ADMISSIONS ON TRIAL
The Michigan Daily - Tuesday, June 24, 2003 - 12
and 1996 respectively. See Brief for
respondents 5, n. 7. Accordingly, we have
.before us only that portion of the District
"Courtis judgment that upheld Michigan's
-sew freshman admissions policy.
4 II
Both Hamacher and Gratz, of course,
-Nave standing to seek damages as compen-
Sation for the alleged wrongful denial of
.their respective applications under Michi-
gan's old freshman admissions system.
{,however, like the plaintiff in Los Angeles v.
iLyons, 461 U. S. 95 (1983), who had stand-
Z3lsg to recover damages caused by "choke-
!*olds" administered by the police in the
past but had no standing to seek injunctive
'selief preventing future chokeholds, peti-
tioners' past injuries do not give them
lhtanding to obtain injunctive relief to pro-
rect third parties from similar harms. See
=id., at 102 ("[P]ast exposure to illegal con-
iduct does not in itself show a present case
4er controversy regarding injunctive relief . .
i, if unaccompanied by any continuing, pres-
ent adverse effects" (quoting O'Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U. S. 488, 495496 (1974))). To
seek forward-looking, injunctive relief,
petitioners must show that they face an
#imminent threat of future injury. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pea, 515 U.
. 200, 210-211 (1995). This they cannot
xo given that when this suit was filed, nei-
ther faced an impending threat of future
injury based on Michigan's new freshman
'admissions policy.'
Even though there is not a scintilla of
-avidence that the freshman admissions pro-
,gram now being administered by respon-
dents will ever have any impact on either
+4amacher or Gratz, petitioers nonetheless
argue that Hamacher has a personal stake in
3his suit because at the time the complaint
vas filed, Hamacher intended to apply to
ttransfer to Michigan once certain admission
policy changes occurred.' See App. 34; see
also Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. Petitioners'
ittempt to base Hamacher's standing in this
Xuit on a hypothetical transfer application
fails for several reasons. First, there is no
lewidence that Hamacher ever actually
applied for admission as a transfer student
.t Michigan. His claim of future injury is at
'Vest "conjectural or hypothetical" rather
-han "real and immediate." O'Shea v. Little-
iwn, 414 U. S., at 494 (internal quotation
narks omitted); see also Lujan v. Defenders
af Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992).
;-Second, as petitioner's counsel conceded
Ati oral argument, the transfer policy is not
before this Court and was not addressed by
the District Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5
4admitting that "[t]he transfer admissions
policy itself is not before youthe Court").
:Unlike the University's frdshman policy,
Which is detailed at great length in the Joint
Appendix filed with this Court, the
specifics of the transfer policy are conspic-
,uously missing from the Joint Appendix
filed with this Court. Furthermore, the
ltassfer-policy is notdiseussed anywhere in
l41e parties' briefs. Nor is it ever even refer-
enced in the District Court's Dec. 13, 2000,
.pinion that upheld Michigan's new fresh-
pman admissions policy'ahd st'ack dbwn
Michigan's old policy. Nonetheless, evi-
idence filed with the District Court by
Michigan demonstrates that the criteria
tsed to evaluate transfer applications at
Michigan differ significantly from the cri-
Weria used to evaluate freshman undergradu-
-ate applications. Of special significance,
Michigan's 2000 freshman admissions poli-
Zy, for example, provides for 20 points to
be added to the selection index scores of
mninority applicants. See ante, at 2-3. In con-
orast, Michigan does not use points in its
:ransfer policy; some applicants, including
,ainority and socioeconomically disadvan-
-taged applicants, "will generally be admit-
tud" if they possess certain qualifications,
including a 2.5 undergraduate grade point
average (GPA), sophomore standing, and a
30 high school GPA. 10 Record 16 (Exh.
