Seventy-Third Year
EDITED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS
"Where Opinionz Are Free STUDENT PUBLICATIONS BL.DG., ANN ARBOR, MICH.,
Editorials printed in T he Michigan Daily ex press the individual opinions of staff writers
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 30, 1965 NIGHT EDITOR: BRUCE WASSERSTEIN
ONLY SOLUTION TO DISPUTE:
Arabs, Israel Must Face Realities
By SHREESH JUYAL
EVER SINCE the creation of the
state of Israel in 1948, the
Palestine problem has continued
to develop in new dimensions.
Perhaps only few sessions of the
United Nations have escaped dis-
cussion of this grave issue and
yet, so far, there has not been
evolved any formula which could
be acceptable for a solution.
The most recent proposal for
settling the long standing Arab-
Israeli dispute came from an Arab
chief of state, President Habib
Bourguiba of Tunisia.
The proposal called for direct
negotiations between the Arabs
and Israelis on the issue on the
basis of the United Nations reso-
lution of 1947 which provided the
partition of Palestine.
ACCORDING to the partition
plan, Israel would cede one-third
of its territory to a Palestine Arab
nation. The partition plan had
earmarkedthe land to be released
by Israel.
But Israel conquered it in the
war with Arabs before becoming
a state in 1948.
Bourguiba's proposal also stip-
ulated that Israel allow the re-
turn of all Palestinians who were
compelled to flee their country
during the war.
WHILE presenting his views,
the Tunisian president was criti-
cal of the Arab policy toward Is-
rael and termed it inefficient. He
said he would be prepared to sub-
mit this proposal before the Arab
summit if it were acceptable to
Israel.
He added that he believed the
Israeli acceptance of his plan
would go further in bringing about
reconciliation in the Arab-Israeli
relations.
Significantly, Bourguiba's pro-
posal was the first initiative for
reconciliation by an Arab states-
man since 1948. His proposal is
realistic. His plan is an expression
of realization of the fact that the
state of Israel does exist and that
it ought to be accepted.
He also conceives that there is
possibility of both Israeli and
Arab communities living side by
side in coexistence with peace and
cooperation.
UNFORTUNATELY, his plan
was welcomed by disapproval of
both Israel and Arab nations. Is-
rael rejected the proosals of
President Bourguiba and her for-
eign minister called the UN parti-
tion "a broken egg of 18 years
ago," however asserting that the
terms were "important" and that
"our reaction must be prudent and
measured."
Earlier, the Israeli Foreign Min-
ister Golda Meir proposed that
Prrgident Bourguiba should visit
Israel to negotiate the dispute.
Israel was perhaps sihcere in
her invitation but failed to assess
the embarrassment her proposal
would have caused to President
Bourguiba at this stage. Bourgui-
ba, reacting to the invitation, said,
"Only (Arab) Palestine people
themselves are qualifiedto nego-
tiate on their fate, and I am not."
ARAB NATIONS are more or
less profoundly opposed to the
existence of Israel. With the pass-
age of time, their opposition is
undoubtedly adding new magni-
tudes of strength and determina-
tion.
Israel-an hostile entity in their
own land, as they see it, is the
result of that imperialist colonial
occupancy of the British and
French in connivance with the
United States and other Western
powers which the Balfour Dec-
laration of 1921 set forth to feed
perpetually Western interests in
the Middle East and to keep Arabs
divided and weakened. This policy
channeled an incessant influx of
what the Arabs call foreign ag-
gressors onto Arab soil and oust-
ed forcefully its real owners from
their homes and land and thus
occupied the land of Palestine.
WITH THIS background, the
reaction of other Arab states to
Bourguiba's proposals can be well
understood.
A resolution of the UAR Nation-
al Assembly condemned the Tuni-
sian president for "violating the
unanimity of millions of Arabs .. .
and abrogating his signature on
resolution of the first Arab sum-
mit meeting," which had called
for united Arab action against Is-
rael.
