vent-i Year EDITED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS Do US. Anti-Guerrilla Tactics ork? Where Opinions Are Free, 420 MAYNARD ST., ANN ARBOR, MIcH. Truth Will Prevail NEws PHONE: 764-0552 Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints. THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1965 NIGHT EDITOR: MICHAEL BADAMO Adlai Stevenson: In Memoriam ADLAI STEVENSON IS DEAD. Deep mourning must be private. But at this moment time must be taken for public mourning, the kind that awakens us, surprised at the number and variety of people for whom Adlai Stevenson meant some- thing important, a friend, a trusted confidante, for some eight years the leader of the Democratic party, but most of all, in this public age, a symbol. For a majority of the people who tonight mourn Adlai Stevenson never shook hands with him, never exchanged a word with him, never saw him themselves, at whatever distance. They mourn a man whose char- acter they had to infer from the newspaper stories-how many thousand of them over the years!-TV news films, the televised 1956 and 1952 con- ventions and campaigns, and inevitably the reams of analysis that sought to make his actions and his personality clear. What did they see, this unseen majority of mourners, whose voices will not be heard publicly? What qualities in the man were they attached to, at the great remove that separated they and he? Only time, perhaps, will tell more clearly. BUT FOR ONE PRIVATE MOURNER, who through happenstance will now have his opinions listened to by a wider circle, it was Adlai Stevenson's concern for the morality of his actions, together with his commitment to political participation that makes it necessary to mourn the man now at his death. Adlai Stevenson had not chosen an easy life. His life if anything had become harder these last years, since becoming permanent United States ambassador to the United Nations. This is not an easy time for moral men to be active in the affairs of great nations, for the suffering must be there. Adlai Stevenson had to defend our Viet Nam and Dominican policies. Even if he felt them to be right-and there is good reason to believe that he did not-he could not help but see the misery and destruction which accom- panied these policies. And from what we can infer of Adlai Stevenson, to see must have been to feel acutely. But as he said in accepting his first presidential normination ". .. from such dread responsibility one does not shrink in fear, in self interest or in false humility." Adlai Stevenson felt he had something to contribute to the United Nations. The news media tell us of his eloquence in the cause of the United States, which we occasionally glimpsed in 30 second TV news re- ports, good relationships with UN delegates from other countries, effective communication with those delegates, a well organized United States delegation to the UN and, hopefully, some communication to others in the U.S. government and the United Nations of the higher purposes of both those political organizations. What he had to contribute was in the final analysis frail enough: the intelligence, sensitivity and true morality of one man. HE STAYED ON, until his death yesterday, in what must be considered an attempt to chart the morality of a public man, a concept honored more often today in the breach, a concept often replaced by power, popular- ity or efficiency, in world politics today. But these, though they may sate the body politic, cannot sustain it, and it was one of Adla Stevenson's contributions to recognize this, and to see what an individual man could do, while holding on to his sense of rightness. His answer, in briefest out- line seems to have been that one must stay involved with politics, where lies the greatest power for good or ill; to the extent that one has power one must use it but only after reflection and with the anguish that reflects the often horrible alternatives; and where one does not have the decisive power to form policies, as was true during his UN tenure one must act so as to make the best of these policies. It is too much to hope that Stevenson's reflections on his years in political life were written down. If they do exist they would be of incalcul- able help in navigating the unknown shoals of political morality. THROUGH HIS ACTIONS and his words, Adlai Stevenson tried to veer the course of world affairs to the side of humanity. May his efforts not have been in vain. -LANE VANDERSLICE EDITOR'S NOTE: Roger Ha- gan is now in radio and televi- sion work on the West Coast, and has been editor of The Cor- respondent, a journal of opin- ion published at Harvard Uni- versity. His article originally appeared in a pamphlet distri- buted by Students for a Demo- cratic Society. By ROGER HAGAN FROM THE PRESENT scope of U.S. counter-insurgency policy it must be obvious that whatever one thinks of it ,it is here to stay in one form or other. It is big, it has accumulated the vested interests of a whole new generation of military men, it is a real response to the problem of Communist and other anti- American expansionism, perhaps the only response we can come up with consistent with the outlook and demands of the American public in the Cold War. It has some good aspects to it, particularly the attempt to turn the military of many small na- tions from parasites linked