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March 16, 1963 - Image 4

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The Michigan Daily, 1963-03-16

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Seventy-T bird Y er
EDTD AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
- UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS
,mer' Opinions Are P'"re STUDENT PUBLICATIONS BLDG., ANN ARBOR, MICH., PHONE NO 2-3241
Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers
or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints.
SATURDAY, MARCH 16, 1963 NIGHT EDITOR: MALINDA BERRY

HISTORY SAID NO:
Agricultural Cacophony Kept British Out

Diplomat Hatcher
Supports 'Concept'

UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT Harlan Hatcher
-a paragon of diplomacy-pulled a stun-
ning about-face Friday. With the least possible
amount of noise and with greatest subtlety,
the president released a letter to Ann Arbor
Mayor Cecil O. Creal stating Ihis and the Uni-
versity's support of fair housing legislation.
President Hatcher has changed his position.
He has not changed it in the sense of negating
"a position previously held but in the sense of
taking a positive stand.
Under pressure, he has at last issued an
official University policy concerning the con-
cept of fair housing.
On Feb. 21, the president expressed "sym-
pathy" with the efforts of the Human Relations
'Board to secure fair housing but declined to
endorse the fair housing legislation before the
City Council. His position was that the Uni-
versity did not interfere in local politics. How-
ever, he made it clear the University has been
and continues to be against discrimination
and will work for its removal 'when University
personnel are concerned.
T HE LETTER to Mayor Creal, said the presi-
dent, was solely an attempt to clarify his
and the University's position. According to him,
his position had not changed and the only
misunderstanding was on the part of 'the Hu-
man Relations Board. He stated that he had
been misrepresented in his views.
In the letter the president goes only so
far as to support the "concept" of fair hous-
ing. He makes no specific referral.to the legis-
lation presently before the City Council. Never-
theless, this statement is the first one in which
the president has endorsed even the concept
of fair housing. Previously, the University has
indicated its opposition to discriminatory hous-
ing through the vehicle of Regents' Bylaw 2.14
-but no specific statement referring to fair
housing was ever made.
The president has taken a definite step for-
ward. With the finesse of an experienced in-

The Well

SIBENIEW YORK newspaper strike is just
about over, yet nothing has been settled.
The International Typographical Union, Local
Six, won the upper hand over the New York
newspaper publishers in a truce proposed by
Mayor Robert Wagner, but the major issue-
automation--has been papered over.
The union won a $12 week wage and fringe
benefit increase, maintained the "bogus" re-
setting of ads cast outside the shop and
limited teletypesetting to the financial page.
The settlement has only postponed the ul-
timate decision. Automation is moving forward
and oposition only leaves unemployment in
its wake. The papers cannot survive without
productivity increases and a desperation effort
to automate may find all the linotypists out
of a job.
DESPITE STUBBORN union resistence, the
movement to automate the technologically
backward and featherbed-ridden newspaper
shops continues. Three more papers have joined
the Los Angeles Times in automating its lino-
types through the aid of computers since the
beginning of the newspaper strike. New suc-
cesses with linotype-operaterless offset print-
ing.are being recorded.
The settlement is a step backward. It fails
to solve the problem of automation that is
plaguing the newspaper industry. The ITU
cannot continue to walk with its nose in the
air, blind to the need for technological change.
It will soon fall into the well of oblivion.
-P. SUTIN
Fraternity Bi
NOW THAT the campus liberals have been
shot down, it looks like the "go-slow" ap-
proach is in vogue again on Student Govern-
ment Council in dealing with affiliate mem-
bership selection practices.
During the campaign, several of the mod-
erate candidates asserted that overt fraternity
discrimination is a "dead issue" because each
house has eliminated its bias clause, if it ever
had one.
This stand is wrong both factually and in-
ferentially. Trigon is still one of the 43 campus
fraternities, and only Christians are allowed
to join it. In fact; if SGC started to take
punitive action, Trigon would probably re-
define itself as a religious club, which is
exempted from anti-discrimination provisions
of Regents Bylaw 2.14.
(In a way, it's a shame that Trigon is the
best target for SGC activists. In contrast to
* ~j~ £ic~i~wu&i~j

