Seventy-Fith Year EDrrED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THEUNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS LOYALTY OF NONALIGNED AT STAKE: Algiers May See Communist Rivalry 9 - ,.:x ere Opinions Are Free, 420 MAYNARD ST., ANN ARBOR, MICH. Truth Will Prevail NEws PHONE: 764-0552 Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints. ESDAY, JUNE 9, 1965 NIGHT EDITOR: ROBERT MOOREI Tuition: Why Ignore Supply and Demand?. Tuition-setting at the University has long been hampered by the ideals of free education. Since this benefits the upper middle class more than any other group, much higher tuition, with more schol- arships, would be much more democratic, and would also ease s(mne of the University's numerous financial burdens. ONE OF THE IDEALS piously proclaim- ed by many spokesmen for the aca- dcemic world, including many of the Uni- versity's top administrators, is that of free education. At least this is the philo- sophical base for charging state resi- dents about $300 per year for tuition while undergraduates at comparable pri- vate institutions are paying $1600 to $2,- 000 per year. In a Daily editorial last January, Ken- neth Winter exposed the free education fallacy for what it is a means of easing the financial load on those who are best able to bear it. As pressures of applicants go up and up, the University quite natur- ally stiffens its admissions policies, be- coming more and more selective. Selectiv- ity, however, quickly weeds out, not the least intelligent (forgive the use of an undefinable word), but those least pre- pared for the rigors of the University by the good (that is, upper middle class) schooling, social background and up- bringing that supply needed mental agil- ity, social awareness, stock of well-honed learning tools and motivation. Upper middle class society, in other words, has run a highly successful end play around the academics' ivory tower. For, while the academic liberals fret about poverty and the restoration of demo- cratic ideals, the admission standards call more and more for what the motivat- * ed, literate and well-heeled upper middle class, more than any other group, is ready and able to provide its children. THERE IS AMPLE PROOF for these contentions. First, the University's year-old Economic Opportunity Program, designed to bring the great benefits of education here to the underprivileged, has had considerable trouble in keeping its participants in school. They just aren't equipped to handle this place. Second, the median income of Uni- versity undergraduates' families is extra- ordinarily high. Prof. Daniel Suits has sampled a large number of students in his Economics 102 lectures in the literary college, and found their median family income (according to the students) to be about $15,000 per year. The figure may be lower for other schools and colleges, but probably not by much. In fact, this is very much an selite in- stitution in terms of what is offered aca- demically, and it now happens that what is offered here is worth plenty of hard, solid cash (remember that $250,000 in added lifetime income for the degree- holder), and, if nothing else, the upper middle class knows how to handle money. Mayor Wagner y, . vs Powell? N LIGHT of Rep. John Lindsay's daring fray into the race for mayor of New York City an interesting question arises concerning who actually is running the faltering city Democratic machine. Rep. Adam Clayton Powell has recent- y criticized incumbent Mayor Robert Wagner for a myriad of reasons and pre- dicted a "summer of discontent" in his Harlem district if Wagner's administra- tion does not meet and heed "the elected leaders of the community" and its clergy- men. It could be that Wagner is more fright- ened of Powell than of Lindsay at this point. Although Harlem's Negro and Puer- to Rican votes are by no means the only critical districts, the image of monolithic Democratic unity splitting down the col- or line might be enough to swing many normally Democratic votes to the official- ly non-partisan Lindsay group. WHEREAS POWELL'S actual political (In all fairness I would have to say that they apparently recognize the other values of a university education as well, for the children they send here are a far cry from the country club set of just 10 years ago.) WINTER RECOGNIZED the outlines of the problem, but failed to follow through to the most obvious and easiest solution, that is, make those that come here pay for what they are getting. They are falling all over each other in their at- temp~ts to enter this and similar institu- tions. Of course, they have been frus-, trated in getting direct economic cri- teria used for admission, so instead they go one step back in the process and make sure that wJiatever it takes to get in is supplied, and money and determination can indeed buy good schools, and high levels of social and intellectual literacy. Everybody in fact is benefitting finan- cially from their determination except the University, which insists on a free education for all paid by Lansing out of the state taxpayer's pocket. And the tax- payers pay the bill through a regressive sales tax and through industrial taxes on the auto industry. And the auto in- dustry probably sells many more cars to under- than to over-$10,000 incomes so that it can pay those taxes and make money for its over-$25,000 stockholders