Seventy-Fifth Year EDITED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS FRANCE, U.S. IN VIET NAM: A Saga of Colonialism, Intervention Where Opinions Are Free. 420MAYNARD ST., ANN ARBOR, MICH. Truth Will Prevail NEWS PHONE: 764-0552 Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily ex press the individual opinions of staff writers or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints. TURDAY, AUGUST 7, 1965 NIGHT EDITOR: BARBARA SEYFRIED Language Issue Threatens T AT . 1' T * indan rNatii THE ONE YEAR OLD government of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India has been forced to face three phe- nomenal problems-the worst food crisis since independence, a fierce Pakistani assault on Rann of Kutch and the cru- cial language issue. Of the three, the language issue has been most explosive and vulnerable to the national integrity. Fortunately, anti-Hin- di demonstrations have ceased in Madras and elsewhere, yet the volcano of oppo- sition feeling may erupt once again if slightlysparked. Under the pressure of staunch opposi- tion to Hindi as the official language of the .country, the central government had to introduce a slight amendment in the language act of 1963 to read, "English shall continue to be used" in addition to Hindi. Meanwhile Congress, the ruling party, in its recent Bangalore session has adopt- ed all the major 14 languages as the media for examinations in the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC).- R EGARDING LANGUAGE policy, the educational institutions will have a three-language formula. In view of the vital importance of English in language- chauvinistic India, the central govern- ment's decision to allow English as an associate official language for an indefi- nite period is commendable. However, one fails to understand why all 14 ma- wor languages are to be media for the UPSC examination. Any such decision is bound to create complex administrative problems, as well as resulting in a seri- ous impact on national integration. India has a total of 856 languages and dialects among which 14 are recognized in the constitution as the major languages of India. Hindi. was adopted as India's future official language since it was spok- en by the largest segment of the popula- tion. Today more than 250 million peo- JoUDITH WARREN............Co-Editor ROBERT HIPPLER............... Co-Editor EDWARD HERSTEIN... ......Sports Editor JUDITH FIELDS.................Business Manager JEFFREY LEEDS .............Supplement Manager NIGHT EDITORS: Michael Badaino, John Meredith, Robert Moore, Barbara Seyfried, Bruce Wasserstein. Subscription rates: $4 for nIA and B ($4.50 by mail); $2 for InA or B ($2.50 by mall). The Daily Is a member of the Associated Press and Collegiate Press Service. The Associated Press is exclusively entitled to the use of ali news dispatches credited to it or otherwise credited to the newspaper. All rghts of re-publication of all other matters here are also reserved. Second class postage paid at Ann Arbor, Mich. Published daily Tuesday thryugh Saturday morning. nalism, umty ple, over half of India's population, speak Hindi, while millions more understand it. Furthermore, unlike English, it is an Indian language. Non-Hindi speaking people have, how- ever, profoundly opposed establishing Hindi as the only national language. Their greatest fear is that this will place them at great economic, political and educa- tional disadvantages compared to those whose mother tongue is Hindi. In the same way retention of English will han- dicap everyone. English has been in use for quite a long time for central adminis- tration and as the link language. Further- more, being an international language and also highly developed, its replace- ment will retard India's growth as a mod- ern nation. However, the language policy announc- ed by the Congress Party in its Banga- lore session is not a final solution to the problem for it is full of contradictions. The three-language formula (continua- tion of English, Hindi at the national level and the regional language at the state level) is to be compulsorily follow- ed. The Hindu, a daily newspaper in Mad- ras, presents this contradiction in a straightforward manner. "IF ALL THE REGIONAL languages are to become media of all-India exami- nations, what is the purpose of three- language formula which is to be com- pulsory? If a student answers the UPSC examination in Telugu, he must have his university education also in the Telugu medium. If he passes a competitive exam- ination in Telugu, how does he fit him- self into central administrative machin- ery? If at the center, English and Hindi are to be used ,how will he become pro- ficient in these languages and what will he do with his own knowledge of Telugu? Surely there must be some relationship between the language in which a stu- dent appears for an all-India examina- tion and the language used for an all- India purpose." This self-evident contradiction has, un- fortunately, not been realized by the In- dian leaders. Granting of regional lan- guages in the national competitive exam- inations will not only create administra- tive problems such as judging standards, in various languages, but would also give rise to regional bias and narrow consid- erations. A number of educators and leaders have suggested that a quota system of recruitment be implemented if it becomes necessary to insure each state proper representation. But the central govern- ment and the