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September 22, 1978 - Image 64

Resource type:
Text
Publication:
The Detroit Jewish News, 1978-09-22

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64 Friday, September 22, 1978

THE DETROIT. JEWISH NEWS

A Force for Jewish Revolution

By YITZHAK BEN-AMI

(Editor's note: Yitzhak
Ben-Anil was one of the
early U.S. activists in the
Irgun. His defense of
Prime Minister Menahem
Begin and condemnation
of David Ben-Gurion and
the Yishuv over the inci-
dent of the ship "Al-
talena" appeared in The
Jewish News of Aug. 18.)
The government of Prime
Minister Menahem Begin
has now lasted more than 12
months.
Much was written by now
on the man, his personal
background, but still some-
what confusedly on his "ter-
rorist background."
What is still completely
unexplored territory, as far
as the U.S. is concerned, is
the historic antecedents and
background of a former
revolutionary — now prime
minister; and the origins of
the underground "Irgun
Zvai Leumi," the organiza-
tion he headed from 1943 to
1948.
The "official" versions
of Zionist history and the
creation of the state of Is-
rael usually ignore or
critically skim over the
history of-the Irgun.
There were certain
periods when revolutionary
"terrorist" acts were per-
formed in retaliation for in-
discriminate killings of
Jewish civilians, or police
torture of Irgun soldiers.
There were, however, no in-
dividual terror acts de-
signed merely to create ter-
ror. The IZL military acts
were carried out against a
foreign army of occupation.
The story of the Irgun can
be properly told only
against the long historic
background of 5,000 years
of proud Hebrew tribes, the
Judean and Israeli states,
the Jewish Diaspora, the
extermination ofthe Jews of
Europe, and the re-
establishment of Hebrew
national existence in the
state of Israel.
The Irgun soldiers saw
themselves as part of this
rich stream of history. And
they drew the proper con-
clusions from this emo-
tional and suffering-packed
past. Few people, even to-
day, grasp the enormity of a
2,000-year psychological
gap that had to be overcome
by the ghetto dwellers of
Europe and the Arab coun-
tries, to develop into hard-
fighting Hebrew revolu-
tionaries of the 1930s and
40s.
Even today, 30 years
after Hitler's extermina-
tion and the repeated as-
saults on the state of Is-
rael, the concepts of He-
brew revolution and mili-
tary strength makes re-
spectable Diaspora Jews

squirm and sends Jewish
intellectuals into tan-
trums.
The introduction of a
"revolutionary" concept
into Zionism could be at-
tributed to Abba Achimeir,
(a young intellectual who
had quit the socialist
Zionist movement in the
1920s,) and a small group of
his followers.
In mid-1932, Achimeir
formed the "Brit-
Habiryonim." The ideology
of the new group was .ac-
tivist and revolutionary and
suggested that violent acts
will be unavoidable in the
final struggle which will
lead to Hebrew indepen-
dence. Despite his abstract
intellectual style, and de-
spite a vehement anti-
socialism, he created the
nuclei of revolutionary
Zionism in Palestine and
Europe, drawing upon intel-
lectuals and workers.
His key followers eventu-
ally rose to become leaders
in the final revolt, both in
the Irgun and Lehi (Stern
Group). The concept of
breaking the law as a
weapon in the struggle for
independence was a historic
turning point in Zionism,
and the Sheils incident in
Tel Aviv (1931) which in-
volved an unauthorized
political demonstration
against the Deputy Colonial
Secretary of Great Britain
reflected that new condi=
tion.
Up to then, one "broke
the law," by owning a
rifle or smuggling a Jew
into Palestine. To act in
any other fashion against
the secular governing
power, the "Caesar," was
really "not done," not
since the Bar-Kokhba re-
bellion (132 CE).
The arrests of Achimeir
and his followers resulting
from the above demonstra-
tion were condoned and
praised by the establish-
ment, especially the Jewish
labor leadership that con-
tinued its one-way romance
with the ruling British
labor movement.
Sixteen years later, the
Zionist labor leadership, be-
cause of its newly-born "re-
sistance" doctrines, was it-
self relegated to the same
prison and enlarged deten-
tion camps, by the British
Labor government of 1947.
The ideological develop-
ment of the Irgun from its
beginning in 1931 was not
accidental. The Jabotinsky
ideology — proud, self-
reliant, non-parochial —
prepared us to join the Ir-
gun, (or the "Maamad," the
code-name we used since
the early 1930s) not to build
a more militant. Hagana,
nor to engage in sporadic
"terrorist" acts in retalia-