and over $12,000 managers to send their children to college to continue the cycle. Since the University asks a mere $300 per' year for its services, the happy stu- dent, well-supplied from home, is able to equip himself with new cars and make "broadening" junkets to Europe (on mon- ey that should go to alleviate the tax burden, much as congressmen take "fact- finding" junkets around the world at taxpayers' expense). In addition he en- joys luxurious apartments, keeps the area merchants in clover and generally pro- vides solid financial bedrock for Wash- tenaw County, already one of the rich- est counties in the country. WHAT IS NEEDED, at a minimum, is to double in-state tuition and raise out- state by a third. It's as simple as that. It was this sort of solution that Winter had in mind when he advocated progressive tuition rates, but that proposal merely fogs the issue, for an increase in schol- arship aid, paid for out of tuition re- ceipts as it is now, would enable the marginal students to get through. And, of course, it would provide the University with some much needed money-$1-2 mil- lion anyway.. This solution, however, is rather mild. Ideally, tuition for both in-state and out- of-state undergraduates would be hiked to match that of the $2000 a year private schools. Admittedly they aren't state-sup- ported, but, in fact, Ivy League alumni support their universities far better than Lansing does tis one. Yale gets 30 per cent of its income from gifts and its alumni fund, and another 30 per cent from investment income (largely alumni- financed endowment). At this level of tuition, the University could benefit from its elite status, and idealism would in fact be no more tarn- ished than now. Scholarships would have to be increased, of course (more than 50 per cent of Yale's undergraduates are now on scholarships), but is there any reason why the rest can't begin to pay for value received? ANOTHER PROBLEM that would be solved is the out-of-state student ra- tio. At $2000 a year for all students, the University would acquire enough finan- cial leverage with respect to Lansing that it could accept students without regard to residence and endure whatever Lans- ing decided to do. (In fact, it has never been proven that the legislators really would do anvthing if the ou.t-nf-state By LEONARD PRATT MOSCOW THREW its hat in the ring last Friday by announc- ing that the Russians will active- ly seek representation at the As- ian-African conference to begin in Algiers April 29. In doing so, the certainty of a Russian-Chinese conflict was added to the already strife-landen agenda for the con- ference. Not that there will be many open debates between nations in Algiers. Indeed, the "Second Bandung" conference, named for its predecessor held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, is expected to produce little more for public con- sumption than anti-American vin- dictives. The Algiers conference will be important not so much for what its participants say as for their actions towards one another and whether or not certain key na- tions are allowed to participate in the conference. THIS IS BECAUSE, by almost all nations concerned, the confer- ence is regarded not as much as an opportunity to discuss mutual policies and problems as it is a chance 'to establish which nations currently are playing leading roles in Asia and Africa. Each group of mutually sympa- thetic nations is currently swing- ing its ideological weight in the struggle to determine whether its favorites among the controversial nations will be allowed to take part in the conference. The ma- jor voices in this pre-conference struggle, scheduled to be aired for- mally at' a foreign ministers' meetingafive days before the con- ference opens, will then determine the "in-crowd" which will prob- ably dominate the meeting and any resulting policy declarations. One such preliminary skirmish has already been settled with the invitation of the Congo to the conference on the condition that Congolese Premier Moise Tshombe will not be allowed to attend. Sev- eral African nations had tried to exclude the Leopoldville govern- ment altogether, and the condi- tional invitation is evidently a compromise worked out by sev- eral North African nations. JUNE 24's prime ministers' meeting will settle the attendance question surrounding two other nations, Malaysia and Russia. In doing so, the meeting will deter- mine future influences on world events in several significant ways. Indonesia's President Sukarno has long vowed to crush the Fed- eration of Malaysia, which he views as a neo-colonialist attempt by the British to maintain their influence in Southeast Asia. So naturally he has opposed Malaysian participation in the conference on the grounds that it would be allowing a European in- fluence into the Asia-Africa meet- ing. But more important than this is the fact that Malaysia's partici- pation in the conference would be a de facto recognition of the Ma- laysian government, and this would be a great setback to Su- karno's drive to annex the coun- try. SUKARNO RECENTLY asserted that "a majority of Asia and Af- rica are of the same opinion as Indonesia and oppose the parti- cipation of Malaysia." Facts seem to refute Sukarno, however, as they often have a habit of doing. India and Japan have already announced their support for Ma- laysian participation, and the sev- eral