oints of view
Dr. Gordis from page 57
Community View
Nuclear Capitulation Will Lead To Iranian Bomb
T
he Iran "voluntary" agreement
provides a direct path for Iran to
get a nuclear bomb and its pro-
visions show that a bomb is Iran's intent.
The construct of "snapback sanctions"
is emasculated by the agreement itself.
The Obama administration capitulated
on all the red lines that it had estab-
lished.
Intercontinental Missiles
The Iran regime's desire for a bomb was
substantiated with Secretary of State
John Kerry's last-minute capitulation
allowing ICBM technology transfer. The
only use for an Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile is to carry a nuclear warhead to
the United States.
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told
the Senate Arms Services Committee,
"We want them [the Iranians] to con-
tinue to be isolated as a military and
limited in terms of the kind of equip-
ment material they are able to get ... the
`I' in ICBM stands for 'intercontinental,
which means having the capability to fly
from Iran to the United States, and we
don't want that?'
Plutonium Bomb
The agreement keeps open the path to a
plutonium bomb, which requires multi-
point detonation. Paragraph 5 on page
146 allows Iranians access to informa-
tion they were trying to develop, stating:
"Review and approve in advance, upon
request by Iran, the design, develop-
ment, fabrication, acquisition, or use
for non-nuclear purposes of multi-point
explosive detonation systems suitable for
a nuclear explosive device and explosive
diagnostic systems ..."
The secret IAEA accords involve the
activities at the Parchin military base
where Iran is believed to be developing
such a trigger for a nuclear bomb.
Paragraph 82.1 of Annex 1 states that
Iran cannot have software to simulate a
nuclear bomb. In 1945, we did not have
the luxury of a computer simulation;
however, we figured out how to explode
the bomb — and now we are going to
train them to do it. If Iran is not going
to build a bomb, it doesn't need multi-
point explosive technology.
No Military Base Inspection
Iran now claims that military bases
are off limits to the IAEA which makes
inspections inadequate and begs the
question, "What are they hiding?"
its heavy-water reactor, and accept more
intrusive inspections including daily
visits to some facilities. Iran never lived
up to the terms of that agreement. So
why do we expect anything different
now, especially after giving Iran the fro-
zen $150 billion?
Snapback Ineffective
Eugene Greenstein Ph.D.
and Irving Ginsberg Ph.D.
Heavy Water Reactor
The agreement also allows Iran to keep
its Arak heavy water reactor. A heavy
water reactor is used to produce pluto-
nium, as well as medical radioisotopes
Iran says it needs. However, a light water
reactor can also produce the same radio-
isotopes. Therefore, Iran's insistence on
keeping Arak and researching multi-
point detonation leads to only one ratio-
nal conclusion — the plutonium bomb.
U.S. Helping Defend Iran
The agreement provides for coopera-
tion in training Iran to strengthen its
ability to protect against and respond to
nuclear security threats, including sabo-
tage, as well as to enable effective and
sustainable nuclear security and physi-
cal protection systems. (Note: Secretary
of State Kerry would not rule out that
these could be used to prevent Israel or
the U.S. from attacking Iran's facilities.)
Why would Iran need to get our security
expertise unless it was doing something
nefarious, like building a nuclear weap-
on capability?
U.S. Helping With Centrifuges
Many places in the agreement refer to
Iran as a partner in developing advanced
nuclear technology, including centrifuge
technology. Interestingly, the United
States will not give centrifuge technol-
ogy to any of the neighboring countries
because peaceful nuclear programs do
not require the ability to enrich ura-
nium.
The agreement provides for Iran
developing and installing advanced cen-
trifuges. In November 2013, the P5+1
signed an agreement with Iran that gave
the Iranians approximately $800 mil-
lion per month to stop enriching above
5 percent, make inoperable half of its
19,000 centrifuges, not to commission
The so-called "snapback sanctions"
provide no comfort as the agreement
exempts long-term contracts signed
prior to the reinstatement of sanctions.
This incentivizes massive, immediate
economic investment in Iran and less
effective sanctions than presently exist.
How does the president say that snap-
back sanctions are a deterrent?
The only remedy to cheating is the
ability to put back sanctions which,
under this agreement, are signifi-
cantly less than the present sanctions.
Therefore, the practical effect is that
to stop cheating, the United States will
be forced to use the military option or
excuse/ignore cheating. Thus, Iran col-
lects $100 billion-plus to continue to
promote terrorism, learns nuclear tech-
nology, and then can choose to break the
agreement with little to fear.
What's The Alternative?
This is a bad agreement because it paves
the way for a nuclear weapon and deliv-
ery system. The alternative is to not lift
sanctions and to demand improvements
in the agreement. That war is the only
alternative is a false narrative.
Our economic power is significant,
even if the United States needs to act
alone. We cannot afford a repeat of
1938 at Munich, where Hitler was given
Czechoslovakia in return for "peace:'
Eleven months later, Hitler used the
superior Czech tanks to invade Poland.
A bad agreement such as this one will
lead to a military outcome instead of
peace.
We need Congress to vote "No:' You
can help by calling your senators and
congress people.
❑
Eugene Greenstein Ph.D. is president of the
Zionist Organization of America-Michigan
Region; Irving Ginsberg Ph.D. was chief scien-
tist at the Department of Energy Laboratory
at the Nevada Test Site, a consultant to the
Iran hegemony in the Middle
East," and suggested that July
14, 2015, may "prove to be
one of the darkest days in the
region's history, especially for
moderate Arab Sunni states
and Israel." Moshe Ya'alon,
Israel's defense minister, called
the deal a "massive betrayal."
Indeed, to many Israelis,
the Obama administration
has become synonymous
with betrayal of Israel. Much
discussed in this context is
Michael Oren's new book, Ally,
about his years as Israel's
ambassador to the U.S. A
meticulous scholar and an
understated, elegant diplomat,
Oren has unleashed a bit of an
uproar by arguing unabash-
edly that Obama sold Israel
down the river. At one point,
he wrote, "Most disturbing for
me personally was the realiza-
tion that our closest ally had
entreated with our deadliest
enemy on an existential issue
without so much as informing
us." That sense of alone-ness,
again.
On the Times of Israel
that morning, four headlines
appeared: "Netanyahu on
Iran deal: The more you read
it, the worse it gets" was fol-
lowed by "Former Auschwitz
guard indicted as accessory
to murder." Just under that
was "Daughter badly hurt as
Paris Jewish family attacked
at home," and, finally, there
was "U.S. presents draft Iran
resolution to Security Council."
The proximity of those articles
on the Iran deal, the Holocaust
and Europe's resurging anti-
Semitism reflects the senti-
ment here that not enough has
changed in 70 years.
That video our son sent of
Israeli soldiers marching som-
berly through the Polish for-
est spoke volumes this week.
True, Israelis can now defend
ourselves. But our ability to
do so was just significantly
curtailed. In ways more harrow-
ing than we might once have
imagined, we know we are still
surrounded. And increasingly,
it feels like we are once again
alone.
❑
defense and intelligence communities and
to the Department of Justice and a former
Dr. Daniel Gordis is senior vice
member of the Nuclear Emergency Search
president and senior fellow at the
Team.
Shalem Center, a Jerusalem research
institute.
58
August 13 • 2015
JIN