C). Because of these differences, Hamacher
abnnot base his right to complain about the
freshman admissions policy on his hypo-
,hetical injury under a wholly separate
transfer policy. For "[i]f the right to com-
plain of one administrative deficiency auto-
matically conferred the right to complain of
all administrative deficiencies, any citizen
aggrieved in one respect could bring the
whole structure of state administration
before the courts for review." Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 358-359,
n. 6 (1996) (emphasis in original); see
also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 999
(1982) ("[A] plaintiff who has been subject
to injurious conduct of one kind [does not]
possess by virtue of that injury the neces-
skry stake in litigating conduct of another
kind, although similar").'
Third, the differences between the fresh-
man and the transfer admissions policies
make it extremely unlikely, at best, that an
injunction requiring respondents to modify
the freshman admissions program would
have any impact on Michigan's transfer pol-
icy. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751
(1984) ("[R]elief from the injury must be
'likely' to follow from a favorable deci-
sion"); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 222 (1974)
('[T]he discrete factual context within
which the concrete injury occurred or is
threatened insures the framing of relief no
broader than required by the precise facts to
Which the court's ruling would be applied").
Tis is especially true in light of petition-
ers' unequivocal disavowal of any request
for equitable relief that would totally pre-
clude the use of race in the processing of
all admissions applications. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-15.
The majority asserts that petitioners
"have challenged any use of race by the
University in undergraduate admissions"
freshman and transfer alike. Ante, at 18, n.
16 (emphasis in original). Yet when ques-
tioned at oral argument about whether peti-
tioners' challenge would impact both
private and public universities, petitioners'
counsel stated: "Your Honor, I want to be
Blear about what it is that we're arguing for
here today. We are not suggesting an
absolute rule forbidding any use of race
under any circumstances. What we are
arguing is that the interest asserted here by
the University, this amorphous, ill-defined,
unlimited interest in diversity is not a com-
pelling interest." Tr. of Oral Arg. 14
(emphasis added). In addition, when asked
whether petitioners took the position that
the only permissible use of race is as a rem-
edy for past discrimination, petitioners'
lawyer stated: "I would not go that far... .
[T]here may be other reasons. I think they
would have to be extraordinary and rare...
." Id., at 15. Consistent with these state-
ments, petitioners' briefs filed with this
Court attack the University's asserted inter-
est in idiversityi but acknowledge that race
could be considered for remedial reasons.
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners 16-17.
Because Michigan's transfer policy was
not challenged by petitioners and is not
before this Court, see supra, at 5, we do not
know whether Michigan would defend its
transfer policy on diversity grounds, or
whether it might try to justify its transfer
policy on other grounds, such as a remedial
interest. Petitioners' counsel was therefore
incorrect in asserting at oral argument that
if the University's asserted interest in
"diversity" were to be "struck down as a
rationale, then the law would be [the] same
with respect to the transfer policy as with
respect to the original [freshman admis-
sions] policy." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7- 8. And the
majority is likewise mistaken in assuming
that "the University's use of race in under-
graduate transfer admissions does not
implicate a significantly different set of
concerns than does its use of race in under-
graduate freshman admissions." Ante, at 16.
Because the transfer policy has never been
the subject of this suit, we simply do not
know (1) whether Michigan would defend
its transfer policy on "diversity" grounds or
some other grounds, or (2) how the absence
of a point system in the transfer policy
might impact a narrow tailoring analysis of
that policy.
At bottom, petitioners' interest in obtain-
ing an injunction for the benefit of younger
third parties is comparable to that of the
unemancipated minor who had no standing
to litigate on behalf of older women in H.
L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 406-407
(1981), or that of the Medicaid patients
transferred to less intensive care who had
no standing to litigate on behalf of patients
objecting to transfers to more intensive care
facilities in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S., at
1001. To have standing, it is elementary
that the petitioners' own interests must be
implicated. Because neither petitioner has a
personal stake in this suit for prospective
relief, neither has standing.
III
It is true that the petitioners' complaint
was filed as a class action and that
Hamacher has been certified as the repre-
sentative of a class, some of whose mem-
bers may well have standing to challenge
the LSA freshman admissions program that
is presently ineffect. But the fact that "a
suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing
to the question of-standing, for even named
plaintiffs who represent a class.6must
allege 'and show that they per onally h'ave
been injured, not that injury has been suf-
fered by other, unidentified members of the
class to which they belong and which they
purport to represent."' Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26,
40, n. 20 (1976) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975)); see also 1 A.