Middle Eastern and African states that maintain diplomatic relations with Malaysia seem cer- tain not to desert her now. In addition, the Philippines, long a mediator between Sukarno and the Malaysians, have also agreed to aid Malaysia's bid for an invi- tation. In many ways, it seems as though there is little to prevent Malaysia's participation except Sukarno's threats; whether or not this will be enough will be decided at the foreign ministers' meeting. If it is not enough, Indonesian withdrawal from the conference is not an impossibility. EITHER WAY, the balance of power in Southeast Asia is up for grabs. Malaysia is certainly not under the British control that Su- karno would like to believe it is. But it has received large amounts of British aid in its attempts to modernize its economy and repel Sukarno's troops and its own in- surgents. This does not make Ma- laysia a bastion of colonialism, but it does make it one of the West's closer allies in the area. If Sukarno has his way, things will be little changed; Malaysia will remain just as controversial as it always has. But if Sukarno loses, for whatever reason, the West's position in Malaysia will have been given a strong stamp of approval by many of Africa's and Asia's most influential na- tions. The most crucial issue of all, however, is whether or not Russia will be allowed to, participate in the conference. This issue too is scheduled to be decided at the foreign ministers' meeting on June 24. CHINA, OF COURSE, is fighting in every way possible to keep the Russians out of Algiers; the Chi- nese have fought too hard for their positions of prominence in the Communist world and in the underdeveloped nonaligned world to want to give a bit of it to the Russians. For a while it looked as if the Russians were going to be shut out entirely. Things were so bad that former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev decided there was no use fighting it and so issued a dignified statement saying that Russia would not contend for a seat at the conference. For months now, the Chinese have been putting pressure on their new-found allies in Africa to convince them of the illegiti- macy of Russia's claim to be rep- resented as an Asian nation. Chi- nese aid investments in Africa have apparently paid off well, as most diplomatic sources report success in their anti-Russian drive. RUSSIA'S NEW leadership, however, has made several im- pressive attempts to r e v e r s e Khrushchev's tendencies to ignore Africa altogether. They seem to correctly view Chinese advances on the continent as a threat to their leadership of many back- ward nations, and Khrushchev's ignorance of Africa as one of his more significant sins. To counteract Khrushchev's pol- icies, the new leadership has in- stituted several "reforms" design- ed to create influences in the Af- rican and Asian nations which are favorable to Russia. The first of these was the furnishing of Rus- sian arms to Kenya's Communist- influenced vice-president, Odinga Odinga. Failure of this overt aid move has still not silenced their Kenyan spokesman. In addition, Russia has recently increased its commitments-to the North Vietnamese. Bombers and missiles in Hanoi clearly give the Russians both a claim to influ- ence there and the desire to pro- tect their investment. SUKARNO, in many ways the key to Southeast Asia, has not been ignored by the Russians. Sharaf R. Rashidov, a member of the Communist party Presidium, is reportedly in Indonesia now as- suring Sukarno of Russian aid against Malaysia. The culmination of all these efforts, large in comparison with Russia's previous moves and even in comparison with some Chinese actions, has been to give many bloc nations pause in their belief of eventual Chinese supremacy in the area. It is upon this doubt that Russia is basing her bid for a conference seat. Russia's chances of success are difficult to be precise about. On the one hand, China does have strong allies in the Asia-Africa bloc. But on the other hand, re- cent Russian moves have been im- portant ones. Probably the best conclusion about the bid's chances is, that the Russian leadership is not a foolish one, however inex- perienced in international affairs it may be. They would certainly not be making the attempt to get a conference seat if they felt that they did not have some reasonable chance of success. THE ALGIERS conference bid represents a necessary risk for the Russians. It is necessary in that they currently are being shut out of the underdeveloped nations by a militant China. To recapture the leadership of the world revo- lution requires that they "do some- thing." But the bid is a very risky necessity, for this may be too early a time to do that "some- thing." The Russians can gain in Algiers. They can, if they gain admittance to the conference, show the smaller nations that they can be just as militant as China, and put themselves back on the road to leadership of the develop- ing bloc. But they can also lose very badly, more than they could ever hope to gain. For if Russia fails in her attempt to gain a seat at Algiers it will serve to greatly re- move her from the sphere of in- fluence of the developing nations. A Russian failure would thus serve as a very important "vote of no confidence" from the Asian-Afri- can world. SUCH A RUSSIAN tragedy would be compounded by the fact that Cuba is almost