ADMISSIONS ON TRIAL

The Michigan Daily - Tuesday, June 24, 2003 -13

2. For that matter, as the Court suggests,
narrow tailoring challenges against the two
policies could well have different out-
comes. Ante, at 18. The record on the deci-
sionm swing process for transfer applicants
is understandably thin, given that petition-
e. never raised a narrow tailoring chal-
,lenge against it. Most importantly, however,
the transfer policy does not use a points-
based "selection index" to evaluate transfer
applicants, but rather considers race as one
of many factors in making the general
determination whether the applicant would
make a " 'contribution to a diverse student
body.' " Ante, at 17 (quoting 2 App. in No.
01-1333 etc. (CA6), p. 531 (capitalization
omitted)). This limited glimpse into the
transfer policy at least permits the infer-
ence that the University engages in a
"holistic review" of transfer applications
consistent with the program upheld today
in Grutter v. Bollinger, post, at 25.
3. The Court surmises that the committee
does not contribute meaningfully to the
University's individualized review of appli-
cations. Ante, at 25-26. The Court should
not take it upon itself to apply a newly-for-
mulated legal standard to an undeveloped
record. Given the District Court's statement
that the committee may examine "any num-
ber of applicants, including applicants
other than under-represented minority
applicants," 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 830 (ED
Mich. 2000), it is quite possible that further
factual development would reveal the com-
mittee to be a "source of individualized
consideration" sufficient to satisfy the
Court's rule, ante, at 4 (O'CONNOR, J.,
concurring). Determination of that issue in
the first instance is a job for the District
Court, not for this Court on a record that is
admittedly lacking.
4. Of course it might be pointless in the
State of Michigan, where minorities are a
much smaller fraction of the population
than in California, Florida, or Texas. Brief
for Resoondents Bollinger et al. 48-49.

inequality remain painfully evident in our
communities and schools.
In the wake "of a system of racial caste
only recently ended," id., at 273 (GINS-
BURG, J., dissenting), large disparities
endure. Unemployment,' poverty,' and
access to health care vary disproportion-
ately by race. Neighborhoods and schools
remain racially divided. African-American
and Hispanic children are all too often edu-
cated in poverty-stricken and underper-
forming institutions.' Adult
African-Americans and Hispanics general-
ly earn less than whites with equivalent
levels of education. Equally credentialed
job applicants receive different receptions
depending on their race.' Irrational preju-
dice is still encountered in real estate mar-
kets' and consumer transactions.' "Bias
both conscious and unconscious, reflecting
traditional and unexamined habits of
thought, keeps up barriers that must come
down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimi-
nation are ever genuinely to become this
country's law and practice." Id., at 274
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting); see generally
Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Inter-
group Relations After Affirmative Action,
86 Calif. L. Rev. 1251, 1276-1291 (1998).
The Constitution instructs all who act for
the government that they may not "deny to
any person . . . the equal protection of the
laws." Amdt. 14, §1. In implementing this
equality instruction, as I see it, government
decision-makers may properly distinguish
between policies of exclusion and inclu-
sion. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476
U. S. 267, 316 (1986) (STEVENS, J., dis-
senting). Actions designed to burden
groups long denied full citizenship stature
are not sensibly ranked with measures
taken to hasten the day when entrenched
discrimination and its after effects have
been extirpated. See Carter, When Victims
Happen To Be Black, 97 Yale L. J. 420,
433-434 (1988) ("[T]o say that two cen-
turies of struggle for the most basic of civil
rights have been mostly about freedom
from racial categorization rather than free-
dom from racial oppressio[n] is to trivialize
the lives and deaths of those who have suf-
fered under racism. To pretend . . . that the
issue presented in [Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978)] was the
same as the issue in [Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954)] is to pre-
tend that history never happened and that
the present doesn't exist.").
Our jurisprudence ranks race a "suspect"
category, "not because [race] is inevitably
an impermissible classification, but
because it is one which usually, to our
national shame, has been drawn for the
purpose of maintaining racial inequality."
Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency, 395 F. 2d 920, 931-932 (CA2
1968) (footnote omitted). But where race is
considered "for the purpose of achieving
equality," id., at 932, no automatic pro-
scription is in order. For, as insightfully
explained, "[t]he Constitution is both color
blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict
with the equal protection clause, a classifi-
cation that denies a benefit, causes harm,
or imposesa burden must not be based on
race. In that sense, the Constitution is color
blind. But the Constitution is color con-
scious to prevent discrimination being per-
petuated and to undo the effects of past
discrimination." United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Ed., 372 F. 2d 836, 876
(CA5 1966) (Wisdom, J.); see Wechsler,
The Nationalization Of Civil Liberties And
Civil Rights, Supp. to 12 Tex. Q. 10, 23
(1968) (Brown may be seen as disallowing
racial classifications that "impl[y] an
invidious assessment" while allowing such
classifications when "not invidious in
implication" but advanced to "correct
inequalities"). Contemporary human rights
documents draw just this
line; they distinguish
between policies of

