OPINION
Page 6
Vol. XCIV, No. 3-S
94 Years of Editorial Freedom
Managed and Edited by Students at
The University of Michigan
Editorials represent a majority opinion of the
Daily Editorial Board
Vetrans settlement
misses the issue
Y ESTERDAY'S out-of-court settlement
between Vietnam war veterans and the
makers of Agent Orange is a victory for ser-
vicemen who were exposed to the defoliant,
but can hardly be considered an end to the
issue.
Seven chemical companies have agreed to
set up a $180 million fund payable to the 15,000
veterans who claimed injuries. However, the
settlement is far short of the billions originally
sought and seems inadequate to cover the
medical and emotional costs of the veterans,
their wives who experienced miscarriages,
and the chiildren born with birth defects and
those yet to be born.
More importantly, none of the defendant
companies admits liability for the injuries.
Even through a settlement was reached either
side can still sue the U.S. government. The
companies claim that it was the government
that set the specifications for Agent Orange
and should therefore share liability.
It is some progress that Vietnam
veterans can now begin to pay off their
medical bills, but it comes only after four
years of legal combat and fails to name the
one party most culpable for the injuries-the
U.S. government.
Unsigned editorials appearing on the
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majority opinion of the Daily's
Editorial Board.
A
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THE CHINA CARD
The Michigan Daily
U.S. mimics S. Africa
By Franz Schurmann
DOES THE Reagan admin- '
istration have a coherent
policy toward Central America?
One way of answering the
question is to look at another part
of the world that has been of
prime concern to U.S. national
security strategists since the
early 1970s-southern Africa.
There, events are moving in a
direction favorable 'to Pretoria
and Washington, and the strategy
that has produced the success
has some interesting
similarities-and differences-to
that of the United States in Cen-
tral America.
White-ruled South Africa,
through a policy of raw power
combined with a willingness to
talk, had just about brought
black-ruled Mozambique and
Angola to their knees.
But these moves came only af-
ter two years of destructive South
African forays into Angola and
the ravaging of Mozambique by
South African-fomented in-
surgencies. Already hard hit by
the decade-long drought,
Mozambique and Angola had no
choice but to come to terms with
South Africa.
The Reagan administration
can take some credit for the turn
of events in southern Africa.
Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs Chester Crocker
played a key role in bringing
them about through his
Kissinger-style shuttle
diplomacy. It would be naive to
believe that Reagan ad-
ministration national security
strategists have not imagined a
comparable solution for Central
America.
The parallels, in fact, are
striking. Nicaragua is com-
parable to Mozambique: both are
ruled, as Washington sees it, by
Marxist-Leninist regimes, and
both support revolutionary
groups in neighboring countries.
Why shouldn't South Africa's
strategy for ending Mozam-
bique's support for the African
National Congress (ANC) work
for the Reagan administration in
its efforts to end Nicaraguan
support of the Salvadoran
guerrillas?
While pounding Mazambique
and Angola mercillessly, South
Africa was willing to talk, with
the bottom-line condition that
ANC and SWAPO had to be
sacrificed. The Reagan ad-
ministration, too, always, has in-
sisted that it's willing to
talk-Richard Stone and Henry
Kissinger were sent to Central
America, the U.S. ambassador
remains in Managua, and
periodically Washington gives a
pat on the back to the peace effor-
ts of the Contadora countries. But
the U.S. has a bottom line, too,
like South Africa: Nicaragua's
abandonment of the Salvadoran
guerrillas.
The difference is that the
Salvadoran guerrillas are a more
serious threat to El Salvador than
SWAPO or ANC were for South
Africa. The guerrillas are getting
stronger, more numerous, more
entrenched, and the Salvadoran
army, already decaying through
desertion, is doing less and less
well in battle.
In addition, there is the
possibility, made thinkable after
Grenada, that the U.S. could
initiate some military action in
the comparatively low-risk
region of the Atlantic coast.
If the Reagan administration is
pursuing a South Africa-style
policy in Central America, then it
has a way to go before it can ex-
pect Nicaragua to acquiesce by
abandoning support for the
guerrillas. The Sandinistas have
a much wideir and better
organized popular base than the
Angola and Mozambique
regimes. And, more important,
the Sandinista army and militias
probably constitute the single
most effective armed forces in all
of Central America. It will
require a lot more pain from
Washington than so far inflicted
to bring Managua to its knees.
Many observers believe the
additional blows may come after
the election, assuming Ronald
Reagan wins. And until then,
there probably will be further
deterioration in El Salvador, fur-
ther mobilization by the San-
dinistas and further erosion of
public and congressional support
in the United States.
All this puts pressure on
Reagan to negotiate seriously
without the bottom-line condition.
Yet present signs, including the
U.S. maneuvers in Honduras and
increased Contra activity, in-
dicate that the administration is
taking the opposite course,
seeking some sort of "victory"
well before November so that it
can shake the growing sense that
we have, once again, waddled in-
to a Vietnam-style quagmire.
The policy may prove to be
coherent without being either
rational or likely to succeed.
Franz Schurmann, a
professor of history at the
University of California-
Berkeley, wrote this article for
Pacific News Service.
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