14 - The Michigan Daily - Tuesday, January 29, 2002 Sof the 1-11 .. 0 War reporting 'intens( By David Enders Daily News Editor Since the war in Afghanistan began in Octo- ber, journalists from around the world have risked their lives to feed an increased appetite for news from the region. "It's pretty disorienting at first. It's the most intense thing I know," Sebastian Junger said. Junger spent time traveling with Northern Alliance troops in Afghanistan in November for an article in the February issue of Vanity Fair. Junger was also in Ann Arbor Saturday promot- ing his book, "Fire." Junger said the case of Robert Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter apparently being held hostage in Pakistan, is a good example of the unpredictability of reporting from unstable areas. "He undoubtedly didn't think he was in any sort of danger, but he wasn't anywhere close to the front line;' Junger said. "What I learned is that the situations that look the most dangerous are not always the most dangerous. The times when I've felt most at risk, I wasn't at the front line," he said, recalling a situation in Sierra Leone about a year and a half ago when he met some particularly hostile armed rebels. "You cal- culate what the risk is and what you're getting for it. If you're just going to get another photo of a tank shooting, then it's not worth it." University journalism fellow JavedNazir also understands the risks of reporting in a war zone. Nazir is the former editor of the Frontier Post, a "progressive and democratic" newspaper in Lahore, Pakistan. "Covering a war has always been a hazardous assignment - but I think before people take these jobs they know what they are getting into," Nazir said. "It gets the adrenaline flowing." University journalism fellow Javed Nazir faces a possible death sentence if he returns to. Pakistan for publishing a letter to his newspaper that was considered blasphemous. "There's a big price to be paid for being a journalist in my country," says Nazir, former editor of the Frontier Post. BRETT MOUNTAIN/Daily "Journalists on both sides face a mutual suspi- cion," of spying for one country or the other, Nazir said. "People like me have been fighting for more freedom to report from India and Pakistan. "It's true to some extent that some journalists did have links to Pakistani and Indian intelli- gence agencies," he said, adding that when he would travel to India, the first thing he had to do was report to police "so they can put someone on my tail." "In the wake of September 11, some Indians wanted to go to Afghanistan through Pakistan, and they were prevented," Nazir said. Pakistani officials feared "the Indians might misreport and try to report that Pakistan is as hopeless as Afghanistan." Nazir faces a possible death sentence if he ' but perilous returns to Pakistan. His newspaper was burned we essentially don't know from an independen down last year for printing a letter to the editor witness what really happened in a major battle; the Pakistani government considered blasphe- he said. "Journalists are relaying a lot of infor mous. "There's a big price to be paid for being a mation directly from the Pentagon." journalist in my country, and some of us are The number of civilian casualties during quite prepared to pay that price," he said. bombing in Afghanistan has also been a point o: In the case of the war in Afghanistan, Collings contention. Some estimate that as many as 3,50( said there has been more access for the media civilians were killed through the beginning o: than in past conflicts. "Compared to the Gulf December. The actual number is far from clear War,the American media have had more access and tallies are often not even discussed on net- in a number of cases because the Pentagon didn't work newscasts. control as much territory in Afghanistan as they "The full extent of civilian casualties is did in the Gulf War," he said. unknown. I think some American news media Collings said the role of the media in the Viet- have made good efforts to find out, but I thini nam War has also shaped the way the U.S. gov- they could do more," Collings said. "The BBC ernment has since granted media access in, did a lot more coverage of civilian casualties conflicts. than the American media. It was the lack of American control in "If I had to speculate, it may come back to Afghanistan that allowed Junger to travel freely this insular approach that maybe the public to the front lines. doesn't want to know how terrible the war is." "The northern alliance was completely open. The subject of civilian bombing victims has Sometimes what they said was wrong, but physi- been Nazir's largest problem with the American cally there was no restriction on access, and we media. "If you want to be objective you have tc could go anywhere we wanted, including places watch the European media," Nazir said, adding that were quite dangerous," Junger said. that there is some backlash in the region toward It C- 9 )f r, A Nazir said he's disappointed there has been lit- tle investigation into the deaths of journalists in the region. "Journalists are not expendable." University communications studies lecturer Anthony Collings recalled being held at gun- point in Beirut, Lebanon. "It was extremely dan- gerous for journalists. They risk their lives trying to bring us the truth," Collings said. Getting the story In situations that do not present physical dan- ger, the greatest challenge journalists face is often access to areas and information, especially when there is tension between two governments. Nazir faced it anytime he covered anything in India and said Indian journalists had the same problem in Pakistan. A job well done? Reporting from Afghanistan in the last months has been by no means uniform, especially in the case of American television news networks, which scrambled to send reporters to Afghanistan after Sept. 11. "I think generally American news media has done a good job covering the war in Afghanistan and the tension between India and Pakistan," Collings said. "There were quite a few stories 'that didn't get covered despite the freedom of American media. No American news media actually witnessed the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, so the way news is reported on American stations. "The American media has been very jingoistic." Junger said he thought the American media has done a good job covering the conflict, but he did take issue with what he felt was a misrepre- sentation of the army with which he traveled. "Probably the most notable thing is that many of them had a pretty cliched opinion of the north- ern alliance that was already formed; they seemed very ready to write them off as a 'bunch of warlords.' That's a great insult to the leaders over there who are very responsible, kind men. It really pained me to see them dismissed like that," Junger said. al Continued from front page w That's when the face-off started. I asked him what he meant, and he had an answer. "Take the example of the recent media coverage of this area. My units have been criticized for letting the Taliban just walk across the bor- der like it's a joke. It's not true. Every day, 7,000 people cross the border to Afghanistan from Chaman. "Also, every day 4,000 Afghans come to this side to work for the day." So, I asked, of what significance was that? "It is linked to the tribal culture, to tribal economics. For thousands of these people, borders are nothing. Fami- lies, shopkeepers, cross it every day. Just because the American media comes here and sees thousands of people with turbans crossing the border, they think that the Taliban are being allowed. Not everyone with a turban is an Afghan, or a Talib. He could be Pak- istani. A Pathan, like you. "We have our own methods, and they work well." But what about the question of murder and execu- tion? About how the low figures for murders in Spin- boldek may be skewed because the Taliban were reported to execute many, sometimes without trial? "I have heard about the strictness of the Taliban," he said. "I cannot comment on the science of numbers. I can say this. When it came to stopping civilian-crime, tribal warfare, et cetera, they (Taliban) were a law and order body other people should learn from." OK, so the colonel, as a military man, was open to the idea of strict military/police control over a violent civilian constituency - there is ample research and news analysis that civilian crime under the Taliban was at an all-time low during their regime in con- trolled parts of Afghanistan, probably due to harsh enforcement mechanisms. But what about Pakistan? Could he see those rules being applied there? Would he not send his daughters to school? Not allow his sons to listen to music? "Of course not," he responded, point blank. "You should pick good things, not bad." I could see where the colonel was going with this. Pick the Taliban's law and order ideal, not their oppres- sive social policies. Help the Americans by making fair{ arrests for them, but don't trust their media because it screws up on understanding the intricacies of the region's complicated tribal culture and economy. Best of both worlds. Pick and choose. No absolutes. Maybe that's why the colonel is doing well. But so are other people. Last weekend, I saw Sebastian Junger at a local bookstore, doing a reading and discussion on his latest work. Junger is a contributing editor for Vani- ty Fair, author of "The Perfect Storm" and modern media's most probable answer to Marco Polo. He's an award-winning journalist, but after his talk the other day about his trip last year to Afghanistan, he might as well be a young Rush Limbaugh. To stick to the proverbial information guns, Junger was lambasting Pakistan, now a front-line state in the ongoing global campaign against terrorism, for the high crime of waging a proxy war in Afghanistan by employ- ing the Taliban against the northern alliance. The Tal- iban and their Pakistani backers were bad, Junger said. The N.A, that rag-tag army, that proud motley crew, was A Pakistani Frontier Corps serviceman inspects a truck en route from Kandahar, Afghanistan, in Chaman at the Afghan border for smuggled merchandise and Illegal refugees. good. Good had finally prevailed in the form of a U.S.