ternational diplomat, he has managed to ac-
complish it with the least possible embarrass-
ment to himself and this institution. Unfor-
tunately, he has done it by skirting the issue,
by not endorsing the specific legislation before
the council. Also, he has saved face by stating
he was misrepresented. President Hatcher fails
to see that no one has ever accused him, per-
sonally, of discriminating. That is not the issue
at stake. He fails to see that all that was
asked by the HRB was support of fair housing
legislation-and riot of the specific proposal.
According to David Aroner, chairman of the
HRB, the letter requesting the president to
endorse fair housing was' sent to him even
before the proposal was presented to City
Council. Thus, an endorsement of a specific
proposal was not involved and, consequently,
interference in ,city matters was not a per-
tinent issue.
EXPLOITING the meeting to its fullest and
using tactics which matched the president's
in subtlety, the HRB managed to take another
step forward. The president agreed to send a
representative of the University to testify at
future hearings of the council on specific
questions concerning the ordinance if it is
clear that substantial numbers of University
personnel are involved.
Whether the president, Director of Uni-
versity Relations Michael Radock and Vice-
President for Student Affairs James A. Lewis,
all present at the meeting, are aware of the full
implications of his statement remains to be
seen. Whether or not they will act in fidelity
to his statement 'also is a question for the
future. Nevertheless, the HRB has obtained a
statement of University position which directly
refers to the fair housing ordinance before
the council.
This step involves no inconsistency on the
part "of the University. It is in keeping with
the University's policy as quoted by the presi-
dent at the meeting Friday: "The Bylaw (2.14)
also states that the University shall work for
the elimination of discrimination from non-
University sources which affect our students cr
staff. We have done so and will continue these
efforts."
HE HBR should rightly be proud of its
efforts. It has at last secured a significant
and positive statement from the president.
Real progress was made at Friday's meeting.
The diligent efforts of the HRB have yielded
significant results. Under its pressure-and
probably other pressures which are not yet
known-this University has made clear its
exact position. The previous position, ex-
pounded by President Hatcher after the HRB
picketing, was at best vague and arbitrary. The
present statement is weak-but it is positive
and public. And that means that whenever the
concept of fair housing is cosideed by City
Council, the position of the Univeisity will be
known and undoubtedly considered.
In the past, President Hatcher has said that
the University has worked quietly and steadily
behind the scenes to eliminate discrimination.
The work certainly has been quiet. The Uni-
versity has failed to live up to its responsibility
as a leader in this community. It has the
moral responsibility as a leader in this com-
munity. It has the moral responsibility, much
as any large organization has, to take a
definite stand for fair housing and it is ex-
tremely unfortunate that the president did not
realize this sooner; it would have saved much
trouble, confusion and embarrassment. The
stand should be stronger, it should have been
presented earlier. President Hatcher has as-
sumed the tactics of diplomacy but has out-
diplomated himself; no amount of face-saving
can compensate for his earlier inaction.
-MARJORIE BRAHMS
as Still Exists
many other campus fraternities, Trigon stays
out of trouble and sees something more to
fraternal ideals than the round of TG's.)
THERE ARE at least three other campus
fraternities which are suspect, as discrim-
inatory practices of their chapters at eastern
universities have recently been revealed. Kappa
Sigma has a "gentlemen's agreement" which

prevents it from accepting non-whites; Phi
Gamma Delta has a similar provision; Lambda
Chi Alpha's ritual cannot be undergone by a
Jew.
Affiliate bias is not a dead issue, despite what
Interfraternity Council and allies may profess.
As long as the potential exists for a University
chapter to be forced by its national not to
pledge minority group members, the subject is
obviously relevant, and the three locals cited,
above should furnish some proof to SGC that
they are not restricted like their brothers out
East.
THE COUNCIL needs members who under-
stand the complications and difficulties

