54 | AUGUST 17 • 2023

S

ome commands in the Torah
were understood so narrowly by
the Sages that they were rendered
almost inapplicable. One example is the ir
ha-nidachat, the city led astray into idolatry,
about which the Torah states that “you
shall put the inhabitants of that town to
the sword.
” (Deut. 13:16) Another is the ben
sorer umoreh, the stubborn
and rebellious child, brought
by his parents to the court
and, if found guilty, put to
death. (Deut. 21:18-21)
In both cases, some Sages
then interpreted the law
so restrictively that they
said “there never was and
never will be” a case in which the law was
applied. (Sanhedrin 71a) As for the con-
demned city, Rabbi Eliezer said that if it
contained a single mezuzah, the law was not
enforced (ibid.). In the case of the rebellious
child, R. Yehuda taught that if the mother
and father did not sound or look alike, the
law did not apply (ibid.). According to these
interpretations, the two laws were never
meant to be put into practice but were writ-
ten solely “so that we should expound them
and receive reward.
” They had only an edu-
cational — not a legal — function.
In the opposite direction, some laws were
held to be far more extensive than they
seemed at first sight. One striking example
occurs in this week’s parshah. It refers to the
conduct of a siege during wartime.
The Torah states: “When you lay siege to
a town and wage war against it for a long
time to capture it, do not destroy its trees;
do not wield an axe against them. You may
eat from them; you must not cut them
down. Are trees of the field human beings,
that you should besiege them, too? Only
trees that you know do not produce food
may you cut down for use building siege
works until the town that has made war
against you falls.
” (Deut. 20:19-20)
This prohibition against destroying
fruit-bearing trees was known as the rule
of bal tashchit, “do not destroy.
” On the face
of it, it is highly limited in scope. It does no
more than forbid a “scorched earth” policy
in the conduct of war. It seems to have no
peacetime application. However, the Sages

understood it very broadly to include any
act of needless destruction.
Maimonides states the law thus: “Not
only does this apply to trees, but also
whoever breaks vessels or tears garments,
destroys a building, blocks a wellspring of
water, or destructively wastes food trans-
gresses the command of bal tashchit.
”
This is the halachic basis of an ethic of
environmental responsibility.
Why did the Oral Tradition, or some of
its exponents, narrow the scope of the law
in some cases, and broaden it in others?
The short answer is: We do not know. The
rabbinic literature does not tell us. But we
can speculate. A posek, seeking to interpret
Divine law in specific cases, will endeavor
to do so in a way consistent with the total
structure of biblical teaching. If a text seems
to conflict with a basic principle of Jewish
law, it will be understood restrictively, at
least by some. If it exemplifies such a princi-
ple, it will be understood broadly.
The law of the condemned city, where
all the inhabitants were sentenced to death,
seems to conflict with the principle of indi-
vidual justice. When Sodom was threatened
with such a fate, Abraham argued that if
there were only 10 innocent people, the
destruction of the entire population would
be manifestly unfair: “Shall the Judge of all
the earth not do justice?” Gen. 18:25
The law of the stubborn and rebellious

son was explained in the Talmud by R.
Jose the Galilean on the grounds that: “The
Torah foresaw his ultimate destiny.
” He had
begun with theft. The likelihood was that
he would go on to violence and then to
murder. “Therefore, the Torah ordained: Let
him die innocent rather than die guilty.
”
This is pre-emptive punishment. The
child is punished less for what he has done
than for what he may go on to do. Rabbi
Shimon bar Yochai, who said the law never
was or would be applied, may have believed
that in Judaism there is a contrary princi-
ple, that people are only judged for what
they have done, not for what they will do.
Retributive punishment is justice; pre-emp-
tive punishment is not.
To repeat: This is speculative. There
may have been other reasons at work. But
it makes sense to suppose that the Sages
sought as far as possible to make their
individual rulings consistent with the val-
ue-structure of Jewish law as they under-
stood it.
On this view, the law of the condemned
city exists to teach us that idolatry, once
accepted in public, is contagious, as we see
from the history of Israel’s kings. The law of
the stubborn and rebellious child is there to
teach us how steep is the downward slope
from juvenile delinquency to adult crime.
Law exists not just to regulate but also to
educate.

Rabbi Lord
Jonathan
Sacks

SPIRIT
A WORD OF TORAH

Environmental
Responsibility