12 Friday, March 1, 1980
THE DETROIT JEWISH NEWS
Did a Stern Gang Assassination Kill a More Favorable Statehood?
By VICTOR BIENSTOCK
(Editor's note:
Bienstock is former man-
aging director of the
Jewish Telegraphic
Agency and had a career
as a foreign correspon-
dent.)
A single episode in the
turbulent history of Pales-
tine from the Balfour Dec-
laration in 1917 to the proc-
lamation of the state of Is-
rael in part of the Holy Land
in 1948 may have been the
decisive factor in Britain's
abandonment of the Pales-
tine Mandate and its failure
to make the existence of the
Jewish state possible with-
out four wars, the loss of
thousands of lives, the em-
bitterment of the Middle
East and its conversion into
an armed camp.
The significance of one
act of terrorism on the
course of events is
suggested by Lord Nicholas
Bethell, British writer and
historian, a one-time
Member of a British Con-
servative government.
He made an exhaustive
study of the documents in
British, Jewish and
American archives, con-
sulted a hundred or more
volumes dealing with
Palestine and inter-
viewed literally hun-
dreds.
- His findings are incorpo-
rated in "The Palestine
Triangle: The Struggle for
the Holy Land, 1935-1948,"
published here by Putnam,
undoubtedly one of the most
comprehensive and faithful
studies of the period.
Unlike most other writers
on this period, Bethell has
been objective in presenta-
tion of the facts, careful to
present all sides of the story
and all viewpoints,
painstaking in his efforts to
resolve such controversial
questions as whether or not
the Irgun Zvai Leumi gave
advance warning of its
bombing of the King David
Hotel and scrupulous in his
attemps to be fair to all.
His study, however, com-
pelled him to condemn suc-
cessive British govern-
ments for their failure to es-
tablish and pursue a consis-
tent policy on Palestine con-
forming to Mandate obliga-
tions and for the heartless-
ness and callousness and,
yes, anti-Jewish prejudice
with which they dealt with
the Jews seeking to escape
death at the hands of the
Nazis — a callousness
which, regrettably, ele-
ments of the United States
government, notably the
State Department, shared.
"The moral and legal
merits of the Arab-Israel
dispute played, of course,
only a secondary role in
forming Britain's policy,"
•
"Only thus will we be able
Bethell points out. "The
over-riding aim in the to silence the wealthy Jews
minds of the British. in America who pay for this
decision-makers was to pro- agitation without any in-
tect Britain's Middle East tention of sacrificing their
position in preparation for a American citizenship,"
likely war against Nazi Cranborne wrote. "And only
thus will we be able to get
Germany."
Protection of British some Jews out of this coun-
interests was the only try, in which they are now
consistent motive in far too many."
Foreign Secretary An-
British policy before
World War II and during thony Eden, the white
and after it when the knight who resigned from
British policy before Neville Chamberlain's
World War II and during cabinet to protest Munich
and after it when the and was reinstated in that
British government post by Prime Minister
sought desperately to Winston Churchill, rejected
preserve a British the proposal. He warned
presence and British that it would create too
influence in the Middle many difficulties for Brit-
ain. As for the miserable
East.
Malcolm MacDonald, the Jews seeking escape, Eden
colonial secretary whose said, "It would be more mer-
1939 White Paper set a final ciful in the end to turn these
limit of 100,000 on Jewish (refugee) ships back."
immigration into Palestine
The Foreign Office atti-
and restricted Jewish tude was epitomized by one
land purchases there official, Armine Dew, who
to a tiny area, told complained in a memo un-
Bethell 40 years later why earthed in Bethell's re-
he, a professed friend and search that, "in my opinion,
believer in Zionism, had de- a disproportionate amount
livered what was thought to of the time of this office is
be the coup de grace to wasted on dealing with
Jewish statehood in the these wailing Jews."
