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July 15, 1965 - Image 2

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Michigan Daily, 1965-07-15

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vent-i Year
EDITED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS

Do US. Anti-Guerrilla

Tactics

ork?

Where Opinions Are Free, 420 MAYNARD ST., ANN ARBOR, MIcH.
Truth Will Prevail

NEws PHONE: 764-0552

Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers
or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints.
THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1965 NIGHT EDITOR: MICHAEL BADAMO

Adlai Stevenson:
In Memoriam
ADLAI STEVENSON IS DEAD.
Deep mourning must be private. But at this moment time must be
taken for public mourning, the kind that awakens us, surprised at the
number and variety of people for whom Adlai Stevenson meant some-
thing important, a friend, a trusted confidante, for some eight years
the leader of the Democratic party, but most of all, in this public age, a
symbol.
For a majority of the people who tonight mourn Adlai Stevenson
never shook hands with him, never exchanged a word with him, never saw
him themselves, at whatever distance. They mourn a man whose char-
acter they had to infer from the newspaper stories-how many thousand
of them over the years!-TV news films, the televised 1956 and 1952 con-
ventions and campaigns, and inevitably the reams of analysis that sought
to make his actions and his personality clear.
What did they see, this unseen majority of mourners, whose voices
will not be heard publicly? What qualities in the man were they attached
to, at the great remove that separated they and he? Only time, perhaps,
will tell more clearly.
BUT FOR ONE PRIVATE MOURNER, who through happenstance will now
have his opinions listened to by a wider circle, it was Adlai Stevenson's
concern for the morality of his actions, together with his commitment to
political participation that makes it necessary to mourn the man now at
his death.
Adlai Stevenson had not chosen an easy life. His life if anything had
become harder these last years, since becoming permanent United States
ambassador to the United Nations. This is not an easy time for moral men
to be active in the affairs of great nations, for the suffering must be there.
Adlai Stevenson had to defend our Viet Nam and Dominican policies. Even
if he felt them to be right-and there is good reason to believe that he did
not-he could not help but see the misery and destruction which accom-
panied these policies. And from what we can infer of Adlai Stevenson, to
see must have been to feel acutely. But as he said in accepting his first
presidential normination ". .. from such dread responsibility one does not
shrink in fear, in self interest or in false humility."
Adlai Stevenson felt he had something to contribute to the United
Nations. The news media tell us of his eloquence in the cause of the
United States, which we occasionally glimpsed in 30 second TV news re-
ports, good relationships with UN delegates from other countries, effective
communication with those delegates, a well organized United States
delegation to the UN and, hopefully, some communication to others in the
U.S. government and the United Nations of the higher purposes of both
those political organizations. What he had to contribute was in the final
analysis frail enough: the intelligence, sensitivity and true morality of one
man.
HE STAYED ON, until his death yesterday, in what must be considered
an attempt to chart the morality of a public man, a concept honored
more often today in the breach, a concept often replaced by power, popular-
ity or efficiency, in world politics today. But these, though they may sate
the body politic, cannot sustain it, and it was one of Adla Stevenson's
contributions to recognize this, and to see what an individual man could
do, while holding on to his sense of rightness. His answer, in briefest out-
line seems to have been that one must stay involved with politics, where lies
the greatest power for good or ill; to the extent that one has power one
must use it but only after reflection and with the anguish that reflects
the often horrible alternatives; and where one does not have the decisive
power to form policies, as was true during his UN tenure one must act so as
to make the best of these policies.
It is too much to hope that Stevenson's reflections on his years in
political life were written down. If they do exist they would be of incalcul-
able help in navigating the unknown shoals of political morality.
THROUGH HIS ACTIONS and his words, Adlai Stevenson tried to veer
the course of world affairs to the side of humanity. May his efforts
not have been in vain.
-LANE VANDERSLICE

EDITOR'S NOTE: Roger Ha-
gan is now in radio and televi-
sion work on the West Coast,
and has been editor of The Cor-
respondent, a journal of opin-
ion published at Harvard Uni-
versity. His article originally
appeared in a pamphlet distri-
buted by Students for a Demo-
cratic Society.
By ROGER HAGAN
FROM THE PRESENT scope of
U.S. counter-insurgency policy
it must be obvious that whatever
one thinks of it ,it is here to stay
in one form or other.
It is big, it has accumulated
the vested interests of a whole
new generation of military men, it
is a real response to the problem
of Communist and other anti-
American expansionism, perhaps
the only response we can come up
with consistent with the outlook
and demands of the American
public in the Cold War.
It has some good aspects to it,
particularly the attempt to turn
the military of many small na-
tions from parasites linked to the
most conservative and feudal in-
terests into socially productive and
progressive elites, and into train-
Ing systems to prepare uneducated
men who pass through them for
the skills needed in modernization.

