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Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers
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By IA AVII0:[, STEINBEiWR
(lutLR 'S NO : the author is a professor of South-
ertt sian history who serves as the national secretary
tot' tho A-,mtia U rStuie _%.siatloii. Although lie "has
nr .rvtionY ' about this plain for peace, Prof. Stein-
berg composed it in . It was first published in
-solidarity" a r 'liIippite journal.)
T HE DIPLOMATIC arteries have hardened in
Vietnam. The spilling of young blood in the
padi fields and swamps has driven both sides into
a rigid posture. Each side seems willing to negotiate
only from a "heads we win; tails you lose" concept.
The plaintive appeals to return to the General
Accords of 1954 have been tainted by the nagging
awareness that what failed once will probably fail
again; too much pride, investment and human life
have been lost to permit the world to return to a
hoplessly shattered compromise as if nothing had
happened in bet ween.
Vietnam has become a Kafkaesque nightmare
of modern man but no one has found a negotiated
way through the labyrinth.
W1iAT 1AS BECOME blatantly evident over
the past years is that there has always been an in-
dilgenous, comnuhlica ting component in Vietnam im-
peding any solution and limiting Washing ton's
and Moscow's ability to impose an external con-
promise.
Quite clearly, not only is Vietnam a contest
between East and West, but it is also a struggle
for hegemony between North and South and be-
tween two models of social mobilization for modern-
ity- the politicized army of the South and the
militarized party of the North.
CUnification of Vietnam is one of the few dreams
shared equally by the leaders of North and South
Vietnam; however, it is vital to recognize that his-
torically it has been an idea "more honour'd in the
breach than the observance." The goal has proven
so elusive that only rarely has the whole area been
unlified.
I' l Til ,1ARLJIST 'IES Vietnan was
divided into la-e ---the state of Funan, located in
the elt rgion below modern Saigon; the state
of Champa, str.ehing north along the coast to
Quang Frii and1 he seventeenth parallel, and the
ti t of Nam Viet, (ecompassing modern North
Viet nam in
The great buffer then as now between Nam Viet
and the south was the Annam cordillera, an in-
hospitable mountain range that cuts from Laos
to the sea near line. The Annam cordillera, served
as ith1 hyph in the term Indo-China, functioning
as the friction point on which two very different
civilizations touched uneasily.
THE HISTORY of Indo-China is the slow but
steady encroachment southward by the Vietnamese
at the expense of the Chams on the other side of
the mountains. This push for lebensraum, for living
room, was not accomplished easily.
But by the middle of the seventeenth century
the Vietnamese had established hegemony over
the whole coast, demanding either cultural as-
similation or isolated retreat into the less fertile
interior.
However, unification politically did not follow
Vietnamization. Somehow the physical and psy-
chological barrier of the land prevented cohesion
from developing. As early as the 1520's the cen-
trifugal forces of separatism had led southern
Vietnamese to resist northern.
TODAY, UNIFICATION is no 1 e s s passionate
because it has proven so chimerical. It has been the
dream that, like Gatsby's, "year by year recedes be-
fore" the Vietnamese. However, if fragmentation
has been the course of Vietnamese history, it may
also be a way out for the United States.
So far, at least, America has accepted division
as inevitable by refusing to support Marshal Ky's
desire to invade the north. She has not been will-
ing, however, to use this historical reality creative-
ly. America has failed, for example, to manipulate
the existing tension between the National Libera-
tion Front and Hanoi. Instead of driving a wedge
between them, she has done the obverse. By treat-
ing the NLF as a complete puppet of H a n o i ,
America has done much to make it just that.
The world Communist movement is not mono-
lithic; neither is the enemy in Vietnam despite the
intricate relationship between the politburo of the
Loa Dong (the Communist party of North Viet-
nam) and the People's Revolutionary Party (the
Communist Party of the South).
