.
6 s
tttpop art
(Continued from preceding page)
which he emulates in his own way. It
is these artists who need to be considered
in depth for they have brought the entire
group to the fore and have posed for
artists, critics and the general public
several very important and intriguing
questions. What is art? What is good art?
What good is this art?
The first question is a difficult one to
answer, perhaps the most difficult of the
three. But it seems to me that what the
public will accept as art, what the mu-
seums will show and buy, what the
human being creates is art. If a painting
by Lichtenstein is not art, then what is
it? What seems to bother the viewer
most in this case is that he does riot want
to be forced to call something which he
dislikes by a name which is sacred to him.
What is far worse and most scathing to
the artist in this case is calling his work
bad art. Here one takes away his right
to feel fulfilled in his work, his self-
respect. And this is in any event the im-
portant question in considering the con-
troversial members of the group, for this
brings up additional questions. What
are they trying to say? Are they trying
to say anything? Have they accomplished
what they set out to do?
EVEN WHEN studying these works for
long periods of time, they never seem
to be more than what they were at first:
a replica in paint of the reality. The
artist seems to have subjected himself
and all his energies to the portrayal of
the object as a separate entity. Lichten-
stein makes no bones about taking his
images ready made from cartoons; he
only enlarges them to wall size and trans-
lates the newsprint colors into oil.
Warhol is the painter of the soup can
sans pareil. He paints it open, empty,
full, battered and, in the Guggenheim
show, endlessly repeated. His job is only
to stencil in the colors in assembly line
fashion, just as Lichtenstein patiently
paints thousands upon thousands of tiny
Ben Day dots.
T HIS SACRIFICE of the artist to his
image, this self-annihilation and de-
nial in the very act of creation has many
parallels in mode'rn life. Practically every-
thing with which one comes in contact
today is factory made, unmarked by the
personalities of its creators. We tend to
think of people in groups, in societies,
as a cluster of characteristics, of pre-
dictable reactions, and as anonymous.
We constantly find ourselves in situa-
tions in which the "me" is ignored, when
no one is singled out or even wishes to
be different. The artist is a part of his
society and perhaps Lichtenstein is
demonstrating in art what millions of
factory workers demonstrate forty hours
a week: that making something is not
necessarily creative in the sense of leav-
ing one's mark on the object one has
made.
In this case the Pop artists are bring-
ing to the public's attention a disease,
a fact if you like, of our existence. They
present in truth the symbolsand symp-
toms of our cultural ills in brazen form.
However, what they have not done and
what will keep them forever from the
ranks of the immortals of art is to con-
cern themselves with technical ability.
Whether through choice, through the
necessity of the very kind of art they
produce which demands that anything
personal be smothered, or whether
through the lack of any ability, they
have relied upon the shockvalue of the
image and upon nothing else.
LOOKING AT the positive results of
this movement, some of which can
be seen in the supplement works, I feel
that the most important are the fresh
approach and new subject matter and
images brought into American art. The
frankness of these artists at their best
is envigor'ating and the return to a
reality with a definitely contemporary
image is stimulating to those tired of
the decorative trend in abstract art. The
soup cans and comic strips probably will
only survive as curiosities; but, and this
is most central, the soup cans can call
artists back to the reality of their en-
vironment, can make them concentrate
once more on the concrete, on their
attitude toward the concrete and help
in this way to put content back into art.
In 1964 It Will Be .. .
KENNEDY
vs.
ROCKE-FELLER
From Andy Warhol, a commentary on modern times
"Rocky" over Goldwater for the G
Tom Wesselmann: "Drawing for Collage" and "Still Life"
By ROBERT SELWA
JOHN F. KENNEDY risks defeat in 1964
more from Nelson Rockefeller than
from Barry Goldwater.
Yes, it is Rockefeller, not Goldwater,
who has the better chance. If the Repub-
lican party wants a battle between con-
servatism and moderate liberalism, Gold-
water is their man. But if they hope to
win in 1964, then it is Rockefeller.
These are the conclusions that follow
from an analysis of the statistics involved,
an analysis that takes into account the
following matters:
In twentieth century America, an in-
cumbent President almost always wins
re-election and usually increases his per-
centage of the popular vote. Eleven times
in this century the incumbent has faced
the voters for a second term; only twice
did he lose. Extraordinary circumstanced
operated on both occasions. Teddy Roose-
velt split William Howard Taft's Repub-
licant party in 1912 and the nation's
greatest depression eliminated Herbert
Hoover's chances for re-election. Also sig-
nificant is the popular vote percentage,
which increased for McKinley (1900),
Woodrow Wilson (1916), Franklin Roose-
velt (1936) and Dwight Eisenhower
(1956). The increases were, respectively,
0.6 per cent, 74 per cent, 3.4 per cent and
2.4 per cent.