certain to be included as an observer at the conference. A pre-conference "eco- nomic seminar" was held in Al- giers in March, with China dom- inating the proceedings. This "seminar" came up with the idea of including some South Ameri- can countries as observers at the conference, "in particular . .. Cu- ba." Recent Algerian spokesmen have said that it is "almost ac- cepted" that the recommendations of the "seminar" would be fol- lowed. The invitation to South Ameri- can nations is certainly a Chinese attempt to impress them with China's power and influence. But if Cuba, nominally a satellite of Russia, should be invited while Russia remains excluded, the Chi- nese can be expected to do some fast footwork designed to impress the Cubans with the Russians' im- potence. If they are able to do this, a formal Chinese bridgehead into the Western Hemisphere may become conceivable. Algiers is the first formal test of power by Russia's new leader- ship. They may not lose it, but if they do, China's position as leader of the Afro-Asian nations will. be immeasurably strengthened. 0 immeasurably strengthened. TODAY AND TOMORROW: Differences Within NA TO Manageable EDITORS NOTE: With this col- unmn, Walter Lippmann begins his report on the information and im- pressions he gathered in his just completed trip to the capitals of Western Europe. By WALTER LIPPMANN AFTER SOME TIME in London and Paris during which I talk- ed with many officials and news- papermen, I am satisfied that in. themselves the problems of the Atlantic Alliance and the West- ern community are quite manage- able, given ordinary competence in foreign affairs. In this they may differ, in fact I think they do differ radically, from our problems in Asia. For as regards Europe there is no con- flict of vital interests. There are no desperate and tragic issues, none which is insoluble. About none need it be said that there is no visible solution. More- :)ver, and above all, Europe and America are members of the same community. NEVERTHELESS, there are problems within this Western community which put a heavy strain upon our official relations and some strain, less than one might have anticipated, on popu- lar feeling on both sides of the Atlantic. It is evident that the center of the strain is between Paris and Washington, and since the beginning of 1965 the strain has aggravated a great deal of the relation between Charles de Gaulle and President Johnson. That is to say, the issues be- tween Washington and Paris which have been posed since about 1958 became heavily charged when President Johnson decided to es- calate the war in Viet Nam and to intervene with massive force in the Dominican Republic. Until this winter the issues be- tween France and the United States were entirely those arising from the transition out of the postwar period and from the cold war with the Soviet Union. The reason why the issues are primar- ily focused upon France and the United States is that among the larger countries of Western Eu- rop Gaullist France has most fully emerged from the war and its aft- ermath, and is therefore most ful- ly independent. BRITAIN, unlike France, is still entangled in the financial conse- quences of the world war and with the unliquidated remnants of her former empire in the Middle East, French position on the more con- crete issues between Paris and Washington, and this will be the more agreeable part of what I have to report. GOLD. All French authorities are agreed that the present inter- national monetary system of the gold exchange standard is work- ing badly, is contrary to their own interests and should be re- formed and probably will have to be if a world monetary crisis is to be avoided. But on the basis of this agree- ment there is an important differ- ence of opinion within the Gaul- list administration about what pis to be done to reform the monetary system. There are two schools. One is the official view held by the Treas- ury and the Bank of France with Finance Minister Giscard d'Es- taing as its protagonist. The oth- er is an unofficial view propound- ed by M. Jacques Rueff. It has strong adherents in very high quarters in the Gaullist adminis- tration, but it has not, so I was told, been accepted by Gen. de Gaulle. THE UNOFFICIAL Rueff school proposes to double the price of gold to about $70 an ounce and to use the proceeds to pay off the American and British currency debts abroad. The official school would accomplish the same ob- ject of paying off the dollar and sterling debts by the creation of a new international monetary unit to be managed by the 10 countries whose currencies are used in world trade. Between this official view and the progressive wing of the Amer- ican monetary experts there is no uribridgeable gap. The French sys- tem could be adapted to achieve the expansion of liquidity which it, the goal of American policy. It would be silly to inflate the remaining Franco-American dif- ferences into a melodrama in which Gen. de Gaulle is trying to wreck the American dollar. THE FUTURE OF NATO. NATO differs from a traditional military alliance in that there has been organized a permanent interna- tional staff and command. The French view is that this in- ternational superstructure was created to deal with the danger- of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and that this danger, which was real enough in the early 1950's, no