By LAURENCE KIRSHBAUM
WHEN French President Charles
de Gaulle rejected Britain's
application for entry into the
European Economic Community
(Common Market) last month, the
American and British press ti-
raded him for personal, dictatorial
designs upon a France-centered
and de Gaulle-centered European
unification.
Overlooked in this journalistic
Bonapartizing was de Gaulle's
stated explanation for the veto
that the incongruencies between
the British and the six-particu-
larly in agricultural policies-made
further negotiations futile at this
point.
As de Gaulle stated in his press
conference of January 14, the ma-
jor question to unity is: "What
is to be done to make Britain,
such as it is, enter the agricultural,
system of the six?"
De Gaulle was not playing Na-
poleon deuxieme here. His initia-
tion of the veto did, it is true, re-
flect the more personal or nation-
al concern of a leader in whose
country 33 per cent of the popula-
tion is involved in agriculture.
But at the same time, de Gaulle
was taking the much more inter-
nationalist role as a sagacious
European statesman aware that
the problems of agricultural unity
have practically precluded achiev-
ing European unification since the
second world war.
AGRICULTURAL roadblocks to
unity have been evident since the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), an international
pact concluded between 17 na-
tions in 1947. Established as one
of the earliest arrangements to
combat the European economic
disintegration at the close of the
war, the GATT's main feature was
a general prohibition against
quota restrictions. Under the
GATT, the signing members
(which included all of the current
Common Market six) were to
abolish their quantitative restric-
tions on imports-both agricul-
tural and industrial-on other
member nations.
This feature had to be quickly
modified to allow countries to re-
tain full quotas on most agri-
cultural products. The reason was
that various countries, among
them Britain and France, had
heavy domestic price-support pro-
grams for their agriculture which
relied on market controls. These
in turn necessitated the control of
imports, rendering the quota sys-
tem unsatisfactory.
If quota reduction would not
AT THE CAMPUS:
C lever
Comedy
THERE ARE at least two distinct
features which make British
comedies distinct from American
ones: first of all, he troup of ac-
tors is by and large the same in
all of them; second, the actors are
all usually character actors whose
comedic talents are not glossed
over by a "star" shine such as in
the American "Doris Day-Cary
Grant-Tony Randall" cycle.
"Carry On Teacher" and "Doc-
tor in Love," both currently play-
ing at the Campus Theatre, are
two good examples of British com-
edies. The first, a member of the
series which included "Carry On
Nurse," ". . . Constable," etc., is
as funny and as raunchy as its
predecessors. If you are looking for
subtle comedy, for quick and clever
lines, for witty humor, you might
as well save your money. But if
you are just interested in having
a few (correction-many) good
laughs at some riotously unaban-
doned humor, GO!M

THE STORY, if such it can be
called, revolves around the mali-
ciousness practiced by a bunch of
children at Mauldin Public School
in an, effort to make a bad im-
pression on some visiting inspec-
tors from the Ministry of Educa-
tion and thus retain their head-
master, who hopes that a favor-
able report from them will mean
a new and better position for him.
Practical jokes reign supreme, and
of course any attempt to describe
the film is really useless, for its
humor is essentially visual.
The second film, "Doctor In
Love," is also another in a loosely-
constructed series, going from
"Doctor At Large" all the way on
up to the present. The first few
starred Dick Bogarde; this one
does not, but it is the funniest of
the lot.
* * * *
"DOCTOR . .." has even less of
a "story" or "plot" than does tl-e
other film on this double-bill, but
its humor tends to be more ber-
bal and slightly less visual. It
traces the adventures of our young
hero through the throes of love
and romance, and cuts irrelevantly
through several layers of absolutely
unrelated-but quite funny-hum-
orous episodes.
The free vacation at the Colds

