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PERSPECTIVES: WAR ON TERRORISM

Wednesday, October 24, 2001- The Michigan Daily - 5

Y UNDER THE FLAK
PART III: THE PosT-WAR SCENARIO
BY WAJ SYED
The regional quandary

On Oct. 12, The New York Times reported what could potentially be the
biggest challenge to U.S. foreign policy makers in this "new war" on terror-
ism. A week into the air-strikes, the U.S./U.K. bombing campaign of Taliban
strongholds and alleged terrorist training camps was showing signs of being mitigat-
ed, even neutralized, by the thoroughly complicated political rivalries enmeshed in
Afghanistan and beyond. The U.S.-led campaign was being held hostage, it was
reported, and the failure of allied planes and missiles to attack front-line Taliban
* troops was proof of such. Then, in the afternoon of Oct. 20, the first "real" offensive
against Taliban front-lines was launched. Why the delay? What quandary made the
U.S. military ignore the Taliban troop buildup so far into the campaign?
The problem lay in the breakdown of yet another American dream. This time, the
dream involved the Northern Alliance, a loosely formed military coalition of Tajiks,
Uzbeks, Hazaras and others ethnic minorities pitted in defiance against the largely
Pushtun Taliban. Until recently, the Alliance was being envisioned as the natural suc-
cessor of the Taliban by U.S. strategy pundits. Surgically precise and relentless
bombing, mixed with some special forces incursions by the U.S. and Britain, fol-
lowed by the decimation of the Taliban military muscle, followed by a political and
military vacuum in the region, followed by the Northern Alliance replacing the Tal-
iban to fill that vacuum. That was the plan emanating from the Pentagon and State
Department's policy-kitchens until a few weeks ago. Simple and straightforward, set
forth to deliver the goods, so to say. But now a new geopolitical tryst in the power
equation has emerged as a complicating corollary.

A PROBLEM BESIDES OSAMA
The U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan is now
in a regional cross-fire. On the one hand are the
unrelenting complications and enmities within the
Afghan political paradigm over the question of who
is going to rule Afghanistan once the bombs stop
dropping. On the other is a risk of the multi-national
coalition being thwarted if extra-Afghan concerns,
like those of Pakistan, are not met, all leading to the
possible stagnation and eventual inadequacy of the
delicately engineered military campaign.
Until Oct. 20, Taliban forces outside Kabul and
Mazar-e-Sharif were still mounting against the
Alliance, which has been hoping to charge through
the broken lines of a Taliban army destroyed by
U.S. and British bombing. The bombing, however,
hadn't materialized. So far, the U.S. had opted not to
attack the Taliban front lines around Kabul so as not
to create a vacuum to be filled by the Northern
Alliance (the campaign so-far had targeted fixed and
mobile weapons systems and communication cen-
ters in major Taliban-held cities). The reasoning lay
in what the Times called a "grim strategic reality":
Pakistan, probably the pivotal state in the U.S.-led
coalition, has threatened to withdraw from the merg-
er and withdraw permission of airspace, logistical,
and intelligence support if such a vacuum is created
to facilitate a takeover by the Northern Alliance.
The Pakistanis clearly don't want the minority
Northern Alliance to enter Kabul, and are in favor of
a more broad government in Afghanistan.
The new equation now finds the U.S. bombing
campaign to be "regulated" and aimed at more than
just destroying the Taliban and the terrorist bases
they sponsor, as well as flushing out Osama bin
Laden. Creating a broadly-based government in an
otherwise anarchic Afghanistan acceptable to other
* regional players as well as the Afghans themselves is
now a further goal which must be met to stabilize the
region. The Bush administration thus finds itself in a
nation-building campaign, besides a militarized one.
THE PAKISTAN FACTOR
This is hardly surprising. Pakistan has a natural
propensity to desire a friendly government in
Afghanistan. Pakistan's nemesis, a largely Hindu
India, lies to the east, while in the west is Shi'ite
Iran which has always had plans for regional hege-
mony. Pakistan is thus anxious about the possible
formation of a new government in Kabul dominated
by the Northern Alliance, whose constituent Tajik,
Uzbek and Hazara elements have received economic
and military assistance from both Iran and India and
even Russia, a former Cold War foe. The domestic
backlash Pakistan is risking now due to its support
for the U.S.-led coalition also justifies its concerns
for relative stability within Afghanistan, whose 10
million Pushtuns share communal ties with Pak-
istan's own 20 million plus Pathans.
A recent Daily column blamed Pakistan for the
birth of the Taliban. Denying the U.S. an active role'
in that equation - which is a surprising error, con-
sidering that the U.S. was the major benefactor of
the Mujahideen, the Taliban's predecessors in the
Afghan war against the Soviets - the column's
commentary did not cover the intricacies of the Pak-
Taliban diad. How and why has Pakistan been
involved with the Taliban?
It all started with "strategic depth," an idea artic-
ulated on the contingent prediction that in the event

