An open plan for withdrawak- --"In 94C34D Seventy-nine years of editorial freedom Edited and managed by students of the University of Michigan Peace within three Vie tnams 420 Maynard St., Ann Arbor, Mich. News Phone: 764-0552 t 'rediscoUered'I alternative which iight indiccae one viable wvay out of the wiar Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints. By IA AVII0:[, STEINBEiWR (lutLR 'S NO : the author is a professor of South- ertt sian history who serves as the national secretary tot' tho A-,mtia U rStuie _%.siatloii. Although lie "has nr .rvtionY ' about this plain for peace, Prof. Stein- berg composed it in . It was first published in -solidarity" a r 'liIippite journal.) T HE DIPLOMATIC arteries have hardened in Vietnam. The spilling of young blood in the padi fields and swamps has driven both sides into a rigid posture. Each side seems willing to negotiate only from a "heads we win; tails you lose" concept. The plaintive appeals to return to the General Accords of 1954 have been tainted by the nagging awareness that what failed once will probably fail again; too much pride, investment and human life have been lost to permit the world to return to a hoplessly shattered compromise as if nothing had happened in bet ween. Vietnam has become a Kafkaesque nightmare of modern man but no one has found a negotiated way through the labyrinth. W1iAT 1AS BECOME blatantly evident over the past years is that there has always been an in- dilgenous, comnuhlica ting component in Vietnam im- peding any solution and limiting Washing ton's and Moscow's ability to impose an external con- promise. Quite clearly, not only is Vietnam a contest between East and West, but it is also a struggle for hegemony between North and South and be- tween two models of social mobilization for modern- ity- the politicized army of the South and the militarized party of the North. CUnification of Vietnam is one of the few dreams shared equally by the leaders of North and South Vietnam; however, it is vital to recognize that his- torically it has been an idea "more honour'd in the breach than the observance." The goal has proven so elusive that only rarely has the whole area been unlified. I' l Til ,1ARLJIST 'IES Vietnan was divided into la-e ---the state of Funan, located in the elt rgion below modern Saigon; the state of Champa, str.ehing north along the coast to Quang Frii and1 he seventeenth parallel, and the ti t of Nam Viet, (ecompassing modern North Viet nam in The great buffer then as now between Nam Viet and the south was the Annam cordillera, an in- hospitable mountain range that cuts from Laos to the sea near line. The Annam cordillera, served as ith1 hyph in the term Indo-China, functioning as the friction point on which two very different civilizations touched uneasily. THE HISTORY of Indo-China is the slow but steady encroachment southward by the Vietnamese at the expense of the Chams on the other side of the mountains. This push for lebensraum, for living room, was not accomplished easily. But by the middle of the seventeenth century the Vietnamese had established hegemony over the whole coast, demanding either cultural as- similation or isolated retreat into the less fertile interior. However, unification politically did not follow Vietnamization. Somehow the physical and psy- chological barrier of the land prevented cohesion from developing. As early as the 1520's the cen- trifugal forces of separatism had led southern Vietnamese to resist northern. TODAY, UNIFICATION is no 1 e s s passionate because it has proven so chimerical. It has been the dream that, like Gatsby's, "year by year recedes be- fore" the Vietnamese. However, if fragmentation has been the course of Vietnamese history, it may also be a way out for the United States. So far, at least, America has accepted division as inevitable by refusing to support Marshal Ky's desire to invade the north. She has not been will- ing, however, to use this historical reality creative- ly. America has failed, for example, to manipulate the existing tension between the National Libera- tion Front and Hanoi. Instead of driving a wedge between them, she has done the obverse. By treat- ing the NLF as a complete puppet of H a n o i , America has done much to make it just that. The world Communist movement is not mono- lithic; neither is the enemy in Vietnam despite the intricate relationship between the politburo of the Loa Dong (the Communist party of North Viet- nam) and the People's Revolutionary Party (the Communist Party of the South). Far more critically, America has failed to real- ize that the division of Vietnam into a North Viet- nam' and a South Vietnam is not the only possible solution. If Vietnam must be divided, why must it be divided only into two? Vietnam has been frag- mented into three parts for more of its history than into two. AND YET, the United States has been so busy pursuing the Geneva partition that she has failed to perceive any other alternative. Drawing on her previous experience, America has been searching for Korean-style solution, in which she can force the North to agre to withdraw behind the seven- teenth parallel. Conjuring up her own civil war and Korean experience, the United States has sought a division of Vietnam along a line which is arti- ficial and inhibiting. Prior to the Tet offensive, the Saigon generals were alarmed at the separatist movement being or- ganized around Hue and the National Liberation Front may have calculated that Hue was politically the most vulnerable, and, therefore, the most val- uable city to attempt to hold. From Hanoi's point of view, the Geneva agree- ments of 1954were a failure. The victory of unifi- cation was