ADMISSIONS ON TRIAL The Michigan Daily - Tuesday, June 24, 2003 - 12 and 1996 respectively. See Brief for respondents 5, n. 7. Accordingly, we have .before us only that portion of the District "Courtis judgment that upheld Michigan's -sew freshman admissions policy. 4 II Both Hamacher and Gratz, of course, -Nave standing to seek damages as compen- Sation for the alleged wrongful denial of .their respective applications under Michi- gan's old freshman admissions system. {,however, like the plaintiff in Los Angeles v. iLyons, 461 U. S. 95 (1983), who had stand- Z3lsg to recover damages caused by "choke- !*olds" administered by the police in the past but had no standing to seek injunctive 'selief preventing future chokeholds, peti- tioners' past injuries do not give them lhtanding to obtain injunctive relief to pro- rect third parties from similar harms. See =id., at 102 ("[P]ast exposure to illegal con- iduct does not in itself show a present case 4er controversy regarding injunctive relief . . i, if unaccompanied by any continuing, pres- ent adverse effects" (quoting O'Shea v. Lit- tleton, 414 U. S. 488, 495496 (1974))). To seek forward-looking, injunctive relief, petitioners must show that they face an #imminent threat of future injury. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pea, 515 U. . 200, 210-211 (1995). This they cannot xo given that when this suit was filed, nei- ther faced an impending threat of future injury based on Michigan's new freshman 'admissions policy.' Even though there is not a scintilla of -avidence that the freshman admissions pro- ,gram now being administered by respon- dents will ever have any impact on either +4amacher or Gratz, petitioers nonetheless argue that Hamacher has a personal stake in 3his suit because at the time the complaint vas filed, Hamacher intended to apply to ttransfer to Michigan once certain admission policy changes occurred.' See App. 34; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. Petitioners' ittempt to base Hamacher's standing in this Xuit on a hypothetical transfer application fails for several reasons. First, there is no lewidence that Hamacher ever actually applied for admission as a transfer student .t Michigan. His claim of future injury is at 'Vest "conjectural or hypothetical" rather -han "real and immediate." O'Shea v. Little- iwn, 414 U. S., at 494 (internal quotation narks omitted); see also Lujan v. Defenders af Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992). ;-Second, as petitioner's counsel conceded Ati oral argument, the transfer policy is not before this Court and was not addressed by the District Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5 4admitting that "[t]he transfer admissions policy itself is not before youthe Court"). :Unlike the University's frdshman policy, Which is detailed at great length in the Joint Appendix filed with this Court, the specifics of the transfer policy are conspic- ,uously missing from the Joint Appendix filed with this Court. Furthermore, the ltassfer-policy is notdiseussed anywhere in l41e parties' briefs. Nor is it ever even refer- enced in the District Court's Dec. 13, 2000, .pinion that upheld Michigan's new fresh- pman admissions policy'ahd st'ack dbwn Michigan's old policy. Nonetheless, evi- idence filed with the District Court by Michigan demonstrates that the criteria tsed to evaluate transfer applications at Michigan differ significantly from the cri- Weria used to evaluate freshman undergradu- -ate applications. Of special significance, Michigan's 2000 freshman admissions poli- Zy, for example, provides for 20 points to be added to the selection index scores of mninority applicants. See ante, at 2-3. In con- orast, Michigan does not use points in its :ransfer policy; some applicants, including ,ainority and socioeconomically disadvan- -taged applicants, "will generally be admit- tud" if they possess certain qualifications, including a 2.5 undergraduate grade point average (GPA), sophomore standing, and a 30 high school GPA. 10 Record 16 (Exh. C). Because of these differences, Hamacher abnnot base his right to complain about the freshman admissions policy on his hypo- ,hetical injury under a wholly separate transfer policy. For "[i]f the right to com- plain of one administrative deficiency auto- matically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 358-359, n. 6 (1996) (emphasis in original); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 999 (1982) ("[A] plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of one kind [does not] possess by virtue of that injury the neces- skry stake in litigating conduct of another kind, although similar").' Third, the differences between the fresh- man and the transfer admissions policies make it extremely unlikely, at best, that an injunction requiring respondents to modify the freshman admissions program would have any impact on Michigan's transfer pol- icy. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984) ("[R]elief from the injury must be 'likely' to follow from a favorable deci- sion"); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 222 (1974) ('[T]he discrete factual context within which the concrete injury occurred or is threatened insures the framing of relief no broader than required by the precise facts to Which the court's ruling would be applied"). Tis is especially true in light of petition- ers' unequivocal disavowal of any request for equitable relief that would totally pre- clude the use of race in the processing of all admissions applications. