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Algiers May See Communist Rivalry
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Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers
or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints.
ESDAY, JUNE 9, 1965
NIGHT EDITOR: ROBERT MOOREI
Tuition: Why Ignore
Supply and Demand?.
Tuition-setting at the University has long been hampered by the
ideals of free education. Since this benefits the upper middle class
more than any other group, much higher tuition, with more schol-
arships, would be much more democratic, and would also ease
s(mne of the University's numerous financial burdens.
ONE OF THE IDEALS piously proclaim-
ed by many spokesmen for the aca-
dcemic world, including many of the Uni-
versity's top administrators, is that of
free education. At least this is the philo-
sophical base for charging state resi-
dents about $300 per year for tuition
while undergraduates at comparable pri-
vate institutions are paying $1600 to $2,-
000 per year.
In a Daily editorial last January, Ken-
neth Winter exposed the free education
fallacy for what it is a means of easing
the financial load on those who are best
able to bear it. As pressures of applicants
go up and up, the University quite natur-
ally stiffens its admissions policies, be-
coming more and more selective. Selectiv-
ity, however, quickly weeds out, not the
least intelligent (forgive the use of an
undefinable word), but those least pre-
pared for the rigors of the University by
the good (that is, upper middle class)
schooling, social background and up-
bringing that supply needed mental agil-
ity, social awareness, stock of well-honed
learning tools and motivation.
Upper middle class society, in other
words, has run a highly successful end
play around the academics' ivory tower.
For, while the academic liberals fret about
poverty and the restoration of demo-
cratic ideals, the admission standards
call more and more for what the motivat-
* ed, literate and well-heeled upper middle
class, more than any other group, is ready
and able to provide its children.
THERE IS AMPLE PROOF for these
contentions. First, the University's
year-old Economic Opportunity Program,
designed to bring the great benefits of
education here to the underprivileged,
has had considerable trouble in keeping
its participants in school. They just aren't
equipped to handle this place.
Second, the median income of Uni-
versity undergraduates' families is extra-
ordinarily high. Prof. Daniel Suits has
sampled a large number of students in
his Economics 102 lectures in the literary
college, and found their median family
income (according to the students) to be
about $15,000 per year. The figure may be
lower for other schools and colleges, but
probably not by much.
In fact, this is very much an selite in-
stitution in terms of what is offered aca-
demically, and it now happens that what
is offered here is worth plenty of hard,
solid cash (remember that $250,000 in
added lifetime income for the degree-
holder), and, if nothing else, the upper
middle class knows how to handle money.
Mayor Wagner
y, . vs Powell?
N LIGHT of Rep. John Lindsay's daring
fray into the race for mayor of New
York City an interesting question arises
concerning who actually is running the
faltering city Democratic machine.
Rep. Adam Clayton Powell has recent-
y criticized incumbent Mayor Robert
Wagner for a myriad of reasons and pre-
dicted a "summer of discontent" in his
Harlem district if Wagner's administra-
tion does not meet and heed "the elected
leaders of the community" and its clergy-
men.
It could be that Wagner is more fright-
ened of Powell than of Lindsay at this
point. Although Harlem's Negro and Puer-
to Rican votes are by no means the only
critical districts, the image of monolithic
Democratic unity splitting down the col-
or line might be enough to swing many
normally Democratic votes to the official-
ly non-partisan Lindsay group.
WHEREAS POWELL'S actual political
(In all fairness I would have to say
that they apparently recognize the other
values of a university education as well,
for the children they send here are a far
cry from the country club set of just 10
years ago.)
WINTER RECOGNIZED the outlines of
the problem, but failed to follow
through to the most obvious and easiest
solution, that is, make those that come
here pay for what they are getting. They
are falling all over each other in their at-
temp~ts to enter this and similar institu-
tions. Of course, they have been frus-,
trated in getting direct economic cri-
teria used for admission, so instead they
go one step back in the process and make
sure that wJiatever it takes to get in is
supplied, and money and determination
can indeed buy good schools, and high
levels of social and intellectual literacy.