A resolution of the Arab League
repudiated Bourguiba by rejecting
any call for recognition, recon-
ciliation or coexistence with Is-
rael." Earlier, anti-Tunisian and
anti - Bourguiba , demonstrations
swept the streets of Cairo, Da-
mascus and Baghdad.
ANY SOLUTION of the Middle
East problem must stipulate rec-
ognition of realities by Israelis
as well as Arabs. However, the
future course of any reconciliation
will primarily depend upon what
attitude is adopted by the West-
ern powers, who have been main
I
Nasser (right) has led the Arabs in recent years against Israel ..
suppliers of arms to Israel in or-
der to maintain what they term
as the equilibrium of power in
that region.
Their attitude maintains that
the existence of Israel is a fact
that must be accepted. They seek,
close and friendly relations with
the Arabs as well as Israelis.
They believe that this status
quo must be maintained and do
not favor an offensive from either
side, although they are prepared
to mediate in the Arab-Israeli dis-
pute whenever the opportunity
occurs.
THE EXISTENCE of Israel as
a fact is a reality which must
be accepted by Arabs.
On the other hand, if the West
and Israel also accept the reality,
they must recognize the just right
of ;120,000 Palestinian refugees to
seek freedom for employment and
return to their homeland and
residence.
The status quo as maintained
cannot last long for it will not
be possible for the West to afford
it for just three million Israelis
against the wishes of one hundred
million Arabs, 'who are now con-
fidently evolving new ideology
and institutions and becoming
conscious of their ancient heri-
tage.
THE MISERABLE plight of over
a million Palestinian refugees in
Gaza Strip and Jordan and in
other parts of Arab countries
cannot remain confined in those
areas for long.
Israel will feel compelled to
either change its rigid attitude
and allow their return to their
former homes or face the adver-
sities of circumstances which with
their future indications do not
seem favorable to the present form
of the Israeli state.
A view similar to this was ex-
pressed by former British Min-
ister Anthony Nuttirig in the sem-
inar on Palestine held in Cairo
last April. "Israel canotcontinue
to exist in the present form and
the Palestinian Arabs should re-
gain their lost rights ink a not too
distant future."
Both the GI and the rebel (above) lose in this war.
4
The next logical step would be a land
invasion of North Viet Nam. Already
American military leaders are talking
seriously of securing a section of terri-
tory just south of the 17th parallel near
the sea for the express purpose of con-
struction of hardened artillery sites for
the bombardment of North Viet Nam.
IN THE CASE of ivasion of North Viet
Nam, it would be totally unreasonable
to think that China would remain silent.
At present there are no Chinese sol-
diers in either North or South Viet Name
Thiswould definitely not be so in the
event of a U.S. invasion.
It would be highly unlikely that the
U.S. would use nuclear weapons in such
JUDITH WARREN:.......................Co-Editor
ROBERT RiPPLER.....................Co-Editor
EDWARD HERSTEIN................ Sports Editor
JUDITH FIELDS. ............... Business Manager
JEFFREY LEEDS............. Supplement Manager
NIGHT EDITORS: Michael Badamo, John Meredith,
Robert Moore, Barbara Seyfried, Bruce Wasserstein.
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WERE UNITED STATES and Chinese
forces to face each other, somewhere
in North Viet Nam, the Chinese would en-
counter a well-equipped, mobile, .and
largely untried American army of rela-
tively small size.
The U.S. on the other hand, would see
a huge Chinese army, underfed, ill-equip-
ped, and positively assured that the se-
curity of their own country was threat-
ened by the American imperialists.
Viet Nam would become a waste land
strewn with the bodies of Americans
and Chinese in addition to the multitude
of innocent Vietnamese peasants caught
in the middle of the international chess
game.
ULTIMATELY, a Korean type of rush
to the conference table would result.
There would be weeks of haggling over
truce lines and terms. And like Korea,
Viet Nam would be, strangely enough,
divided at some convenient and arbitrary
place-like the 17th parallel. The stale-
mate would begin all over again.