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15. The majority asserts that petitioners "have challenged any use of race by the University in undergraduate admissions" freshman and transfer alike. Ante, at 18, n. 16 (emphasis in original). Yet when ques- tioned at oral argument about whether peti- tioners' challenge would impact both private and public universities, petitioners' counsel stated: "Your Honor, I want to be Blear about what it is that we're arguing for here today. We are not suggesting an absolute rule forbidding any use of race under any circumstances. What we are arguing is that the interest asserted here by the University, this amorphous, ill-defined, unlimited interest in diversity is not a com- pelling interest." Tr. of Oral Arg. 14 (emphasis added). In addition, when asked whether petitioners took the position that the only permissible use of race is as a rem- edy for past discrimination, petitioners' lawyer stated: "I would not go that far... . [T]here may be other reasons. I think they would have to be extraordinary and rare... ." Id., at 15. Consistent with these state- ments, petitioners' briefs filed with this Court attack the University's asserted inter- est in idiversityi but acknowledge that race could be considered for remedial reasons. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners 16-17. Because Michigan's transfer policy was not challenged by petitioners and is not before this Court, see supra, at 5, we do not know whether Michigan would defend its transfer policy on diversity grounds, or whether it might try to justify its transfer policy on other grounds, such as a remedial interest. Petitioners' counsel was therefore incorrect in asserting at oral argument that if the University's asserted interest in "diversity" were to be "struck down as a rationale, then the law would be [the] same with respect to the transfer policy as with respect to the original [freshman admis- sions] policy." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7- 8. And the majority is likewise mistaken in assuming that "the University's use of race in under- graduate transfer admissions does not implicate a significantly different set of concerns than does its use of race in under- graduate freshman admissions." Ante, at 16. Because the transfer policy has never been the subject of this suit, we simply do not know (1) whether Michigan would defend its transfer policy on "diversity" grounds or some other grounds, or (2) how the absence of a point system in the transfer policy might impact a narrow tailoring analysis of that policy. At bottom, petitioners' interest in obtain- ing an injunction for the benefit of younger third parties is comparable to that of the unemancipated minor who had no standing to litigate on behalf of older women in H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 406-407 (1981), or that of the Medicaid patients transferred to less intensive care who had no standing to litigate on behalf of patients objecting to transfers to more intensive care facilities in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S., at 1001. To have standing, it is elementary that the petitioners' own interests must be implicated. Because neither petitioner has a personal stake in this suit for prospective relief, neither has standing. III It is true that the petitioners' complaint was filed as a class action and that Hamacher has been certified as the repre- sentative of a class, some of whose mem- bers may well have standing to challenge the LSA freshman admissions program that is presently ineffect. But the fact that "a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question of-standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class.6must allege 'and show that they per onally h'ave been injured, not that injury has been suf- fered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent."' Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 40, n. 20 (1976) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975)); see also 1 A. Conte & H. Newberg, Class Actions ยง2:5 (4th ed. 2002) ("[O]ne cannot acquire indi- vidual standing by virtue of bringing a class action").' Thus, in Blum, we squarely held that the interests of members of the class could not satisfy the requirement that the class representatives have a personal interest in obtaining the particular equitable relief being sought. The class in Blum included patients who wanted a hearing before being transferred to facilities where they would receive more intensive care. The class representatives, however, were in the category of patients threatened with a trans- fer to less intensive care facilities. In explaining why the named class representa- tives could not base their standing to sue on the injury suffered by other members of the class, we stated: "Respondents suggest that members of the class they represent have been trans- ferred to higher levels of care as a result of [utilization review committee] decisions. Respondents, however, 'must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975). Unless these individuals can thus demonstrate the requisite case or controversy between themselves personally and [petitioners], "none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).' Ibid." 457 U. S., at 1001, n. 13. Much like the class representatives in Blum, Hamacherbthe sole class representa- tive in this cased cannot meet Article III's threshold personal-stake requirement. While unidentified members of the class he represents may well have standing to chal- lenge Michigan's current freshman admis- sions policy, Hamacher cannot base his standing to sue on injuries suffered by other members of the class. IV As this case comes to us, our precedents leave us no alternative but to dismiss the writ for lack of jurisdiction. Neither peti- tioner has a personal stake in the outcome of the case, and neither has standing to seek prospective relief on behalf of unidentified class members who may or may not have standing to litigate on behalf of themselves. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 1. In challenging the use of race in admissions at Michigan's law school, Bar- bara Grutter alleged in her complaint that she "has not attended any other law school" and that she "still desires to attend the Law School and become a lawyer." App. in No. 02-241, p. 30. 2. Petitioners did not seek to have Gratz represent the class pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). See App. 71, n. 3. 3. In arguing that Hamacher lacked standing, Michigan also asserted that Hamacher "would need to achieve a 3.0 grade point average to attempt to transfer to the University of Michigan." Id., at 64, n. 2. The District Court rejected this argument, concluding that "Hamacheris present grades are not a factor to be considered at this time." Id., at 67. 4. In responding to questions about peti- tioners' standing at oral argument, petition- ers' counsel alluded to the fact that Michigan might continually change the details of its admissions policy. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. The change in Michigan's freshman admissions policy, however, is not the reason why petitioners cannot establish standing to seek prospective relief. Rather, the reason they lack standing to seek for- ward-looking relief is that when this suit was filed, neither faced a "real and immedi- ate threat" of future injury under Michi- gan's freshman admissions policy given that they had both already enrolled at other institutions. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pea, 515 U. S. 200, 210 (1995) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 105 (1983)). Their decision to obtain a college education elsewhere distinguishes this case from Allan Bakke's single-minded pursuit of a medical education from the University of California at Davis. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974) (per curiam). 5. Hamacher clearly can no longer claim an intent to transfer into Michigan's under- graduate program given that he graduated from college in 2001. However, this fact alone is not necessarily fatal to the instant class action because we have recognized that, if a named class representative has standing at the time a suit is initiated, class actions may proceed in some instances fol- lowing mootness of the named class repre- sentative's claim. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975) (holding that the requisite Article III "case or controversy" may exist "between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot"); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). The problem in this case is that neither Gratz nor Hamacher had standing to assert a forward-looking, injunctive claim in federal court at the time this suit was ini- tiated. 6. Under the majority's view of standing, there would be no end to Hamacher's abili- ty to challenge any use of race by the Uni- versity in a variety of programs. For if Hamacher's right to complain about the transfer policy gives him standing to chal- lenge the freshman policy, presumably his ability to complain about the transfer poli- cy likewise would enable him to challenge Meichigat' rlaw schol mi fislons policy, as well: as any other race-based admissions policy usedhby Michiga.. 7. Of -course, th injury tb Hamacher would give him standing to claim damages for past harm on behalf of class members, but he was certified as the class representa- tive for the limited purpose of seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. 7-8)). I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS's critique that the Court thus ignores the basic principle of Article III standing that a plaintiff cannot challenge a government program that does not apply to him. See ante, at 6, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion).' But even on the Court's indulgent stand- ing theory, the decision should not go beyond a recognition that diversity can serve as a compelling state interest justify- ing race-conscious decisions in education. Ante, at 20 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, post, at 15-21). Since, as the Court says, "petitioners did not raise a narrow tailoring challenge to the transfer policy," ante, at 18, n. 16, our decision in Grutter is fatal to Hamacher's sole attack upon the transfer policy, which is the only policy before this Court that he claims aggrieved him. Hamacher's challenge to that policy having failed, his standing is presumably spent. The further question whether the freshman admissions plan is narrowly tailored to achieving student body diversity remains legally irrelevant to Hamacher and should await a plaintiff who is actually hurt by it.' II The cases now contain two pointers toward the line between the valid and the unconstitutional in race-conscious admis- sions schemes. Grutter reaffirms the per- missibility of individualized consideration of race to achieve a diversity of students, at least where race is not assigned a preor- dained value in all cases. On the other hand, Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), rules out a racial quota or set-aside, in which race is the sole fact of eligibility for certain places in a class. Although the freshman admissions system here is subject to argument on the merits, I think it is clos- er to what Grutter approves than to what Bakke condemns, and should not be held unconstitutional on the current record. The record does not describe a system with a quota like the one struck down in Bakke, which "insulate[d]" all nonminority candidates from competition from certain seats. Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.); see also Richmond v. J A. Cro- son Co., 488 U. S. 469, 496 (1989) (plurali- ty opinion) (stating that Bakke invalidated "a plan that completely eliminated nonmi- norities from consideration for a specified percentage of opportunities"). The Bakke plan "focused solely on ethnic diversity" and effectively told nonminority applicants that "[n]o matter how strong their qualifi- cations, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribu- tion to educational diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with appli- cants from the preferred groups for the [set-aside] special admissions seats." Bakke, supra, at 315, 319 (opinion of Pow- ell, J.) (emphasis in original). The plan here, in contrast, lets all appli- cants compete for all places and values an applicant's offering for any place not only on grounds of race, but ii 'gimade test scores, strength of high school, quality-of course of study, residence, alumni relation- ships,'le dership, persohal character, socioeconomic disadvantage, athletic abili- ty, and quality of a personal essay. Ante, at 6. A nonminority applicant who scores highly in these other categories can readily garner a selection index exceeding that of a minority applicant who gets the 20-point bonus. Cf. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U. S. 616, 638 (1987) (upholding a program in which gender "was but one of numerous factors [taken] into account in arriving at [a] deci- sion" because "[n]o persons are automati- cally excluded from consideration; all are able to have their qualifications weighed against those of other applicants" (empha- sis deleted)). Subject to one qualification to be taken up below, this scheme of considering, through the selection index system, all of the characteristics that the college thinks relevant to student diversity for every one of the student places to be filled fits Justice Powell's description of a constitutionally acceptable program: one that considers "all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each appli- cant" and places each element "on the same footing for consideration, although not nec- essarily according them the same weight." Bakke, supra, at 317. In the Court's own words, "each characteristic of a particular applicant [is] considered in assessing the applicant's entire application." Ante, at 23. An unsuccessful nonminority applicant cannot complain that he was rejected "sim- ply because he was not the right color"; an applicant who is rejected because "his com- bined qualifications . . . did not outweigh those of the other applicant" has been given an opportunity to compete with all other applicants. Bakke, supra, at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.). The one qualification to this description of the admissions process is that member- ship in an underrepresented minority is given a weight of 20 points on the 150- point scale. On the face of things, however, this assignment of specific points does not set race apart from all other weighted con- siderations. Nonminority students may receive 20 points for athletic ability, socioe- conomic disadvantage, attendance at a socioeconomically disadvantaged or pre- dominantly minority high school, or at the Provost's discretion; they may also receive 10 points for being residents of Michigan, 6 for residence in an underrepresented Michi- gan county, 5 for leadership and service, and so on. The Court nonetheless finds fault with a scheme that "automatically" distributes 20 points to minority applicants because "[t]he only consideration that accompanies this distribution of points is a factual review of an application to determine whether an individual is a member of one of these minority groups." Ante, at 23. The objection goes to the use of points to quantify and compare characteristics, or to the number of points awarded due to race, but on either reading the objection is mistaken. The very nature of a college's permissible practice of awarding value to racial diversi- ty means that race must be considered in a way that increases some applicants' chances for admission. Since college admission is not left entirely to inarticulate intuition, it is hard to see what is inappropriate in assigning some stated value to a relevant characteristic, whether it be reasoning aii- ty, writing style, running speed, or minority race. Justice Powell's plus factors necessari- ly are assigned some values. The college simply does by a numbered scale what the law school accomplishes in its "holistic review," Grutter, post, at 25; the distinction does not imply that applicants to the under- graduate college are denied individualized consideration or a fair chance to compete on the basis of all the various merits their applications may disclose. Nor is it possible to say that the 20 points convert race into a decisive factor compara- ble to reserving minority places as in Bakke. Of course we can conceive of a point system in which the "plus" factor given to minority applicants would be so extreme as to guarantee every minority applicant a higher rank than every nonmi- nority applicant in the university's admis- sions system, see 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53 (opinion of Powell, J.). But petitioners do not have a convincing argument that the freshman admissions system operates this way. The present record obviously shows that nonminority applicants may achieve higher selection point totals than minority applicants owing to characteristics other than race, and the fact that the university admits "virtually every qualified underrep- resented minority applicant," App. to Pet. for Cert. IlIla, may reflect nothing more than the likelihood that very few qualified minority applicants apply, Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 39, as well as the possibility that self-selection results in a strong minority applicant pool. It suffices for me, as it did for the District Court, that there are no Bakke-like set-asides and that consideration of an applicant's whole