Everybody in fact is benefitting finan-
cially from their determination except
the University, which insists on a free
education for all paid by Lansing out of
the state taxpayer's pocket. And the tax-
payers pay the bill through a regressive
sales tax and through industrial taxes
on the auto industry. And the auto in-
dustry probably sells many more cars
to under- than to over-$10,000 incomes
so that it can pay those taxes and make
money for its over-$25,000 stockholders
and over $12,000 managers to send their
children to college to continue the cycle.
Since the University asks a mere $300
per' year for its services, the happy stu-
dent, well-supplied from home, is able
to equip himself with new cars and make
"broadening" junkets to Europe (on mon-
ey that should go to alleviate the tax
burden, much as congressmen take "fact-
finding" junkets around the world at
taxpayers' expense). In addition he en-
joys luxurious apartments, keeps the area
merchants in clover and generally pro-
vides solid financial bedrock for Wash-
tenaw County, already one of the rich-
est counties in the country.
WHAT IS NEEDED, at a minimum, is to
double in-state tuition and raise out-
state by a third. It's as simple as that. It
was this sort of solution that Winter had
in mind when he advocated progressive
tuition rates, but that proposal merely
fogs the issue, for an increase in schol-
arship aid, paid for out of tuition re-
ceipts as it is now, would enable the
marginal students to get through. And, of
course, it would provide the University
with some much needed money-$1-2 mil-
lion anyway..
This solution, however, is rather mild.
Ideally, tuition for both in-state and out-
of-state undergraduates would be hiked
to match that of the $2000 a year private
schools. Admittedly they aren't state-sup-
ported, but, in fact, Ivy League alumni
support their universities far better than
Lansing does tis one. Yale gets 30 per
cent of its income from gifts and its
alumni fund, and another 30 per cent
from investment income (largely alumni-
financed endowment).
At this level of tuition, the University
could benefit from its elite status, and
idealism would in fact be no more tarn-
ished than now. Scholarships would have
to be increased, of course (more than 50
per cent of Yale's undergraduates are
now on scholarships), but is there any
reason why the rest can't begin to pay
for value received?
ANOTHER PROBLEM that would be
solved is the out-of-state student ra-
tio. At $2000 a year for all students, the
University would acquire enough finan-
cial leverage with respect to Lansing that
it could accept students without regard
to residence and endure whatever Lans-
ing decided to do. (In fact, it has never
been proven that the legislators really
would do anvthing if the ou.t-nf-state
By LEONARD PRATT
MOSCOW THREW its hat in the
ring last Friday by announc-
ing that the Russians will active-
ly seek representation at the As-
ian-African conference to begin in
Algiers April 29. In doing so, the
certainty of a Russian-Chinese
conflict was added to the already
strife-landen agenda for the con-
ference.
Not that there will be many
open debates between nations in
Algiers. Indeed, the "Second
Bandung" conference, named for
its predecessor held in Bandung,
Indonesia in 1955, is expected to
produce little more for public con-
sumption than anti-American vin-
dictives.
The Algiers conference will be
important not so much for what
its participants say as for their
actions towards one another and
whether or not certain key na-
tions are allowed to participate in
the conference.
THIS IS BECAUSE, by almost
all nations concerned, the confer-
ence is regarded not as much as
an opportunity to discuss mutual
policies and problems as it is a
chance 'to establish which nations
currently are playing leading roles
in Asia and Africa.
Each group of mutually sympa-
thetic nations is currently swing-
ing its ideological weight in the
struggle to determine whether its
favorites among the controversial
nations will be allowed to take
part in the conference. The ma-
jor voices in this pre-conference
struggle, scheduled to be aired for-
mally at' a foreign ministers'
meetingafive days before the con-
ference opens, will then determine
the "in-crowd" which will prob-
ably dominate the meeting and
any resulting policy declarations.