suit the European national agri-
cultural policies, tariff reductions
proved equally unacceptable. When
the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation was es-
tablished in 1948 to recommend
ways to bolster the European econ-
omy (and to allocate Marshall
Plan funds) the first thing it
called for was the reduction of
tariffs. Seven years later, in a
study conducted by the same or-
ganization, it was noted that the
major products which could not
be "reduced" and which were still
protected by tariffs were agricul-
tural, particularly eggs, cereals and
horticultural products.
* * *
IT WAS becoming obvious that
external barriers, such as tariffs
and quotas, were not the major
impediments to agricultural unity.
Whereas these constituted the ma-
jor barriers to trade in manu-
factured products, the trade in
agricultural produce was being
complicated by internal, non-tariff
and non-quota barriers. These in-
cluded the problem of domestic
subsidies-such as the British pay-
ment deficiency plan-and the
question of important revenues
like internal taxes which were
collected on farm products in
France, Germany and Italy.
The importance of non-tariff
barriers became clear in the Bene-
lux Customs Agreement signed in
1947 between Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands. In
this agreement, although tariff
and quota barriers were abolished,
the price discrepancies in agri-
cultural products (Dutch butter
was several cents a pound lower
than Belgian butter) caused the
need for a minimum price stan-
dard to be set in each country.
The price standard meant that
where prices in a particular pro-
duct dropped below a minimum
price for that commodity, set in-
dividually by each country, the
country was empowered to impose
a tariff on that product.
This standard was the failure of
the agreement. By 1958, prices had
not leveled off, tariffs (under this
minimum price standard) were be-
ing imposed, and agricultural pro-
ducts were continually being
smuggled across borders to obtain
higher prices.
* * *
FROM THESE and other at-
tempts at unifying various Euro-
pean countries economically, a
pattern was emerging. Industrial
agreements were meeting prac-
tically unqualified success-as in
the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity-while agricultural agree-
ments were being broken faster
than they could be made.
The framers of the Treaty of
Rome (the Common Market con-
stitution) through the negotiating
years of 1951-57 realized one major
point: the expansion of agricul-
ture into supra-national markets
could not be governed as simply
or as effectively as the expansion
of industrial trade. As a corollary,
the framers felt that where a part-
ner was in fundamental dis-
equilibrium agriculturally with the
rest of its partners, there would be
an increased tendency to add re-
strictions between partners.
The only recourse the framers
could take-and the one they did
-was to formulate a very vague,
work-it-out-later agricultural pol-
icy. Not wishing to endanger the
treaty before its adoption and ra-
tification, the framers chose to
concentrate on the more success-
fully-tested provisions for indus-
trial trade.
FOR AGRICURTURE they add-
ed special provisions to these gen-
eral clauses which would lead to-

ward an organized market for
European agriculture on the whole.
There was also a special list made
of produce which would be in-
dividually negotiated as to tariffs
and quotas.
Generally, they did establish a
framework for an agricultural pol-
icy-but it too was vague, trading
specifics for prescience. The gen-
eral agricultural goals aimed to
increase productivity; insure a
higher standard of living for the
agriculture populations; stabilize
markets; and insure reasonable
prices in supplies to consumers.
All of which were very flavorful
but without taste. Even the more
specific measures adopted-such
as a minimum price clause like
the one that had existed at Bene-
lux-were noticeably general. Ar-
ticle 44 of the treaty did entitle
countries to fix the minimum
price standard, butneglected to.
show how the Price would be
established or maintained.
In short, the agricultural pro-
visions were geared to the fu-
ture. Long-term contracts "to in-
crease the volume of trade" were
to be signed before the end of the
first-stage of the agreement 'Jan
1961). Common agricultural or-
ganizations were to be created af-
ter the treaty came into effect.
Even the most important agri-
cultural items were conveniently
placed on a special list, which
meant that they would also await
further negotiation.
* * *
THE TREATY as adopted in
1957 even provided for a waiver
on all the "end of the first stage"
musts if all six nations unani-
mously wanted it, realizing that
the agricultural problems would
barely have been touched by De-
cember of 1961.
This was exactly the case. While
the first three years of the imple-
mentation of the treaty saw many
agreements on tariffs of specific
products, the non-tariff consider-
ations (minimum price standards
and long-term trade agreements,
for example) arising from the na-
tional incongruencies were left un-
touched.
Came the end of 1961 and the
countries of the six-especially
France-might have been willing
to pass into the second stage of
the treaty leaving the farm poli-
cies basically unresolved. Except
that a funny thing happened on
the way to the farm: Great Brit-
ain officially announced .ts in-
tention to seek entry into the
Common Market in October of
1961.
* * *
THE ANNOUNCEMENT did not
come as a total shock. Sir Edward
Heath, Lord Privy Seal of Britain,
had been conducting preliminary
negotiations with the ministers of
the six for the past six or seven
months. But the announcement
did come sooner than expected. De
Gaulle, realizing that once the
treaty entered the second stage
most agricultural decisions would
be by majority vote, had planned
on having the agricultural prob-
lem worked out before considering
British entry.
Within fifteen days of the time
that Heath had announced his
acceptance of the Treaty of Rome
"in principle," de Gaulle unleash-
ed his first verbal bomb. On Nov.
30, his Foreign Minister Couve de
Murville announced that unless a
start could be made toward formu-
lating and implementing the com-
mon agricultural policy by the end
of the year, a halt would have to
be called in the progress of the
Common Market.
Two days later M. Baumgartner,
French finance minister, suggested
that the GATT call a conference

