IPAGE FOUR THE MICHIGAN DAILY FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1951 G :.1 On A Policy for 1N THE current issue of Collier's, University alumnus Tom Dewey presents his idea of what our country's policy in the Far East should be. Without compunction, Dewey asks that we give Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists moral, political, technical, military and financial assistance; that we enable them to immediately invade the Chinese mainland and engage the Com- munist forces of Mao Tse-tung in a battle to secure a "Free China." Each day that we continue to hesitate, he says, is a day of aid to the Communists. The cost of such a policy, Dewey asserts, will be in terms of American money and equipment, not American life. He sees no involvement for the United States in a war of attrition on the mainland. The U.S. will be the power behind the power. To support his battle cry, Dewey has drawn upon experiences gained on his re- cent trip to the Far East. The picture that he has drawn of Chiang, the Nationalist Army and Nationalist politics is one of sweet smelling herbs and exotic foods. It is a picture that contrasts sharply with much that has been learned through the experi- ences of the past two decades. Yet, it is a picture that, because of our antipathy toward Communist China, is being accepted on a wide basis in this country and may, if not checked, lead us to serious entanglement in a full scale war. * * * DEWEY cites several items in favor of sup- porting Chiang. We have a moral obli- gation, he claims, in that we have deserted this former ally, an ally that engaged mil- lions of Japanese troops in battle and kept them from fighting our soldiers in the Paci- fic. Ignored are the facts thta the Gimo, far from leading the Chinese against the Japanese, insisted upon continuing the civil war in his own country; that Chiang re- jected proposals to form a united front and had to be kidnapped in order to force him to turn his attentions toward resisting the invader of his country. And this he did only intermittently. The Nationalists, as unbend- ing as the Communists, also share the blame for the failure of the Marshall Mission to form a united China. Rightfully then, the Nationalists can be called constant foes of Communism but it should be remembered that they were willing to sacrifice the well-being of both the Chinese and the Allied cause in pur- suing the anti-Red policy. The Gimo is also praised for not selling out to the Japanese though this is a negative virtue, and one which could supply a firmer basis for supporting the Chinese Communists who were the main force in the fight against the Japanese. The graft and corruption that became synonymous with Nationalism are white- washed to the point where one is led to doubt that they ever existed. Chiang, says Dewey, is a prisoner of his past successes. "He cannot clean house and get rid of unnecessary generals and public officers." The current court row to obtain several mil- lion dollars loaned by the U.S. for aircraft and held by a Nationalist general in Wash- ington is a reminder of past habits. It is claimed that the Gimo is possessed of an absolute integrity that cannot be doubted, but where a man surrounded himself with miiltary and political crooks and allowed them to run the government he cannot be so easily vindicated of allblame. Another favorable aspect of the Nation- alists, according to Dewey is their firm determination to return to the mainland and liberate it from the Reds. The Na- tionalist Army of 600,000 is the biggest anti-Communist force in the Pacific. It is well led, Dewey says, and will fight if given the arms. In direct opposition to this statement is the report that many Nationalist troops would immediately change sides once they hit the mainland, that their fervor for the cause of the Gimo is not as intense as we are led to believe. The recent purges in Red China might have a profound effect on such sentiments. Yet, the Nationalists themselves are not de- void of totalitarian practices. Their record on civil liberties is almost as bad as the Communists' while on the all important land reform they have been worse. Dewey ex- cuses the present existence of an efficient Nationalist Secret Police because of the cri- tical times. But this is an excuse that when accepted works for either side. ,* * ESSENTIALLY Dewey's argument, though dressed in Mandarin emotion and silk worms, has little concern over Chiang Kai Shek his indignities, his graft or his im- perialism. A similar case would be built up for whatever army resided on the off shore island of Formosa. The purpose, when all the curtains are drawn aside, is the practical goal of protecting the Western world and China its defense perimeter. The liberation of China is not important for China's sake but rather to keep the Chinese Reds from disrupting the status quo in Southeast Asia, the Vietnam-Siam area. A Red move into this part of the mainland would cripple the market area and food supply zone of a free trading Japan and Philippines, two areas of influence that we must maintain in order to keep a barrier of islands between the Communists and ourselves. But Dewey's plan, were it to be carried out, would far from advance our cause. It would necessitate arming this 600,000 man force and keeping it armed. This could only be done at the expense of our troops or of Eisenhower's European Army both of which are already far behind sup- ply schedule. If ever a showdown is to come between the U.S. and Russia, the in- dustrial power of Central Europe will be far more important than China and the whole Far East. Before we can think of offensively throwing equipment down an endless pit we must secure our defense line. Assuming that we went so far as to arm