to the most conservative and feudal in- terests into socially productive and progressive elites, and into train- Ing systems to prepare uneducated men who pass through them for the skills needed in modernization. BUT THERE ARE reasons to question the new momentum of counter-insurgency and the theory on which it rests, and it will be important to understand these reasons while the question still remains fluid. o To begin with ,the program to this point has frequently involved us in propping up regimes which have little local legitimacy, that is, little consensus among the gov- erned that their rulers have any business being their rulers. Thus, while we hardly notice the program and its effects, the picture which much of the world gets of us is of a meddlesome im- perialist nation, fully committed to manipulating and controlling the destinies of other people through a series of puppets whose chief assignment is to protect American interests, either finan- cial or military security needs. The argument that we make, that we care for only fruitful sta- bility, fails to impress them, par- ticularly when we speak at the same time of the danger of al- lowing a hostilehenvironment of American security interests to de- velop; and this is how much of our discussion of Southeast Asia and Latin America is cast. 0 Secondly, the counter-insurg- ency program, like any commit- ment that gets institutions, agen- cies and hierarchies into motion, develops a momentum of its own, De Gaulle May Act In Our Interests By WALTER LIPPMANN T WOULD BE most surprising if the current crisis led to the breakup of the Common Market. Each of the countries concerned has much to lose by a rupture, and none has anything to gain. The occasion out of which the crisis grew was a highly technical and quite manageable financial controversy about payments to agriculture. But contained within this controversy there is a deep issue which involves the shape of the European future. CONCEIVABLY this issue also can in the end be compromised. But as it now appears it poses the question of whether the six continental West European coun- tries shall move toward a con- federation, which could include the whole of Europe, or toward a federation of the six with a cen- tral government, superior to the governments in Paris, Bonn, Rome and so forth. The immediate practical ques- tion is whether the development of the Common Market can for the time being be separated from a decisive move affecting the con- stitutional future of Europe. THE CURRENT CRISIS has been precipitated by the attempt of the Federalists, such as Dr. Hallstein, the president of the Commission of the Common Mar- ket, to graft onto the financing of agriculture a very big decision toward a supranational European government. This means that in four and a half years at the latest the six Western European countries- France, West Germany, Italy, Bel- gium, The Netherlands and Lux-, embourg-are to have a common tariff as against the rest of the world, no customs barriers within the market and to pay farm sub- sidies and export rebates entirely from a common pool. THE FEDERALISTS, who want to create a supranational West European state, have thought that they could move ahead by feeding this common agricultural fund with revenues from the duties on industrial products. These revenues, according to the Federalists' proposal, would go increasingly to the community treasury instead of the member states. The Federalists are proposing to strengthen their power by bring- ing the European parliament into the budget-making process. This is an ingenious device for using the Common Market to bring about a West European fed- eral state. It would be a long, perhaps.. decisive step. Gaullist France is refusing to take that step. That is why there is a crisis. GEN. CHARLES de Gaulle's resistance to the creation of a supranational West European state is widely regarded as a piece of reactionary nationalism which is preventing the rise of a new great state. It is quite true, of course, that Gen. de Gaulle is profoundly op- posed to the reduction of French sovereignty and to any develop- ments in which France would tend to become in Europe some- thing like one of the states in our federal union. But are we in any position to blame him? Would any American President or any American Con- gress be willing today to enter a supranational state? We must not be shocked or surprised that France is as nationalist as the United States under President Johnson. WE SHOULD PAUSE, too, be- fore we pronounce the Gaullist conception of Europe as reaction- ary. If the Federalists prevail and construct a supranational state, it will be extremely difficult for British Parliament, with its world- wide responsibilities, to surrender large elements of its sovereignty to it. Moreover, a federal government in Western Europe with a supra- national bureaucracy would close the door for a long time to the inclusion of Eastern Europe in the Community of Europe. In fact, the underlying issue be- tween de Gaulle and the Federal- ists is between a tight little Europe of the six and a looser greater Europe which would in- clude the whole continent. Can it truly be said that the idea of a greater Europe - which would mean the reunification of Ger- many and a settlement with the Soviet Union-is reactionary ac- cording to