longer exists. It no .longer exists because the Soviet Union is effectively deter- red by United States nuclear pow- er and, second, because since the death of Stalin the Soviet Union has become greatly preoccupied with her own internal problems and with the problem of China. THE GAULLISTS believe that because the NATO structure is not necessary it does much harm to keep it going. Gen. de Gaulle has, to be sure a deep personal distrust of integrated military commands, of any relationship which leaves the soldier in any doubt as to whether his orders come from his own countrymen. But above and beyond this per- sonal conviction there is a gen- eral French belief that the time has come to put an end to the cold war with the Soviet Union, to make peace with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and solve the German problem and that dismantling the NATO structure is necessary in order to promote this peace. What then is to become of the North Atlantic Treaty if the or- ganization is disestablished? My own conclusion, based on much inquiry, is that the structure need not be wholly disestablished and that the real field of the coming negotiations about NATO will be how much of a common planning staff is to be maintained into the 1970s. GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION. There has been much, confusion here about whether or not Gen. de Gaulle is proposing to exclude the'"United States from a settlement of the German ques- tion. Certain of his words have lent themselves to this interpre- tation, but in fact that is not the intention. The French government has two different but complementary things in mind. The first is that the German question can be set- tled peaceably only with the con- sent and cooperation of the na- tions of Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union. Insofar, therefore, as Western Germany and the United States entertain any notion that they can compel the Soviet bloc to sur- render East Germany, they are obstructing the pacification of Europe. That is what the French mean by saying, though their language has been inaccurate and misleading, that the German ques- tion is a question for Europeans. BUT at the same time the French government is now, though it was not a few years ago, in favor of Soviet-American nego- tiation aimed at improving the general context of a European settlement-by the regulation and reduction of armaments, by agree- ments of nonaggression, by phased disengagement and by the increase of economic and cultural'relations. If there is any radical difference here with the fundamentals of President Johnson's European policy-to solve the German prob- lem by building bridges to the East-I do not know what the difference is. But this is not all that needs to be said. What I have written to- day is the brighter side of the pic- ture. The darker side, which I must reserve for another article, is that there exists not only in France and just under the surface in Britain, but also elsewhere, a profound crisis of confidence in the competence of the Johnson administration as the leader of the Western Alliance and of the non-Communist world. (c)1965.The washington Post Co. VIETNAMESE CONFLICT: China, Russia Stymied--Why Not Victory? EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the second of two articles on the prob- lemns of U.S. involvement in Viet Nam. By CAL SKINNER, JR. WHEN THE QUESTION of the war in Viet Nam comes up, one of the first questions that occurs to the observer is "what aboutiChina?" Indeed, what about China? Can't you just see 700 million Chinese pouring down into South Viet Nam? Herman Kahn, a famous stra- tegist, physicist and mathemati- cian, can't. In a recent interview in U.S. the fear of Chinese intervention. He merely discounts the potential effectiveness of it. "Put yourself in Peiping for a moment," he says. "You face the threat of destruc- tion of much industry, military in- stallations (and atomic installa- tions) by bombing, and you are almost certain to lose the ground war. "Don't think of Viet Nam as being close to China. When it comes to the practical problems of fighting a war,. the U.S. is, in effect,ncloser to Viet Nam than China is. Yousee, South China is not Manchuria, where the to get out from under Chinese domination, and it was very hard to do," according to Kahn. "The moment Ho starts inviting the Chinese in, he's asking for Chinese supervision and Chinese domina- tion. He doesn't want to do it," Kahn concludes. In the-event of a Chinese in- tervention, a great change would take place in the complexion of the war-a change not favorable to the Communists. No longer would it be a guerrilla war. Regu- lar United States units would be- come increasingly effective against the enemy and the Viet Cong would tend to lose whatever sup- and that of Hanoi. The question remains of the probability of Rus- sian intervention. "We don't find many things the Russians can do about Viet Narm that they would want to do," de- clares Kahn. "The Russians are cautious, in general," To back up his point, Kahn notes, "We hardly hesitate to drop American soldiers anywhere in the world. Russian soldiers are in only one place- Cuba-that is outside their area." And how can we be sure that the Russians won't start an atomic war? Kahn again points out the inherent cautiousness of Soviet foreign policy, as well as citing *