Far more critically, America has failed to real-
ize that the division of Vietnam into a North Viet-
nam' and a South Vietnam is not the only possible
solution. If Vietnam must be divided, why must it
be divided only into two? Vietnam has been frag-
mented into three parts for more of its history than
into two.
AND YET, the United States has been so busy
pursuing the Geneva partition that she has failed
to perceive any other alternative. Drawing on her
previous experience, America has been searching
for Korean-style solution, in which she can force
the North to agre to withdraw behind the seven-
teenth parallel. Conjuring up her own civil war and
Korean experience, the United States has sought
a division of Vietnam along a line which is arti-
ficial and inhibiting.
Prior to the Tet offensive, the Saigon generals
were alarmed at the separatist movement being or-
ganized around Hue and the National Liberation
Front may have calculated that Hue was politically
the most vulnerable, and, therefore, the most val-
uable city to attempt to hold.
From Hanoi's point of view, the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954were a failure. The victory of unifi-
cation was snatched from them, and it seems clear
that they cannot and will not stop fighting now
unless they have won something.
If America insists on a Korean-style solution--
a bi-partite solution which Hanoi must equate to
an American victory - she will not achieve peace.
Obviously any disengagement must be predicated
upon a mutual awareness that goals can be achiev-
ed by non-violent means. Each side must recognize
privately that a stalemate situation has been
reached. As long as either side believes that victory
is possible merely by a continued application of
force, no true settlement is possible, even though
for propaganda reasons negotiations can have been
in progress for years.
NEVERTHELESS, IF IT beame possible to
find a compromise which offered each side suf-
ficient claim to victory, it should also become
possible to establish the basis for peace. The "re-
discovery" that Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin have
distinct identities offers that hope by resurrect-
ing the idea of a tripartite division of Vietnam
along traditional, well-established historical lines.
However America's goals in Vietnam are de-
fined, they can all be achieved by this "rediscov-
ery." America wants to maintain a balance of
power in Southeast Asia and to offer protection
to her friends. America wants to contain China
and to give Southeast Asians an alternative to
communism. She wants to protect the sea lanes
past Singapore and to retain the rice-growing po-
tential of the delta for the free world. She wants to
demonstrate to friend and foe alike that she will
honor her commitments and that there is no
credibility gap in her. treaty obligations.
THE UNITED STATES should first issue an
open appeal to Hanoi to negotiate for the forma-
tion of two new states in what formerly had been
South Vietnam. In the south the new state of the
Republic of Cochin Vietnam would be created
with its capital in Saigon. In the middle the newv
neutralist state of Annam would be established
with its capital at Hue.
For at least an initial period the United States
would guarantee the survival of the Republic
of Cochin Vietnam with whatever force might be
necessary. Hopefully, the United States and North
Vietnam would agree to respect and honor the
sovereignty of all five states of Indo-China, the
newly "rediscovered" three states in Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia.
If not, at least both sides would pledge them-
selves to respect the neutrality and integrity of the
New Annam and agree to abide by whatever style
government might emerge after an election.
The I.C.C. (International Control Commission
would assume responsibility to administer both the
refugee problem and the election, which could
be set one year after signinga cease-fire agree-
ment.
If Annam elected a communist, neutralist or
Buddhist government, Washington would support
it with guaranteed economic aid administered
by the I.C.C. If the Annamese elected a democratic
government, Hanoi would equally respect its
integrity, assured, at least, that Annam would be
genuinely neutralist, like Austria.
FOR A SET PERIOD prior to the election
there would be free migration between the south
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1969
NIGHT EDITOR: NADINE COHODAS
-f41NA 0..,eCHI
NOR T"#
W HANO
NAMGO
on
.A OS Ma
VENIAN(
a~hinonuM 9 on
I? of( lautma s u #
* *W
NAM
CAMBODIA
. I
and cen'ral regions Anyone who wanted to take
reluge in the other area would be xwelcomed and
protected so that no one would be forced to live
under a regime lie found inimical.