of all the main agricultural pro-
ducers. He wished to introduce a
plan, he said, to drop all systems
of subsidies and replace them with
agreements to maintain normal
prices.
De Murville's threats and Baum-
gartner's vagaries were clear in-
dications that Britain had France
aflame about the agricultural
problems. Unrest in the country-
side among the farm-workers
(who comprise 20 per cent of the
French labor force) had been the
spark. And another irksome fea-
ture about the British for de
Gaulle was Heath's announce-
ment that transitional arrange-
ments'might have to continue for
15 years before the agricultural
policies could be completely har-
monized.
* * *
DE GAULLE thus forced the
agricultural issue. Heath's pre-
liminary negotiations had to be
temporarily dropped as the Com-
mon Market ministers got together
to debate the agricultural policy
in mid-December of 1961.
After a month of haggling an
agricultural program was blended
from the conflicting non-tariff
and tariff barriers. The program,
once achieved, would apply to all
members uniformly; would grad-
ually bring the divergent price
levels to a market-wide median;
and would encourage the more
heavy consumers of farm produce,
such as West Germany,, to buy
within the market from the big-
gest producer, namely France.
The program was to be financed
by a special Common Market
Guidance and Guarantee Fund
which would administer farm sup-
port programs, handle the stock-
piling of agricultural surpluses (to
keep the market steady) and fund
structural changes in the econ-
omies of the countries.
This fund would itself be funded
by a fixed assessment to each
country, increasing as each part-
ner had less and less need to ad-
minister its own internal subsidy
programs. The policy called for
at least a 50 per cent reduction
by 1966 on external and internal
duties. By 1970, the abolition of
all remaining internal discripan-
cies was to be enacted.
* * *
THESE EIGHT YEARS were to
be called a "transition period" to
denote the drastic reorganization
of traditional European agricul-
tural patterns which would take
place.
It was this transitory period
which was to be the bais for
Britain's rejection. For although
the farm problem was at least tem-
porarily resolved to France and
Britain's satisfaction in January,
1962, it was to pop up within the
year. Heath returned to the nego-,
tiations table wisely dealing with
industrial concessions, leaving ag-
riculture within the larger con-
text of Common Market relations
with the Commonwealth and the
United States. But in the late
summer the farm problem once
more reared its fanged pitchfork.
While both sides agreed that
ultimately (by 1970) Britain would
adopt the ECC's common agricul-
tural policy, the dispute centered
around what the British would
do during the eight-year, two-
stage transitory period.
* * * -
THE BRITISH wanted to grad-
ually taper off their present price
support system (called "deficiency
payments"). The six wanted them
to abandon the system immedi-
atelyupon entry. Themsix feared
that if the British price-supported
farmers were admitted into the
market, their (the six's) farmers

