54 | AUGUST 17 • 2023 

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ome commands in the Torah 
were understood so narrowly by 
the Sages that they were rendered 
almost inapplicable. One example is the ir 
ha-nidachat, the city led astray into idolatry, 
about which the Torah states that “you 
shall put the inhabitants of that town to 
the sword.
” (Deut. 13:16) Another is the ben 
sorer umoreh, the stubborn 
and rebellious child, brought 
by his parents to the court 
and, if found guilty, put to 
death. (Deut. 21:18-21)
In both cases, some Sages 
then interpreted the law 
so restrictively that they 
said “there never was and 
never will be” a case in which the law was 
applied. (Sanhedrin 71a) As for the con-
demned city, Rabbi Eliezer said that if it 
contained a single mezuzah, the law was not 
enforced (ibid.). In the case of the rebellious 
child, R. Yehuda taught that if the mother 
and father did not sound or look alike, the 
law did not apply (ibid.). According to these 
interpretations, the two laws were never 
meant to be put into practice but were writ-
ten solely “so that we should expound them 
and receive reward.
” They had only an edu-
cational — not a legal — function.
In the opposite direction, some laws were 
held to be far more extensive than they 
seemed at first sight. One striking example 
occurs in this week’s parshah. It refers to the 
conduct of a siege during wartime. 
The Torah states: “When you lay siege to 
a town and wage war against it for a long 
time to capture it, do not destroy its trees; 
do not wield an axe against them. You may 
eat from them; you must not cut them 
down. Are trees of the field human beings, 
that you should besiege them, too? Only 
trees that you know do not produce food 
may you cut down for use building siege 
works until the town that has made war 
against you falls.
” (Deut. 20:19-20)
This prohibition against destroying 
fruit-bearing trees was known as the rule 
of bal tashchit, “do not destroy.
” On the face 
of it, it is highly limited in scope. It does no 
more than forbid a “scorched earth” policy 
in the conduct of war. It seems to have no 
peacetime application. However, the Sages 

understood it very broadly to include any 
act of needless destruction. 
Maimonides states the law thus: “Not 
only does this apply to trees, but also 
whoever breaks vessels or tears garments, 
destroys a building, blocks a wellspring of 
water, or destructively wastes food trans-
gresses the command of bal tashchit.
” 
This is the halachic basis of an ethic of 
environmental responsibility.
Why did the Oral Tradition, or some of 
its exponents, narrow the scope of the law 
in some cases, and broaden it in others? 
The short answer is: We do not know. The 
rabbinic literature does not tell us. But we 
can speculate. A posek, seeking to interpret 
Divine law in specific cases, will endeavor 
to do so in a way consistent with the total 
structure of biblical teaching. If a text seems 
to conflict with a basic principle of Jewish 
law, it will be understood restrictively, at 
least by some. If it exemplifies such a princi-
ple, it will be understood broadly.
The law of the condemned city, where 
all the inhabitants were sentenced to death, 
seems to conflict with the principle of indi-
vidual justice. When Sodom was threatened 
with such a fate, Abraham argued that if 
there were only 10 innocent people, the 
destruction of the entire population would 
be manifestly unfair: “Shall the Judge of all 
the earth not do justice?” Gen. 18:25
The law of the stubborn and rebellious 

son was explained in the Talmud by R. 
Jose the Galilean on the grounds that: “The 
Torah foresaw his ultimate destiny.
” He had 
begun with theft. The likelihood was that 
he would go on to violence and then to 
murder. “Therefore, the Torah ordained: Let 
him die innocent rather than die guilty.
” 
This is pre-emptive punishment. The 
child is punished less for what he has done 
than for what he may go on to do. Rabbi 
Shimon bar Yochai, who said the law never 
was or would be applied, may have believed 
that in Judaism there is a contrary princi-
ple, that people are only judged for what 
they have done, not for what they will do. 
Retributive punishment is justice; pre-emp-
tive punishment is not.
To repeat: This is speculative. There 
may have been other reasons at work. But 
it makes sense to suppose that the Sages 
sought as far as possible to make their 
individual rulings consistent with the val-
ue-structure of Jewish law as they under-
stood it. 
On this view, the law of the condemned 
city exists to teach us that idolatry, once 
accepted in public, is contagious, as we see 
from the history of Israel’s kings. The law of 
the stubborn and rebellious child is there to 
teach us how steep is the downward slope 
from juvenile delinquency to adult crime. 
Law exists not just to regulate but also to 
educate.

Rabbi Lord 
Jonathan 
Sacks

SPIRIT
A WORD OF TORAH

Environmental
Responsibility