BUT THERE ARE reasons to
question the new momentum of
counter-insurgency and the theory
on which it rests, and it will be
important to understand these
reasons while the question still
remains fluid.
o To begin with ,the program to
this point has frequently involved
us in propping up regimes which
have little local legitimacy, that
is, little consensus among the gov-
erned that their rulers have any
business being their rulers.
Thus, while we hardly notice
the program and its effects, the
picture which much of the world
gets of us is of a meddlesome im-
perialist nation, fully committed
to manipulating and controlling
the destinies of other people
through a series of puppets whose
chief assignment is to protect
American interests, either finan-
cial or military security needs.
The argument that we make,
that we care for only fruitful sta-
bility, fails to impress them, par-
ticularly when we speak at the
same time of the danger of al-
lowing a hostilehenvironment of
American security interests to de-
velop; and this is how much of
our discussion of Southeast Asia
and Latin America is cast.
0 Secondly, the counter-insurg-
ency program, like any commit-
ment that gets institutions, agen-
cies and hierarchies into motion,
develops a momentum of its own,

De Gaulle May Act
In Our Interests

By WALTER LIPPMANN
T WOULD BE most surprising
if the current crisis led to the
breakup of the Common Market.
Each of the countries concerned
has much to lose by a rupture, and
none has anything to gain.
The occasion out of which the
crisis grew was a highly technical
and quite manageable financial
controversy about payments to
agriculture. But contained within
this controversy there is a deep
issue which involves the shape of
the European future.
CONCEIVABLY this issue also
can in the end be compromised.
But as it now appears it poses
the question of whether the six
continental West European coun-
tries shall move toward a con-
federation, which could include
the whole of Europe, or toward a
federation of the six with a cen-
tral government, superior to the
governments in Paris, Bonn, Rome
and so forth.
The immediate practical ques-
tion is whether the development
of the Common Market can for
the time being be separated from
a decisive move affecting the con-
stitutional future of Europe.
THE CURRENT CRISIS has
been precipitated by the attempt
of the Federalists, such as Dr.
Hallstein, the president of the
Commission of the Common Mar-
ket, to graft onto the financing
of agriculture a very big decision
toward a supranational European
government.
This means that in four and a
half years at the latest the six
Western European countries-
France, West Germany, Italy, Bel-
gium, The Netherlands and Lux-,
embourg-are to have a common
tariff as against the rest of the
world, no customs barriers within
the market and to pay farm sub-
sidies and export rebates entirely
from a common pool.
THE FEDERALISTS, who want
to create a supranational West
European state, have thought that
they could move ahead by feeding
this common agricultural fund
with revenues from the duties on
industrial products.
These revenues, according to the
Federalists' proposal, would go
increasingly to the community
treasury instead of the member
states.

The Federalists are proposing to
strengthen their power by bring-
ing the European parliament into
the budget-making process.
This is an ingenious device for
using the Common Market to
bring about a West European fed-
eral state. It would be a long,
perhaps.. decisive step. Gaullist
France is refusing to take that
step. That is why there is a crisis.
GEN. CHARLES de Gaulle's
resistance to the creation of a
supranational West European
state is widely regarded as a piece
of reactionary nationalism which
is preventing the rise of a new
great state.
It is quite true, of course, that
Gen. de Gaulle is profoundly op-
posed to the reduction of French
sovereignty and to any develop-
ments in which France would
tend to become in Europe some-
thing like one of the states in our
federal union.
But are we in any position to
blame him? Would any American
President or any American Con-
gress be willing today to enter a
supranational state? We must not
be shocked or surprised that
France is as nationalist as the
United States under President
Johnson.
WE SHOULD PAUSE, too, be-
fore we pronounce the Gaullist
conception of Europe as reaction-
ary. If the Federalists prevail and
construct a supranational state, it
will be extremely difficult for
British Parliament, with its world-
wide responsibilities, to surrender
large elements of its sovereignty to
it.
Moreover, a federal government
in Western Europe with a supra-
national bureaucracy would close
the door for a long time to the
inclusion of Eastern Europe in
the Community of Europe.
In fact, the underlying issue be-
tween de Gaulle and the Federal-
ists is between a tight little
Europe of the six and a looser
greater Europe which would in-
clude the whole continent. Can it
truly be said that the idea of a
greater Europe - which would
mean the reunification of Ger-
many and a settlement with the
Soviet Union-is reactionary ac-
cording to American principles or
contrary to our real interests?
(c) 1965, The Washington Post Co.