One such preliminary skirmish
has already been settled with the
invitation of the Congo to the
conference on the condition that
Congolese Premier Moise Tshombe
will not be allowed to attend. Sev-
eral African nations had tried to
exclude the Leopoldville govern-
ment altogether, and the condi-
tional invitation is evidently a
compromise worked out by sev-
eral North African nations.
JUNE 24's prime ministers'
meeting will settle the attendance
question surrounding two other
nations, Malaysia and Russia. In
doing so, the meeting will deter-
mine future influences on world
events in several significant ways.
Indonesia's President Sukarno
has long vowed to crush the Fed-
eration of Malaysia, which he
views as a neo-colonialist attempt
by the British to maintain their
influence in Southeast Asia.
So naturally he has opposed
Malaysian participation in the
conference on the grounds that it
would be allowing a European in-
fluence into the Asia-Africa meet-
ing.
But more important than this
is the fact that Malaysia's partici-
pation in the conference would be
a de facto recognition of the Ma-
laysian government, and this
would be a great setback to Su-
karno's drive to annex the coun-
try.
SUKARNO RECENTLY asserted
that "a majority of Asia and Af-
rica are of the same opinion as
Indonesia and oppose the parti-
cipation of Malaysia." Facts seem
to refute Sukarno, however, as
they often have a habit of doing.
India and Japan have already
announced their support for Ma-
laysian participation, and the sev-
eral Middle Eastern and African
states that maintain diplomatic
relations with Malaysia seem cer-
tain not to desert her now.
In addition, the Philippines, long
a mediator between Sukarno and
the Malaysians, have also agreed
to aid Malaysia's bid for an invi-
tation.
In many ways, it seems as
though there is little to prevent
Malaysia's participation except
Sukarno's threats; whether or not
this will be enough will be decided
at the foreign ministers' meeting.
If it is not enough, Indonesian
withdrawal from the conference is
not an impossibility.
EITHER WAY, the balance of
power in Southeast Asia is up for
grabs. Malaysia is certainly not
under the British control that Su-
karno would like to believe it is.
But it has received large amounts
of British aid in its attempts to
modernize its economy and repel
Sukarno's troops and its own in-
surgents. This does not make Ma-
laysia a bastion of colonialism, but
it does make it one of the West's
closer allies in the area.
If Sukarno has his way, things
will be little changed; Malaysia
will remain just as controversial as
it always has. But if Sukarno
loses, for whatever reason, the
West's position in Malaysia will
have been given a strong stamp
of approval by many of Africa's
and Asia's most influential na-
tions.
The most crucial issue of all,
however, is whether or not Russia
will be allowed to, participate in
the conference. This issue too is
scheduled to be decided at the
foreign ministers' meeting on June
24.
CHINA, OF COURSE, is fighting
in every way possible to keep the
Russians out of Algiers; the Chi-
nese have fought too hard for
their positions of prominence in
the Communist world and in the
underdeveloped nonaligned world
to want to give a bit of it to the
Russians.
For a while it looked as if the
Russians were going to be shut
out entirely. Things were so bad
that former Premier Nikita S.
Khrushchev decided there was no
use fighting it and so issued a
dignified statement saying that
Russia would not contend for a
seat at the conference.
For months now, the Chinese
have been putting pressure on
their new-found allies in Africa
to convince them of the illegiti-
macy of Russia's claim to be rep-
resented as an Asian nation. Chi-
nese aid investments in Africa
have apparently paid off well, as
most diplomatic sources report
success in their anti-Russian
drive.
RUSSIA'S NEW leadership,
however, has made several im-
pressive attempts to r e v e r s e
Khrushchev's tendencies to ignore
Africa altogether. They seem to
correctly view Chinese advances
on the continent as a threat to
their leadership of many back-
ward nations, and Khrushchev's
ignorance of Africa as one of his
more significant sins.