snatched from them, and it seems clear that they cannot and will not stop fighting now unless they have won something. If America insists on a Korean-style solution-- a bi-partite solution which Hanoi must equate to an American victory - she will not achieve peace. Obviously any disengagement must be predicated upon a mutual awareness that goals can be achiev- ed by non-violent means. Each side must recognize privately that a stalemate situation has been reached. As long as either side believes that victory is possible merely by a continued application of force, no true settlement is possible, even though for propaganda reasons negotiations can have been in progress for years. NEVERTHELESS, IF IT beame possible to find a compromise which offered each side suf- ficient claim to victory, it should also become possible to establish the basis for peace. The "re- discovery" that Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin have distinct identities offers that hope by resurrect- ing the idea of a tripartite division of Vietnam along traditional, well-established historical lines. However America's goals in Vietnam are de- fined, they can all be achieved by this "rediscov- ery." America wants to maintain a balance of power in Southeast Asia and to offer protection to her friends. America wants to contain China and to give Southeast Asians an alternative to communism. She wants to protect the sea lanes past Singapore and to retain the rice-growing po- tential of the delta for the free world. She wants to demonstrate to friend and foe alike that she will honor her commitments and that there is no credibility gap in her. treaty obligations. THE UNITED STATES should first issue an open appeal to Hanoi to negotiate for the forma- tion of two new states in what formerly had been South Vietnam. In the south the new state of the Republic of Cochin Vietnam would be created with its capital in Saigon. In the middle the newv neutralist state of Annam would be established with its capital at Hue. For at least an initial period the United States would guarantee the survival of the Republic of Cochin Vietnam with whatever force might be necessary. Hopefully, the United States and North Vietnam would agree to respect and honor the sovereignty of all five states of Indo-China, the newly "rediscovered" three states in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. If not, at least both sides would pledge them- selves to respect the neutrality and integrity of the New Annam and agree to abide by whatever style government might emerge after an election. The I.C.C. (International Control Commission would assume responsibility to administer both the refugee problem and the election, which could be set one year after signinga cease-fire agree- ment. If Annam elected a communist, neutralist or Buddhist government, Washington would support it with guaranteed economic aid administered by the I.C.C. If the Annamese elected a democratic government, Hanoi would equally respect its integrity, assured, at least, that Annam would be genuinely neutralist, like Austria. FOR A SET PERIOD prior to the election there would be free migration between the south SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1969 NIGHT EDITOR: NADINE COHODAS -f41NA 0..,eCHI NOR T"# W HANO NAMGO on .A OS Ma VENIAN( a~hinonuM 9 on I? of( lautma s u # * *W NAM CAMBODIA . I and cen'ral regions Anyone who wanted to take reluge in the other area would be xwelcomed and protected so that no one would be forced to live under a regime lie found inimical. Ini the meanwhile the United States would evacuate its bases in Annam. withdrawing its troops into the southern region and proving its honor- able intentions by reducing the size of the Amer- ican garrison dramatically; she would yield con- siderable territory, including the great base at Duanang. The actual line between Cochin and An- naum would have to be drawn carefully in order to establish a frontier which is traditionally valid, militarily wise, and politically feasible-. The United States would further guarantee its good intentions by Jputting into escrow and inter- national control some billions of dollars to aid rehabilitation and development in all three areas of Vietnam and in the Mekong Project. The nature and length of America's commit- ment to the South must be left for inegotiation with bothI Hanoi and Saigon, though America would promise as an intial minimum continued protection and sufficient time to prevent subver- sion. This scheme is a chance to gain time in which to turn the delta region into a rich, fertile land, an area in which the communists mn i g ht t have diffieult y in generating an insurgency again. TO AC'COMIPLISII THIS, the United States would have to bring all its leverage to bear on the South Vietnamese elite to force them to sup- port sweeping land reform, economic development, and political freedom. America must. receive con- penisation frw har investment. Since the world al- re considers Saigon a ptuppet of Washington, American must not be embarrassed at using her power to achieve those goals for which so much effort has been expended. T1he entrenched landlords and army officirs will obviously oppose this process violently, but once and for all the United States has to make clear to this oligarchy that the alternative is sure Hanoi victory. The United States must be pre- pared to withdraw completely if the Saigon leader- ship refuses to accept these terms. At last, Amer- ica mutst display to her allies the same resolve that slht shows her enemies. Of vital importance is whether this scheme would offer Hanoi enough. It is clear that the NLF has controlled large areas of the delta for