. 6 s tttpop art (Continued from preceding page) which he emulates in his own way. It is these artists who need to be considered in depth for they have brought the entire group to the fore and have posed for artists, critics and the general public several very important and intriguing questions. What is art? What is good art? What good is this art? The first question is a difficult one to answer, perhaps the most difficult of the three. But it seems to me that what the public will accept as art, what the mu- seums will show and buy, what the human being creates is art. If a painting by Lichtenstein is not art, then what is it? What seems to bother the viewer most in this case is that he does riot want to be forced to call something which he dislikes by a name which is sacred to him. What is far worse and most scathing to the artist in this case is calling his work bad art. Here one takes away his right to feel fulfilled in his work, his self- respect. And this is in any event the im- portant question in considering the con- troversial members of the group, for this brings up additional questions. What are they trying to say? Are they trying to say anything? Have they accomplished what they set out to do? EVEN WHEN studying these works for long periods of time, they never seem to be more than what they were at first: a replica in paint of the reality. The artist seems to have subjected himself and all his energies to the portrayal of the object as a separate entity. Lichten- stein makes no bones about taking his images ready made from cartoons; he only enlarges them to wall size and trans- lates the newsprint colors into oil. Warhol is the painter of the soup can sans pareil. He paints it open, empty, full, battered and, in the Guggenheim show, endlessly repeated. His job is only to stencil in the colors in assembly line fashion, just as Lichtenstein patiently paints thousands upon thousands of tiny Ben Day dots. T HIS SACRIFICE of the artist to his image, this self-annihilation and de- nial in the very act of creation has many parallels in mode'rn life. Practically every- thing with which one comes in contact today is factory made, unmarked by the personalities of its creators. We tend to think of people in groups, in societies, as a cluster of characteristics, of pre- dictable reactions, and as anonymous. We constantly find ourselves in situa- tions in which the "me" is ignored, when no one is singled out or even wishes to be different. The artist is a part of his society and perhaps Lichtenstein is demonstrating in art what millions of factory workers demonstrate forty hours a week: that making something is not necessarily creative in the sense of leav- ing one's mark on the object one has made. In this case the Pop artists are bring- ing to the public's attention a disease, a fact if you like, of our existence. They present in truth the symbolsand symp- toms of our cultural ills in brazen form. However, what they have not done and what will keep them forever from the ranks of the immortals of art is to con- cern themselves with technical ability. Whether through choice, through the necessity of the very kind of art they produce which demands that anything personal be smothered, or whether through the lack of any ability, they have relied upon the shockvalue of the image and upon nothing else. LOOKING AT the positive results of this movement, some of which can be seen in the supplement works, I feel that the most important are the fresh approach and new subject matter and images brought into American art. The frankness of these artists at their best is envigor'ating and the return to a reality with a definitely contemporary image is stimulating to those tired of the decorative trend in abstract art. The soup cans and comic strips probably will only survive as curiosities; but, and this is most central, the soup cans can call artists back to the reality of their en- vironment, can make them concentrate once more on the concrete, on their attitude toward the concrete and help in this way to put content back into art. In 1964 It Will Be .. . KENNEDY vs. ROCKE-FELLER From Andy Warhol, a commentary on modern times "Rocky" over Goldwater for the G Tom Wesselmann: "Drawing for Collage" and "Still Life" By ROBERT SELWA JOHN F. KENNEDY risks defeat in 1964 more from Nelson Rockefeller than from Barry Goldwater. Yes, it is Rockefeller, not Goldwater, who has the better chance. If the Repub- lican party wants a battle between con- servatism and moderate liberalism, Gold- water is their man. But if they hope to win in 1964, then it is Rockefeller. These are the conclusions that follow from an analysis of the statistics involved, an analysis that takes into account the following matters: In twentieth century America, an in- cumbent President almost always wins re-election and usually increases his per- centage of the popular vote. Eleven times in this century the incumbent has faced the voters for a second term; only twice did he lose. Extraordinary circumstanced operated on both occasions. Teddy Roose- velt split William Howard Taft's Repub- licant party in 1912 and the nation's greatest depression eliminated Herbert Hoover's chances for re-election. Also