oppression and measures
designed to accelerate de
facto equality. See Grutter,
post, at 1 (GINSBURG, J.,
concurring) (citing the
United Nations-initiated
Conventions on the Elimi-

nation of All Formi of Racial Discrimina-
tion and on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women).
The mere assertion of a laudable govern-
mental purpose, of course, should not
immunize a race-conscious measure from
careful judicial inspection. See Jefferson
County, 372 F. 2d, at 876 ("The criterion is
the relevancy of color to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose."). Close review is
needed "to ferret out classifications in real-
ity malign, but masquerading as benign,"
Adarand, 515 U. S., at 275 (GINSBURG,
J., dissenting), and to "ensure that prefer-
ences are not so large as to trammel unduly
upon the opportunities of others or inter-
fere too harshly with legitimate expecta-
tions of persons in once-preferred groups,"
id., at 276.
II
Examining in this light the admissions
policy employed by the University of
Michigan's College of Literature, Science,
and the Arts (College), and for the reasons
well stated by JUSTICE SOUTER, I see no
constitutional infirmity. See ante, at 3-8
(dissenting opinion). Like other top-rank-
ing institutions, the College has many more
applicants for admission than it can accom-
modate in an entering class. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 108a. Every applicant admitted
under the current plan, petitioners do not
here dispute, is qualified to attend the Col-
lege. Id., at II la. The racial and ethnic
groups to which the College accords spe-
cial consideration (African-Americans,
Hispanics, and Native-Americans) histori-
cally have been relegated to inferior status
by law and social practice; their members
continue to experience class-based discrim-
ination to this day, see supra, at 1-4. There
is no suggestion that the College adopted
its current policy in order to limit or
decrease enrollment by any particular
racial or ethnic group, and no seats are
reserved on the basis of race. See Brief for
Respondents 10; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42 (in
the range between 75 and 100 points, the
review committee may look at applications
individually and ignore the points). Nor has
there been any demonstration that the Col-
lege's program unduly constricts admis-
sions opportunities for students who do not
receive special consideration based on race.
Cf. Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and
the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admis-
sions, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1045, 1049 (2002)
("In any admissions process where appli-
cants greatly outnumber admittees, and
where white applicants greatly outnumber
minority applicants, substantial preferences
for minority applicants will not significant-
ly diminish the odds of admission facing
white applicants.").'I
The stain of generations of racial oppres-
sion is still visible in our society, see
Krieger, 86 Calif. L. Rev., at 1253, and the
determination to hasten its removal remains
vital. One can reasonably anticipate, there-
fore, that colleges and universities will
seek to maintain their minority enroll-
ment-and the networks and opportunities
thereby opened to minority graduates-
whether or not they can do so in full candor
through adoption of affirmative action
plans of the kind here at issue. Without
recourse to such plans, institutions of high-
er education may resort to camouflage. For
example, schools may encourage applicants
to write of their cultural traditions in the
essays they submit, or to indicate whether
English is their second language. Seeking
to improve their chances for admission,
applicants may highlight the minority
group associations to which they belong, or
the Hispanic surnames of their mothers or
grandparents. In turn, teachers' recommen-
dations may emphasize who a student is as
much as what he or she has accomplished.
See, e.g., Steinberg, Using Synonyms for
Race, College Strives for Diversity, N. Y.
Times, Dec. 8, 2002, section 1, p. 1, col. 3
(describing admissions process at Rice
University); cf. Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 14-15 (suggesting institu-
tions could consider, inter alia, "a history
of overcoming disadvantage," "reputation
and location of high school," and "individ-