Conte & H. Newberg, Class Actions ยง2:5
(4th ed. 2002) ("[O]ne cannot acquire indi-
vidual standing by virtue of bringing a
class action").' Thus, in Blum, we squarely
held that the interests of members of the
class could not satisfy the requirement that
the class representatives have a personal
interest in obtaining the particular equitable
relief being sought. The class in Blum
included patients who wanted a hearing
before being transferred to facilities where
they would receive more intensive care. The
class representatives, however, were in the
category of patients threatened with a trans-
fer to less intensive care facilities. In
explaining why the named class representa-
tives could not base their standing to sue on
the injury suffered by other members of the
class, we stated:
"Respondents suggest that members of
the class they represent have been trans-
ferred to higher levels of care as a result of
[utilization review committee] decisions.
Respondents, however, 'must allege and
show that they personally have been
injured, not that injury has been suffered by
other, unidentified members of the class to
which they belong and which they purport
to represent.' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 502 (1975). Unless these individuals
can thus demonstrate the requisite case or
controversy between themselves personally
and [petitioners], "none may seek relief on
behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S.
488, 494 (1974).' Ibid." 457 U. S., at 1001,
n. 13.
Much like the class representatives in
Blum, Hamacherbthe sole class representa-
tive in this cased cannot meet Article III's
threshold personal-stake requirement.
While unidentified members of the class he
represents may well have standing to chal-
lenge Michigan's current freshman admis-
sions policy, Hamacher cannot base his
standing to sue on injuries suffered by other
members of the class.
IV
As this case comes to us, our precedents
leave us no alternative but to dismiss the
writ for lack of jurisdiction. Neither peti-
tioner has a personal stake in the outcome
of the case, and neither has standing to seek
prospective relief on behalf of unidentified
class members who may or may not have
standing to litigate on behalf of themselves.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1. In challenging the use of race in
admissions at Michigan's law school, Bar-
bara Grutter alleged in her complaint that
she "has not attended any other law school"
and that she "still desires to attend the Law
School and become a lawyer." App. in No.
02-241, p. 30.
2. Petitioners did not seek to have Gratz
represent the class pursuant to Federal Rule
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). See App. 71, n. 3.
3. In arguing that Hamacher lacked
standing, Michigan also asserted that
Hamacher "would need to achieve a 3.0
grade point average to attempt to transfer to
the University of Michigan." Id., at 64, n. 2.
The District Court rejected this argument,
concluding that "Hamacheris present
grades are not a factor to be considered at
this time." Id., at 67.
4. In responding to questions about peti-
tioners' standing at oral argument, petition-
ers' counsel alluded to the fact that
Michigan might continually change the
details of its admissions policy. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 9. The change in Michigan's
freshman admissions policy, however, is not
the reason why petitioners cannot establish
standing to seek prospective relief. Rather,
the reason they lack standing to seek for-
ward-looking relief is that when this suit
was filed, neither faced a "real and immedi-
ate threat" of future injury under Michi-
gan's freshman admissions policy given that
they had both already enrolled at other
institutions. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pea, 515 U. S. 200, 210 (1995) (quoting
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 105
(1983)). Their decision to obtain a college
education elsewhere distinguishes this case
from Allan Bakke's single-minded pursuit
of a medical education from the University
of California at Davis. See Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); cf.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974)
(per curiam).
5. Hamacher clearly can no longer claim
an intent to transfer into Michigan's under-
graduate program given that he graduated
from college in 2001. However, this fact
alone is not necessarily fatal to the instant
class action because we have recognized
that, if a named class representative has
standing at the time a suit is initiated, class
actions may proceed in some instances fol-
lowing mootness of the named class repre-
sentative's claim. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975) (holding that the
requisite Article III "case or controversy"
may exist "between a named defendant and
a member of the class represented by the
named plaintiff, even though the claim of
the named plaintiff has become moot");
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S.