sig- nificant is the popular vote percentage, which increased for McKinley (1900), Woodrow Wilson (1916), Franklin Roose- velt (1936) and Dwight Eisenhower (1956). The increases were, respectively, 0.6 per cent, 74 per cent, 3.4 per cent and 2.4 per cent. Other factors also point to a Kennedy victory. For one, the Kennedy campaign organization is one of the most effective in modern political history and should not be underestimated. In addition, Ken- nedy enjoys high personal popularity, which has generally grown since 1960, although a recent temporary drop has been indicated by the Gallup polls and should be attributed to voter disappoint- ment with the often unsuccessful Ken- nedy legislative program. The Adminis- tration's support of civil rights has also meant a decline in his popularity, partic- ularly in the South. But a President's popularity rises and falls. Kennedy's popularity will probably rise when he begins campaigning again, for he is a charismatic personality and a dynamic speaker. Taking into account these three factors-the incumbent's advantage, the campaign organization and Kenedy's per- sonal popularity, cne can predict that he will gain one per cent more of the popular- vote in non-Southern states in 1964. And this is actually a cautious prediction! THE SOUTH is the great imponderable in 1964. Several states of the temper- mental South refused to give electoral votes to President Harry Truman in 1948 and could withhold them again from an- other Democratic President-Kennedy in 1964. Goldwater, with his advocacy of states rights, could take a good portion of the South. Rockefeller, with his advocacy of civil rights and federal action stronger than the performance so far by the Ken- nedy Administrataion, would not. He could not unless he radically changes his positions or unless he has a Vice-Presi- dential candidate who would draw a lot of Southern votes-namely, Goldwater, who refuses to be a Vice-Presidential candidate.r But Rockefeller can take the big urban states like New York and New Jersey, while Goldwater could not. Both the deep South and the solidly Republican states are losing in popula- tion proportional to the rest of the na- tion, resulting in a decrease in their electoral voting strength. This will be a factor, a major factor, pulling for Ken- nedy. He can lose the South to Goldwater without losing too much sleep; he can afford to skip over the small states that will vote for either Goldwater or Rocke- feller anyway. It is a little amazing how close Presi- dential elections are in both national popular votes and in many state popular votes. Numerous states were decided in 1960 by a margin of less than a few per cent, and some were decided by less than one per cent, in one of the four closest Presidential elections in U.S. history. As a result, Kennedy's popularity growth can make a big difference in non-South- ern states. In assessing this difference, this writer has used a one per cent changeover factor. This means that out of every 100 voters, one of them who supported Richard Nixon in 1960 would support Kennedy in 1964. Or, put another way, the change- overs to Kennedy would be one per cent more than the changeovers away from him. The changeover factor probably will be more than one per cent, but I have used this figure as a cautious and safe estimate. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the above factors, and examining the state-by- state results of the 1948 and 1960 elec- tions, particularly the latter, the follow- ing estimates emerge: Kennedy would defeat Rockefeller, 292 to 246 electoral votes. Kennedy would de- feat Goldwater 311 to 227. The latter would be the result with Kennedy losing, not winning, most of the South. With a generous estimate of Gold- water's chances in the South, one can predict victories for him in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tenessee, and Virginia- 8 southern states!-and still he would not have a chance unless he could take Cali- fornia and Illinois. A victory over Rockefeller is less certain for Kennedy. The President would have only 22 votes over the 270 needed to win. If three or more of the Southern states withhold ordinarily Democratic voting blocs from Kennedy and give them to a third candidate, neither Kennedy nor Rockefeller would have the required ma- jority. This rare' combination of events would throw the election into the House of Representatives where anything could happen. It is possible that the 41 votes of Alabama (10), Arkansas (6), Louisiana (10), Mississippi (7) and South Carolina (8) would be withheld from Kennedy. Southerners have bolted from the party on other occasions. In 1948 the 39 elec- toral votes of Alabama (11), Louisiana (10), Mississippi (9) and South Carolina (8), along with one Tennessee vote, were cast for Strom Thurmond. In 1956 an Alabama Democratic elector refused to vote for Stevenson and cast his vote for a local judge. In 1960, Senator Harry Byrd (D-Va) received 15 electoral votes -the eight unpledged Mississippi Demo- crats, six unpledged among the 11 Ala- bama votes and one Oklahoma Republi- can. Furthermore, the states of Missis- sippi, Arkansas and South Carolina have legal provisions