Ini the meanwhile the United States would
evacuate its bases in Annam. withdrawing its troops
into the southern region and proving its honor-
able intentions by reducing the size of the Amer-
ican garrison dramatically; she would yield con-
siderable territory, including the great base at
Duanang. The actual line between Cochin and An-
naum would have to be drawn carefully in order
to establish a frontier which is traditionally valid,
militarily wise, and politically feasible-.
The United States would further guarantee its
good intentions by Jputting into escrow and inter-
national control some billions of dollars to aid
rehabilitation and development in all three areas
of Vietnam and in the Mekong Project.
The nature and length of America's commit-
ment to the South must be left for inegotiation
with bothI Hanoi and Saigon, though America
would promise as an intial minimum continued
protection and sufficient time to prevent subver-
sion. This scheme is a chance to gain time in
which to turn the delta region into a rich, fertile
land, an area in which the communists mn i g ht t
have diffieult y in generating an insurgency again.
TO AC'COMIPLISII THIS, the United States
would have to bring all its leverage to bear on
the South Vietnamese elite to force them to sup-
port sweeping land reform, economic development,
and political freedom. America must. receive con-
penisation frw har investment. Since the world al-
re considers Saigon a ptuppet of Washington,
American must not be embarrassed at using her
power to achieve those goals for which so much
effort has been expended.
T1he entrenched landlords and army officirs
will obviously oppose this process violently, but
once and for all the United States has to make
clear to this oligarchy that the alternative is
sure Hanoi victory. The United States must be pre-
pared to withdraw completely if the Saigon leader-
ship refuses to accept these terms. At last, Amer-
ica mutst display to her allies the same resolve that
slht shows her enemies.
Of vital importance is whether this scheme
would offer Hanoi enough. It is clear that the NLF
has controlled large areas of the delta for years,
but this may be an inducement rather than a
liability. As far as the communist strategists are
concerned, the cadres in the south would merely
have to lie low, secure in their home areas. Unless
the Allied economic, political and social effort
succeeded, the delta would remain firmly under
their control.
Moreover, the North would stand an excellent
chance of winning the election in Annam and
extending its influence by peaceful means south-
ward some hundreds of miles. While it is true that
the Hanoi regime probably still considers itself as
much a guerrilla movement as a stable govern-
ment, there are strong pressures working on Hanoi
to encourage it to seek at least a respite from the
fighting.
THE UNITED STATES must not be niggardly.
Proper generosity, administered through a neutral
agency, plus the establishmbent of a common mar-
ket of Indo-China, through which Hanoi could
buy delta rice at low prices, might be strong econo-
mic inducement. Finally, there would be no need
for Hanoi to abandon its long range goal of uni-
fication. During the negotiations a plebiscite
schedule could be established so that after a set
time, perhaps five years, each of the three areas
would hold an I.C.C.-sponsored election to deter-
mine whether each state wanted to remain inde-
pendent or join one of the other areas. Such
national unification elections would offer the North
the chance of eventual success via political means.
THIS IS THE CHALLENGE America must be
willing to accept. To reverse Clausewtz's famed
maxim, politics must become an extension of war
by other means. The competition for the individ-
ual Vietnamese's loyalty could be fought and won
in terms of economic betterment and self-fulfill-
ment. Let the free world and the communists chil-
lenge each other to see which system can do more
for the people.
Because of the ideological component, it may
not be naive to envision the struggle as converted
to a peaceful one. For a change, the individual
Vietnamese citizen might benefit from the cold
war. Obviously, the specific terms of the settlement
must be left vague at this point. The frontier lines,
the size of the continued American presence, the
means to end all forms of military subversion, the
terms by which the new Annam would function
- these and other points belong in secret negotia-
tion.
It is sufficient here merely to suggest that force
is not the only means by which a conflict can be
resolved. Indeed, a bold challenge to the Com-
munist Powers to take up this peaceful struggle
night permit the United States to refurbish its
tarnished image throughout the world and to
weld its divided citizenry in a worthwhile cause.