747 (1976). The problem in this case is that
neither Gratz nor Hamacher had standing to
assert a forward-looking, injunctive claim
in federal court at the time this suit was ini-
tiated.
6. Under the majority's view of standing,
there would be no end to Hamacher's abili-
ty to challenge any use of race by the Uni-
versity in a variety of programs. For if
Hamacher's right to complain about the
transfer policy gives him standing to chal-
lenge the freshman policy, presumably his
ability to complain about the transfer poli-
cy likewise would enable him to challenge
Meichigat' rlaw schol mi fislons policy,
as well: as any other race-based admissions
policy usedhby Michiga..
7. Of -course, th injury tb Hamacher
would give him standing to claim damages
for past harm on behalf of class members,
but he was certified as the class representa-
tive for the limited purpose of seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief.
7-8)). I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS's
critique that the Court thus ignores the
basic principle of Article III standing that a
plaintiff cannot challenge a government
program that does not apply to him. See
ante, at 6, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion).'
But even on the Court's indulgent stand-
ing theory, the decision should not go
beyond a recognition that diversity can
serve as a compelling state interest justify-
ing race-conscious decisions in education.
Ante, at 20 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger,
post, at 15-21). Since, as the Court says,
"petitioners did not raise a narrow tailoring
challenge to the transfer policy," ante, at
18, n. 16, our decision in Grutter is fatal to
Hamacher's sole attack upon the transfer
policy, which is the only policy before this
Court that he claims aggrieved him.
Hamacher's challenge to that policy having
failed, his standing is presumably spent.
The further question whether the freshman
admissions plan is narrowly tailored to
achieving student body diversity remains
legally irrelevant to Hamacher and should
await a plaintiff who is actually hurt by it.'
II
The cases now contain two pointers
toward the line between the valid and the
unconstitutional in race-conscious admis-
sions schemes. Grutter reaffirms the per-
missibility of individualized consideration
of race to achieve a diversity of students, at
least where race is not assigned a preor-
dained value in all cases. On the other
hand, Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265
(1978), rules out a racial quota or set-aside,
in which race is the sole fact of eligibility
for certain places in a class. Although the
freshman admissions system here is subject
to argument on the merits, I think it is clos-
er to what Grutter approves than to what
Bakke condemns, and should not be held
unconstitutional on the current record.
The record does not describe a system
with a quota like the one struck down in
Bakke, which "insulate[d]" all nonminority
candidates from competition from certain
seats. Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of
Powell, J.); see also Richmond v. J A. Cro-
son Co., 488 U. S. 469, 496 (1989) (plurali-
ty opinion) (stating that Bakke invalidated
"a plan that completely eliminated nonmi-
norities from consideration for a specified
percentage of opportunities"). The Bakke
plan "focused solely on ethnic diversity"
and effectively told nonminority applicants
that "[n]o matter how strong their qualifi-
cations, quantitative and extracurricular,
including their own potential for contribu-
tion to educational diversity, they are never
afforded the chance to compete with appli-
cants from the preferred groups for the
[set-aside] special admissions seats."
Bakke, supra, at 315, 319 (opinion of Pow-
ell, J.) (emphasis in original).
The plan here, in contrast, lets all appli-
cants compete for all places and values an
applicant's offering for any place not only
on grounds of race, but ii 'gimade test
scores, strength of high school, quality-of
course of study, residence, alumni relation-
ships,'le dership, persohal character,
socioeconomic disadvantage, athletic abili-
ty, and quality of a personal essay. Ante, at
6. A nonminority applicant who scores
highly in these other categories can readily
garner a selection index exceeding that of a
minority applicant who gets the 20-point
bonus. Cf. Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U. S. 616,
638 (1987) (upholding a program in which
gender "was but one of numerous factors
[taken] into account in arriving at [a] deci-
sion" because "[n]o persons are automati-
cally excluded from consideration; all are
able to have their qualifications weighed
against those of other applicants" (empha-
sis deleted)).
Subject to one qualification to be taken
up below, this scheme of considering,
through the selection index system, all of
the characteristics that the college thinks
relevant to student diversity for every one
of the student places to be filled fits Justice
Powell's description of a constitutionally
acceptable program: one that considers "all
pertinent elements of diversity in light of
the particular qualifications of each appli-
cant" and places each element "on the same
footing for consideration, although not nec-
essarily according them the same weight."