Holy Land. The arguments
But Prime Minister
and pressures from the Churchill was of a differ-
Foreign Office and the army ent cast and orientation.
were too great to withstand, He had put himself on re-
he said, and convinced him cord as far back as 1908
finally that he would be act- as a Zionist sympathizer
ing in the best interests of when he told British
Britain and of the Jews Zionists that "I am in full
themselves if he proceeded sympathy with the histor-
with it.
ical aspirations of the
"At the back of my mind Jews." As colonial secre-
was the idea that if we won tary, he was responsible
the war and I stayed in for the appointment of
office, I would then be able Sir Herbert Samuel as
to give the Zionists a better first British high com-
deal," he told Bethell. "It missioner of Palestine.
would have meant abandon-
As a mavarick Conserva-
ing the White Paper, yes, tive back-bencher, Chur-
another change of policy, chill fought tenaciously
but that's nothing new, is it? against a whole series of
Policies change as circum- White Papers, all aimed at
cutting down Britain's Bal-
stances change.
"We were obliged under four Declaration obliga-
the Mandate to facilitate tions to the Jews.
Jewish immigration under
His was the strongest
voice heard in the House of
suitable conditions.
Once these conditions Commons against the Mac-
improved, we might have Donald White Paper, which,
been able to allow more ironically, was the official
Jewish immigrants. But in British policy throughout
1939 the conditions were his tenure at No. 10 Dowing
very unsuitable."
St. As prime minister, he
When the problem of pushed through authoriza-
Jewish refugees from tion for a Jewish brigade
Hitler became an acute composed of Palestinian
embarrassment to Brit- Jewish volunteers over the
ain Lord Cranborne, the fierce objections of the
lord privy seal, proposed Foreign Office and the
that Britain set up a army.
I recall Churchill, pale
Jewish state in Eritrea
and settle the passengers and drawn after the ordeals
of the refugee ships there. of the Cairo and Teheran
There was no love for the conferences at the end of
Jews behind the Cran- 1943, in the garden of the
borne proposal. The lord Birtish Embassy in Cairo
privy seal explained his where he addressed a mixed
proposal in a Foreign lot, including correspon-
Office document which dents of most of the Arab
Bethell retrieved from press. It was not one of his
better days. His delivery
the archives:
was faltering and unin-
spired. But when one of my
colleagues asked a question
about Palestine, he drew
himself up, his entire mien
became animated. "I per-
sonally have always been a
Zionist," he told us proudly.
"The Jews have made the
desert bloom."
This was too much for
Lord Lampson, the
British ambassador, who
interrupted Churchill to
adjourn the session.
Shocked attaches told us
before we left that those
remarks of the prime
minister's were to treated
as off the record.
The event that changed
the course of history and
turned the British from the
course that Churchill had
set once the worst part of the
war was over and directly
towards abandonment of
the Mandate was the assas-
sination of Lord Moyne, the
WINSTON CHURCHILL
minister of state in Cairo.
Moyne was no particular
friend of the Jews — in fact
the Zionists considered
him coldly indifferent to the
fate of the Jews in Nazi
hands and he was quoted
once in connection with re-
scue plans ("probably
wrongly," Bethell says) as
remarking: "What would I
do with a million Jews?"
But Moyne was a close
friend of Churchill. As a
loyal associate and also as a
reluctant convert to the be-
lief that partition was the
only workable solution to
the Palestine problem,
Moyne worked hard to pro-
duce a partition plan to
which he could get the
agreement of the Arab rul-
ers.
I was stationed in Cairo in
1944 and reported some of
the proposals drafted in his
ministry which Moyne cir-
culated to the Arabs.
Abba Eban, who was
then a captain in the
British Army attached to
the Ministry of State, in
Cairo, in its Arab Affairs
Department, sub-
sequently wrote, as Lord
Bethell reports: "In 1944,
there seemed every
likelihood that the parti-
tion plan would go
through. It was approved
not only by the pro-
Zionists but also by (Col-
onial Secretary Oliver)
Stanley, (Palestine High
Commissioner sir
Harold) Mac Michael,
Moyne and others. These
were very powerful au-
spices."
More importantly, Chur-
chill himself had come
around to the belief that
partition was the best
possible solution. The in-
famous MacDonald White
Paper of 1939 was the offi-
cial policy when Churchill
took office as Prime Minis-
ter. He never accepted it,
nor did he seek its repeal al-
though he expressed his
vehement disagreement on
every occasion the Palestine
issue arose.