these Nationalists we would have to go just so much farther in supplying them not only with planes and ships but with trained men to fly these planes and to sail these ships. For the Nationalists, no matter how determined, will never be able to walk across the waters to the mainland and once there will never be effective without tactical air support. The war that would ensue would not be decided in a matter of months but rather of years. China has space to spare in which contending armies can move back and forth with great ease. To cap- ture the principle cities in China would mean little. The Japanese held these ci- ties during the war but in no way did they hold China. It would be a costly war of attrition and one which we would most likely be forced to enter. Our ships, our planes, our guns will be employed, our men to a limited extent. The Sev- enth Fleet is protecting the island of Formosa even now. It would have to con- tinue such protection or else leave the Nationalists vulnerable in the rear. Our participation, therefor, would be most ac- tive, and since we are already opposing the Reds in a limited war it would be a mat- ter of fact that we were fighting them on the mainland. The consequences could be far reaching. Mao has a mutual defense treaty with Stalin that can be invoked as soon as China is attacked. It is ex- tremely likely that Russia which has so much at stake in Manchuria, Siberia and the Maritime Province will not desert her strongest ally. Dewey 's proposal would have the same effect as MacArthur's plan for an unlimited war, a war that would provide little benefit and much increased agony. Were we to accept both Mao and Stalin as irreconcil- able enemies we could proceed with such plans though in a wiser fashion. But in no way have we turned our minds to accepting as inevitable a wholesale struggle for the world. We are still negotiating in Korea, we are still negotiating in. Paris. We are also fighting in Korea and we are also arm- ing in Europe. But always the emphasis is on prevention not infection. To split the world once and for all with nothing to gain but holocaust would be both futile and tragic. --Leonard Greenbaum "I Can't Bear To Look" DAILY OFFICIAL BULLETIN Il I-. A -1 (Continued from Page 2) Forest. Plans for the International Buffet to be discussed. t + 1 r, - ' RCS r -OOV r. x S i - Intra-Quad Radio ON THE Washington Merry-Go-Round with DREW PEARSON WASHINGTON-Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Wash- ington last month, General Eisenhower indicated that the great- est danger of war was a possible, attack on Yugoslavia by Soviet satellites next spring. if this happens, U.S. defense planners have figured the Red armies are almost certain to strike through the Ljubljana gap in northern Yugoslavia, then rush down the Dalmation coast to Sovietized Albania. This not only would cut off most Allied sup- plies sent to the aid of Yugoslavia, but would put Moscow within a few minutes' bombing distance of Rome and the Vatican. Thus the entire Adriatic seacoast of Italy from Venice to Brin- disi, would face a Red waterfront, and the Italian population, one- third Communist, inevitably would be subject to sabotage, upheaval and eventual revolution. These were some of the factors I had in mind in urging Marshal Tito to cut red tape and release Archbishop Stepinac right away. For this now famous churchman had become not only a football of politics but a symbol of persecution, which was seri- ously hurting relations between our two countries. Actually I knew, from having spent two years in Yugoslavia di- recting Quaker relief work after World War I, also from my visit there last winter, that there is little religious discrimination in Yugoslavia. I have served on the same hospital board with Moslems, Orthodox and Catholics, seen them work together and live together. Probably there is more tolerance there than here. -SYMBOL OF BITTERNESS- FURTHERMORE, the National Catholic Welfare Council in coopera- tion with CARE picked a Catholic attorney, John A. Zvetina of Chicago, who speaks the language and who made a thorough survey of Yugoslavia last September to see whether CARE food packages were being distributed fairly as between Catholic and non-Catholic, Com- munist and non-Communist. He returned with a ,highly favorable report. Despite this, it was only natural that the continued incar- ceration of Archbishop Stepinac should rankle many Catholics in this country. In releasing him, however, Tito faced a domestic problem which, I regret to say, was comparable perhaps to that of Senator Russell of Georgia if he were suddenly to reverse himself and vote for the FEPC for Southern Negroes. For in Orthodox Serbia the religious massacres that took place under Hitler, and for which Archbishop Stepinac was imprisoned, still cause great bitterness: It is charged that 700,000 Serbs were killed in these church massacres because they refused to desert the Orthodox faith. What complicated Tito's political problem was that Serbia is that part of the Yugoslav confederation where he is least popu- lar, where he has to gain strength rather than lose it. In Serbia, Archbishop Stepinac has become a burning, bitter symbol. Thus Tito, while winning friends in the U.S.A. knew that he would have Healy in the Office of the Dean of Wo- men as soon as possible. Registered student sponsored social events for the coming week-end: November 30- Alpha Kappa Psi Couzens Hall Kappa Kappa Psi "M" Club Stockwell Hall December 1- Alpha Delta Phi Alpha Kappa Kappa Alpha Tau Omega Beta Theta Pi Chi Phi Delta Chi Delta Tau Delta Kappa Sigma Lambda Chi Alpha Les Voyageurs Phi Delta Phi Phi Gamma Delta Phi Chi Philippine Michigan Club Phi Sigma Kappa Prescott House Sigma Delta Ta Sigma N Sigma Pi Theta