Other factors also point to a Kennedy
victory. For one, the Kennedy campaign
organization is one of the most effective
in modern political history and should
not be underestimated. In addition, Ken-
nedy enjoys high personal popularity,
which has generally grown since 1960,
although a recent temporary drop has
been indicated by the Gallup polls and
should be attributed to voter disappoint-
ment with the often unsuccessful Ken-
nedy legislative program. The Adminis-
tration's support of civil rights has also
meant a decline in his popularity, partic-
ularly in the South. But a President's
popularity rises and falls. Kennedy's
popularity will probably rise when he
begins campaigning again, for he is a
charismatic personality and a dynamic
speaker. Taking into account these three
factors-the incumbent's advantage, the
campaign organization and Kenedy's per-
sonal popularity, cne can predict that he
will gain one per cent more of the popular-
vote in non-Southern states in 1964. And
this is actually a cautious prediction!
THE SOUTH is the great imponderable
in 1964. Several states of the temper-
mental South refused to give electoral
votes to President Harry Truman in 1948
and could withhold them again from an-
other Democratic President-Kennedy in
1964.
Goldwater, with his advocacy of states
rights, could take a good portion of the
South. Rockefeller, with his advocacy of
civil rights and federal action stronger
than the performance so far by the Ken-
nedy Administrataion, would not. He
could not unless he radically changes his
positions or unless he has a Vice-Presi-
dential candidate who would draw a lot
of Southern votes-namely, Goldwater,
who refuses to be a Vice-Presidential
candidate.r
But Rockefeller can take the big urban
states like New York and New Jersey,
while Goldwater could not.
Both the deep South and the solidly
Republican states are losing in popula-
tion proportional to the rest of the na-
tion, resulting in a decrease in their
electoral voting strength. This will be a
factor, a major factor, pulling for Ken-
nedy. He can lose the South to Goldwater
without losing too much sleep; he can
afford to skip over the small states that
will vote for either Goldwater or Rocke-
feller anyway.
It is a little amazing how close Presi-
dential elections are in both national
popular votes and in many state popular
votes. Numerous states were decided in
1960 by a margin of less than a few per
cent, and some were decided by less than
one per cent, in one of the four closest
Presidential elections in U.S. history. As
a result, Kennedy's popularity growth
can make a big difference in non-South-
ern states.
In assessing this difference, this writer
has used a one per cent changeover factor.
This means that out of every 100 voters,
one of them who supported Richard
Nixon in 1960 would support Kennedy in
1964. Or, put another way, the change-
overs to Kennedy would be one per cent
more than the changeovers away from
him. The changeover factor probably will
be more than one per cent, but I have
used this figure as a cautious and safe
estimate.
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the above
factors, and examining the state-by-
state results of the 1948 and 1960 elec-
tions, particularly the latter, the follow-
ing estimates emerge:
Kennedy would defeat Rockefeller, 292
to 246 electoral votes. Kennedy would de-
feat Goldwater 311 to 227.
The latter would be the result with
Kennedy losing, not winning, most of the
South. With a generous estimate of Gold-
water's chances in the South, one can
predict victories for him in Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, Tenessee, and Virginia-
8 southern states!-and still he would not
have a chance unless he could take Cali-
fornia and Illinois.
A victory over Rockefeller is less certain
for Kennedy. The President would have
only 22 votes over the 270 needed to win.
If three or more of the Southern states
withhold ordinarily Democratic voting
blocs from Kennedy and give them to a
third candidate, neither Kennedy nor
Rockefeller would have the required ma-
jority. This rare' combination of events
would throw the election into the House
of Representatives where anything could
happen. It is possible that the 41 votes
of Alabama (10), Arkansas (6), Louisiana
(10), Mississippi (7) and South Carolina
(8) would be withheld from Kennedy.
Southerners have bolted from the party
on other occasions. In 1948 the 39 elec-
toral votes of Alabama (11), Louisiana
(10), Mississippi (9) and South Carolina
(8), along with one Tennessee vote, were
cast for Strom Thurmond. In 1956 an
Alabama Democratic elector refused to
vote for Stevenson and cast his vote for
a local judge. In 1960, Senator Harry
Byrd (D-Va) received 15 electoral votes
-the eight unpledged Mississippi Demo-
crats, six unpledged among the 11 Ala-
bama votes and one Oklahoma Republi-
can. Furthermore, the states of Missis-
sippi, Arkansas and South Carolina have
legal provisions which would enable a
slate of unpledged electors to run and
win. And Governor Ross Barnett of
Mississippi is running around the country
promoting a Southern coup of this na-
ture.
There is also the possibility that some
Southerners are so angry at the Kennedy
clan that they would vote for any Re-
publican, even Rockefeller, just to effect
a change. In this event Rockefeller may
have a better chance than Goldwater of
winning the 1964 election than this 19-
vote difference indicates.