ual outlook as reflected by essays"). If hon-
esty is the best policy, surely Michigan's

accurately described, fully disclosed Col-
lege affirmative action program is prefer-
able to achieving similar numbers through
winks, nods, and disguises."
***
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the
judgment of the District Court.

ment on L
(Nov.
http://gsb.u
Mincy, The
Their Rese
Clear and C
ment of I
165-186 (M
8. See, e.g

1. See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Commerce, tion in Me
Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of National Re
the United States: 2002, p. 368 (2002) pp. i,
(Table 562) (hereinafter Statistical http://www.
Abstract) (unemployment rate among hase Repo
whites was 3.7% in 1999, 3.5% in 2000, "two indivi
and 4.2% in 2001; during those years, the other white
unemployment rate among African-Amen- homeseeker
cans was 8.0%, 7.6%, and 8.7%, respec- agents to in
tively; among Hispanics, 6.4%, 5.7%, and advertised
6.6%). "discriminal
2. See, e.g., U. S. Dept of Commerce, and sales m
Bureau of Census, Poverty in the United areas nation
States: 2000, p. 291 (2001) (Table A) (In more, Mortl
2000, 7.5% of non-Hispanic whites, 22.1% Review of
of African-Americans, 10.8% of Asian- (existing r
Americans, and 21.2% of Hispanics were minority ho
living in poverty); S. Staveteig & A. Wig- "face discri
ton, Racial and Ethnic Disparities: Key ing instituti
Findings from the National Survey of 9. See, e.,
America's Families 1 (Urban Institute Discrimina
Report B-5, 2000) ("Blacks, Hispanics, and Estima
and Native Americans. . . each have pover- Rev. 109, 14
ty rates almost twice as high as Asians and 38 testers n
almost three times as high as whites."). than 400 a
3. See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Commerce, finding "th
Bureau of Census, Health Insurance Cover- lower price
age: 2000, p. 391 (2001) (Table A) (In tester types"
2000, 9.7% of non-Hispanic whites were 10. The U
without health insurance, as compared to centage pla
18.5% of African-Americans, 18.0% of and Texas as
Asian-Americans, and 32.0% of His-pan- alternativ[e]
ics.); Waidmann & Rajan, Race and Ethnic to enroll m
Disparities in Health Care Access and Uti- students. Br
lization: An Examination of State Varia- Curiae 14; s
tion, 57 Med. Care Res. and Rev. 55, 56 Beyond Pert
(2000) ("On average, Latinos and African Equal Opp
Americans have both worse health and (Nov. 2002
worse access to effective health care than percent2/pe
do non-Hispanic whites ...."). guarantee ad
4. See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Commerce, a fixed perc
Bureau of Census, Racial and Ethnic Resi- high school
dential Segregation in the United States: or 20% plai
1980-2000 (2002) (documenting residen- disingenuo
tial segregation); E. Frankenberg, C. Lee, were adopte
& G. Orfield, A Multiracial Society with increasing r
Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the cans and H
Dream? 4 (Jan. 2003), http://www.civil- education s
rightsproject.harvard.edu/ 44; seeC.H
research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.p in College
df (all Internet materials as visited June 2, Analysis o
2003, and available in Clerk of Court's case 14-19 (200
file), ("[W]hites are the most segregated ject.harvar
group in the nation's public schools; they tion/tri statt
attend schools, on average, where eighty for their eff
percent of the student body is white."); id., segregation
at 28 ("[A]lmost three-fourths of black and They can en
Latino students attend schools that are pre- ment in uni
dominantly minority .... More than one in minority hi
six black children attend a school that is enough to g
99-100% minority .... One in nine Latino most of the
students attend virtually all minority are minorit
schools."). plans link cc
5. See, e.g., Ryan,Schools, Race, and terion-high
Money, 109 Yale L. J. 249, 273- 274 (1999) perverse inc
("Urban public schools are attended prima- to keep the
rily by African-American and Hispanic stu- segregated s
dents"; students who attend such schools from taking
are disproportionately poor, score poorly lower their 
on standardized tests, and are far more go, What S
likely to drop out than students who attend 'X-Percent
nonurban schools.). Education, J
6. See, e.g., Statistical Abstract 140 if percenta
(Table 211). numbers of
7. See, e.g., Holzer, Career Advancement graduate lev
Prospects and Strategies for Low-Wage in graduate
Minority Workers, in Low-Wage Workers 11. Contr
in the New Economy 228 (R. Kazis & M. do not sugg
Miller eds. 2001) ("[I]n studies that have so that it cc
sent matched pairs of minority and white universities.
applicants with apparently equal creden- the Constitu
tials to apply for jobs,
whites routinely get more
interviews and job offers
than either black or His-
panic applicants."); M.
Bertrand & S. Mul- *,
lainathan, Are Emily and
Brendan More Employ-
able than Lakisha and
Jamal?: A Field Experi-
E TAL.
ell's diversity rationale is
binding precedent. The
Court finds it unnecessary

