LOOKING BACK 17*Ing- It Back T he Jerusalem question gradually slipped into the background after 1953. Jordan de- clared in 1960 that Jerusalem was one of the two capitals of the Kingdom and the Western powers duly protested. But the partition of Jerusalem was an established, if not a legal, fact of life. If Israel had designs on East Jerusalem, it was certainly not apparent and, during the outbreak of hostilities bet- ween Israel and Egypt in Oc- tober 1956, the armistice line between Israel and Jordan re- mained quiet. Israeli govern- ment spokesmen repeatedly said that when the time was ripe, Israel would ask the United Nations to revise its position on Jerusalem. Israel probably hoped also that one day the question of access to the Western Wall would be successfully resolved. This situation was to change abruptly in 1967 as the culmination of a chain of events, beginning in 1965. Al- Fatah, an Arab guerrilla organization, began a cam- paign of sabotage in Israel in January 1965. As the ac- tivities of the organization grew over the months, it became increasingly evident that it was directed from bases in Syria and sentiment grew in Israel, especially in military circles, for a strike against those bases. Arab ap- prehension in Jordan and Syria rose, since these two countries were most likely to receive the brunt of Israeli retaliation. The Jordanian government Reprinted from"The Jerusalem Question," by H. Eugene Bovix, courtesy World Zionist Press Service 98 FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1990 took steps to prevent its ter- ritory from being used to pro- vide transit points for al-Fatah members passing from Syria to Israel. While the Syrian of- ficial radio broadcast the boastful and exaggerated com- muniques of al-Fatah, the Syrian government disclaim- ed any responsibility for al- Fatah's activities and pro- claimed an inability to do anything about the organization. The Soviet Union sought to capitalize on the rising ten- sion to direct Arab hostility against the United States. In view of Israel's apparent drift toward abandonment of its avowed policy of non- identification and its increas- ing identification with the Western camp, the Arabs, The Arab reaction was probably greater than the Soviet Union expected. notably Egypt, appeared to furnish a better vehicle for furthering the Soviet aim of ridding the area of Western influence. In the spring of 1966, Soviet propaganda charged that the CENTO foreign ministers meeting in Ankara and the U.S. chiefs of mission con- ference in Beirut in April 1966 had as their purpose the planning and coordination of a joint U.S.-Israel plan for an Israeli attack on Syria. Then, on May 25, 1966, while Premier Alexei Kosygin was on a visit to the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), the Soviet foreign ministry sum- moned the Israeli ambassador in Moscow and handed him a statement, described as the harshest in 10 years, in which the Soviet Union accused Israel of massing troops on the border of Syria and plotting with the "imperialists" against Syria. Israel refuted the charges in a statement on June 2, 1966. Having obtained con- siderable mileage out of the charges of a plot against Syria in the spring of 1966, the Soviet Union apparently decided to try a similar gam- bit in 1967. The occasion was furnished by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's state- ment in early May 1967 that Israel's patience with the ac- tivities of al-Fatah was grow- ing thin. Arab nerves had become frayed as a result of a large-scale Israeli retaliatory raid into Jordan the previous November, the reaction to which almost cost King Hus- sein his throne. Tension was further heightened in April 1967 by an incident between Israel and Syria. Israeli aircraft knocked out Syrian gun posi- tions that had been shelling Israeli villages and shot down six Syrian airplanes. Then, on May 13, 1967, the Soviet Union supplied false in- telligence to Syria and the United Arab Republic that Israel was placing on the Syrian armistice line from 11 to 13 brigades and that Israel would attack Syria on May 17. The Arab reaction was pro- bably greater than the Soviet Union expected and certainly was in excess of the 1966 reac- tion. U.A.R. President Gamal Abdul Nassar ordered some 50,000 Egyptian troops into Sinai, bringing the total number of troops facing Israel to 80,000. He also requested that the United Nations Emergency Force, placed in the Gaza Strip and along the WZPS/Sammy Avnis A look at the events leading up to the Six-Day War, which saw the recapture of East Jerusalem and the reunification, after 19 years, of the city. People of all faiths now visit the Western Wall freely. Egyptian side of the Egyptian- Israel armistice line in 1957, be withdrawn. Encouraged by the en- thusiastic Arab response, he subsequently proclaimed the blockade of the Strait of Tiran. Israel, most of whose oil supp- ly passes through the strait to the port of Eilat, had warned that such a blockade would be casus belli and, consequently, it struck at the United Arab Republic on June 5, 1967. King Hussein of Jordan had signed a joint defense agree- ment with the United Arab Republic iri Cairo on May 30 and, despite an appeal from Israel not to enter the war, Jordan, like Syria, came to the United Arab Republic's assistance. In Jerusalem, the fighting began with Jordan's attempt to seize Government House from the United Na- tions; because of its high and strategic location between East and West Jerusalem, possession of Government House would give its occupant a distinct advantage hr any at- tempt to dominate the rest of the city. The Israelis promptly pushed the Jordanians out and, circling the Walled City, entered it from the east through St. Stephen's Gate, also known as Lion's Gate. By the cease-fire on June 10, Israel had occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank of Jordan, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights in Syria. In the meantime, Israelis were surprised and jubilant to find East Jerusalem once again in their hands and Israeli troops prayed at the Western Wall on June 7 for the first time in 19 years.