sians pitched in with military assistance, anxious
about the spill-over effects in the former central
Asian Soviet republics that was being exported by
Taliban orthodoxy. If some comparisons are drawn
out, it wouldn't be too much to say that a multi-
polar "mini-Cold War" has been going on in South
and Central Asia for the last decade.
Still, some obvious warning signals were missed
by the Pakistanis, the first among them being Pak-
istan's own ethnic make-up. A strong Taliban-led state
in Afghanistan, which practiced ultra-orthodox Sunni
Islam and was severely ethnocentric was never going
to be compatible with a multi-ethnic Pakistan that was
20 percent Shi'ite. The bargain was both territorially
and politically risky, for it would amalgamate ethnic
strife with religious sectarianism, something particu-
larly onerous for a barely democratic Pakistan.
But the signs were ignored. Instead, when the
Taliban stepped into the political equation in 1994
and even garnered some public opin.ion in their
favor, bringing lbw,.
harsh as it was but still
a much needed change
in the prevalent anar-
chy of Afghanistan,
Pakistan almost zeal-.
ously supported theN
new movement. A
politically unstablek
Bonnie had met a mili-
tant and indoctrinated 1.
Clyde.
As the cliche goes,
the rest is-history. The
Taliban's military
achievements, suc-
cessful thanks to Pak-
istani backing, made
them even more severe
and unyielding as far
as diplomacy went.
Recent Pakistani
efforts to negotiate a
deal with the Taliban
over bin Laden were
an embarrassing fail-
ure to the Pak-military:
top brass which wasn
fancying itself as a
potential peace-maker.
Whatever leverage
Pakistan had with the
Taliban has evaporat-
ed. But now that the
fate of the Taliban An Afghan Northern Alliance1
seems sealed due to Baghram, 11 miles from Kab
the offensive launched against them, what sort of
future lies ahead for Afghanistan?
PAST, PRESENT AND ... PAST?
The question, probably the biggest one in the
political fray right now if you overlook bin Laden,
is frustrating even to the experts. A recent Jane's
Sentinel article stated, rather bleakly, that while
calls for a Marshall Plan-like program for
Afghanistan were not out of the question, the fail-
ure to establish an administration that was not rep-
resentative of the ethnic groupings would "merely
fragment Afghanistan beyond repair and stymie
reconstruction efforts."
Ominous here is the probability of recreating the

explain that to its Pakistani allies, who would then
find themselves in a potential confrontation with the
Northern Alliance, for the Pakistanis have been sup-
porting the war effort against the Alliance all these
years? Furthermore, what of the majority Pashtuns?
While marginalising 40 percent of the country is not
an option, the failure to do so will consolidate isola-
tion from the north of the country and vulnerability
to a second chapter of "Talibanesque mobilization,"
while Pakistani Pushuns (Pathans), who will by no
means watch silently from across the border, might
find themselves crossing over for yet another jihad.
Those are not the only possibilities. Growing
ethnic tensions might further complicate the task of
forming any stable and broadly representative gov-
ernment in Kabul. The Jane's Sentinel reports that
"the bleak alternative may be a de facto partition of
the country between a southern 'Pashtunistan' and a
northern minority confederation punctuated by con-
tinuing low-level war." By no means a far stretch,
this is reminiscent of the Baltics, and ominous here
is the implication that there is a clear risk of recreat-
ing a Talibanized Afghanistan once the bombing
stops, this time in fractions. Unless the involved for-
eign administrations are willing to militarily inter-
vene in the already shambled country every now and
then and also be responsible for displacing millions
of civilians and killing on a continuum, a new
approach for the future is in order.
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
Clearly, Mr. Bush's dichotomizing rhetoric of
good and evil, terrorists and victims, is not written
by his speechwriters for handling such complicated
notions. But the aims of the White House have been
clear from the outset: Destroy the operational effec-
tiveness of the Taliban, so as to facilitate the special
forces that will be deployed to kill or capture
Osama bin Laden and his merry mullahs. Simple,
yes, but clearly not enough for Afghanistan's woes.
The Jane's Sentinel report suggests that "if
Afghanistan is to stand even the slightest chance of
being anything other than a failed state, the leaders
of those states keen to remove the Taliban will be
required to demonstrate a level of prescience thus
far absent from their
strategy." It is now
obvious that such a
shift to "remove" the
Taliban, at least the
one envisioned by
the Bushies, is going
to create other geo-
political and ethnic
disasters in the
region. That's the
first problem.
The second prob-
lem is the potential
instability of the
entire region.
Nuclear Pakistan,
America's newly
allied sweetheart, is
apprehensive about
anything that
involves power in the
hands of the North-
ern Alliance. Presi-
dent Parvez
Musharraf has
ardently stressed that
he doesn't want to
see the Alliance
"draw mileage" from
a deposed Taliban
regime. Musharraf's
fears are justified.
AP PHOTO Pakistan does not
fighter holds a rifle near want to face-off with
ul. an unfriendly regime
in Afghanistan while it has domestic as well as for-
eign concerns like India to deal with. Also, consid-
ering the domestic violence and economic costs
Musharraf is putting up with on the home front for
facilitating this coalition, his demands need hearing.
Meanwhile, India, Iran and Russia are conferencing
to try to make happen the opposite of what the Pak-
istanis want, each for its own reason. With the
Northern Alliance, the Indians would like to flank
Pakistan with an Afghan regime that is aggressive
towards that country, while Iran and Russia would
want a more complacent Afghan government that is
not "exporting" a Sunni jihad.
The third problem, and probably the greatest
one, is the lack of consensus on the envisioned