Congress Party have re- jected the idea. -SHREESH JUYAL EDITOR'S NOTE: Lawrence Bat- tistini is a professor of social sci- ence at Michigan State University. The article, reprinted here, was written for the War/Peace Report. By LAWRENCE H. BATTISTINI PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, in a memorandum on Indochina in January of 1944, wrote to Secre- tary of State Cordell Hull: "France has had the country- 30 million inhabitants-for near- ly 100 years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning. France has milked it for 100 years. The people of In- dochina are entitled to some- thing better than that." President Roosevelt actually proposed to Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek that at the end of the war Indochina should be placed under an international trustee- ship to prepare it for independ- ence. But events were already in motion that would bring a far different future to Indochina. The Japanese began moving in- to Indochina as early as 1939, and the French colonial administra- tors there collaborated with them, IN THAT YEAR Ho Chi Minh organized a coalition, the Viet Nam Doe Lap Dong Minh (the Vietminh Independence League), known as the Vietminh for short. In December, 1940, the Vietminh engaged in open rebellion in Coch- in-China. Ho Chi Minh proclaim- ed that the aim of the Vietminh was to fight both Japanese and French "Fascist imperialism" for the attainment of national inde- pendence. In the closing months of World nese forces south of the 16th par- with supplies and equipment by units of the United States Office of Strategic Services based in Kunming, China. Later they were joined by OSS collaborators. With the collapse of the Japa- nese war effort, Bao Dai, who had been collaborating with the Japa- nese, on August 29, 1945, abdicat- ed and transferred his powers to the Vietminh who were in effec- tive administrative control of most of Viet Nam. ON SEPTEMBER 2, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Viet Nam in the name of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. On that same day, ironically enough, General Vo Nguyen Giap spoke of "particularly intimate re- lations" with the U.S. and China. Perhaps he said this because many U.S. officers in Viet Nam had implied in speeches that the Vietnamese could count on U.S. support. With the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in administrative control of most of the country, the Indochinese problem might have been settled then and there, had not the French been assist- ed in returning, with transport service and military supplies. AT THE POTSDAM Conference of July, 1945, the military deci- sion was made for the British to take the surrender of all Japa- nese forces south o fthe 16th par- alel in Indochina and for the Kuomintang Chinese to take the surrender of all forces north of that parallel. The occupation forces of Kuo- mintang China recognized the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (the DRV) in their zone and co- operated with it. This was not so in the southern zone, where the British occupation forces under General Gracey from the very be- ginning paved the way for the re- turn of the French to power. At first the French were very weak, but with British support they even rearmed Japanese troops and employed them in oper- ations against the Vietminh. HEARING ABOUT THIS, Gen- eral MacArthur in Tokyo angrily declared to an American journal- ist: "If there is anything that makes my blood boil it is to see our allies in Indochina and Java deploying Japanese troops to re- conquer these little people we promised to liberate." What General MacArthur may not have known was that the "little people" who were resisting reconquest were the Vietminh un- der the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Early in 1946 the French made a deal with Kuomintang China, which then withdrew its occupa- tion troops. With the complete withdrawal of the British and Kuomintang Chinese troops, the French, now heavily reinforced, proceeded to restore their colonial dominion. FRANCE MADE a pretense of making an accommodation with the DRV and engaged in some dis- cussions, but in bad faith. Fight- ing broke out in December, 1946, and what French writers on the subject call "The First Indochin- ese Colonial War" got underway. With the war going badly against them, the French in 1949 granted nominal independence to Viet Nam, as well as to Laos and vened with direct military partici- pation. Secretary of State Dulles proposed massive U.S. air and naval support, but this was re- jected as impractical in a study made by General Ridgeway. Then Dulles offered Bidault, the French foreign minister, the use of two nuclear bombs, which Bi- dault rejected for fear their use would escalate the war and bring Communist China and the Soviet Union into the conflict. In the spring of 1954 the French were at last willing to go to the conference table with the Vietminh. Dulles tried desper- ately to keep France in the war. Failing in that, he refused to take a direct part in the armistice ne- gotiations that ensued at Geneva. JUST AS the Indochinese dis- cussions started, news came of the great French disaster at Dien- bienphu. The Geneva conference got un- derway on May 8, 1954. At that time the military map strongly favored the Vietminh, who con- trolled nearly everything north of the 17th parallel and probably 40 per cent of that parallel. Four agreements were conclud- ed