LOOKING BACK
17*Ing- It
Back
T
he Jerusalem
question gradually
slipped into the
background after
1953. Jordan de-
clared in 1960 that Jerusalem
was one of the two capitals of
the Kingdom and the Western
powers duly protested. But the
partition of Jerusalem was an
established, if not a legal, fact
of life.
If Israel had designs on East
Jerusalem, it was certainly
not apparent and, during the
outbreak of hostilities bet-
ween Israel and Egypt in Oc-
tober 1956, the armistice line
between Israel and Jordan re-
mained quiet. Israeli govern-
ment spokesmen repeatedly
said that when the time was
ripe, Israel would ask the
United Nations to revise its
position on Jerusalem. Israel
probably hoped also that one
day the question of access to
the Western Wall would be
successfully resolved.
This situation was to change
abruptly in 1967 as the
culmination of a chain of
events, beginning in 1965. Al-
Fatah, an Arab guerrilla
organization, began a cam-
paign of sabotage in Israel in
January 1965. As the ac-
tivities of the organization
grew over the months, it
became increasingly evident
that it was directed from bases
in Syria and sentiment grew
in Israel, especially in
military circles, for a strike
against those bases. Arab ap-
prehension in Jordan and
Syria rose, since these two
countries were most likely to
receive the brunt of Israeli
retaliation.
The Jordanian government
Reprinted from"The Jerusalem
Question," by H. Eugene Bovix,
courtesy World Zionist Press
Service
98
FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1990
took steps to prevent its ter-
ritory from being used to pro-
vide transit points for al-Fatah
members passing from Syria
to Israel. While the Syrian of-
ficial radio broadcast the
boastful and exaggerated com-
muniques of al-Fatah, the
Syrian government disclaim-
ed any responsibility for al-
Fatah's activities and pro-
claimed an inability to do
anything about the
organization.
The Soviet Union sought to
capitalize on the rising ten-
sion to direct Arab hostility
against the United States. In
view of Israel's apparent drift
toward abandonment of its
avowed policy of non-
identification and its increas-
ing identification with the
Western camp, the Arabs,
The Arab reaction
was probably
greater than the
Soviet Union
expected.
notably Egypt, appeared to
furnish a better vehicle for
furthering the Soviet aim of
ridding the area of Western
influence.
In the spring of 1966, Soviet
propaganda charged that the
CENTO foreign ministers
meeting in Ankara and the
U.S. chiefs of mission con-
ference in Beirut in April
1966 had as their purpose the
planning and coordination of
a joint U.S.-Israel plan for an
Israeli attack on Syria.
Then, on May 25, 1966,
while Premier Alexei Kosygin
was on a visit to the United
Arab Republic (U.A.R.), the
Soviet foreign ministry sum-
moned the Israeli ambassador
in Moscow and handed him a
statement, described as the
harshest in 10 years, in which
the Soviet Union accused
Israel of massing troops on the
border of Syria and plotting
with the "imperialists"
against Syria. Israel refuted
the charges in a statement on
June 2, 1966.
Having obtained con-
siderable mileage out of the
charges of a plot against Syria
in the spring of 1966, the
Soviet Union apparently
decided to try a similar gam-
bit in 1967. The occasion was
furnished by Israeli Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol's state-
ment in early May 1967 that
Israel's patience with the ac-
tivities of al-Fatah was grow-
ing thin. Arab nerves had
become frayed as a result of a
large-scale Israeli retaliatory
raid into Jordan the previous
November, the reaction to
which almost cost King Hus-
sein his throne.
Tension was further
heightened in April 1967 by
an incident between Israel
and Syria. Israeli aircraft
knocked out Syrian gun posi-
tions that had been shelling
Israeli villages and shot down
six Syrian airplanes. Then, on
May 13, 1967, the Soviet
Union supplied false in-
telligence to Syria and the
United Arab Republic that
Israel was placing on the
Syrian armistice line from 11
to 13 brigades and that Israel
would attack Syria on May 17.
The Arab reaction was pro-
bably greater than the Soviet
Union expected and certainly
was in excess of the 1966 reac-
tion. U.A.R. President Gamal
Abdul Nassar ordered some
50,000 Egyptian troops into
Sinai, bringing the total
number of troops facing Israel
to 80,000. He also requested
that the United Nations
Emergency Force, placed in
the Gaza Strip and along the
WZPS/Sammy Avnis
A look at the events leading up to
the Six-Day War, which saw the
recapture of East Jerusalem and the
reunification, after 19 years, of the city.
People of all faiths now visit the Western Wall freely.
Egyptian side of the Egyptian-
Israel armistice line in 1957,
be withdrawn.
Encouraged by the en-
thusiastic Arab response, he
subsequently proclaimed the
blockade of the Strait of Tiran.
Israel, most of whose oil supp-
ly passes through the strait to
the port of Eilat, had warned
that such a blockade would be
casus belli and, consequently,
it struck at the United Arab
Republic on June 5, 1967.
King Hussein of Jordan had
signed a joint defense agree-
ment with the United Arab
Republic iri Cairo on May 30
and, despite an appeal from
Israel not to enter the war,
Jordan, like Syria, came to
the United Arab Republic's
assistance. In Jerusalem, the
fighting began with Jordan's
attempt to seize Government
House from the United Na-
tions; because of its high and
strategic location between
East and West Jerusalem,
possession of Government
House would give its occupant
a distinct advantage hr any at-
tempt to dominate the rest of
the city.
The Israelis promptly
pushed the Jordanians out
and, circling the Walled City,
entered it from the east
through St. Stephen's Gate,
also known as Lion's Gate. By
the cease-fire on June 10,
Israel had occupied East
Jerusalem, the West Bank of
Jordan, the Gaza Strip, the
Sinai Peninsula, and the
Golan Heights in Syria.
In the meantime, Israelis
were surprised and jubilant to
find East Jerusalem once
again in their hands and
Israeli troops prayed at the
Western Wall on June 7 for
the first time in 19 years.