Bakke, supra, at 317. In the Court's own
words, "each characteristic of a particular
applicant [is] considered in assessing the
applicant's entire application." Ante, at 23.
An unsuccessful nonminority applicant
cannot complain that he was rejected "sim-
ply because he was not the right color"; an
applicant who is rejected because "his com-
bined qualifications . . . did not outweigh
those of the other applicant" has been given
an opportunity to compete with all other
applicants. Bakke, supra, at 318 (opinion of
Powell, J.).
The one qualification to this description
of the admissions process is that member-
ship in an underrepresented minority is
given a weight of 20 points on the 150-
point scale. On the face of things, however,
this assignment of specific points does not
set race apart from all other weighted con-
siderations. Nonminority students may
receive 20 points for athletic ability, socioe-
conomic disadvantage, attendance at a
socioeconomically disadvantaged or pre-
dominantly minority high school, or at the
Provost's discretion; they may also receive
10 points for being residents of Michigan, 6
for residence in an underrepresented Michi-
gan county, 5 for leadership and service,
and so on.
The Court nonetheless finds fault with a
scheme that "automatically" distributes 20
points to minority applicants because "[t]he
only consideration that accompanies this
distribution of points is a factual review of
an application to determine whether an
individual is a member of one of these
minority groups." Ante, at 23. The objection
goes to the use of points to quantify and
compare characteristics, or to the number
of points awarded due to race, but on either
reading the objection is mistaken.
The very nature of a college's permissible
practice of awarding value to racial diversi-
ty means that race must be considered in a
way that increases some applicants' chances
for admission. Since college admission is
not left entirely to inarticulate intuition, it
is hard to see what is inappropriate in
assigning some stated value to a relevant
characteristic, whether it be reasoning aii-
ty, writing style, running speed, or minority
race. Justice Powell's plus factors necessari-
ly are assigned some values. The college
simply does by a numbered scale what the
law school accomplishes in its "holistic
review," Grutter, post, at 25; the distinction
does not imply that applicants to the under-
graduate college are denied individualized
consideration or a fair chance to compete
on the basis of all the various merits their
applications may disclose.
Nor is it possible to say that the 20 points
convert race into a decisive factor compara-
ble to reserving minority places as in
Bakke. Of course we can conceive of a
point system in which the "plus" factor
given to minority applicants would be so
extreme as to guarantee every minority
applicant a higher rank than every nonmi-
nority applicant in the university's admis-
sions system, see 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53
(opinion of Powell, J.). But petitioners do
not have a convincing argument that the
freshman admissions system operates this
way. The present record obviously shows
that nonminority applicants may achieve
higher selection point totals than minority
applicants owing to characteristics other
than race, and the fact that the university
admits "virtually every qualified underrep-
resented minority applicant," App. to Pet.
for Cert. IlIla, may reflect nothing more
than the likelihood that very few qualified
minority applicants apply, Brief for
Respondents Bollinger et al. 39, as well as
the possibility that self-selection results in
a strong minority applicant pool. It suffices
for me, as it did for the District Court, that
there are no Bakke-like set-asides and that
consideration of an applicant's whole spec-
trum of ability is no more ruled out by giv-
ing 20 points for race than by giving the
same points for athletic ability or socioeco-
nomic disadvantage.
Any argument that the "tailoring"
amounts to a set-aside, then, boils down to
the claim that a plus factor of 20 points
makes some observers suspicious, where a
factor of 10 points might not. But suspicion
does not carry petitioners' ultimate burden
of persuasion in this constitutional chal-
lenge, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.