The election of 1960 seems to have
greatest weight and the election of 1948
second greatest weight in estimating the
outcome of the 1964 election. The 1960
election involved Kennedy as it does in
'64; the 1948 election comes closest to a
Kennedy-type contest, or at least a Ken-
nedy-Rockefeller kind of contest. Like
Rockefeller today, Thomas Dewey was the
moderate liberal Governor of New York;
Truman, like Kennedy, was the moder-
ately liberal incumbent. The elections of
1952 and 1956 and the pre-1948 elections
are less accurate indicators because they
involved the extraordinary personal pop-
ularity of Dwight Eisenhower and Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt.
HERE IS THE STATE-BY-STATE run-
down upon which this article's esti-
mates and conclusions are based:
ALABAMA in 1948 voted for Thurmond.
In 1960 the state was strongly Demo-
cratic, but 6 of its 11 electoral votes were
unpledged and went to Byrd. It has 10
electoral votes in 1964: count them for
Goldwater in a Goldwater contest and
count them for Kennedy on a tentative
basis in a Rockefeller contest.
ALASKA narrowly went to Nixon in
1960. If only one per cent of those who
voted for Nixon would have voted for
Kennedy (the "changeover" factor), Alas-
ka's 3 electoral votes would have gone to
Kennedy. Taking into account the growth
of Kennedy's popularity since 1960, I pre-
dict this state will switch to Kennedy in
1964.
ARIZONA cast 4 votes for Truman in
1948. But in 1960 it voted strongly for
Nixon. As Goldwater's home state, it
would go to him in 1964-or no doubt to
any Republican including Rockefeller.
Count 5 votes for each of them.
ARKANSAS gave Truman 9 Votes in
1948. Kennedy beat Nixon easily. But it
could swing over to Goldwater. This
would not be easy, but being generous to
the Goldwater side, one would predict 6
votes for Goldwater. As for a Rockefeller
contest, Kennedy gets 6 tentative votes.
CALIFORNIA is the big question mark.
In 1948 it went to Dewey by a narrow
margin. It went to Eisenhower by large
margins. And 1960's vote was so tricky
that everyone thought Kennedy had it at
first. The absentee ballots that came in
late pushed Nixon ahead by half a per
cent. As an amalgam of the nation, Cali-
fornia reflects the nation's vote. It would
reflect Kennedy's national popularity. It
has an active right-wing pro-Goldwater
minority, but this is a minority. The lib-
eral Governor Brown won re-election in
1962. With all this in mind, I give Cali-
fornia's 40 votes to Kennedy in 1964,
against either Rockefeller or Goldwater.
COLORADO went to Truman in 1948,
but voted solidly Republican in 1960.
Count its 6 votes for Goldwater and
Rockefeller.
CONNECTICUT, on the other hand,
went to Dewey in 1948 but voted solidly
Democratic in 1960. Count its 8 votes for
Kennedy. This is sure in a Kennedy-Gold-
water battle; Rockefeller would put up a
better fight.
DELAWARE cast its 3 votes to Dewey
in "1948. In 1960 Kennedy narrowly edged
Nixon out. Kennedy would defeat Gold-
water in 1964 and would probably edge
Rockefeller out. Count 3 votes for Ken-
nedy that could swing over to Rockefeller
if Rockefeller becomes as popular as
Kennedy.
FLORIDA used to be part of the solid
South. With considerable migration to
that state and with that migration con-
sisting of people who tend to be Republi-
can, Florida has changed. It cast 8 votes
for Truman in 1948 and 10 votes for Nix-
on in 1960. Kennedy would have won if
there had been a 1%/ per cent vote change-
over. If Kennedy's popularity will make
that much of a difference, he will take
the state. B
is: 14 votes
in 1964.
GEORGIA
Democratic
presidential
nedy took t
second high
Georgia did
moderately
was runnin
there was a
got the sup
Georgia has
cratic-even
ably not eve
12 for Kenni
HAWAII
state in 196(
The state c
but taking :
ularity, the
votes for Ke
IDAHO vi
went to Nix
The margin-
over-would
mount. Coun
Rockefeller.
ILLINOIS
man in 1948
by an extre
a changeove
and Texas
President. L
nedy selecte
Tied Texas a
If Kennedy's
pact on Illii
good chanc
votes. This
magazine (C
for Goldwat
for Kennedy
INDIANA
won; Nixon
-especially
13 votes.
IOWA, all
another sa:
Count 9 vot
water.
KANSAS
state can ge
Republican
White, it w
1960 it wen
largest Rept
for Rockefel
KENTTJCI
on won easi
for Kenned,
changeover o
toral votes fo
LOUISIA
1948. Altho
electoral vot
of the state'
to Kennedy
toral votes i
Rockefeller c
Kennedy-vo
MAINE is ;
to Dewey an
43 per cent o
Maine, like r
states, is din
the nation's
toral votes i
left in 1964 :
MARYLA
ly Democrati
ulation-elect
gave Kenne
give him 10 i
MASSACI
Truman stat
ator Kenned
vote in 1960
store for the
MICHIGA
Thiebaud and Warhol : "Bologna and Cheese" and "Before and After"
Roy Lichtenstein: Sections one and five of six-part "dive Ammo"