would balk at having to compete
virtually unsubsidized in the fluc-
tuating market which the policy
had established.
The center of the controversy
was the cereal trade. The British
guaranteed price (under their pay-
ment deficency plan) was 20
pounds (about $56) per ton while
the lowest community level of
cerial per ton was 32 pounds a
ton. The six wanted the British to
let their price rise to the com-
munity level giving tapering sub-
sidies to the consumer to compen-
sate for his increased prices.
But the British were having
none of it. The upheaval (which
such a jerk in prices would cause)
would precipitate a lack of con-
fidence on the part of their farm-
ers, not to mention a tremendous
additional expense. All this for
something the British couldn't see
was necessary. They believed that
a free market was a free market:
the community price should be
lowered to meet their level.
* *
THIS PROPOSAL outraged the
French. It just so happened that
they had a surplus of cereal grains
on their hands. They had been
foremost (during the establish-
ment of a common policy the past
January) in pushing for a very-
highly protected farm program-
one which would admittedly help
them pass off their grain-under
the monetary guidance of the Ag-
ricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund. Now, here were the British,
not even entered, threatening to
crack-up the whole farm policy.
To ice the cake, Orville Freeman,
American secretary of agriculture,
was pressuring for an open tree-
trade farm policy which would
permit American surplus grain to
be dumped upon the market too.
Not only did the French have
a good thing in the agricultural
policy, all of the six did. In the
January negotiations, French con-
cessions had been tremendous as
they had abandoned a number of
their demands for the ~et-up of
the agricultural guidance fund.
Even German Chancellor Ade-
nauer, at odds with the French
over the farm policy, had come
out strongly in favor of the policy.
And now here was England
threatening to recreate problems.
De Gaulle, wary since late 1961,
was now violently concerned lest
all that had preceeded go for
naught. At the press conference he
indicated the intensity of his wor-
ries. De Murville officially vetoed
the application two-weeks later in
the same vein, asking rhetorically
if Britain had or could or wanted
to fulfill the necessary conditions
for a successful agricultural pro-
gram and for a successful Common
Market generally.
The answer from eight months
of negotiations with the British
was clearly no.
'TARAS BULBA':
Unique
Spectacle
THERE'S A FUNNY thing about
the spectacular, that peculiar
idiom of American filmmakers-
it keeps getting better and better.
"Taras Bulba," the Harold Hecht
production that opened last nght
at the State Theatre, is easily
recognized as an American spec-
tacular. All the essential ingre-
dients are there, yet this particular
spectacular is better than the us-
ual variety; it is almost tasteful.
The thousand-fold cast looks more
like the vindictive army it is sup-
posed to be. and less like a band
of local herders hoping to pick up
a few pesos from crazy American
filmmakers. The Eastman color is
used as expertly in the blush of
a maiden's cheek as in the glare
of a ghastly battle wound. The
Panavision wide-screen technique

emphasizes the natural grandeur
of the Argentine Andes (alias Rus-
sian Steppes) as well as the scope
of an attacking army. The battle
scenes still make the audience in-
hale and exhale in unison, but
the grease paint gore is applied
with a lighter and more subtle
hand. The sex orgies are decadent,
but attended by fine family men
whom we know believe only in true
love. Franz Waxman's music is
resplendent, classical.
.And, most important to all us
romantics, the love scenes are
played by the bravest of heroes
(Tony Curtis) and the most vir-
ginal of maidens (Christine Kauf-
mann).
UNFORTUNATELY, an other-
wise "good spectacular" (if such
a rating exists among movie cri-
tics) is marred by faulty special
effects, including a mile-deep cre-
vasse whose sides do not match
and the spires of the city of Kiev
which look more painted than
pointed.
By far, the movie's finest fea-
ture is Yul Brynner, castIas the
firey Taras Bulba whose motto is
to "put your faith in your sword
and your sword in a Pole." Flank-
ed by his two sons in battle, his
Cossack arrogance is masterful,
'hic w4.. nrn'.'n.l y ne .n.4 a -alni lf in4

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