THE MICHIGAN DAILY
FRIDAY, MAY 13, 1966
eportSays ndonesian Coup Communist-Ba
cked
(EDITOR'S NOTE: Washingtoni
Yost far eastern correspondent
Stanley Karnow is the first Amer-
ican reporter to tour Indonesia in'
the wake of the Sept. 30 rebellion
and the resultingtbloodshed. Kar-
now and an interpreter traveled
through Java and Bali in the first
two weeks of April to obtain this
on-the-scene account of the nas-
sacres. The following is a con-
densed version of his report.)
By STANLEY KARNOW
(c), 1966, The Washington Post Co.
DJAKARTA-For years, Presi-
dent Sukarno's Indonesia posed
as the divinely endowed guide of
the world's underdeveloped coun-
tries, the beacon for "new emerg-
ing forces" everywhere. Simul-
taneously, Sukarno promoted him-j
self as the great unifier of his
sprawling archipelago republic,
boasting that he had amalgamated
more than 100 million people of
different cultures under the motto,
bhinneka tunggal ika-"unity in
diversity."
Within the past six months,
however, events have proved the
emptiness of Sukarno's charisma-
tic orgy of slogans and exhorta-
tions. In several ways, Indonesia
has revealed itself to be as primi-
tive and savage as any place on
earth.
Far from cementing a nation,
Sukarno's past antics aggravated
tensions among his country's rival
political, military, religious and
regional factions. In the aftermath
of an abortive Communist bid for
power last fall, these tensions
erupted in a bloodbath that, by
human measure, makes even the
Viet Nam war seem mild.
Figures Unclear
The unadulterated truth is im-
possible to snare in Indonesia,'
where facts and figures are as
elusive as the fleeting shadows of
a wayang play. What emerged
from my research was, among
other things, a fairly plausible
pattern of the cataclysm that has
shaken this land.
I found that the attempted coup
d'etat in Djakarta last Sept. 30
was more than a palace maneuver.
It was part of a broader Com-
munist plan of insurrection, linked
to a revolt by pro-Communist
military elements in central Java
and moves by Communist groups
elsewhere.
Reliable evidence indicates, too,
that Red China had bulwarked
paramilitary Indonesian Commun-
ist groups with weapons and
training.
When their initial coup fizzled,
by the barest margin, the Com-
munists in central Java tried
again, this time with a "people's
uprising" of the kind described in
Leninist mythology. It was a spas-
modic, uncoordinated, clumsy at-
tempt that failed as well, exposing
thousands of Communists, fellow-
travelers, and totally innocent folk
to a most ferocious repression.
Repression Begins
The repression began in last
October and spread eastward.
In central Java, where it started,l
the slaughter was mainly carried
out by the army .under the guise
of "legal" executions. A few weeks
afterwards in east Java, military
units delivered captives to Moslem
youths, who butchered them in
frenzies of religious fanaticism.
By December, the homicidal fever
reached Bali, where massive kill-
ings by both mobs and soldiers lowing last September's attempted consin. A Moslem leader in the
took on a mystical, almost sac- revolt. Diplomats here in Djakarta central Java town of Bojolali
rificial significance. put the figure closer to 300,000. praised his Communist associates,
Almost - everywhere, Indonesia's From my own observation, I would now dead, for their honesty on the
Chinese residents, most of them calculate that the post-coup holo- Municipal Council.
merchants, were ready targets. caust took at least a half million Everywhere, though, people
Blamed for high prices, they had lives, sought to justify the destruction
their shops and schools wrecked Match those statistics with of the Communists with the same
and looted. Java's demography. Roughly the phrase: "If we hadn't done it to
And as recently as ten days ago, size of New York State, Java is a them, they would have done it to
in parts of central Java I visited, swollen megalopolis of nearly 70 us."
the killing continued. million people crammed into what That attitude was largely found-
Salatiga Killings can best be described as a vast ed on the brutal fashion in which
One night, in the town of Sala- rural slum. There are hundreds of the Communists murdered six
tiga, two army trucks rumbled Kediris, Pasuruans and Banjuwan- army generals as their coup un-
through the streets, stopping brief- gis in Java, each with its thou- folded on Sept. 30. It also stemmed
ly at four shabby buildings com- sands of victims. from conduct before the revolt.