which can, as it has in Viet Nam,
run long past the point of dim-
inishing returns.
The problem of institutional
momentum is the more difficult to
handle when it concerns the plan-
ning and execution of clandestine
and covert operations which suffer
few checks from an aroused pub-
lic or allied opinion. The carry-
over of the Bay of Pigs invasion
from the Eisenhower to the Ken-
nedy administrations is an ex-
ample of such momentum; most
observers have by now noted
Kennedy's doubts about the af-
fair ,and his reluctance to contra-
dict, as a new commander-in-
chief, the specialists and generals
who had planned it.
Such momentums are involved
whenever billions of dollars and
new professional roles are crystal-
lized around a new policy.
We shall have to consider where
these momentums may lead and
how they can be kept under con-
trol, for they can limit the free-
dom of even a strong leader and a
public opinion clear on what it
wants.
s Third, the theory underlying
the program is itself questionable
in some respects. The idea (which
the U.S. is depending on) that de-
mocracy follows economic develop-
ment is far from certain, for eco-
nomic development can take many
forms and be carried out under
many auspices, by either narrow-
ly- or broadly-based power struc-
tures.
Russia and Spain are exam-
ples of left-wing and right-wing
authoritarian societies which are
developed; in the latter case most
notably, it is for the benefit of the
few.
This element of Prof. Walt W.
Rostow's theory of economic
growth-which underlies U.S. pol-
icies-is now coming under criti-
cism by some scholars, as is his
central idea - that every indus-
trializing country has a crucial
and always identifiable "take-off"
stage, after which it can grow on
its own without outside help.
" Fourth, consider what coun-
ter-insurgency means: inserting
ourselves into the domestic politi-
cal life of another society to skew
it in one direction.
We would hardly want this prin-
ciple generalized, for we would
not stand for it ourselves.
The assumption that to do so
is the proper role for American
secret bureaucracies can lead, un-
der some imaginable American re-
gimes, to formidable abuses, if it
has not already.
* Fifth, how politically realistic
is it? This is probably the most
important criticism of our theory
of counter-insurgency. Does it take
account of the political aspira-
tions of the people involved?
Basically it rests on deterring
internal insurgency in an under-
developed nation to a halt-that
is, to inactivity and acquiescence.
But it necessarily does not focus
on creating a society which can
embrace some part of their dis-
sident aspirations so as' to build
a minimum common denominator
government like our own, or Ja-
pan's, or those of Western (and
perhaps Eastern) Europe.
That is, it does not focus on
creating a consensus. In situations
where sizable minorities have
made a strong commitment to
change their society radically,
mere deterrence will not be
enough; these minorities will
simply not cease activity because
it has been made costly for them.
If they are internal, not totally
externally motivated (that is, if
they are not serving solely the for-
eign policy interests of Russia or
China) they will fight all the
harder to expel our "foreign" in-
trusions into their society.
They must also be attracted
into a viable future, one different
from their own plans, but also
different from the past or pres-
ent against which they rebel.

Counter-insurgency contributes
primarily to the negative deter-
rent power of a regime, and
civic action woos at best the un-
committed. It holds out no vision
of a desirable future, in grudging
acceptance of which the rebels
may lay down their arms.
0 Sixth, so far we have tended
to take all insurgency as exter-
nally motivated. This is a crude
mistake, perhaps related to over-.
learning the Malaysian model
(where British forces crushed ex-
ternally-directed rebels in the late
1940's) and we have begun to
learn better.
But it raises the question of
whether the bureaucracies in ques-
tion, given the nature of their
recruitment and internal ideol-
ogies, can always distinguish bas-
ically nationalist actions, perhaps
supported from the outside by
powers naturally interested in re-
ducing our strength in an area,
from Communist actionsain the
interests of a foreign Communist
power.
Since every change of sympathy
in the world becomes an Ameri-
can political issue, it is hard to
be optimistic about how subtle we
will be in deciding with whom to
compromise, if we are the sine
qua non of political settlement in
a country, as we are in Viet Nam.
0 Then, seventh ,there is the