to decide this issuen
because the Court endors-
es Justice Powell's view r

abor Market Discrimination
18, 2002),
chicago.edu/pdf/bertrand.pdf;
Urban Institute Audit Studies:
arch and Policy Context, in
onvincing Evidence: Measure-
Discrimination in America
. Fix & R. Struyk eds. 1993).
g., M. Turner et a., Discrimin-
tropolitan Housing Markets:
suts from Phase I HDS 2000,
iii (Nov. 2002,
huduser.org/Publications/pdf/P
rt.pdf (paired testing in whidh
duals-one minority and the
-pose as otherwise identical
s, and visit real estate or rental
quire about the availability of
housing units" revealed that
tion still persists in both rental
narkets of large metropolitan
twide"); M. Turner & F. Skid-
gage Lending Discrimination: A
Existing Evidence 2 (1999)
esearch evidence shows that
mebuyers in the United States
mination from mortgage lend-
os.").
g., Ayres, Further Evidence of
tion in New Car Negotiations
tes of its Cause, 94 Mich. L.
09-110 (1995) (study in whicil
egotiated the purchase of more
utomobiles confirmed earlier
at dealers systematically offer
s to white males than to other
).
nited States points to the "per-
is" used in California, Florida,
one example of a "race-neutral
" that would permit the College
eaningful numbers of minority
ief for United States as Amicio
ee Commission on Civil Rights,
entage Plans: The Challenge of
'rtunity in Higher Education .
), http://www.usccr.gov/pub/
rcent2.pdf (percentage plai
mission to state universities for
entage of the top students from
s in the State). Calling such 1
ns "race-neutral" seems to me
us, for they "unquestionably
d with the specific purpose of
epresentation of African-Ameri-
ispanics in the public higher
ystem." Brief for Respondents
orn & S. Flores, Percent Plats
Admissions: A Comparative
f Three States' Experiences
3), http://www.civilrightspro-
d.edu/research/affirmativeae
.pdf. Percentage plans depend
ectiveness on continued racia
at the secondary school level
sure significant minority enroll
versities only if the majority
gh school population is large
uarantee that, in many schools,
students in the top 10 or 20%
ies. Moreover, becausesucs
ollege admission to a single cril
school class rank-they create
entives. They encourage parents
ir childreh in low-performing
chools, and discourage student
challenging classes that might
grade point averages. See Sein'
tates Aren't Saying About the
Solution,' Chronicle of Higher
une 2, 2000, p. A31. And even
e plans could boost the sheer
minority enrollees at the undef-
el, they do not touch enrollment
and professional schools.
ary to the Court's contentionj
est "changing the Constitutioa
onforms to the conduct of the
"Ante, at 27, n. 22. In my view,
ition, properly interpreted, per-
mits government officials t
respond openly to the contin-
uing importance of race. See
supra, at 4-5. Among consti-
tutionally permissible optioe,
those that candidly disclose
their consideration of race
seem to me preferable to