mandeered to hold the thousand What I found more difficult to Encouraged by Sukarno, who call-
Communist suspects still under assess than the quantity of kill- ed them "my brothers," the Com-
arrest. ings was the qualitative mood this munists had been arrogant, intimi-
The sequence, as related to tne slaughter had engendered. dating and provocative.
next morning by a local, recalled Here and there I encountered a
the French Revolution's reign of residue of fear. A schoolteacher in Peasant Movements
terror. At each building, an army Surakarta confessed to me that he Feeling their strength, Commun-
captain read names from a list, still hesitated to console the fami- ist peasant movements in several
advising them of their guilt "in lies of his slain Communist friends. regions took over private farm-
the name of law," though no trial "I don't have the courage," he lands, claiming that they were
was ever held. Eventually filled said, "I might be judged guilty by instituting "agrarian reform." In
with 60 prisoners and piloted by association." other places, Communist bullies
a platoon of troops, the trucks In contrast, a jovial newspaper attacked mosques and Moslem
drove six miles through a dark editor in Semarang treated the schools, desecrating the Koran
landscape of rice fields and rub- slaughter as a huge joke. "We publicly. At a village near Sema-
ber estates to a barren spot near sent the Reds to Sukabumi," he rang, the Communist cultural
the village of Djelok. said, explaining to me that Suka- group, Lekra, taunted local Mos-
The neighborhood peasants had bumi, a town south of Djakarta, lems by performing a play entitled
been ordered by their headman to means "good earth." "The Death of Allah."
# dig a large pit the day before. More often, however, Inview the Most significantly, the army was
The prisoners, lined up at the edge massacre with quiet, remorseless irritated by persistent Commun-
of the pit, were shot down in a equanimity.- ist efforts to pervade its ranks
matter of minutes. Some may have Many Lose Friends with political commissars, an idea
been buried alive, my informant Many had close Communist originally introduced by Peking's
believed. friends who were killed. An Il- Premier Chou En-Lai. The army
500,000 Dead linois-trained professor of eco- also resisted Communist attempts
A few months ago, Sukarno an- nomics at the University of Djog- to create a "fifth force" of armed
,nounced that 87,000 people had jakarta lost two colleagues, both youths and peasants, though. such
been killed in the massacres fol- educated at the University of Wis- groups were surreptitiously forti-
fied with Chinese weapons
way.
any-
See Dangers
To some extent, the top Com-
munist leaders seem to have re-
alized the danger of challenging
their enemies. But they were un-
able to discipline some of their
own auxiliaries. In particular, their
peasant front went on agitating.
violently to dispossess landowners.
The rising Communist pressure
so alarmed the Moslems that in
March, 1965, five major Islamic
organizations banded together in
a joint pledge to maintain unity,
Indonesian Moslems are a far
more tolerant species than their
coreligionists of the Middle East.
But as one of them told me: "In
the face of a Communist threat,
we were prepared for a jihad-a
holy war.''
It is not quite clear, however,
why the Communist bid for power
last September should have failed
so dismally.
Perhaps their project misfired
mainly because, in Indonesia's
chronic confusion, nothing ever
works smoothly. The Communists,
after all, were as Indonesian as
their enemies.
Plan Good
On paper at least, the Com-,
munists coup plan seemed good.
In Djakarta, Lt. Col. Untung's
Palace Guard Battalion combined
with two visiting battalions, air
force elements, and armed Com-
munist youths were scheduled to
kidnap and kill Gen. Abdul Haris
Nasution, the Defense Minister,
and the entire general staff.
With these officers removed,
Sukarno would have had no choice
but to rely on the Communists to
manage the country.
In a parallel move in central
Java, five battalions of the Di-
ponegoro Division were primed to
seize key positions in that region.
Their leader was Col. Sahirman,
the division's intelligence chief,
who had returned just three
months earlier from training at
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
They were connected with high-
er officers elsewhere such as the
air force chief Vice Marshal Omar
Dhani and Brig. Gen. Supardjo, a
commander in Kalimantan who
played politics in Djakarta.
Varied Motives
These military insurgents pre-
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sumably had varied motives. Many'
were central Javanese, with roots
in a strongly Communist region.
Others were disgruntled oppor-
tunists who saw in a Communist
takeover the chance for rapid pro-
motion.