years, but this may be an inducement rather than a liability. As far as the communist strategists are concerned, the cadres in the south would merely have to lie low, secure in their home areas. Unless the Allied economic, political and social effort succeeded, the delta would remain firmly under their control. Moreover, the North would stand an excellent chance of winning the election in Annam and extending its influence by peaceful means south- ward some hundreds of miles. While it is true that the Hanoi regime probably still considers itself as much a guerrilla movement as a stable govern- ment, there are strong pressures working on Hanoi to encourage it to seek at least a respite from the fighting. THE UNITED STATES must not be niggardly. Proper generosity, administered through a neutral agency, plus the establishmbent of a common mar- ket of Indo-China, through which Hanoi could buy delta rice at low prices, might be strong econo- mic inducement. Finally, there would be no need for Hanoi to abandon its long range goal of uni- fication. During the negotiations a plebiscite schedule could be established so that after a set time, perhaps five years, each of the three areas would hold an I.C.C.-sponsored election to deter- mine whether each state wanted to remain inde- pendent or join one of the other areas. Such national unification elections would offer the North the chance of eventual success via political means. THIS IS THE CHALLENGE America must be willing to accept. To reverse Clausewtz's famed maxim, politics must become an extension of war by other means. The competition for the individ- ual Vietnamese's loyalty could be fought and won in terms of economic betterment and self-fulfill- ment. Let the free world and the communists chil- lenge each other to see which system can do more for the people. Because of the ideological component, it may not be naive to envision the struggle as converted to a peaceful one. For a change, the individual Vietnamese citizen might benefit from the cold war. Obviously, the specific terms of the settlement must be left vague at this point. The frontier lines, the size of the continued American presence, the means to end all forms of military subversion, the terms by which the new Annam would function - these and other points belong in secret negotia- tion. It is sufficient here merely to suggest that force is not the only means by which a conflict can be resolved. Indeed, a bold challenge to the Com- munist Powers to take up this peaceful struggle night permit the United States to refurbish its tarnished image throughout the world and to weld its divided citizenry in a worthwhile cause. There are, of course, enormous risks to this plan. No one would initially emerge the victor; in time, pressures would build on both sides once again to resolve the conflict by force. Hanoi would have to accept something less than total victory, and America too would have to watch at the least Annam's probable turn to the left. All Vietnamese would be frustrated and unhappy at a solution which fragmented rather than coalesced, HOWEVER, WHAT ARE the alternatives? Viet- nam has lived with partition for centuries. Peace is obviously the prime requisite to any forward pro- gress. After twenty years there is finally a hint of rapprochement between East and West Germany; . in time Korea may find a solution also, Perhaps only a new generation - not born in war and hate - will see that day in Vietnam. However, one can be sure that the present con- frontation not only drives it further and further into the Vietnamese future, but also threatens the future of all minkind. ore thoughts on ROTC as antithetical to a university edu cation Seond of Twvo Parts (tiTIi"(W -NoT,'i'The atithor is a protes"'(cor otfu;hilospy in the tiesi- de nt if,d College. Yesterdiay lProf. tei argedthat. ROTC should he eptseara efrom the univer- sity b(e( tike: 1) it is 'technic4t traning in tie narrowest sense, and 2) there is a 'profound opposi- tion . ..be tween the ideal, of thne ni lit ary ad"hose-of flowe n- t illl "''The 'following is :ishort eni- ed inn in, of Prof. coolieii's origintat CARL COHEN 'hird. ecause of ,le essential na- tore of military organizations, thitch' inemtbers are not properly suited for itnttmct ioni in a free universit y. This is not to inpttgn in any way the tharacter' of t le indlividnals concern- ed. TIhes are, almost invariably, men 01 high int egrity and devotion to dtmty. They are basically unsuited foi' Itniverbity teaching becatise tihey cx- ilicitly uwa their highest lprofessidonal duty not to tritth, or to the life of he mind, but to their iiitai'y units amid 1 heir commtanders. Btut trtith, and I he judgment of those itt comn- mani are somnetimtes at odds. TIls IS W'IAT underlies the slpreadimig concer'n of students and .1aculty inembers when officers on . '[U l U' . nh r m i I ized the restraints and commitments of their military service. They follow orders not only because they have to, but because they want to; and they find the fact that judgments come from high government authori- ties to be the strongest possible war- rant for their accuracy. Such internalized distortion is, from a pedagogical point of view, as bad or worse than deliberate decep- tion, When backed by sincerity, rigid, pat.yline instruction is the more ef- fective in molding the military cadet. IS TOO much purity being demand- ed (by implication) here? Aren't all university professors afflicted with biases and distortions of their own, military or not? Of course many are; nor need they deny it. But an honest scholar and teacher seeks to rec- ognize his own biases for what they are, to take them into account, and to lay