those that conceal it. :
"presumed" absent "a show-..
ing to the contrary." Id., at
318- 319. Enrolling a "criti-
cal mass" of minority stu-
dents simply to assure some A
specified percentage of a par,

JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG,
wIth whom JUSTICE DAVID SOUTER
Joins, dissenting. *
-*JUSTICE BREYER joins Part I of this
opinion.
Educational institutions, the Court
acknowledges, are not barred from any and
all consideration of race when making
admissions decisions. Ante, at 20; see
Grutter v. Bollinger, post, at 13-21. But the
Court once again maintains that the same
standard of review controls judicial inspec-
tion of all official race classifications.
Ante, at 21 (quoting Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peia, 515 U. S. 200, 224 (1995);
Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 488 U. S.
469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)). This
insistence on "consistency," Adarand, 515
U. S., at 224, would be fitting
were our Nation free of the
vestiges of rank discrimina-
tion long reinforced by law,
see id., at 274-276, and n. 8
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting).
But we are not far distant 4#
from an overtly discriminato-
ry past, and the effects of
centuries of law-sanctioned
Syllabus
The University of Michigan
Law School (Law School),
one of the Nation's top law
schools, follows an official
admissions policy that seeks
to achieve student body diver-
sity through compliance with Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265.
Focusing on students' academic ability cou-
pled with a flexible assessment of their tal-
ents, experiences, and potential, the policy
requires admissions officials to evaluate
each applicant based on all the information
available in the file, including a personal
statement, letters of recommendation, an
essay describing how the applicant will
contribute to Law School life and diversity,
and the 'applicant's undergraduate grade
point average (GPA) and Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT) score. Additional-
ly, officials must look beyond grades and
scores to so-called "soft variables," such as
recommenders' enthusiasm, the quality of
the undergraduate institution and the appli-
cant's essay, and the areas and dif-ficulty of
undergraduate course selection. The policy
does not define diversity solely in terms of
racial and ethnic status and does not
restrict the types of diversity contributions
eligible for "substantial weight," but it does
reaffirm the Law School's commitment to
diversity with special reference to the
inclusion of African-American, Hispanic,
and Native-American students, who other-
wise might not be represented in the stu-
dent body in meaningful numbers. By
enrolling a "critical mass" of underrepre-
sented minority students, the policy seeks
to ensure their ability to contribute to the
Law School's character and to the legal
profession. When the Law School denied
admission to petitioner Grutter, a white

w
,, ,
:
':,
x


GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER.

Michigan resident with a
3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT
score, she filed this suit,
alleging that respondents
had discriminated against
her on the basis of race in
violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and 42 U. S. C. §1981; that
she was rejected because the Law School
uses race as a "predominant" factor, giving
applicants belonging to certain minority
groups a significantly greater chance of
admission than students with similar cre-
dentials from disfavored racial groups; and
that respondents had no compelling interest
to justify that use of race. The District
Court found the Law School's use of race
as an admissions factor unlawful. The Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Bakke was binding prece-
dent establishing diversity as a compelling
state interest, and that the Law School's use
of race was narrowly tailored because race
was merely a "potential 'plus' factor" and
because the Law School's program was vir-
tually identical to the Harvard admissions
program described approvingly by Justice
Powell and appended to his Bakke opinion.
Held:
The Law School's narrowly tailored use
of race in admissions decisions to further a
compelling interest in obtaining the educa-
tional benefits that flow from a diverse stu-
dent body is not prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause, Title VI, or §1981. Pp.
9-32.
(a) In the landmark Bakke case, this
Court reviewed a medical school's racial
set-aside program that reserved 16 out of
100 seats for members of certain minority
groups. The decision produced six separate
opinions, none of which commanded a