tion for indiscriminate Arab
attacks on civilians, which
were common in the 30s, but
to lay the foundation for the
final showdown to precede
independence.
The inner group de-
veloped gradually among
students of the Hebrew
University, (the "El-Al"
student organization)
and others, and it
gathered intellectually
around Prof. Joseph
Klausner. Very few
teachers dared teach
nationalistic pride. Prof.
Klausner was one of the
few.
The British Empire in the
30s was the world power. It
controlled Palestine, the
life-saving haven for
Europe's Jews. We knew
that time was running out
for them. Britain was keep-
ing the doors of Palestine
closed. Then Britain will
have to go.
Two things had to be
done: Firstly, we had to
build a military revolution-
ary force that eventually
would expel the British
(this in 1931-1932!), and
secondly we had to establish
the organization, tie "un-
derground railroad," that
would eventually channel
the flood of Jews from
Europe, in order to save the
largest number before it
was too late.
On the first point, we
were ideologically actually
ahead of Jabotinsky. Al-
most to the end of his days,
even as commander in chief
of the Irgun (1937-40), he
retained the notion that
somewhere, somehow, a
gentlemanly settlement
could be reached with Great
Britain.
However, most of us
youngsters, recruited from
the ranks of the "Betar-
Revisionists" and some
"religious" individuals,
were identifying with an
embryonic military-
revolutionary entity.
Eventually, this radical
ideological nucleus
triggered a split within
the Irgun. In 1937, Ab-
raham Tehomi, the first
commander of the Irgun,
left the ranks and re-
joined the Hagana with
his followers. Tehomi
and his followers, either
because they did not ac-
tually espouse the "revo-
lutionary" ideology or for
tactical reasons, pre-
ferred to return to the
"respectable" main-
stream of the Palestine
Jewish community's
_thinking and framework.
This schism further re-
fined the ideological de-
velopment of the IZL under
the leadership of Raziel and
Stern.
The moving ideological



Irgun Zvai Leumi

force behind David Raziel,
Abraham Stern and the
hundreds of others who
greW up and developed
politically in the early 30s,
was the conviction that, in
the final analysis, the crea-
tion of the state and the
physical saving of the lives
of millions of Europe's Jews
would be attained only
through our military action.
Thus, the choosing of the
name "The National Mili-
tary Organization," was an
expression of that commit-
ment.
This concept was, later, to
be the basis for Begin's
soul-searching decision to
execute the two British
sergeants in retaliation for
the failure of the mandatory
government to recognize
three Irgun soldiers whom
it executed as soldiers of a
national revolutionary
army — fighting for na-
tional independence — the
same as the armies of
George Washington,
Garibaldi, or Pilsudski
fought.
Thinking in national-
statesmanly terms, the
Irgun halted in 1939 the
war against the occupy-
ing power, declaring that
the battle had to be di-
rected, for as long as
strategically necessary,
against the monster
enemy.
Stern disagreed with
halting the war against the
British, even temporarily,
and again the Irgun was
faced with a split.
Historically, it is impor-
tant, to recognize the con-
tinuous ideological thread
that ran through those
early years, from 1931 to
1948. It can be traced from
the youngsters of the early
30s joining, what was
thought by some, to be only
a "National Hagana,"
through the evolution of the
quixotic rebels of the "Brit
Habiryonim," maturing
into seasoned, revolution-
ary leaders with years of
sacrifice behind them, even-
tually becoming parliamen-
taries in the Knesset.
The thread was spun,
hardly ever permitted to
weaken, even with
Jabotinsky and Irgun com-
mander David Raziel gone,
even with the bulk of the fu-
ture nation wiped out.
It culminated in 1944,
when Begin launched the
Revolt, forcing a reluctant
"official" Zionist leadership
into finally joining a war for
national fulfillment and a
declaration of independence
and statehood.
-
The other vital phase of
the Irgun's work was
what Jabotinsky hoped
would, in the 1930s, be-
come "the national
Jewish sport" — the
"Aliyah Bet" or the
"extra legal" immigra-
tion to Palestine.
The Irgun was the organ-
ization which, in 1937-1940,
was in charge of piloting the
rickety boats to the shores of
Palestine and landing the
immigrants, as well as pre-
paring and coordinating the
movements of the immig-