To counteract Khrushchev's pol-
icies, the new leadership has in-
stituted several "reforms" design-
ed to create influences in the Af-
rican and Asian nations which are
favorable to Russia. The first of
these was the furnishing of Rus-
sian arms to Kenya's Communist-
influenced vice-president, Odinga
Odinga. Failure of this overt aid
move has still not silenced their
Kenyan spokesman.
In addition, Russia has recently
increased its commitments-to the
North Vietnamese. Bombers and
missiles in Hanoi clearly give the
Russians both a claim to influ-
ence there and the desire to pro-
tect their investment.
SUKARNO, in many ways the
key to Southeast Asia, has not
been ignored by the Russians.
Sharaf R. Rashidov, a member of
the Communist party Presidium,
is reportedly in Indonesia now as-
suring Sukarno of Russian aid
against Malaysia.
The culmination of all these
efforts, large in comparison with
Russia's previous moves and even
in comparison with some Chinese
actions, has been to give many
bloc nations pause in their belief
of eventual Chinese supremacy in
the area. It is upon this doubt
that Russia is basing her bid for
a conference seat.
Russia's chances of success are
difficult to be precise about. On
the one hand, China does have
strong allies in the Asia-Africa
bloc. But on the other hand, re-
cent Russian moves have been im-
portant ones. Probably the best
conclusion about the bid's chances
is, that the Russian leadership is
not a foolish one, however inex-
perienced in international affairs
it may be. They would certainly
not be making the attempt to get
a conference seat if they felt that
they did not have some reasonable
chance of success.
THE ALGIERS conference bid
represents a necessary risk for
the Russians. It is necessary in
that they currently are being shut
out of the underdeveloped nations
by a militant China. To recapture
the leadership of the world revo-
lution requires that they "do some-
thing."
But the bid is a very risky
necessity, for this may be too
early a time to do that "some-
thing." The Russians can gain
in Algiers. They can, if they gain
admittance to the conference,
show the smaller nations that they
can be just as militant as China,
and put themselves back on the
road to leadership of the develop-
ing bloc.
But they can also lose very
badly, more than they could ever
hope to gain. For if Russia fails
in her attempt to gain a seat at
Algiers it will serve to greatly re-
move her from the sphere of in-
fluence of the developing nations.
A Russian failure would thus serve
as a very important "vote of no
confidence" from the Asian-Afri-
can world.
SUCH A RUSSIAN tragedy
would be compounded by the fact
that Cuba is almost certain to be
included as an observer at the
conference. A pre-conference "eco-
nomic seminar" was held in Al-
giers in March, with China dom-
inating the proceedings. This
"seminar" came up with the idea
of including some South Ameri-
can countries as observers at the
conference, "in particular . .. Cu-
ba." Recent Algerian spokesmen
have said that it is "almost ac-
cepted" that the recommendations
of the "seminar" would be fol-
lowed.
The invitation to South Ameri-
can nations is certainly a Chinese
attempt to impress them with
China's power and influence. But
if Cuba, nominally a satellite of
Russia, should be invited while
Russia remains excluded, the Chi-
nese can be expected to do some
fast footwork designed to impress
the Cubans with the Russians' im-
potence. If they are able to do
this, a formal Chinese bridgehead
into the Western Hemisphere may
become conceivable.
Algiers is the first formal test
of power by Russia's new leader-
ship. They may not lose it, but if
they do, China's position as leader
of the Afro-Asian nations will. be
immeasurably strengthened.
0
immeasurably strengthened.
TODAY AND TOMORROW:
Differences Within NA TO Manageable
EDITORS NOTE: With this col-
unmn, Walter Lippmann begins his
report on the information and im-
pressions he gathered in his just
completed trip to the capitals of
Western Europe.
By WALTER LIPPMANN
AFTER SOME TIME in London
and Paris during which I talk-
ed with many officials and news-
papermen, I am satisfied that in.
themselves the problems of the
Atlantic Alliance and the West-
ern community are quite manage-
able, given ordinary competence
in foreign affairs.