at the Geneva conference: -A cease-fire agreement for Viet Nam, -A cease-fire agreement for Laos, -A cease-fire agreement for Cambodia, and -A Final Declaration of the Participating Powers. The Viet Nam cease-fire agree- ment was signed by Ta Quang Buu, vice-minister of defense for the DRV and by General Delteil for the French' Union Forces in Indochina. AMONG ITS provisions were the following: -A "provisional military de- marcation line" was to be estab- lished at approximately the 17th parallel, -Military forces of the two sides were to regroup in their respective zones within 300 days, -National elections were to be held in both zones on July 20, 1956, under the supervision of an International Supervisory Com- mission composed of Indian, Ca- nadian and Polish representatives, -Compliance with the cease- fire provisions was to be super,- vised by international control com- mission, chaired by the Indian member, and -The introduction of new mili- tary equipment or the establish- ment of foreign military bases was -Associated Press THE PLIGHT OF THE Vietnamese first came to the attention of President Roosevelt early in 1944. Since then the United States has become increasingly involved in the politics and economy of the Southeast Asian nation. Above, American soldiers of the First Infantry Division land in South Viet 4 Nam soon to be followed by many more. prohibited. A "Final Declaration ing achievements of the postwar of the Powers" in general reaf- era." The Soviet Union appeared firmed these agreements. to be somewhat indifferent, glad mainly that the war was over A SOUTH VIETNAMESE dele- and that there had been no esca- gation representing the Bai Dai lation. government made a'protest dec- Secretary Dulles, however, was laration, in which it objected to bitterly disappointed and regarded the division of the country, the the Geneva agreements not as a date of the elections, and some settlement, but merely as a battle other matters, lost. He was determined that It specifically wanted the Unit- South Viet Nam would under no ed Nations to exercise temporary circumstances come under the control over all of Viet Nam and control of a Communist regime. to supervise compliance with the Ho Chi Minh made several pro- cease-fire agreement. posals for talks, as provided for On July 21, the last day of the in the cease-fire agreement, on conference, Walter Bedell Smith, questions relating to trade, com- acting for the U.S., declined to munications, etc., between the accept the agreement and instead North and the South. All his issued a unilateral declaration in overtures were rebuffed by Ngo which he stated the U.S. "will re- Dinh Diem, who now exercised, frain from the threat or use of power in the South with the sup- force to disturb" the agreement, port of the U.S. and. that the U.S. would continue to work for unification of Viet HE ALSO MADE several, pro- Nam "through free elections su- posals for the holding of talks pervised by the UN to insure that for the elections. These were also they are conducted fairly." rebuffed or ignored by Diem. There was little doubt that Ho PRIME MINISTER Nehru of In- Chi Minh would have won the dia, speaking for the neutralist elections in the South as well as nations, hailed the Geneva agree- in the Northh. ments as "one of the outstand- With the defeat of the Binh Xuyen and the armed sects which had challenged his authority, Diem became confident of his pow- er. He stepped up his authoritar- ianism and repressions, encourag- ed by certain American activist elements. In 1957, with the encourage- ment of Washington, Diem launched a series of veritable man hunts. The police, under brother Ngo Dinh Can, greatly augmented in numbers, employed the most brutal methods. The police drive was ostensibly aimed against Com- munists but liberals, democrats, socialists and all who disagreed with Diem openly were affected. HUNTED DOWN like wild ani- mals the Communists began to fight back and to return brutal- ity for brutality. Informers, vil- lage chiefs who had presided over the man hunts, were shot. Peasants began giving assist- ance to the Communists and the sects. Increasing numbers began deserting the villages to take up arms. At the end of March, 1959, Diem candidly admitted that"at the present time Viet Nam is a nation at war." DANGERS INHERENT: The Limits of Self-Determination 4 EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is reprinted from the York, Pa., Gazette and Daily. By WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS THE PRINCIPLE of self-deter- mination, when strictly inter- preted and honored, provides an ethical and workable basis for the conduct of foreign affairs. It cannot prevent all wars, or solve all the problems of a nation. At its best, however, it is capable of suppgrting, and even strength- ening, the self-control and mu- tual respect which limit violence in human affairs. But American action in the Dominican Republic and Viet Nam makes it clear that the principle of self-determination can also lead a nation into making very militant efforts to impose its par- ticular conception of self-deter- mination upon other countries. THIS CAN BE explained in a number of ways. The leaders can be hypocrites, knowingly using the language of self-determination, while knowingly acting on other axioms. This is a relatively rare thing, however, and there is no significant evidence that Ameri- can leaders qualify as hypocrites. It is far more likely that