majority. Four Justices would have upheld
the program on the ground that the govern-
ment can use race to remedy disadvantages
cast on minorities by past racial prejudice.
438 U. S., at 325. Four other Justices would
have struck the program down on statutory
grounds. Id., at 408. Justice Powell,
announcing the Court's judgment, provided
a fifth vote not only for invalidating the
program, but also for reversing the state
court's injunction against any use of race
whatsoever. In a part of his opinion that
was joined by no other Justice, Justice
Powell expressed his view that attaining a
diverse student body was the only interest
asserted by the university that survived
scrutiny. Id., at 311. Grounding his analysis
in the academic freedom that "long has
been viewed as a special concern of the
First Amendment," id., at 312, 314, Justice
Powell emphasized that the "'nation's
future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure' to the ideas and
mores of students as diverse as this
Nation." Id., at 313. However, he also em-
phasized that "[i]t is not an interest in sim-
ple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect
guaranteed to be members of selected eth-
nic groups," that can justify using race. Id.,
at 315. Rather, "[t]he diversity that furthers
a compelling state interest encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic ori-
gin is but a single though important ele-
ment." Ibid. Since Bakke, Justice Powell's
opinion has been the touchstone for consti-
tutional analysis of race-conscious admis-
sions policies. Public and private
universities across the Nation have mod-
eled their own admissions programs on Jus-
tice Powell's views. Courts, however, have
struggled to discern whether Justice Pow-

that student body diversity
is a compelling state interest in the context
of university admissions. Pp. 9-13.
(b) All government racial classifications
must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny. Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Peta, 515 U. S. 200, 227. But
not all such uses are invalidated by strict
scrutiny. Race-based action necessary to
further a compelling governmental interest
does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause so long as it is narrowly tailored to
further that interest. E.g., Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U. S. 899, 908. Context matters when
reviewing such action. See Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 343-344. Not
every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable, and strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for care-
fully examining the importance and the sin-
cerity of the government's reasons for using
race in a particular context. 13-15.
(c) The Court endorses Justice Powell's
view that student body diversity is a com-
pelling state interest that can justify using
race in university admissions. The Court
defers to the Law School's educational
judgment that diversity is essential to its
educational mission. The Court's scrutiny
of that interest is no less strict for taking
into account complex educational judg-
ments in an area that lies primarily within
the university's expertise. See, e.g., Bakke,
438 U. S., at 319, n. 53 (opinion of Powell,
J.). Attaining a diverse student body is at
the heart of the Law School's proper insti-
tutional mission, and its "good faith" is

ticular group merely because;
of its race or ethnic origin would be patent-
ly unconstitutional. E.g., id., at 307. But
the Law School defines its critical mass
concept by reference to the substantial,
important, and laudable educational bene-.;
fits that diversity is designed to produce,
including cross-racial understanding and
the breaking down of racial stereotypes.
The Law School's claim is further bolstered
by numerous expert studies and reports
showing that such diversity promotes learn-
ing outcomes and better prepares studentsf
for an increasingly diverse workforce, for :
society, and for the legal profession. Majots
American businesses have made clear that
the skills needed in today's increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse peope,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. High-rankt
ing retired officers and civilian military
leaders assert that a highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps is essential to
national security. Moreover, because uni-
versities, and in particular, law schools,
represent the training ground for a large
number of the Nation's leaders, Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634, the path to
leadership must be visibly open to talented
and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity. Thus, the Law School has a comoe
pelling interest in attaining a diverse stu-
dent body. 15-21.
(d) The Law School's admissions pro-
gram bears the hallmarks ofa narrowly tai-
lored plan. To be narrowly tailored, a
race-conscious ad-missions program cannot