In this they may differ, in fact
I think they do differ radically,
from our problems in Asia. For
as regards Europe there is no con-
flict of vital interests. There are
no desperate and tragic issues,
none which is insoluble.
About none need it be said that
there is no visible solution. More-
:)ver, and above all, Europe and
America are members of the same
community.
NEVERTHELESS, there are
problems within this Western
community which put a heavy
strain upon our official relations
and some strain, less than one
might have anticipated, on popu-
lar feeling on both sides of the
Atlantic. It is evident that the
center of the strain is between
Paris and Washington, and since
the beginning of 1965 the strain
has aggravated a great deal of the
relation between Charles de Gaulle
and President Johnson.
That is to say, the issues be-
tween Washington and Paris
which have been posed since about
1958 became heavily charged when
President Johnson decided to es-
calate the war in Viet Nam and to
intervene with massive force in
the Dominican Republic.
Until this winter the issues be-
tween France and the United
States were entirely those arising
from the transition out of the
postwar period and from the cold
war with the Soviet Union. The
reason why the issues are primar-
ily focused upon France and the
United States is that among the
larger countries of Western Eu-
rop Gaullist France has most fully
emerged from the war and its aft-
ermath, and is therefore most ful-
ly independent.
BRITAIN, unlike France, is still
entangled in the financial conse-
quences of the world war and with
the unliquidated remnants of her
former empire in the Middle East,
French position on the more con-
crete issues between Paris and
Washington, and this will be the
more agreeable part of what I
have to report.
GOLD. All French authorities
are agreed that the present inter-
national monetary system of the
gold exchange standard is work-
ing badly, is contrary to their
own interests and should be re-
formed and probably will have to
be if a world monetary crisis is to
be avoided.
But on the basis of this agree-
ment there is an important differ-
ence of opinion within the Gaul-
list administration about what pis
to be done to reform the monetary
system.
There are two schools. One is
the official view held by the Treas-
ury and the Bank of France with
Finance Minister Giscard d'Es-
taing as its protagonist. The oth-
er is an unofficial view propound-
ed by M. Jacques Rueff. It has
strong adherents in very high
quarters in the Gaullist adminis-
tration, but it has not, so I was
told, been accepted by Gen. de
Gaulle.
THE UNOFFICIAL Rueff school
proposes to double the price of
gold to about $70 an ounce and to
use the proceeds to pay off the
American and British currency
debts abroad. The official school
would accomplish the same ob-
ject of paying off the dollar and
sterling debts by the creation of a
new international monetary unit
to be managed by the 10 countries
whose currencies are used in world
trade.
Between this official view and
the progressive wing of the Amer-
ican monetary experts there is no
uribridgeable gap. The French sys-
tem could be adapted to achieve
the expansion of liquidity which it,
the goal of American policy.
It would be silly to inflate the
remaining Franco-American dif-
ferences into a melodrama in
which Gen. de Gaulle is trying to
wreck the American dollar.
THE FUTURE OF NATO. NATO
differs from a traditional military
alliance in that there has been
organized a permanent interna-
tional staff and command.
The French view is that this in-
ternational superstructure was
created to deal with the danger-
of a Soviet invasion of Western
Europe and that this danger,
which was real enough in the early
1950's, no longer exists.
It no .longer exists because the
Soviet Union is effectively deter-
red by United States nuclear pow-
er and, second, because since the
death of Stalin the Soviet Union
has become greatly preoccupied
with her own internal problems
and with the problem of China.
THE GAULLISTS believe that
because the NATO structure is
not necessary it does much harm
to keep it going. Gen. de Gaulle
has, to be sure a deep personal
distrust of integrated military
commands, of any relationship
which leaves the soldier in any
doubt as to whether his orders
come from his own countrymen.
But above and beyond this per-
sonal conviction there is a gen-
eral French belief that the time
has come to put an end to the
cold war with the Soviet Union, to
make peace with Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union and solve
the German problem and that
dismantling the NATO structure
is necessary in order to promote
this peace.