A little good might come out of the
whole thing, though. For at least a while
the pressure might be taken off the Viet-
namese peasant, allowing him to get in
at least one crop without being attacked
by somebody.
-MICHAEL BADAMQ
.. . and both sides in the dispute have trained troops (above-Arab girl paratroopers.
TODAY AND TOMORROW:
U.S. Should Let Hanoi, Saigon gNegotiate
By WALTER LIPPMANN
LN A RECENT press conference,
President Johnson quoted some
secret reports he had received
from a foreigner who had made
contact with a high official in
Hanoi. The President meant to
convince our people that he had
tried and failed to "get them (the
North Vietnamese) to talk to us."
The first secret report was on
Feb. 15, very shortly after our
bombing offensive had begun. The
second report was on June 7, when
the bombing policy had been in
operation for four months.
The substance of both reports
was the same. Neither the threat
of the bombing nor the results
of the bombing had induced Hanoi
to take an interest in negotiating
peace with the United States.
THERE IS NO DOUBT that the
President is correctly informed.
Hanoi will not negotiate with
Washington because it is convinc-
ed that Saigon has lost the war
and that we cannot reverse the
results.
In Paris a few weeks ago I talked
with a number of specialists on
Southeast Asia, both French and
Vietnamese. I asked them what
would happen if the President or-
dered the bombing of Hanoi and
Haiphong and invaded with a very
large army.
.. .
FIFFER
It would only make more cer-
tain, they said, the ultimate dom-
ination of Viet Nam by China.
For the result of all our bomb-
ing in the North and of all our
fighting in the South would be to
wreck and ruin the whole of Viet
Nam to a point where the Viet-
namese themselves would be quite
unable to reconstruct their econ-
omy.
They would have to turn to
China. For the United States
would find no government which
it could support, and amidst the
devastation only an oriental dic-
tatorship would be able to deal
with the chaos and the misery.
I HAVE LEARNED over the
years to have great respect for
the judgment of these men with
whom I talked. They have the ad-
vantage not only of the long
French experience in Indo-China,
but also of their contacts, through
the large Vietnamese colony in
Paris, with Hanoi and even with
the Viet Cong.
They are prophesying now that
while U.S. military power can
destroy the political and economic
structure of Viet Nam, it cannot
transform the defeated Saigonese
into victors.
The more the devastation, the
more certainly will China be the
ultimate winner.
DOES THIS MEAN that the
time has passed, owing to the ir-
reparable losses in South Viet
Nam, when the President can hope
to induce Hanoi to negotiate with
him?
If he means with him, I am
afraid there is no doubt it means
lus- that-
This is an exceedingly shrewd
political maneuver. For if the
President continues his present
policy, which is to commit an in-
creasingly large ground army in
order to produce a stalemate, he
will be accused of wasting Ameri-
can lives for no real purpose.
Messrs. Laird and Ford, on the
other hand, will go to the country
saying that if- the President had
only dared to bomb Hanoi and
Haiphong the United States would
have had a victory without casual-
ties on the ground. It would not
be true, because all experience goes
to show that wars cannot be won
by bbmbing alone. But it would be
effective demamogy.
THE PRESIDENT is int a squeeze
because his limited policy has
failed and an unlimited policy
would incur greater risks of great
war than he has a right to take.
The moment of truth is draw-
ing near, a moment when he will
have to ask himself whether, since
he cannot negotiate with Hanoi,
someone else can.
In the months to come he will
have to consider whether the only
course still open to him is to en-
courage the Vietnamese - Hanoi,
Saigon, Viet Cong--to negotiate
with each other.
IF THEY COULD work out a
deal among themselves, it would
no doubt mean that our influence
in Viet Nam had sunk to a very
low point, except as we recovered
some of it in assisting the recon-
struction of the country.
But there may be some conso-
lation in the fact that a Vietna-
mese solution made by the Viet-
namese might lay the foundations
of an independent Viet Nam, inde-
pendent of the United States to
be sure, and, in some measure, in-
dependent also of China.
Copyright, 1965, Los AngelesTimes
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