There are, of course, enormous risks to this
plan. No one would initially emerge the victor;
in time, pressures would build on both sides once
again to resolve the conflict by force. Hanoi would
have to accept something less than total victory,
and America too would have to watch at the least
Annam's probable turn to the left.
All Vietnamese would be frustrated and unhappy
at a solution which fragmented rather than
coalesced,
HOWEVER, WHAT ARE the alternatives? Viet-
nam has lived with partition for centuries. Peace
is obviously the prime requisite to any forward pro-
gress. After twenty years there is finally a hint of
rapprochement between East and West Germany; .
in time Korea may find a solution also,
Perhaps only a new generation - not born in
war and hate - will see that day in Vietnam.
However, one can be sure that the present con-
frontation not only drives it further and further
into the Vietnamese future, but also threatens the
future of all minkind.
ore thoughts on ROTC as antithetical to a university edu
cation
Seond of Twvo Parts
(tiTIi"(W -NoT,'i'The atithor is a
protes"'(cor otfu;hilospy in the tiesi-
de nt if,d College. Yesterdiay lProf.
tei argedthat. ROTC should
he eptseara efrom the univer-
sity b(e( tike: 1) it is 'technic4t
traning in tie narrowest sense,
and 2) there is a 'profound opposi-
tion . ..be tween the ideal, of thne
ni lit ary ad"hose-of flowe n-
t illl "''The 'following is :ishort eni-
ed inn in, of Prof. coolieii's origintat
CARL COHEN
'hird. ecause of ,le essential na-
tore of military organizations, thitch'
inemtbers are not properly suited for
itnttmct ioni in a free universit y. This
is not to inpttgn in any way the
tharacter' of t le indlividnals concern-
ed. TIhes are, almost invariably, men
01 high int egrity and devotion to
dtmty. They are basically unsuited foi'
Itniverbity teaching becatise tihey cx-
ilicitly uwa their highest lprofessidonal
duty not to tritth, or to the life of
he mind, but to their iiitai'y units
amid 1 heir commtanders. Btut trtith,
and I he judgment of those itt comn-
mani are somnetimtes at odds.
TIls IS W'IAT underlies the
slpreadimig concer'n of students and
.1aculty inembers when officers on .
'[U l U' . nh r m i I
ized the restraints and commitments
of their military service. They follow
orders not only because they have
to, but because they want to; and
they find the fact that judgments
come from high government authori-
ties to be the strongest possible war-
rant for their accuracy.
Such internalized distortion is,
from a pedagogical point of view, as
bad or worse than deliberate decep-
tion, When backed by sincerity, rigid,
pat.yline instruction is the more ef-
fective in molding the military cadet.
IS TOO much purity being demand-
ed (by implication) here? Aren't all
university professors afflicted with
biases and distortions of their own,
military or not? Of course many are;
nor need they deny it. But an honest
scholar and teacher seeks to rec-
ognize his own biases for what they
are, to take them into account, and
to lay them out before his students
so far as he ca n.
More important still, the biases of
university professors are, or ought to
be, their own, freely arrived at, and
when appropriate, freely given up--
not those of any superior, powerful,
ontsir institution .niirvoitv lcture.
SOMETIMES THE REPLY is
given: "There are bad courses, weak
instructors, even incompetent in-
structors, in every university. Every
school and college has its legendary
lemons. Why pick on the military?"
This is a very bad argument. Where
there are bad courses or incompetent
instructors let us, by all means, elim-
inate them too. Surely we cannot
allow some bad instruction to serve
as an excuse for more of it.
FURTHERMORE, the method of
appointment of the faculty in ROTC
programs is such as to invite mediocre
instruction and scholarship. What
usually happens is that the host
university loses (or gives away) its
normal academic control over ap-
pointments in military departments.