S. 267, 287-288 (1986) (plurality opinion
of Powell, J.), and it surely does not warrant
condemning the college's admissions
scheme on this record. Because the District
Court (correctly, in my view) did not
believe that the specific point assignment
was constitutionally troubling, it made only
limited and general findings on other char-
acteristics of the university's admissions
practice, such as the conduct of individual-
ized review by the Admissions Review
Committee. 122 F. Supp. 2d 8[l, 82-830
(ED Mich. 2000). At the Court-indicates,
we know very little about the actual role of
the revie* committee. Ante, at 6("The
record does not reveal precisely how many
applications are flagged for this individual-
ized consideration [by the committee]");
see also ante, at 4 (O'CONNOR, J., concur-
ring) ("The evidence in the record ..
reveals very little about how the review
committee actually functions"). The point
system cannot operate as a de factoset-
aside if the greater admissions process,
including review by the committee, results
in individualized review sufficient to meet
the Court's standards. Since the record is
quiet, if not silent, on the case-by-case
work of the committee, the Court would be
on more defensible ground by vacating and
remanding for evidence about the commit-
tee's specific determinations.'
Without knowing more about how the
Admissions Review Committee actually
functions, it seems especially unfair to treat
the candor of the admissions plan as an
Achilles' heel. In contrast to the college's
forthrightness in saying just what plus fac-
tor it gives for membership in an underrep-
resented minority, it is worth considering
the character of one alternative thrown up
as preferable, because supposedly not based
on race. Drawing on admissions systems
used at public universities in California,
Florida, and Texas, the United States con-
tends that Michigan could get student
diversity in satisfaction of its compelling
interest by guaranteeing admission to a
fixed percentage of the top students from
each high school in Michigan. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 18; Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, O. T. 2002, No. 02-241,
pp. 13-17.
While there is nothing unconstitutional
about such a practice, it nonetheless suffers
from a serious disadvantage.4 It is the dis-
advantage of deliberate obfuscation. The
"percentage plans" are just as race con-
scious as the point scheme (and fairly so),
but they get their racially diverse results
without saying directly what they are doing
or why they are doing it. In contrast, Michi-
gan states its purpose directly and, if this
were a doubtful case for me, I would be
tempted to give Michigan an extra point of
its own for its frankness. Equal protection
cannot become an exercise in which the
winners are the ones who hide the ball.
III
If this plan were challenged by a plaintiff
with proper standing under Article III, I
would affirm the judgment of the District
Court granting summary judgment to the
college. As it is, I would vacate the judg-
ment for lack of jurisdiction, and I respect-
fully dissent.
1. The Court's holding arguably exposes
a weakness in the rule of Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U. S. 991 (1982), that Article III stand-
ing may not be satisfied by the unnamed
members of a duly certified class. But no
party has invited us to reconsider Blum, and
I follow JUSTICE STEVENS in approach-
ing the case on the assumption that Blum is
settled law.
JUSTICE DAVID SOUTER, with whom
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG
joins as to Part II, dissenting.
I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that
Patrick Hamacher has no standing to seek
declaratory or injunctive relief against a
freshman admissions policy that will never
cause him any harm. I write separately to
note that even the Court's new gloss on the
law of standing should not permit it to
reach the issue it decides today. And
because a majority of the Court has chosen
to address the merits, I also add a word to
say that even if the merits were reachable, I
would dissent from the Court's judgment.
I
The Court's finding of Article III stand-
ing rests on two propositions: first, that
both the University of Michigan's under-
graduate college's transfer policy and its
freshman admissions policy seek to achieve
student body diversity through the "use of
race," ante, at 12-20, and second, that
Hamacher has standing to challenge the
transfer policy on the grounds that diversity
can never be a "compelling state interest"
justifying the use of race in any admissions
decision, freshman or transfer, ante, at 18.
The Court concludes that, because
Hamacher's argument, if successful, would
seal the fate of both policies, his standing
to challenge the transfer policy also allows
him to attack the freshman admissions poli-
cy. Ante, at 18, n. 16 ("[P]etitioners chal-
lenged any use of race by the University to
promote diversity, including through the
transfer policy"); ibid. ("'[T]he University
considers race for a purpose to achieve a
diversity that we believe is not compelling,
and if that is struck down as a rationale,
then the [result] would be [the] same with
respect to the transfer policy as with
respect to the [freshman] admissions policy,
Your Honor"' (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg.