Peace Risk
And what of the European Union
and the United Nations, which Israel
wants out, and the Palestinians say
must be included? Sharon could find
himself sucked into a full-fledged
international conference — rather
than the U.S.-led meeting he desires
— and a situation of pressure on Israel
the U.S. analysis, would make it much that he never anticipated.
Then there is the agenda. Can an
easier for moderate Arab states to go
Israeli plan for an interim settlement
along with moves to induce a change
mesh with the Saudi and Palestinian
in Baghdad.
The Americans also believe a confer- insistence on a final deal?
On the Israeli left, former Israeli
ence would enable them to convince
Foreign
Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami pre-
Arab states with a major stake in
dicts
the
conference will fail unless it
regional stability, such as Egypt and
adopts
the parameters laid out on
Saudi Arabia, to pressure the
the
core
permanent status issues
Palestinians to move forward.
— borders, Jerusalem and
U.S. National Security Adviser
refugees — by former U.S.
Condoleezza Rice says a confer-
President
Bill Clinton in
ence would have to be 'based on
December
2000. The conference's
three principles: Israeli with-
mandate,
Ben-Ami
says, should
drawal from Palestinian cities, an Powell
be
to
close
the
gaps
that remain
end to violence and a clear
beyond
the
Clinton
parameters.
denunciation of terror by the
On the Israeli right, Knesset
Arab moderates. All this would
member Yuval Steinitz argues
provided modicum of regional
that the conference will fail
stability as a launching pad for
because the timing is wrong:
Operation Saddam Hussein.
The United States should change
For the moderate Arab states,
Sharo n
the regime in Iraq and then hold
a conference would provide a
the
regional
conference, not the other
chance to play a highly visible and
way
around,
he says. The Palestinians,
prestigious role in Middle East peace-
Steinitz says, deliberately have been cre-
making. It also could provide an open-
ating instability to defer or deter an
ing for better ties with the United
American attack on Iraq, and it will be
States, while ostensibly backing
impossible to get any concessions from
Palestinian interests.
them until Saddam has been removed.
Egypt already has indicated its will-
ingness to participate — as long as the
conference picks up where previous
Are They Ready?
negotiations broke off, a condition
But the biggest problem remains the
that may not be acceptable to Israel.
fundamental question of substance:
Of all the interested parties, it is the
Can Sharon, supremely mistrustful of
Palestinians who stand to gain most:
Palestinian intentions, put anything on
Israeli withdrawal, international
the table that the Palestinians could
observers, early statehood, Arab and
accept? Conversely, is Arafat, whose
international pressure for Israeli con-
direct role in Palestinian terror now has
cessions and an American and
been clearly documented, ready to
European "Marshall plan" to rebuild
make a deal with Israel on any terms?
Palestinian ruins. Arafat long has
If they can't bridge the gaps on sub-
called to internationalize the conflict,
stance, how effective can a conference
and a conference would be interna-
prove over time in lowering violence?
tionalization in spades.
But there are problems. First there is Powell clearly hopes a conference
would promote stability, even if it
the question of participants: Will the
doesn't solve all the problems.
Arabs come if Sharon insists on keep-
Indeed, the conference idea assumed
ing Arafat out? Powell is trying to
added
urgency for Powell when he vis-
finesse the issue by talking about a
ited Israel's northern border and saw
conference at ministerial level, but it's
for himself how Israel could slide into
unclear if the Arab side will buy it.
war
with Syria and Lebanon. Powell's
And what about Syria? Sharon's
hastily
arranged visits to Beirut and
vision of a conference of "moderate"
Damascus
seemed to cool that situa-
Arab states surely excludes Syria, and
tion,
at
least
for now. Powell's next
Damascus might, through Hezbollah,
hurdle
on
the
way to a conference is a
heat up Israel's northern border to
Palestinian
declaration
denouncing
provoke an Israeli attack and torpedo
terror
—
and
ending
hostilities.
the peace conference.
All sides may gamble on a risky alternative: an international peace conference.
LESLIE SUSSER
Jewish Telegraphic Agency
Jerusalem
hen Ariel Sharon decid-
ed to isolate Palestinian
Authority leader Yasser
Arafat in Ramallah, the
Israeli prime minister realized he
would be accused of deliberately
blocking diplomatic channels if he
didn't find an alternative form of dia-
logue with the Palestinians.
Sharon's answer: A regional
conference of Israel, moder-
ate Arab states and
Palestinians — but not
Arafat — to be convened under
American auspices.
The conference would focus on con-
demning terror, defining a roadmap to
Palestinian statehood and widening
the circle of Middle Eastern countries
at peace with Israel. The terms of ref-
erence would include the recent Saudi
peace initiative based on the principle
of land for peace, and an Israeli count-
er-proposal emphasizing the need for a
long-term interim arrangement
between Israel and the Palestinians
before final borders are determined.
Sharon formally raised the idea in
an otherwise tough early April speech
in the Knesset. He then put it to visit-
ing U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell in their April 12 meeting in
Jerusalem, and Powell immediately
began to run with it.
Inside Israel, the idea has broad sup-
port across the political spectrum, aside
from the far-right parties. It is a bold
idea and, if it gets off the ground,
could herald the first signs of real
progress in Middle East peacemaking
since the inconclusive Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations at Taba in January 2001.
The reason the conference idea
might fly is that it appeals strongly to
several of the major players. The trou-
ble is that most of them mean differ-
ent things by it.
ground rules, they could end up
smothering the parley before it starts.
For Israel, the conference idea pro-
vides several bonuses. It enables
Sharon to offer the Palestinians a
"political horizon" without seeming to
be rewarding terror. Sharon can dangle
the prospect of a conference while still
insisting he won't actually hold politi-
cal negotiations with the Palestinian's
until violence stops.
By widening the negotiating frame-
work to include other players and
issues, Sharon can argue
that the new Palestinian
track is a natural adjunct of
the wider process, and not a
case of Israel being forced to the nego-
tiating table by violence, even if terror
does not subside altogether.
Moreover, Israeli officials believe the
Palestinians would be reluctant to forfeit
the chance to reap major political gains
via the international community, and
would be under enormous pressure to
maintain a de facto ceasefire before, dur-
ing and after the conference, provided
that it leads to a viable peace process.
A successful conference will put the
onus on the Palestinian side to keep
the peace.
Even if there is no immediate
progress from a conference, Sharon will
gain time. The premier envisions an
ongoing mechanism akin to the Madrid
Peace Conference of 1991, when an
international gathering of several days
was followed by committees that tack-
led the issues on a continuing basis.
Such a system now, Sharon feels,
would create a counter-terrorism
dynamic and improve Israel's interna-
tional image.
Sharon stands to make domestic gains
too. By initiating a parley along the
lines of the Madrid conference, Sharon
takes on the mantle of potential peace-
maker. He also hints that he is going
back to basics, wiping out the errors of
the failed Oslo process and building
peace on more solid foundations.
ANALYSIS
Something For All
U.S. Agenda
As the various sides try to outmaneu-
ver each other in laying down the
For the United States, the conference
primarily would be a means of pacify-
ing the region in advance of a planned
strike against Iraq. Quiet on the
Israeli-Palestinian front, according to
Leslie Susser is the diplomatic corre-
spondent for the Jerusalem Report.
4/19
2002
22
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