American principles or contrary to our real interests? (c) 1965, The Washington Post Co. which can, as it has in Viet Nam, run long past the point of dim- inishing returns. The problem of institutional momentum is the more difficult to handle when it concerns the plan- ning and execution of clandestine and covert operations which suffer few checks from an aroused pub- lic or allied opinion. The carry- over of the Bay of Pigs invasion from the Eisenhower to the Ken- nedy administrations is an ex- ample of such momentum; most observers have by now noted Kennedy's doubts about the af- fair ,and his reluctance to contra- dict, as a new commander-in- chief, the specialists and generals who had planned it. Such momentums are involved whenever billions of dollars and new professional roles are crystal- lized around a new policy. We shall have to consider where these momentums may lead and how they can be kept under con- trol, for they can limit the free- dom of even a strong leader and a public opinion clear on what it wants. s Third, the theory underlying the program is itself questionable in some respects. The idea (which the U.S. is depending on) that de- mocracy follows economic develop- ment is far from certain, for eco- nomic development can take many forms and be carried out under many auspices, by either narrow- ly- or broadly-based power struc- tures. Russia and Spain are exam- ples of left-wing and right-wing authoritarian societies which are developed; in the latter case most notably, it is for the benefit of the few. This element of Prof. Walt W. Rostow's theory of economic growth-which underlies U.S. pol- icies-is now coming under criti- cism by some scholars, as is his central idea - that every indus- trializing country has a crucial and always identifiable "take-off" stage, after which it can grow on its own without outside help. " Fourth, consider what coun- ter-insurgency means: inserting ourselves into the domestic politi- cal life of another society to skew it in one direction. We would hardly want this prin- ciple generalized, for we would not stand for it ourselves. The assumption that to do so is the proper role for American secret bureaucracies can lead, un- der some imaginable American re- gimes, to formidable abuses, if it has not already. * Fifth, how politically realistic is it? This is probably the most important criticism of our theory of counter-insurgency. Does it take account of the political aspira- tions of the people involved? Basically it rests on deterring internal insurgency in an under- developed nation to a halt-that is, to inactivity and acquiescence. But it necessarily does not focus on creating a society which can embrace some part of their dis- sident aspirations so as' to build a minimum common denominator government like our own, or Ja- pan's, or those of Western (and perhaps Eastern) Europe. That is, it does not focus on creating a consensus. In situations where sizable minorities have made a strong commitment to change their society radically, mere deterrence will not be enough; these minorities will simply not cease activity because it has been made costly for them. If they are internal, not totally externally motivated (that is, if they are not serving solely the for- eign policy interests of Russia or China) they will fight all the harder to expel our "foreign" in- trusions into their society. They must also be attracted into a viable future, one different from their own plans, but also different from the past or pres- ent against which they rebel. Counter-insurgency contributes primarily to the negative deter- rent power of a regime, and civic action woos at best the un- committed. It holds out no vision of a desirable future, in grudging acceptance of which the rebels may lay down their arms. 0 Sixth, so far we have tended to take all insurgency as exter- nally motivated. This is a crude mistake, perhaps related to over-. learning the Malaysian model (where British forces crushed ex- ternally-directed rebels in the late 1940's) and we have begun to learn better. But it raises the question of whether the bureaucracies in ques- tion, given the nature of their recruitment and internal ideol- ogies, can always distinguish bas- ically nationalist actions, perhaps supported from the outside by powers naturally interested in re- ducing our strength in an area, from Communist actionsain the interests of a foreign Communist power. Since every change of sympathy in the world becomes an Ameri- can political issue, it is hard to be optimistic about how subtle we will be in deciding with whom to compromise, if we are the sine qua non of political settlement in a country, as we are in Viet Nam. 0 Then, seventh ,there is the their opponents are responsive to pressures short of violence, but very strong elites need not respond to others demands at all. By changing the threshold, we alter the nature of the opposition in an ominous direction. * Eights, there is the converse question of whom we are hurt- ing. Those who suffer the most in Viet Nam are the innocents, ,their homes burned, their so- cities wrecked, their fields pois- oned. " Finally, the new stress on counter-insurgency places decisive power in the hands of a bur- eaucracy almost completely im- mune to congressional and pub- lic scrutiny: and this is the power to do many things-to change the