them out before his students so far as he ca n. More important still, the biases of university professors are, or ought to be, their own, freely arrived at, and when appropriate, freely given up-- not those of any superior, powerful, ontsir institution .niirvoitv lcture. SOMETIMES THE REPLY is given: "There are bad courses, weak instructors, even incompetent in- structors, in every university. Every school and college has its legendary lemons. Why pick on the military?" This is a very bad argument. Where there are bad courses or incompetent instructors let us, by all means, elim- inate them too. Surely we cannot allow some bad instruction to serve as an excuse for more of it. FURTHERMORE, the method of appointment of the faculty in ROTC programs is such as to invite mediocre instruction and scholarship. What usually happens is that the host university loses (or gives away) its normal academic control over ap- pointments in military departments. The Commandant of the unit (tem- porarily given a title like: "Professor of Miltiary Science" or "Professor of Naval Science"-titles that must be a source of considerable amusement to some of them) is appointed first, on the recommendation of his serv- ice. The university will have a dif- fictilt time rejecting him, even if technically able to do so. The university might, of course, versities because, traditionally and currently, the greatest part of the material taught within them is not worthy of a university. The evidence in support of this claim is readily at hand, and can be examined ad naus- eum by anyone willing to take the trouble to do so. Much of the time of the ROTC cadet is spent on activities which, though important to the military, are junk to the university. Military drill, military courtesy, the wearing of military uniforms and insignia- all this is constantly worked over. Such training is not only intellec- tually contemptible; it is, even more, fundamentally inconsistent with the attitudes and spirit of a democractic citizenry. Each of these five clusters of con- siderations is compelling by itself; together they present, against ROTC, a case of overwhelming force. Some supporters of ROTC on campus reply with a counter-argu- ment raised in a different, more political frame. They say, in effect: "Yes, ROTC courses are thin stuff, we know. But the world is in disorder, and our nation must maintain a military arm. To do while continuing to support estab- lished practices, but it is unsound. Eliminating ROTC from the univer- sities by no means entails that of- ficer recruitment among college men must cease. On the contrary, it may well continue with improvements for all concerned. FOR THE SAKE of humanity, and our own wvell-being. we should now be looking to the eventual elimination of mihitary establishmtents e v e r y - where. But even allowing that a military arm is a vital national ned at present, its size could surely be sharply reduced. The officer corps is a good place to b!gimi. As for those officers wvho mmust still be recrtmited, it. isdesirable, of course, ttat they be liberally educated, that they com largely from the pool of college stu- dents. Btut this speaks to the us tion of where the recruitment should take place, not how it should go on. ROTC programs have become our national habit; there are other, better ways of achieving the goals sought, without having to suffer the unhappy marriage of the university and the military earlier discussed. There is an irony, too, in an argument that imnlores the universities starved for the military, with respect to officer training? Without seeking to fix the details of their proper relations, some general principles can be laid down. 1. The fewer the formal connec- tions between the military and the university, the better for both. When they function as wholly separate in- stitutions, academic work will not be corrupted by the need to serve external objects, and military aims will not be interfered with by ir- relevant scholarship. 2. Let the military pursue its of- ficer recruitment by developing a two-fold program: a) Contractual agreements, in which the university has no part, whatever, may be reached between the military services and interested college students who are potential officers. Such agreements might commit the service to award a com- mission upon graduation from uni- versity, provided certain courses of study-established and conducted by the university only-be completed. In effect, the officer candidate would be accepting, by voluntary agreement, an additional set of "dis- tribution requirements" in order to win his commission. In return, the tirely free of military influence or control. That portion of the work done in summer camp would be entirely free of university influence or control. Such a system, barely sketched here, would be more economical than that now in effect, and could be easily established. More important, it would oblige neither a dilution of the aca- demic emphasis of the university, nor a dilction of the seriousness or tough- ness of basic military training. EACH INSTITUTION might then go about its proper business separate- ly. If there is a theoretical antagon- ism between them let them compete for the moral and intellectual sup- port of young men and women. Con- cretely, the university might adopt toward the military recruiters the same attitude of reasonable tolerance it adopts toward private industrial employers, or other governmental em- ployers, who seek to recruit its stu- dents to their ranks. An opportunity for students to hear all the argu- ments, pro and con, might well be provided, and even places for inter- views with military as well as private recruiting personnel.