The Commandant of the unit (tem-
porarily given a title like: "Professor
of Miltiary Science" or "Professor of
Naval Science"-titles that must be
a source of considerable amusement
to some of them) is appointed first,
on the recommendation of his serv-
ice. The university will have a dif-
fictilt time rejecting him, even if
technically able to do so.
The university might, of course,
versities because, traditionally and
currently, the greatest part of the
material taught within them is not
worthy of a university. The evidence
in support of this claim is readily at
hand, and can be examined ad naus-
eum by anyone willing to take the
trouble to do so.
Much of the time of the ROTC
cadet is spent on activities which,
though important to the military,
are junk to the university. Military
drill, military courtesy, the wearing
of military uniforms and insignia-
all this is constantly worked over.
Such training is not only intellec-
tually contemptible; it is, even more,
fundamentally inconsistent with the
attitudes and spirit of a democractic
citizenry.
Each of these five clusters of con-
siderations is compelling by itself;
together they present, against ROTC,
a case of overwhelming force.
Some supporters of ROTC on
campus reply with a counter-argu-
ment raised in a different, more
political frame. They say, in effect:
"Yes, ROTC courses are thin
stuff, we know. But the world is in
disorder, and our nation must
maintain a military arm. To do
while continuing to support estab-
lished practices, but it is unsound.
Eliminating ROTC from the univer-
sities by no means entails that of-
ficer recruitment among college men
must cease. On the contrary, it may
well continue with improvements for
all concerned.
FOR THE SAKE of humanity, and
our own wvell-being. we should now be
looking to the eventual elimination
of mihitary establishmtents e v e r y -
where. But even allowing that a
military arm is a vital national ned
at present, its size could surely be
sharply reduced. The officer corps is
a good place to b!gimi. As for those
officers wvho mmust still be recrtmited,
it. isdesirable, of course, ttat they
be liberally educated, that they com
largely from the pool of college stu-
dents. Btut this speaks to the us
tion of where the recruitment should
take place, not how it should go
on. ROTC programs have become our
national habit; there are other, better
ways of achieving the goals sought,
without having to suffer the unhappy
marriage of the university and the
military earlier discussed. There is
an irony, too, in an argument that
imnlores the universities starved for
the military, with respect to officer
training? Without seeking to fix the
details of their proper relations, some
general principles can be laid down.
1. The fewer the formal connec-
tions between the military and the
university, the better for both. When
they function as wholly separate in-
stitutions, academic work will not
be corrupted by the need to serve
external objects, and military aims
will not be interfered with by ir-
relevant scholarship.
2. Let the military pursue its of-
ficer recruitment by developing a
two-fold program:
a) Contractual agreements, in
which the university has no part,
whatever, may be reached between
the military services and interested
college students who are potential
officers. Such agreements might
commit the service to award a com-
mission upon graduation from uni-
versity, provided certain courses of
study-established and conducted by
the university only-be completed.
In effect, the officer candidate
would be accepting, by voluntary
agreement, an additional set of "dis-
tribution requirements" in order to
win his commission. In return, the
tirely free of military influence or
control. That portion of the work
done in summer camp would be
entirely free of university influence
or control.
Such a system, barely sketched
here, would be more economical than
that now in effect, and could be easily
established. More important, it would
oblige neither a dilution of the aca-
demic emphasis of the university, nor
a dilction of the seriousness or tough-
ness of basic military training.
EACH INSTITUTION might then
go about its proper business separate-
ly. If there is a theoretical antagon-
ism between them let them compete
for the moral and intellectual sup-
port of young men and women. Con-
cretely, the university might adopt
toward the military recruiters the
same attitude of reasonable tolerance
it adopts toward private industrial
employers, or other governmental em-
ployers, who seek to recruit its stu-
dents to their ranks. An opportunity
for students to hear all the argu-
ments, pro and con, might well be
provided, and even places for inter-
views with military as well as private
recruiting personnel.