
away from war instead of toward
it.
BY THAT FAILURE, indeed, we
have self-determined ourselves in-
to a war. To put it bluntly, we re-
fused to honor the election pro-
visions of the Geneva Agreement
because we thought the revolu-
tionary coalition would win in an
honest vote. All else has followed
from that basic unwillingness to
act in keeping with our avowed
commitment to self-determination.
Despite our escalation of the
conflict, our opponents may show
enough self-restraint and ration'-
ality to keep that war from be-.
coming a nuclear disaster.
If so, we must prepare our.-
selves to acknowledge that self-
restraint and rationality, and to
admit that our picture of them
has been inaccurate and therefore,
misleading.
EVEN MORE, WE must ac-
knowledge the dangers inherent-in
the individualistic and egocentric
philosophy of self - determination.
And from that point we must go
on to evolve a philosophy of co-
determination that rests upon 'a
recognition of the mutuality of
existence, and stress the necessity
of defining success in terms of
cooperation with others, rather
than in terms unilateral and ego-
centric victory over others.
4
4
'LORD JIM':
Is It One Movie or Two?
I
At the Michigan Theatre
"LORD JIM" as conceived by,
Richard Brooks is essentially
two movies. One, a breathtaking
and exciting action picture com-
plete with taut, harrowing battles
and wild tropical locations. The
other, an antagonizing allegorical
sermon frought with over-verbali-
zation and universal moral cliches.
It's a shame actually. The sourc-
es of both are derived from the
Conrad novel. But as written the
two were carefully intertwined as
a single purpose and the result
was a symbiotic action, each sup-
ON THE OTHER hand, there is
O'Toole the Tormented Soul, ex-
pounding and grimacing in an-
guish while discussing in detail
the motivation for each particu-
lar groan and drop of sweat. The
first approaches Lord Jim. The
second runs away.
For those who suspect Conrad
as the key to the failure of "Iord
Jim" as a movie, one need only
look to Carol Reed's version of
"Outcast of the Islands" to ab-
solve the author. When under-
stood and handled with the same
subtlety and constraint that the
film medium must utilize when
Jergens and Paul Lukas, to the
caricatures created by Eli Wal-
lach and James Mason. Both of
the latter, representing Evil, ap-
proach slapstick. O'Toole's per-
formance, except where the script
betrays him, is superb as always.
Daliah Lavi is another example
of Brooks sabotage. She is in-
credibly believable as the Con-
rad woman but every time she
opens her mouth Brooks' under-
lining dialogue destroys the illu-
sion.
The photography is also in-
consistent ranging from the nat-
ural, realistic Far East shipping