- led invasion of the country. G.I. Joe had beaten Cobra, and Cobra Commander had lost his turban. Now, he proposed, all was well on the moralistic, military, and philosophical Afghani front. All Ameri- ca needed to do now was "hang out" in the region. It was beautiful. Junger spoke and a hundred Ann Arborites lay breathless in the impressionable sands of his sexy new book, aptly titled "Fire," readily available for everyone (to feel like Marco Polo) for $24.99. Yes, Pakistan had waged a proxy war. Yes, it had used the Taliban, or Cobra, for its purposes against the northern alliance. But the N.A. was no G.I. Joe. The truth of the matter is, and shall remain, that the infor- mation missed out (oranot relayed) by Junger is more complicated, more fluid, and more bitter than most would like it to be: The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan - proba- bly the ultimate goal of the U.S. strategy there in the 1980s - lead to Afghanistan being left out of the U.S. "national interest" paradigm. For the lethally armed and battle-hardened Mujahideen, the decade-long military, intelligence and finance based relationship with the United States now seemed like a one-night stand, with the U.S. walking away almost as soon as its goals in the region were satis- fied. The political vacuum in the country was imminent, and so it came. The fall of the USSR in late 1991 gave another impetus to this group, who were now trying to come to terms with power-sharing; basically fighting for the political crumbs over the table the Soviets had left. Inevitably, violence ensued. Battle lines were drawn between groups, mostly split along religious lines. All armed up with no one to fight but themselves, the for- mer Mujahideen found Afghanistan in a civil war, drought, a refugee exodus, and the overthrow of the quasi-government which was a de-facto successor after the Soviets followed. By 1996, the Taliban, mostly student-warriors from seminaries in Pakistan (the same seminaries which had been the hot-bed for recruiting the Mujahideen for the anti-Soviet struggle led by the U.S. in the '80s), as well as mercenaries who had been called in for Jihad, Inc. by figures like Reagan and Zia-ul-Haq from all over the Muslim world, were ruling over the capital, Kabul.. The same ferocious-looking, bearded individuals President Reagan had met at the White House in 1985 and introduced as "the moral equivalent of America's founding fathers" were now raping Afghanistan, caus- ing thousands more to flee across the border. Pakistan's intelligence service, a praetorian state-within-a-state, started calling the shots, trying to control the chaos in the region, but only created more problems because of lack of democratic oversight in a country which had too many of its own problems. That's where the problem lies. In the avoidance of small, truthful detail. I've heard the term "Jihad" thrown about on Fox, in Poli Sci 460, in Muslim Student Asso- ciation forums, in Friday sermons at mosques. I've seen it painted on the walls of the Pashtun enclaves in Quetta and Arab neighborhoods in Brooklyn. I've heard rants ahAt the Talihan and their terror Osama and his nlots. A) President of Pakistan, he's one of the most praised statesmen of current times: America's new ally, apprehender of mullahs and militants. Wrong. Musharraf is actually the gentleman who was being shunned by the international community before Sept. 11. He was called a usurper, a hawkish junta gen- eral, a philanderer of democracy. On a visit to Pakistan, Bill Clinton was apprehensive about shaking hands with him for the cameras. George W. Bush could not remem- ber his name in a pre-election Newsweek interview. Even though he had been marginalizing relations with the Taliban and Islamic militants in his own country and approaching peace with India before September 11th, he was still a "dictator." In "Western eyes," Musharraf's proud uniform was, till recently, his biggest failing. Q) Who is Osama bin Laden? A) Oh, I know him. He's the bearded/psycho/mili- tant/mullah/jihadi/sadist/terrorist mastermind guy. Leader of al-Qaida, Enemy of Democracy, Dr. Evil of the Islamic World, conniving apocalypse from the Jihad Cave with his sidekick, Mullah Omar. Wrong again: Osama is a former Mujahid of the Afghan War of the 1980s, where the US., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan were the primary donors and facilitators of an international jihad against the Soviets. He has issues, sure, but so would anyone who recruits and trains jihadis for the CIA. He's not ticked off at McWorld, so to say. After all, he wears American camouflage jackets and a Timex. He's got some crazy ideas, but so would many here if 20,000 bearded and turbaned mullahs decided to park ten squadrons of F-15s in Detroit to scare away the weak Canadians, sort of like Americans are doing in Saudi Arabia to fend off the Iraqis. This quiz was brought to you by Common Sense: Our world has to change with political realities, not idealistic parables. Men in uniform don't exclusively indicate the end of egalitarianism. Generals aren't necessarily demons of democracy. And chickens, particularly rich and crazy ones, always come home to roost, especially i.a * 4..a.. ,r....:n. .,.4am-, a +- .~ N . AhW