American policy is the result of a dangerous tendency inherent in the principle and the logic of self- determination. The philosophy of self-determination is a particular and partial statement of a broader outlook usually known as individ- ualism. It emerged, along with the eco- nomic doctrine of free enterprise, as part of the modern attack on the earlier Christian ideas of community. THIS PHILOSOPHY of indi- vidualism arose primarily in Western Europe, and hence that principle of self-determination be- came intimately linked with a kind of geographical and cultural egotism. It was considered valid only for the nations that emerged from the ruins of the medieval church and the Holy Roman Empire. The rest of the world was thought of ON THE OTHER hand, the principles of self-determination do not provide a clear or strong definition of limits on one's own action. The reason for this is theystress placed on achieving success and dignity by fulfilling one's own self - determined objectives. The philosophy of self - determination says very little about cooperation or mutual determination. The projection of one's self as the key to dignity and meaning leads to assertiveness and aggres- siveness. It also defines being ac- cepted largely in terms of other people consenting to act on one's own terms, rather than on terms worked out by co-determination. THESE ASPECTS of individ- ualism a n d self - determination create a strong momentum toward sustained conflict and violence. This momentum is the key to un- derstanding American policy in Viet Nam and in Latin America. We have demanded the accept- ance by others of our particular self-determination and have de- fended that claim by saying that we are defending the principle it- self. But the central axiom of self- determination provides no support for what we have done or for what we are doing. For, if we are to honor the principle of self-deter- mination, then we have to treat Viet Nam as a political, social and economic unit. THIS MEANS that we have to recognize the Viet Cong as a legi- timate force in that society. We cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally outlaw the Viet Cong (or Castro's Cuba) without violating the prin- ciple that we say we are defend- ing. Recognizing the legitimacy of the Viet Cong will open the way to end the war and allow the Vietnamese to reunify their own country under a coalition govern- ment as an equal rather than treating Viet Nam as an area in which we exercise our right of self-determination by determining other people. We are responsible for our dangerous predicament in . Viet Nam. We have failed to exercise the restraint and self-control that are necessary if the principle of self-determination is to lead us away from war instead of toward it. BY THAT FAILURE, indeed, we have self-determined ourselves in- to a war. To put it bluntly, we re- fused to honor the election pro- visions of the Geneva Agreement because we thought the revolu- tionary coalition would win in an honest vote. All else has followed from that basic unwillingness to act in keeping with our avowed commitment to self-determination. Despite our escalation of the conflict, our opponents may show enough self-restraint and ration'- ality to keep that war from be-. coming a nuclear disaster. If so, we must prepare our.- selves to acknowledge that self- restraint and rationality, and to admit that our picture of them has been inaccurate and therefore, misleading. EVEN MORE, WE must ac- knowledge the dangers inherent-in the individualistic and egocentric philosophy of self - determination. And from that point we must go on to evolve a philosophy of co- determination that rests upon 'a recognition of the mutuality of existence, and stress the necessity of defining success in terms of cooperation with others, rather than in terms unilateral and ego- centric victory over others. 4 4 'LORD JIM': Is It One Movie or Two? I At the Michigan Theatre "LORD JIM" as conceived by, Richard Brooks is essentially two movies. One, a breathtaking and exciting action picture com- plete with taut, harrowing battles and wild tropical locations. The other, an antagonizing allegorical sermon frought with over-verbali- zation and universal moral cliches. It's a shame actually. The sourc- es of both are derived from the Conrad novel. But as written the two were carefully intertwined as a single purpose and the result was a symbiotic action, each sup- ON THE OTHER hand, there is O'Toole the Tormented Soul, ex- pounding and grimacing in an- guish while discussing in detail the motivation for each particu- lar groan and drop of sweat. The first approaches Lord Jim. The second runs away. For those who suspect Conrad as the key to the failure of "Iord Jim" as a movie, one need only look to Carol Reed's version of "Outcast of the Islands" to ab- solve the author. When under- stood and handled with the same subtlety and constraint that the film medium must utilize when Jergens and Paul Lukas, to the caricatures created by Eli Wal- lach and James Mason. Both of the latter, representing Evil, ap- proach slapstick. O'Toole's per- formance, except where the script betrays him, is superb as always. Daliah Lavi is another example of Brooks sabotage. She is in- credibly believable as the Con- rad woman but every time she opens her mouth Brooks' under- lining dialogue destroys the illu- sion. The photography is also in- consistent ranging from the nat- ural, realistic Far East shipping