which would enable a slate of unpledged electors to run and win. And Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi is running around the country promoting a Southern coup of this na- ture. There is also the possibility that some Southerners are so angry at the Kennedy clan that they would vote for any Re- publican, even Rockefeller, just to effect a change. In this event Rockefeller may have a better chance than Goldwater of winning the 1964 election than this 19- vote difference indicates. The election of 1960 seems to have greatest weight and the election of 1948 second greatest weight in estimating the outcome of the 1964 election. The 1960 election involved Kennedy as it does in '64; the 1948 election comes closest to a Kennedy-type contest, or at least a Ken- nedy-Rockefeller kind of contest. Like Rockefeller today, Thomas Dewey was the moderate liberal Governor of New York; Truman, like Kennedy, was the moder- ately liberal incumbent. The elections of 1952 and 1956 and the pre-1948 elections are less accurate indicators because they involved the extraordinary personal pop- ularity of Dwight Eisenhower and Frank- lin D. Roosevelt. HERE IS THE STATE-BY-STATE run- down upon which this article's esti- mates and conclusions are based: ALABAMA in 1948 voted for Thurmond. In 1960 the state was strongly Demo- cratic, but 6 of its 11 electoral votes were unpledged and went to Byrd. It has 10 electoral votes in 1964: count them for Goldwater in a Goldwater contest and count them for Kennedy on a tentative basis in a Rockefeller contest. ALASKA narrowly went to Nixon in 1960. If only one per cent of those who voted for Nixon would have voted for Kennedy (the "changeover" factor), Alas- ka's 3 electoral votes would have gone to Kennedy. Taking into account the growth of Kennedy's popularity since 1960, I pre- dict this state will switch to Kennedy in 1964. ARIZONA cast 4 votes for Truman in 1948. But in 1960 it voted strongly for Nixon. As Goldwater's home state, it would go to him in 1964-or no doubt to any Republican including Rockefeller. Count 5 votes for each of them. ARKANSAS gave Truman 9 Votes in 1948. Kennedy beat Nixon easily. But it could swing over to Goldwater. This would not be easy, but being generous to the Goldwater side, one would predict 6 votes for Goldwater. As for a Rockefeller contest, Kennedy gets 6 tentative votes. CALIFORNIA is the big question mark. In 1948 it went to Dewey by a narrow margin. It went to Eisenhower by large margins. And 1960's vote was so tricky that everyone thought Kennedy had it at first. The absentee ballots that came in late pushed Nixon ahead by half a per cent. As an amalgam of the nation, Cali- fornia reflects the nation's vote. It would reflect Kennedy's national popularity. It has an active right-wing pro-Goldwater minority, but this is a minority. The lib- eral Governor Brown won re-election in 1962. With all this in mind, I give Cali- fornia's 40 votes to Kennedy in 1964, against either Rockefeller or Goldwater. COLORADO went to Truman in 1948, but voted solidly Republican in 1960. Count its 6 votes for Goldwater and Rockefeller. CONNECTICUT, on the other hand, went to Dewey in 1948 but voted solidly Democratic in 1960. Count its 8 votes for Kennedy. This is sure in a Kennedy-Gold- water battle; Rockefeller would put up a better fight. DELAWARE cast its 3 votes to Dewey in "1948. In 1960 Kennedy narrowly edged Nixon out. Kennedy would defeat Gold- water in 1964 and would probably edge Rockefeller out. Count 3 votes for Ken- nedy that could swing over to Rockefeller if Rockefeller becomes as popular as Kennedy. FLORIDA used to be part of the solid South. With considerable migration to that state and with that migration con- sisting of people who tend to be Republi- can, Florida has changed. It cast 8 votes for Truman in 1948 and 10 votes for Nix- on in 1960. Kennedy would have won if there had been a 1%/ per cent vote change- over. If Kennedy's popularity will make that much of a difference, he will take the state. B is: 14 votes in 1964. GEORGIA Democratic presidential nedy took t second high Georgia did moderately was runnin there was a got the sup Georgia has cratic-even ably not eve 12 for Kenni HAWAII state in 196( The state c but taking : ularity, the votes for Ke IDAHO vi went to Nix The margin- over-would mount. Coun Rockefeller. ILLINOIS man in 1948 by an extre a changeove and Texas President. L nedy selecte Tied Texas a If Kennedy's pact on Illii good chanc votes. This magazine (C for Goldwat for Kennedy INDIANA won; Nixon -especially 13 votes. IOWA, all another sa: Count 9 vot water. KANSAS state can ge Republican White, it w 1960 it wen largest Rept for Rockefel KENTTJCI on won easi for Kenned, changeover o toral votes fo LOUISIA 1948. Altho electoral vot of the state' to Kennedy toral votes i Rockefeller c Kennedy-vo MAINE is ; to Dewey an 43 per cent o Maine, like r states, is din the nation's toral votes i left in 1964 : MARYLA ly Democrati ulation-elect gave Kenne give him 10 i MASSACI Truman stat ator Kenned vote in 1960 store for the MICHIGA Thiebaud and Warhol : "Bologna and Cheese" and "Before and After" Roy Lichtenstein: Sections one and five of six-part "dive Ammo"