their opponents are responsive to
pressures short of violence, but
very strong elites need not respond
to others demands at all.
By changing the threshold, we
alter the nature of the opposition
in an ominous direction.
* Eights, there is the converse
question of whom we are hurt-
ing. Those who suffer the most
in Viet Nam are the innocents,
,their homes burned, their so-
cities wrecked, their fields pois-
oned.
" Finally, the new stress on
counter-insurgency places decisive
power in the hands of a bur-
eaucracy almost completely im-
mune to congressional and pub-
lic scrutiny: and this is the power
to do many things-to change the
balance of social forces in other
societies, to create the image of
America that most of the world
receives, to give our opponents
full pretext to break international
law, and to circumscribe the ef-
fectiveness of all the other poli-
cies and programs we undertake
to promote international law and
social justice.
History will be made by these
secret bureaucracies, in ways, and
in pursuit of goals, determined
with less and less reference to

to

SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS tanove) defend the outpost of
Ba Gia from attack by the Viet Cong. Can military action-almost
undiluted by social reforms-ever hope to suppress rebellions in
underdeveloped countries?

American politics or values, and
with almost no sensitivity to mi-
nority criticism.
BUT THERE would probably be
no easy victories for law and rea-
son in a plebiscitory foreign poli-
cy either. The present system of
passing public opinion through
several filters and processings
where expertise is added will prob-
ably be the best we can develop.
Not raw opinion, but the proc-
ess of argument in the public
prints and before organizations
and voters, partaken in by offi-
cials and critics, professors, com-
mittees, and men-in-the-letter
columns, or what we might call
the "opinion process" is the vital
input we worry about.
Here takes place whatever ulti-
mate definition we have of our
iational moralities and goals.
SOMEHOW the inhibitions of
opinion process must be maintain-
ad as a check on the bureaucra-
cies which run foreign policy.
What America will need in the
foreseeable future, then, are cour-
ageous muckrakers. Expose will
be the crucial function of the next
decade, and piety the greatest
disservice.

T. S. Eliot's 'Clerk'-
A Technical Success
At Lydia Mendelssohn Theatre
LAST NIGHT'S PRODUCTION of T. S. Eliot's "The Confidential
Clerk" by the University Players was successful theatre due to
the brilliance of both the playwright and the technicians. On the
whole the acting was adequate.
The play is a result of Eliot's experimentation in mixing elements
of wit and serious metaphysics. Although he sacrifices the poetic style
for which he is so well known, he creates a dramatic verse form
that allows the use of modern colloquialism.
His is a realistic play that deals with the problem of sympathy
and understanding between people who are unable to communicate
with each other. The characters are further frustrated by limitations
imposed upon their freedom of choice by what has happened in
the past.
ON THE SURFACE, the plot is concerned with establishing the
true parentage of Colby Simpkins, played by Thomas Manning.
His concept of reality, with his insistence on fact, lies between
that of his "father," Sir Claude Mulhammer, played by Kenneth
Chomont, and his "step-mother," Lady Elizabeth, played by Julia Lacy.
Sir Claude, who thinks he is being obedient to fact, is actually
deluded for the twenty-five years that he believes Colby is his son.
On the other hand, Lady Elizabeth, who judges people by their aura,
finally comes to have the clearest concept of reality.
BOTH THE SET and the costumes are appropriate and well done.
The lighting is used extremely effectively in creating the mood of
the play, especially withinthe scenes themselves. It changes as the
emotion of the play changes.
"Confidential Clerk" is a well written play that is well worth
seeing because it is such a success from a technical point of view.
-LINDA A. KESLER
Two Italian Casc
Still. Show vffQuality
At the Campus Theatre
"DIVORCE ITALIAN STYLE," the first and the best of the humor-
ously didactic commentaries on the strange ways of "Italian
Style" love and lovers, handles the touchy topic of how to eliminate
an amorous but obnoxious mate when the convenient Americanism
of divorce is out of the question.
The humor and confusion of this situation are furthered by hot
Italian tempers, passions and family pride; Marcello Mastroianni, as
the dissatisfied husband, finds himself torn between the prospect of
putting up with an unbearable wife or risking family ruin by allowing
himself to become cuckolded, thus making the murder of his wife not
only possible but extremely admirable.
"YESTERDAY, Today and Tomorrow" actually consists of three
separate stories, with the leading roles in each played by Academy
Award-winning actress Sophia Loren and Marcello Mastroianni.
In the first story Miss Loren gives a perfectly beautiful character-
ization of a bawdy and boisterous lower-class Neapolitan wife. She
attempts to avoid prosecution for selling black market cigarettes by
making use of an obscure law which states that a pregnant woman
cannot be arrested. So she fights the law in the only way she can--
by remaining continually pregnant over a neriod of several years.

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