The Palestine question
and others, as far as Chur-
chill was involved, would
have to wait until he had
accomplished his primary
task — the defeat of Hitler.
Towards the latter part of
1944, Churchill had given
thought to Palestine and
the Jews. He had pushed
through the Palestine
Jewish Legion and had a
majority of the Cabinet in
support of a partition solu-
tion when he felt the gov-
ernment would be free to
deal with the question.
He indicated this to Dr.
Chaim Weizmann, the
head of the Jewish
Agency for Palestine, at a
meeting on Nov. 4 when
he informed him there
was a partition plan in
existence to which he had
not yet given his assent
although he favored par-
tition and believed the
Negev should be part of
the new Jewish state.
John Martin, Churchill's
secretary, noted in his min-
utes of the meeting that "it
was made clear to Weiz-
mann that any scheme ap-
proved by Churchill would
be the maximum the
Zionists could hope to ob-
tain, that to carry it
through, Churchill would
have to overcome consider-
able opposition, especially
from the Conservative
Party and the army."
Martin's notes added that
"nothing would be done to
implement the (partition)
scheme until the end of the
war, probably until after
the General Election."
The elated Weizmann
wrote to Rabbi Hillel Silver,
the American Zionist
leader, that Churchill had
also assured him that "if
Roosevelt and I come to-
gether to the conference ta-
ble, we can carry through
all we want."
Churchill, as Bethell
points out, believed, un-
like the Foreign Office,
that Zionism ran paral-
lel to British interests and
that a Jewish state in
Palestine would be a
more reliable and power-
ful ally for Britain than
the Arabs for whom he
had little respect." There
can be no doubt, Bethell
says, that Churchill in-
tended to establish that
state "and would have
succeeded in this aim in
spite of the Foreign
Office. But he and Weiz-
mann, as they lunched at
Chequers that Saturday,
could not take into ac-
count the shattering fact
that two days earlier the
Lehi (Stern Gang) had
sent two men to Cairo to
kill the prime minister's
old and dear friend, Wal-
ter Moyne."
The effect of the assassi-
nation was immediate and
devastating. A mourning
Churchill revealed the
shattering of his faith in
Zionism in an emotional
tribute to his friend in the
House of Commons! "If our
dreams for Zionism should
be dissolved in the
the revolvers of ass,.
and if our efforts s 'or its .11-
ture should provoke a new
wave of banditry worthy of
the Nazi Germans, many
persons like myself will
have to reconsider the posi-
tion that we have main-
tained so firmly for so long a
time."
The fire went out of Chur-
chill's Zionism with the
death of Moyne and, as
Bethell reports, "the parti-
tion scheme lost its momen-
tum, allowing its opponents
in the Foreign Office and
army to gather their
strength for a counterat-
tack."
The death of President
Roosevelt the following Ap-
ril, Bethell suggests, may
have been the final blow
that induced Churchill "to
surrender to all the pres-
sures and abandon his plan
to implement a scheme of
partition as soon as the
German war ended."
Three days after
Roosevelt's death, Chur-
chill changed his mind
about having a cabinet
discussion on partition
and told Herbert Morri-
son, chairman of the
cabinet committee on
Palestine, that "I am sure
it is best to let it lie for the
present." He refused to
see Weizmann again and
two weeks after he had
told Morrison to post-
pone the discussion he
concluded that the
British Parliament could
not resolve the issue and
that "the question will
become one for the peace
conference."
The collapse of Forei&
Secretary Ernest Bevin's
brutal policy on Palestine,
which culminated in the de-
cision that British would
throw in the sponge and re-
treat from Palestine,
shocked and embitter - -1
Churchill who saw it
sign of the final disintegra-
tion of the British Empire to
which he had devotekii his
life.
In 1948, the tired old
rior" rebuffed his old friend
Weizmann's efforts to make
peace with a cold verbal
message: 'The Palestine
position now, as concerns
Great Britain, is simply
such a hell-disaster that I
cannot take it up again or
renew my efforts of 20
years. It is a situation which
I myself cannot help in and
must, as far as I can, put out
of my mind. But send
Weizmann himself my
warm regards.' "