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October 04, 2017 - Image 10

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The Michigan Daily

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I

n
U.S.
politics,
the

call
for
tolerating

differences
between

people — based on class, race,
ethnicity,
gender,
sexual

orientation or most any other
identity — has been assigned
to the realm of liberalism,
generally speaking. But when
liberals have called for a wider
definition of “hate speech,”
people
have
accusedthem

of intolerance. This idea of
“tolerance” is connected to
the idea of empathy. Liberals
call for empathizing with
marginalized groups — and
therefore tolerating them — but
when it comes to conservatives
they make no such calls to
action.

In the media, this issue

of
liberal
(in)tolerance
of

conservatives
isn’t
new,

but I believe the intensity
of the problem has been
underemphasized. The conflict
between the call for more
empathy and tolerance toward
others, on the one hand, and the
call for more restricted speech,
on the other hand, exists on a
philosophical level — it has to
do with beauty and justice, two
values that are most important
to society.

Empathy
has,
from
the

beginning, been tied to the
realm of aesthetics, the field of
philosophy concerned with the
appreciation of art, beauty and
good taste. According to the
Oxford English Dictionary, the
term first appears in English
in the work of Vernon Lee
and Clementina Anstruther-
Thomson, two prominent late-
19th-century
scholar-artists

who lived together openly as
lovers, friends and co-authors.

In their most prominent book,
“Beauty and Ugliness: And
Other Studies in Psychological
Aesthetics,”
they
define

empathy
as
an
“aesthetic

sympathetic feeling.”

The emergence of empathy

in the English lexicon during
the early 1900s, in Western
Europe, coincides with the
rise of modernity and the first
artworks famous for their

ugliness. A great example is
Marcel
Duchamp’s
statue

“Fountain” (1917), which is
literally a urinal signed with a
pseudonym.

The viewer of a work of

art can empathize with the
artwork and find it beautiful
— or empathize with a work
of art and find it ugly. Theodor
Lipps, one of the most famous
scholars on empathy, calls the
former “positive empathy” and
the latter “negative empathy.”

While
I
can
empathize

with a work of art and find
it ugly beautiful (or however
else a work of art could be
described), I argue that the
work of empathizing is in itself
beautiful. What do I mean by
beautiful? Well, I don’t really
know. It’s almost impossible to

define as a word, as described
in its really long entry in the
Stanford
Encyclopedia.
I

like to define the beautiful
as something that “makes
sense,” or speaks to some
truth. Whether the thing the
empathizer is trying to feel
into is beautiful or ugly, the
empathizer is still making
sense of something.

But I can only empathize

with
someone if
that person
expresses
him
or

herself
outwardly.
Once I can
empathize
with
someone
else’s
emotions,
I
can

determine

whether those emotions are
ugly or beautiful. Prominent
art critic Arthur Danto claims
an ugly work of art can still
be artistically right, in that
the work’s ugliness allows
it to successfully convey the
artist’s
intended
message.

In the context of human
emotion, I could empathize
with someone and determine
whether their ugly or beautiful
emotions are valid.

Take,
for
example,
the

white supremacists and neo-
Nazis who protested this
August in Charlottesville, Va.
I can empathize with these
people’s emotions. By this, I
mean I can understand what
it feels like to be angry or
feel disenfranchised. I, by
no means, am endorsing or

condoning their actions, but
the principles of empathy
allow
me
to
understand

their
emotions
according

to how they’re expressed.
Simultaneously, I can reach
my own conclusion that their
intentions and actions are
morally wrong and are an
impediment to the furthering
of equality and justice in this
country.

I can empathize in the

same way with Dana Greene,
who last week knelt in the
Diag for nearly 24 hours in
protest of anti-Black racism,
going
through
the
same

emotional and moral process.
To make myself clear, I want to
emphasize that the actions on
the part of white supremacist
and neo-Nazi protesters are in
no way equivalent to Greene’s
— the former incited violence
and advocated hate, and the
latter advocated for justice
and peace. The process of
empathizing allows me to
recognize Greene’s emotions
as valid because of the life
experiences that led to them,
and then reach my own
conclusion that his actions
and intentions are morally
justifiable and align with
my own vision of furthering
equality.

If empathy is in itself

beautiful
and
beauty

furthers justice in the world
(as I postulated in my first
column), then I could say
empathizing is a morally
right thing to do. But in
order to empathize, I must
have someone to empathize
with, which requires free
expression.

Here,
we
reach
the

entanglement of empathy,
beauty, justice and the right
to free speech. Empathy
requires
individuals
to

express themselves, whether
in the form of creating
works of art, writing op-eds,
protesting or engaging in
other expressive activities.
And empathy also requires
people
to
receive
the

emotions of others, putting
it at odds with calls for safe
spaces, specifically on college
campuses. When individual
expression
fits
a
given

definition of “hate speech,”
that
expression
becomes

morally indefensible, unjust,
etc.

The liberal call for more

empathy seems to be at odds
with calls for restrictions
on hate speech and more
safe spaces. What kind of
expression
is
defensible?

And who can be expected
to “receive” the emotions of
others? If we restrict certain
forms of expression, are
we limiting our ability to
empathize with others?

To me, the answer is yes. I

suppose the greater question
is: What’s more just — allowing
individuals to continue writing
anti-Islam messages on the
Diag, or restricting that kind
of expression and approaching
the problem of, in this case,
Islamophobia, from a different
angle — say, through more
inclusive messages and greater
cultural
awareness
being

taught in public schools? While,
logically speaking, restricting
expression limits empathetic
possibilities, it may be a
necessary
compromise
to

achieve a more just society.

2B

Managaing Statement Editor:

Lara Moehlman

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Yoshiko Iwai

Brian Kuang

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Editor in Chief:

Emma Kinery

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Wednesday, October 4, 2017 // The Statement

Empath in the Wild: Free to feel BY REGAN DETWILER, COLUMNIST

statement

THE MICHIGAN DAILY | OCTOBER 4, 2017

ILLUSTRATION BY REGAN DETWILER

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