balance of social forces in other societies, to create the image of America that most of the world receives, to give our opponents full pretext to break international law, and to circumscribe the ef- fectiveness of all the other poli- cies and programs we undertake to promote international law and social justice. History will be made by these secret bureaucracies, in ways, and in pursuit of goals, determined with less and less reference to to SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS tanove) defend the outpost of Ba Gia from attack by the Viet Cong. Can military action-almost undiluted by social reforms-ever hope to suppress rebellions in underdeveloped countries? American politics or values, and with almost no sensitivity to mi- nority criticism. BUT THERE would probably be no easy victories for law and rea- son in a plebiscitory foreign poli- cy either. The present system of passing public opinion through several filters and processings where expertise is added will prob- ably be the best we can develop. Not raw opinion, but the proc- ess of argument in the public prints and before organizations and voters, partaken in by offi- cials and critics, professors, com- mittees, and men-in-the-letter columns, or what we might call the "opinion process" is the vital input we worry about. Here takes place whatever ulti- mate definition we have of our iational moralities and goals. SOMEHOW the inhibitions of opinion process must be maintain- ad as a check on the bureaucra- cies which run foreign policy. What America will need in the foreseeable future, then, are cour- ageous muckrakers. Expose will be the crucial function of the next decade, and piety the greatest disservice. T. S. Eliot's 'Clerk'- A Technical Success At Lydia Mendelssohn Theatre LAST NIGHT'S PRODUCTION of T. S. Eliot's "The Confidential Clerk" by the University Players was successful theatre due to the brilliance of both the playwright and the technicians. On the whole the acting was adequate. The play is a result of Eliot's experimentation in mixing elements of wit and serious metaphysics. Although he sacrifices the poetic style for which he is so well known, he creates a dramatic verse form that allows the use of modern colloquialism. His is a realistic play that deals with the problem of sympathy and understanding between people who are unable to communicate with each other. The characters are further frustrated by limitations imposed upon their freedom of choice by what has happened in the past. ON THE SURFACE, the plot is concerned with establishing the true parentage of Colby Simpkins, played by Thomas Manning. His concept of reality, with his insistence on fact, lies between that of his "father," Sir Claude Mulhammer, played by Kenneth Chomont, and his "step-mother," Lady Elizabeth, played by Julia Lacy. Sir Claude, who thinks he is being obedient to fact, is actually deluded for the twenty-five years that he believes Colby is his son. On the other hand, Lady Elizabeth, who judges people by their aura, finally comes to have the clearest concept of reality. BOTH THE SET and the costumes are appropriate and well done. The lighting is used extremely effectively in creating the mood of the play, especially withinthe scenes themselves. It changes as the emotion of the play changes. "Confidential Clerk" is a well written play that is well worth seeing because it is such a success from a technical point of view. -LINDA A. KESLER Two Italian Casc Still. Show vffQuality At the Campus Theatre "DIVORCE ITALIAN STYLE," the first and the best of the humor- ously didactic commentaries on the strange ways of "Italian Style" love and lovers, handles the touchy topic of how to eliminate an amorous but obnoxious mate when the convenient Americanism of divorce is out of the question. The humor and confusion of this situation are furthered by hot Italian tempers, passions and family pride; Marcello Mastroianni, as the dissatisfied husband, finds himself torn between the prospect of putting up with an unbearable wife or risking family ruin by allowing himself to become cuckolded, thus making the murder of his wife not only possible but extremely admirable. "YESTERDAY, Today and Tomorrow" actually consists of three separate stories, with the leading roles in each played by Academy Award-winning actress Sophia Loren and Marcello Mastroianni. In the first story Miss Loren gives a perfectly beautiful character- ization of a bawdy and boisterous lower-class Neapolitan wife. She attempts to avoid prosecution for selling black market cigarettes by making use of an obscure law which states that a pregnant woman cannot be arrested. So she fights the law in the only way she can-- by remaining continually pregnant over a neriod of several years. Second class postage paid at Ann Arbor, Mich. Published daily Tuesday through Saturday morning. FEIFFER %'AEAT . You AY'~ AT ME! ^11 1 in,% At a 1 I i l { i I 1 af, youJ ('M{ SPTA26. QO ~(cQ? ---2 t CiJ STAR 'TOO,13ufty- BU(- e~ 1 M1fJUT6- WAMT WO KEC"P IT UP'? !f" PN5T MAKE' VAP12 AP6 'bQI ' ywp 53 AV\ MSTART( a.AMP i MAT MAID . - wat' Z r HE. I;Vt 0 SUL )KS AKYAN' YOUR ~A ATME. CHICKE bjKAK'UHPIEErN FMS!1 N~OT 0 ~ ~cypFPIGU9. 1 60,G X' AAII4SE 50PE.-fwy-0oAlgST 60 J1,IS IT ? our'TAIe M GTIU' Gtr IC'lJ Cf OW! '1'QD.8L{ QURA9Y TOAE boy? 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