spec- trum of ability is no more ruled out by giv- ing 20 points for race than by giving the same points for athletic ability or socioeco- nomic disadvantage. Any argument that the "tailoring" amounts to a set-aside, then, boils down to the claim that a plus factor of 20 points makes some observers suspicious, where a factor of 10 points might not. But suspicion does not carry petitioners' ultimate burden of persuasion in this constitutional chal- lenge, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 287-288 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.), and it surely does not warrant condemning the college's admissions scheme on this record. Because the District Court (correctly, in my view) did not believe that the specific point assignment was constitutionally troubling, it made only limited and general findings on other char- acteristics of the university's admissions practice, such as the conduct of individual- ized review by the Admissions Review Committee. 122 F. Supp. 2d 8[l, 82-830 (ED Mich. 2000). At the Court-indicates, we know very little about the actual role of the revie* committee. Ante, at 6("The record does not reveal precisely how many applications are flagged for this individual- ized consideration [by the committee]"); see also ante, at 4 (O'CONNOR, J., concur- ring) ("The evidence in the record .. reveals very little about how the review committee actually functions"). The point system cannot operate as a de factoset- aside if the greater admissions process, including review by the committee, results in individualized review sufficient to meet the Court's standards. Since the record is quiet, if not silent, on the case-by-case work of the committee, the Court would be on more defensible ground by vacating and remanding for evidence about the commit- tee's specific determinations.' Without knowing more about how the Admissions Review Committee actually functions, it seems especially unfair to treat the candor of the admissions plan as an Achilles' heel. In contrast to the college's forthrightness in saying just what plus fac- tor it gives for membership in an underrep- resented minority, it is worth considering the character of one alternative thrown up as preferable, because supposedly not based on race. Drawing on admissions systems used at public universities in California, Florida, and Texas, the United States con- tends that Michigan could get student diversity in satisfaction of its compelling interest by guaranteeing admission to a fixed percentage of the top students from each high school in Michigan. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Grut- ter v. Bollinger, O. T. 2002, No. 02-241, pp. 13-17. While there is nothing unconstitutional about such a practice, it nonetheless suffers from a serious disadvantage.4 It is the dis- advantage of deliberate obfuscation. The "percentage plans" are just as race con- scious as the point scheme (and fairly so), but they get their racially diverse results without saying directly what they are doing or why they are doing it. In contrast, Michi- gan states its purpose directly and, if this were a doubtful case for me, I would be tempted to give Michigan an extra point of its own for its frankness. Equal protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball. III If this plan were challenged by a plaintiff with proper standing under Article III, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court granting summary judgment to the college. As it is, I would vacate the judg- ment for lack of jurisdiction, and I respect- fully dissent. 1. The Court's holding arguably exposes a weakness in the rule of Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991 (1982), that Article III stand- ing may not be satisfied by the unnamed members of a duly certified class. But no party has invited us to reconsider Blum, and I follow JUSTICE STEVENS in approach- ing the case on the assumption that Blum is settled law. JUSTICE DAVID SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG joins as to Part II, dissenting. I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that Patrick Hamacher has no standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief against a freshman admissions policy that will never cause him any harm. I write separately to note that even the Court's new gloss on the law of standing should not permit it to reach the issue it decides today. And because a majority of the Court has chosen to address the merits, I also add a word to say that even if the merits were reachable, I would dissent from the Court's judgment. I The Court's finding of Article III stand- ing rests on two propositions: first, that both the University of Michigan's under- graduate college's transfer policy and its freshman admissions policy seek to achieve student body diversity through the "use of race," ante, at 12-20, and second, that Hamacher has standing to challenge the transfer policy on the grounds that diversity can never be a "compelling state interest" justifying the use of race in any admissions decision, freshman or transfer, ante, at 18. The Court concludes that, because Hamacher's argument, if successful, would seal the fate of both policies, his standing to challenge the transfer policy also allows him to attack the freshman admissions poli- cy. Ante, at 18, n. 16 ("[P]etitioners chal- lenged any use of race by the University to promote diversity, including through the transfer policy"); ibid. ("'[T]he University considers race for a purpose to achieve a diversity that we believe is not compelling, and if that is struck down as a rationale, then the [result] would be [the] same with respect to the transfer policy as with respect to the [freshman] admissions policy, Your Honor"' (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg.