Seventy-Third Year EDITED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS "Where Opinionz Are Free STUDENT PUBLICATIONS BL.DG., ANN ARBOR, MICH., Editorials printed in T he Michigan Daily ex press the individual opinions of staff writers or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints. WEDNESDAY, JUNE 30, 1965 NIGHT EDITOR: BRUCE WASSERSTEIN ONLY SOLUTION TO DISPUTE: Arabs, Israel Must Face Realities By SHREESH JUYAL EVER SINCE the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the Palestine problem has continued to develop in new dimensions. Perhaps only few sessions of the United Nations have escaped dis- cussion of this grave issue and yet, so far, there has not been evolved any formula which could be acceptable for a solution. The most recent proposal for settling the long standing Arab- Israeli dispute came from an Arab chief of state, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. The proposal called for direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis on the issue on the basis of the United Nations reso- lution of 1947 which provided the partition of Palestine. ACCORDING to the partition plan, Israel would cede one-third of its territory to a Palestine Arab nation. The partition plan had earmarkedthe land to be released by Israel. But Israel conquered it in the war with Arabs before becoming a state in 1948. Bourguiba's proposal also stip- ulated that Israel allow the re- turn of all Palestinians who were compelled to flee their country during the war. WHILE presenting his views, the Tunisian president was criti- cal of the Arab policy toward Is- rael and termed it inefficient. He said he would be prepared to sub- mit this proposal before the Arab summit if it were acceptable to Israel. He added that he believed the Israeli acceptance of his plan would go further in bringing about reconciliation in the Arab-Israeli relations. Significantly, Bourguiba's pro- posal was the first initiative for reconciliation by an Arab states- man since 1948. His proposal is realistic. His plan is an expression of realization of the fact that the state of Israel does exist and that it ought to be accepted. He also conceives that there is possibility of both Israeli and Arab communities living side by side in coexistence with peace and cooperation. UNFORTUNATELY, his plan was welcomed by disapproval of both Israel and Arab nations. Is- rael rejected the proosals of President Bourguiba and her for- eign minister called the UN parti- tion "a broken egg of 18 years ago," however asserting that the terms were "important" and that "our reaction must be prudent and measured." Earlier, the Israeli Foreign Min- ister Golda Meir proposed that Prrgident Bourguiba should visit Israel to negotiate the dispute. Israel was perhaps sihcere in her invitation but failed to assess the embarrassment her proposal would have caused to President Bourguiba at this stage. Bourgui- ba, reacting to the invitation, said, "Only (Arab) Palestine people themselves are qualifiedto nego- tiate on their fate, and I am not." ARAB NATIONS are more or less profoundly opposed to the existence of Israel. With the pass- age of time, their opposition is undoubtedly adding new magni- tudes of strength and determina- tion. Israel-an hostile entity in their own land, as they see it, is the result of that imperialist colonial occupancy of the British and French in connivance with the United States and other Western powers which the Balfour Dec- laration of 1921 set forth to feed perpetually Western interests in the Middle East and to keep Arabs divided and weakened. This policy channeled an incessant influx of what the Arabs call foreign ag- gressors onto Arab soil and oust- ed forcefully its real owners from their homes and land and thus occupied the land of Palestine. WITH THIS background, the reaction of other Arab states to Bourguiba's proposals can be well understood. A resolution of the UAR Nation- al Assembly condemned the Tuni- sian president for "violating the unanimity of millions of Arabs .. . and abrogating his signature on resolution of the first Arab sum- mit meeting," which had called for united Arab action against Is- rael. A resolution of the Arab League repudiated Bourguiba by rejecting any call for recognition, recon- ciliation or coexistence with Is- rael." Earlier, anti-Tunisian and anti - Bourguiba , demonstrations swept the streets of Cairo, Da- mascus and Baghdad. ANY SOLUTION of the Middle East problem must stipulate rec- ognition of realities by Israelis as well as Arabs. However, the future course of any reconciliation will primarily depend upon what attitude is adopted by the West- ern powers, who have been main I Nasser (right) has led the Arabs in recent years against Israel .. suppliers of arms to Israel in or- der to maintain what they term as the equilibrium of power in that region. Their attitude maintains that the existence of Israel is a fact that must be accepted. They seek, close and friendly relations with the Arabs as well as Israelis. They believe that this status quo must be maintained and do not favor an offensive from either side, although they are prepared to mediate in the Arab-Israeli dis- pute whenever the opportunity occurs. THE EXISTENCE of Israel as a fact is a reality which must be accepted by Arabs. On the other hand, if the West and Israel also accept the reality, they must recognize the just right of ;120,000 Palestinian refugees to seek freedom for employment and return to their homeland and residence. The status quo as maintained cannot last long for it will not be possible for the West to afford it for just three million Israelis against the wishes of one hundred million Arabs, 'who are now con- fidently evolving new ideology and institutions and becoming conscious of their ancient heri- tage. THE MISERABLE plight of over a million Palestinian refugees in Gaza Strip and Jordan and in other parts of Arab countries cannot remain confined in those areas for long. Israel will feel compelled to either change its rigid attitude and allow their return to their former homes or face the adver- sities of circumstances which with their future indications do not seem favorable to the present form of the Israeli state. A view similar to this was ex- pressed by former British Min- ister Anthony Nuttirig in the sem- inar on Palestine held in Cairo last April. "Israel canotcontinue to exist in the present form and the Palestinian Arabs should re- gain their lost rights ink a not too distant future." Both the GI and the rebel (above) lose in this war. 4 The next logical step would be a land invasion of North Viet Nam. Already American military leaders are talking seriously of securing a section of terri- tory just south of the 17th parallel near the sea for the express purpose of con- struction of hardened artillery sites for the bombardment of North Viet Nam. IN THE CASE of ivasion of North Viet Nam, it would be totally unreasonable to think that China would remain silent. At present there are no Chinese sol- diers in either North or South Viet Name Thiswould definitely not be so in the event of a U.S. invasion. It would be highly unlikely that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in such JUDITH WARREN:.......................Co-Editor ROBERT RiPPLER.....................Co-Editor EDWARD HERSTEIN................ Sports Editor JUDITH FIELDS. ............... Business Manager JEFFREY LEEDS............. Supplement Manager NIGHT EDITORS: Michael Badamo, John Meredith, Robert Moore, Barbara Seyfried, Bruce Wasserstein. The Daily is a member of the Associated Press and Collegiate Press Service. The Associated Press is exclusively entitled to the use of all news dispatches credited to it or otherwise credited to the newspaper. All rights of re-publication of all oth r matters here are also reserved. Subscription rates: $4 for lIA and B ($4.50 by mall); $2 for IA or B ($2.50 by mail). Second class postage paid at Ann Arbor, Mich. Published daily Tuesday thruagh Saturday morning. WERE UNITED STATES and Chinese forces to face each other, somewhere in North Viet Nam, the Chinese would en- counter a well-equipped, mobile, .and largely untried American army of rela- tively small size. The U.S. on the other hand, would see a huge Chinese army, underfed, ill-equip- ped, and positively assured that the se- curity of their own country was threat- ened by the American imperialists. Viet Nam would become a waste land strewn with the bodies of Americans and Chinese in addition to the multitude of innocent Vietnamese peasants caught in the middle of the international chess game. ULTIMATELY, a Korean type of rush to the conference table would result. There would be weeks of haggling over truce lines and terms. And like Korea, Viet Nam would be, strangely enough, divided at some convenient and arbitrary place-like the 17th parallel. The stale- mate would begin all over again. A little good might come out of the whole thing, though. For at least a while the pressure might be taken off the Viet- namese peasant, allowing him to