rants from various camps
and gathering points, over-
land and on the Danube and
the sea-going vessels.
The Irgun leadership as-
signed quite a number of its
top officers to this task
(Lankin, Kremin, Zar-
zevsky, Tagansky, Harari,
Kalfus and many others),
and they covered the conti-
nent, establishing the over-
land pipeline, securing and
piloting the boats.
Some were caught in the
war and never returned to
Palestine. Others were im-
prisoned by the British.-
This historic chapter
was an intrinsic part of
the Irgun's history, sec-
ond only to the actions on
the battle front, super-
vised and encouraged by
Raziel personally. It was
the main reason for the
dispatch of a delegation
to the U.S.A. (February,
1939) composed of Robert
Briscoe of Dublin, Lt. Col.
Patterson, and H.
Lubinsky.
The delegation had, as its
principal purpose, the rais-
ing of funds for "Aliyah
Bet." Training and weapons
would now be forthcoming
from friendly European
governments. We planned
and hoped that the large
funds required for "Aliyah
Bet" would be raised in
America.
On both sides of the
ocean, however, the task
turned out to be unrealiz-
able, primarily because of
the vehement opposition of
the Jewish and Zionist es-
tablishment. From
Bucharest to Paris to Los
Angeles, the doors of tem-
ples and homes were shut to
us.
The campaign against the
Irgun became intensified
when in March, '39, the first
Irgun representative, with
special emphasis on
mobilizing funds for
"Aliyah Bet," arrived in the
U.S., followed shortly by
half-a-dozen other Irgun
emissaries.
The
"American
Friend's of a Jewish
Palestine" was organized
in New York in 1939, and
it was later followed by
several other public
committees which raised
substantial funds, used to
help finance the "Aliyah
Bet" up_tc.; 1941 and later
on the vessels "Ben
Hecht" and "Atalena" in
1947-1948.
Tens of thousands of Jews
owe their lives to these re-
scue operations. Tens of

-

thousands more could have
been saved. Up to 1941, the
Nazis were permitting Jews
to leave the lands Germany
occupied. It was, however,
expensive and dangerous to
charter, to man, and to
guide the boats. This is why
we went to London, Paris,
New York, and asked for
help. We could have done
much, much more.
The Jewish establish-
ment refused to listen to us
or to look into the face of the
monstrous beast. More,
they fought us as if we were
the enemy. And they ft t
us for nine long years.
J.B. Bell is one of the few,
non-partisan historians
who points out that
Jabotinsky repeatedly pre-
dicted and clearly warned of
the oncoming catastrophe.
It was and still is customary
for Jewish leaders and
many laymen_to state that
"no one could have foreseen
it."
One may observe that
given such apology by
their leaders, non-Jewish
nations would have
brought their leaders be-
fore a "war crime trial."
In the aftermath of the
extermination, Jewish
Zionist or non-Zionist lead-
ers should have been sum-
moned before a national tri-
bunal in Israel to account
for their actions or inaction.
Such leaders should have
included Weizmann,
Goldmann, Wise, Green-
baum and yes, Ben-Gurion.
Their unforgivable be-
havior included among
other things, a vicious cam-
paign against the NZO/
Irgun immigration activity
that extended all-the way
from Western Europe's
relatively wealthy Jewish
communities, to the entire
U.S. This undoubtedly cost
us tens of thousands of lives
that could have been saved,
had we had the means.
But preceding that, the
gravest and most critical
historical chapter was the
one that took place in the
mid and late thirties, when
official Zionism opposed
Jabotinsky's call for Euro-
pean evacuation, missed, or
(worse) intentionally ig-
nored the physical threat to
Europe's Jewry, caused not
only because of
intellectual-historic in-
adequacies, but also be-
cause of inter-Zionist
ideological struggles, party
and personal power politics.
This is one of the most tragic
chapters in the all too 'n
tragic Jewish history.

-

CHAIM WEIZMANN

DAVID BEN-GURION

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