OPINION Page 6 Vol. XCIV, No. 3-S 94 Years of Editorial Freedom Managed and Edited by Students at The University of Michigan Editorials represent a majority opinion of the Daily Editorial Board Vetrans settlement misses the issue Y ESTERDAY'S out-of-court settlement between Vietnam war veterans and the makers of Agent Orange is a victory for ser- vicemen who were exposed to the defoliant, but can hardly be considered an end to the issue. Seven chemical companies have agreed to set up a $180 million fund payable to the 15,000 veterans who claimed injuries. However, the settlement is far short of the billions originally sought and seems inadequate to cover the medical and emotional costs of the veterans, their wives who experienced miscarriages, and the chiildren born with birth defects and those yet to be born. More importantly, none of the defendant companies admits liability for the injuries. Even through a settlement was reached either side can still sue the U.S. government. The companies claim that it was the government that set the specifications for Agent Orange and should therefore share liability. It is some progress that Vietnam veterans can now begin to pay off their medical bills, but it comes only after four years of legal combat and fails to name the one party most culpable for the injuries-the U.S. government. Unsigned editorials appearing on the left side of this page represent a majority opinion of the Daily's Editorial Board. A K 0" THE CHINA CARD The Michigan Daily U.S. mimics S. Africa By Franz Schurmann DOES THE Reagan admin- ' istration have a coherent policy toward Central America? One way of answering the question is to look at another part of the world that has been of prime concern to U.S. national security strategists since the early 1970s-southern Africa. There, events are moving in a direction favorable 'to Pretoria and Washington, and the strategy that has produced the success has some interesting similarities-and differences-to that of the United States in Cen- tral America. White-ruled South Africa, through a policy of raw power combined with a willingness to talk, had just about brought black-ruled Mozambique and Angola to their knees. But these moves came only af- ter two years of destructive South African forays into Angola and the ravaging of Mozambique by South African-fomented in- surgencies. Already hard hit by the decade-long drought, Mozambique and Angola had no choice but to come to terms with South Africa. The Reagan administration can take some credit for the turn of events in southern Africa. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker played a key role in bringing them about through his Kissinger-style shuttle diplomacy. It would be naive to believe that Reagan ad- ministration national security strategists have not imagined a comparable solution for Central America. The parallels, in fact, are striking. Nicaragua is com- parable to Mozambique: both are ruled, as Washington sees it, by Marxist-Leninist regimes, and both support revolutionary groups in neighboring countries. Why shouldn't South Africa's strategy for ending Mozam- bique's support for the African National Congress (ANC) work for the Reagan administration in its efforts to end Nicaraguan support of the Salvadoran guerrillas? While pounding Mazambique and Angola mercillessly, South Africa was willing to talk, with the bottom-line condition that ANC and SWAPO had to be sacrificed. The Reagan ad- ministration, too, always, has in- sisted that it's willing to talk-Richard Stone and Henry Kissinger were sent to Central America, the U.S. ambassador remains in Managua, and periodically Washington gives a pat on the back to the peace effor- ts of the Contadora countries. But the U.S. has a bottom line, too, like South Africa: Nicaragua's abandonment of the Salvadoran guerrillas. The difference is that the Salvadoran guerrillas are a more serious threat to El Salvador than SWAPO or ANC were for South Africa. The guerrillas are getting stronger, more numerous, more entrenched, and the Salvadoran army, already decaying through desertion, is doing less and less well in battle. In addition, there is the possibility, made thinkable after Grenada, that the U.S. could initiate some military action in the comparatively low-risk region of the Atlantic coast. If the Reagan administration is pursuing a South Africa-style policy in Central America, then it has a way to go before it can ex- pect Nicaragua to acquiesce by abandoning support for the guerrillas. The Sandinistas have a much wideir and better organized popular base than the Angola and Mozambique regimes. And, more important, the Sandinista army and militias probably constitute the single most effective armed forces in all of Central America. It will require a lot more pain from Washington than so far inflicted to bring Managua to its knees. Many observers believe the additional blows may come after the election, assuming Ronald Reagan wins. And until then, there probably will be further deterioration in El Salvador, fur- ther mobilization by the San- dinistas and further erosion of public and congressional support in the United States. All this puts pressure on Reagan to negotiate seriously without the bottom-line condition. Yet present signs, including the U.S. maneuvers in Honduras and increased Contra activity, in- dicate that the administration is taking the opposite course, seeking some sort of "victory" well before November so that it can shake the growing sense that we have, once again, waddled in- to a Vietnam-style quagmire. The policy may prove to be coherent without being either rational or likely to succeed. Franz Schurmann, a professor of history at the University of California- Berkeley, wrote this article for Pacific News Service. 4 4 Wasserman WALTER AONDLE D.-SN'T l4UNOW WNX T TOUBI-E lA' IN - NOW W'E WA~Y BEHIND RIMt ot'Th S TT~e M FOMr SUROUND)ED Q ... ,. ,. ,.z - . , . .