Some were sincerely convinced
that communism, with its dis-
ciplined organization, was the only
salvation from Indonesia's creep-
ing chaos.
Indeed, many Western experts
have agreed that Indonesian Com-
munists were among the country's
most dedicated, selfless people.
The objectives of these military
rebels on central Java, it now
appears, was to secure a hard
Communist base in their area
should the operation in the capital
go awry.
At the same time, Communist
plantation, factory and dock
workers elsewhere throughout the
country were instructed to grab
control of their enterprises in pre-
paration for the establishment of
a peoples democracy.
Sukarno Cautious
Sukarno was undoubtedly aware
of the impending Communist ac-
tion. He may have even welcomed
the prospect of the Communists
liquidating the generals he in-
tensely disliked. But with chara-
teristic caution, Sukarno probably
remained uncommitted, waiting to
see how the coup would turn.
It turned badly. The Commun-
ists murdered six generals but fail-
ed to eliminate Nasution and Lt.
Gen. Suharto, who rallied troops
and put down the uprising quickly.
At this stage, the Communists
shifted to their contingency plan.
Communist leader Dipa Nusan-
tara Aidit reportedly urged Su-
karno to join him in retreating to
central Java. With Sukarno beside
them, the Communists would have
had legitimacy and Suharto could
have been branded the rebel.
But- Sukarno, who understands
power, certainly recognized the
folly of siding with civilians
against- soldiers in a potential civil
war. He chose to stay in Djakarta.
Aidit flew to central Java alone.
The situation in central Java
was a hopeless blur. In Djogjakar-
ta, a pro-Communist staff officer
named Maj. Muljono had strangled
the garrison commander and as-
sumed control of the city, expect-
ing the population to rally to his
colors.'
But the people mostly ignored
him. Finally, learning of the coup's
collapse in Djakarta, Muljono fled.
He was later captured and execut-
ed.
In the weeks that followed, the
situation seemed to simmer down.
But in late October, in scattered
areas of central Java, the Com-
munists attempted a strange sort
of comeback. With nothing more
deadly than knives. and bamboo
staves, they tried to take control
of towns.
Many Rumors
These alarums and excursions
were fueled by a heady assortment
of rumors and purposeful propa-
ganda. In some places it was said
that Sukarno. had died and Aidit
was president.
Elsewhere people believed that
Sukarno had in fact withdrawn to
central Java calling on the masses
to rise against his rebellious army.
With no way of sorting out al-
legiances in the confusion, many
Communists regarded themselves
as loyal defenders of the republic.
Their uprising at Bojolali, for
example, began on the afternoon
of Oct. 21. A reported 10,000 Com-
munist youths, peasants, and wom-
en withdrew from the town, re-
grouped in the nearby countryside
and prepared an assault for that
evening.
Two Rifles in Arsenal
Besides clubs and knives, their
arsenal consisted of two rifles.
They felled trees to block roads,
cut telephone wires and burned a
few houses. Beyond those gestures,
they did nothing significant for
nearly three days. Finally, in a
last fling, they rushed at a police
barracks, they rushed at a police
barracks, shouting defiantly. The
police killed five of them, and the
rest fled.
By then, however, paratroop
commandos from Djakarata had
entered the region. A- company of
them was dispatched" to Bojolali,
and the roundup began. Day after
day, soldiers aided by local vigi-
lantes combed the surrounding
villages, dragging out known or
suspected Communists.
According to several sources in
the area, Aidit himself was be-
trayed by a Communist subordi-
nate. He was reportedly captured
on Nov. 22 near Surakarta, held
for a week, then taken to the bank
of a nearby river and shot. When
I asked whyhe was not taken to
Djakarta to stand trial, an army
officer replied: he might have
been protected or pardoned by
people inhigh place.
Crude Justice
In central Java, with the army
in sway, there was a modicum of
crude justice. A good many prison-
ers were at least interrogated and
classified. Thousands were released
on parole after "indoctrination."
Thousands more were sent to
Nusakambangan, a Devils Island
in the Indian Ocean south of Java.
And thousands were shot, to be
buried in unmarked graves.
Near the town of Prambanan,
the site of ancient Hindu temples,
the district officer guided me to
See COMMUNISTS, Page 8
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