get in at least one crop without being attacked by somebody. -MICHAEL BADAMQ .. . and both sides in the dispute have trained troops (above-Arab girl paratroopers. TODAY AND TOMORROW: U.S. Should Let Hanoi, Saigon gNegotiate By WALTER LIPPMANN LN A RECENT press conference, President Johnson quoted some secret reports he had received from a foreigner who had made contact with a high official in Hanoi. The President meant to convince our people that he had tried and failed to "get them (the North Vietnamese) to talk to us." The first secret report was on Feb. 15, very shortly after our bombing offensive had begun. The second report was on June 7, when the bombing policy had been in operation for four months. The substance of both reports was the same. Neither the threat of the bombing nor the results of the bombing had induced Hanoi to take an interest in negotiating peace with the United States. THERE IS NO DOUBT that the President is correctly informed. Hanoi will not negotiate with Washington because it is convinc- ed that Saigon has lost the war and that we cannot reverse the results. In Paris a few weeks ago I talked with a number of specialists on Southeast Asia, both French and Vietnamese. I asked them what would happen if the President or- dered the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong and invaded with a very large army. .. . FIFFER It would only make more cer- tain, they said, the ultimate dom- ination of Viet Nam by China. For the result of all our bomb- ing in the North and of all our fighting in the South would be to wreck and ruin the whole of Viet Nam to a point where the Viet- namese themselves would be quite unable to reconstruct their econ- omy. They would have to turn to China. For the United States would find no government which it could support, and amidst the devastation only an oriental dic- tatorship would be able to deal with the chaos and the misery. I HAVE LEARNED over the years to have great respect for the judgment of these men with whom I talked. They have the ad- vantage not only of the long French experience in Indo-China, but also of their contacts, through the large Vietnamese colony in Paris, with Hanoi and even with the Viet Cong. They are prophesying now that while U.S. military power can destroy the political and economic structure of Viet Nam, it cannot transform the defeated Saigonese into victors. The more the devastation, the more certainly will China be the ultimate winner. DOES THIS MEAN that the time has passed, owing to the ir- reparable losses in South Viet Nam, when the President can hope to induce Hanoi to negotiate with him? If he means with him, I am afraid there is no doubt it means lus- that- This is an exceedingly shrewd political maneuver. For if the President continues his present policy, which is to commit an in- creasingly large ground army in order to produce a stalemate, he will be accused of wasting Ameri- can lives for no real purpose. Messrs. Laird and Ford, on the other hand, will go to the country saying that if- the President had only dared to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong the United States would have had a victory without casual- ties on the ground. It would not be true, because all experience goes to show that wars cannot be won by bbmbing alone. But it would be effective demamogy. THE PRESIDENT is int a squeeze because his limited policy has failed and an unlimited policy would incur greater risks of great war than he has a right to take. The moment of truth is draw- ing near, a moment when he will have to ask himself whether, since he cannot negotiate with Hanoi, someone else can. In the months to come he will have to consider whether the only course still open to him is to en- courage the Vietnamese - Hanoi, Saigon, Viet Cong--to negotiate with each other. IF THEY COULD work out a deal among themselves, it would no doubt mean that our influence in Viet Nam had sunk to a very low point, except as we recovered some of it in assisting the recon- struction of the country. But there may be some conso- lation in the fact that a Vietna- mese solution made by the Viet- namese might lay the foundations of an independent Viet Nam, inde- pendent of the United States to be sure, and, in some measure, in- dependent also of China. Copyright, 1965, Los AngelesTimes I A 'T f4q Ps MOt SXG V ON- XC "Pt C*A t It't\ lt f to {ttef ' G. T W7~ PtLAR I G ITh -rH6 5T) )1S. o L R65p~cre H-AV MY lISHEI2 S1 k K 6lAAJ6D ASKED MC 10 VI AM AP. \'l te W}NR C QU2 60 WRONG r , I,,, :y: ;.J . . ,;. .