What then is to become of the
North Atlantic Treaty if the or-
ganization is disestablished? My
own conclusion, based on much
inquiry, is that the structure need
not be wholly disestablished and
that the real field of the coming
negotiations about NATO will be
how much of a common planning
staff is to be maintained into the
1970s.
GERMANY AND THE SOVIET
UNION. There has been much,
confusion here about whether or
not Gen. de Gaulle is proposing
to exclude the'"United States from
a settlement of the German ques-
tion. Certain of his words have
lent themselves to this interpre-
tation, but in fact that is not the
intention.
The French government has
two different but complementary
things in mind. The first is that
the German question can be set-
tled peaceably only with the con-
sent and cooperation of the na-
tions of Eastern Europe and of
the Soviet Union.
Insofar, therefore, as Western
Germany and the United States
entertain any notion that they
can compel the Soviet bloc to sur-
render East Germany, they are
obstructing the pacification of
Europe. That is what the French
mean by saying, though their
language has been inaccurate and
misleading, that the German ques-
tion is a question for Europeans.
BUT at the same time the
French government is now, though
it was not a few years ago, in
favor of Soviet-American nego-
tiation aimed at improving the
general context of a European
settlement-by the regulation and
reduction of armaments, by agree-
ments of nonaggression, by phased
disengagement and by the increase
of economic and cultural'relations.
If there is any radical difference
here with the fundamentals of
President Johnson's European
policy-to solve the German prob-
lem by building bridges to the
East-I do not know what the
difference is.
But this is not all that needs to
be said. What I have written to-
day is the brighter side of the pic-
ture. The darker side, which I
must reserve for another article,
is that there exists not only in
France and just under the surface
in Britain, but also elsewhere, a
profound crisis of confidence in
the competence of the Johnson
administration as the leader of
the Western Alliance and of the
non-Communist world.
(c)1965.The washington Post Co.
VIETNAMESE CONFLICT:
China, Russia Stymied--Why Not Victory?
EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the
second of two articles on the prob-
lemns of U.S. involvement in Viet
Nam.
By CAL SKINNER, JR.
WHEN THE QUESTION of the
war in Viet Nam comes up,
one of the first questions that
occurs to the observer is "what
aboutiChina?" Indeed, what about
China? Can't you just see 700
million Chinese pouring down into
South Viet Nam?
Herman Kahn, a famous stra-
tegist, physicist and mathemati-
cian, can't.
In a recent interview in U.S.
the fear of Chinese intervention.
He merely discounts the potential
effectiveness of it. "Put yourself
in Peiping for a moment," he says.
"You face the threat of destruc-
tion of much industry, military in-
stallations (and atomic installa-
tions) by bombing, and you are
almost certain to lose the ground
war.
"Don't think of Viet Nam as
being close to China. When it
comes to the practical problems of
fighting a war,. the U.S. is, in
effect,ncloser to Viet Nam than
China is. Yousee, South China
is not Manchuria, where the
to get out from under Chinese
domination, and it was very hard
to do," according to Kahn. "The
moment Ho starts inviting the
Chinese in, he's asking for Chinese
supervision and Chinese domina-
tion. He doesn't want to do it,"
Kahn concludes.
In the-event of a Chinese in-
tervention, a great change would
take place in the complexion of
the war-a change not favorable
to the Communists. No longer
would it be a guerrilla war. Regu-
lar United States units would be-
come increasingly effective against
the enemy and the Viet Cong
would tend to lose whatever sup-
and that of Hanoi. The question
remains of the probability of Rus-
sian intervention.
"We don't find many things the
Russians can do about Viet Narm
that they would want to do," de-
clares Kahn. "The Russians are
cautious, in general," To back up
his point, Kahn notes, "We hardly
hesitate to drop American soldiers
anywhere in the world. Russian
soldiers are in only one place-
Cuba-that is outside their area."
And how can we be sure that
the Russians won't start an atomic
war? Kahn again points out the
inherent cautiousness of Soviet
foreign policy, as well as citing
*