future of Afghanistan. It would be optimal for the
U.S. to barge in, capture and present Osama's
head on a platter (like Cheney was quoted
demanding) to the American public, and then get
out, just like it did after the Soviets left in 1989.
Clearly, that is not an option now; the White
House and the State Department have confirmed
that. So what's it going to be?
The U.S. cannot, and will not, be allowed to
unilaterally dictate the terms of the new govern-
ment in power, and that is compounded by the
Bush administration's weak resolve for nation-
building. Britain is silent on the issue. Turkey
wants to get involved, but only as a security pres-
ence once the fighting stops. That leaves the bulk
of the nation-building to the United Nations,
which has dispatched its number one negotiator,
Lakhdar Brahimi, as the envoy for the region. But
who ever is in charge of such an operation has a
daunting task ahead: working with the Northern
Alliance minorities, other disenfranchised factions
of Afghanistan, and the majority Pashtuns to satis-
fy their needs, as well as addressing the regional
worries of Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, and
maybe even China, which is troubled by its own

UDyrh
GLOBAL VIEWS
NOTABLE UOTABLES
GURCHARAN DAS
THE TIMES OF INDIA
MUMBAI
Amidst all the confusion, uncertainty and fear,
ordinary Indians understand that in the end this is a war
against fanaticism and terror and for decency and
civilised tolerance for other religions and cultures. They
realise that in all wars, some innocent people will be
killed. But they also know from experience that almost
every victim of terrorism is also an innocent person.
Thus, this is not America's war. It is also our war. But
President Bush has to be sensitive as he prosecutes it.
He needs to convince the world that non-American
lives are just precious as American ones. Otherwise, for
all the good that America will achieve, the world will
continue to dislike them."
- From today's Times of India.

JANET DALEY
THE DALY TELEGRAPH
LONDON

4 We are at war with the most dangerous adversaries
conceivable. The object is to defeat them and to destroy
the possibility of them committing further-atrocities.
Self-examination can come later."
- From yesterday's Daily Telegraph.
IGNACIO RAMONET
LE MONDE DIPLOMKTIQUE
PARIS
The present rampant pro-Americanism of the
West's politicians and media should not blind us to a
harsh but obvious truth. Throughout the world, and
particularly in the countries of the South, the most
common public reaction to the attacks in New York and
Washington has been: what happened in New York was
sad, but 'the U.S. deserved it."
- From the October edition of Le Monde Diplomatique.
YOSSI OLMERT
THE JERUSALEM POST
JERUSALEM
It is a diplomatic imperative not to give cause to
elements within the American administration which
are long seeking to downgrade the level, intensity and
intimacy of the American-Israeli relationship. Soon
enough, the sober, the open-minded echelons in the
American administration and also in American media
and public opinion at large, will find out that their
coalition, which they are working so hard to establish, is
more on paper than a reality."
- From yesterday's Jerusalem Post.
GEORGE MONBIOT
THE GUARDIAN
LONDON
As the authorAhmed Rashid has documented, in
1995 the U.S. oil company Unocal started negotiating
to build oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan,
through Afghanistan and into Pakistani ports on the
Arabian Sea. The company's scheme required a single
administration in Afghanistan, which would guarantee
safe passage for its goods. Soon after the Taliban took
Kabul in September 1996, the (Daily) Telegraph
reported that 'oil industry insiders say the dream of
m-,r in a nineline aros Afahanistan is the main

of a conventional war
with India, a much
feared scenario in Pak-
istani defense planning
due to India's larger
conventional force,
Afghanistan's friendly
soil could serve as a
safe-haven for the
Pakistani military to
strategically withdraw
to. That flawed
* approach has now
proven to be a grave
one on the part of the

Creating a broadly-based government in
an otherwise anarchic Afghanistan
acceptable to other regional players as
well as the Afghans themselves is now
a further goal which must be met to
stabilize the region. The Bush
administration thus finds itself in a
nation-building campaign, besides
a militarized one.

same conditions that
brought the Taliban
into power. This is the
creation of a Northern
Ireland-style scenario
in the Sunni/Muslim
sphere instead of the
Catholic/Protestant one
which predicates
Northern Ireland's ten-
sions. Punctuating such
tensions is the possibil-
ity of factionstthat
would be willing to put
to test their ethnic and

Pakistani military planners; starting in 1994, Pak-
istan's cultivating close relations with the Taliban
has finally culminated in the present reality of ani-
mosity between them. Little did the Pakistanis per-
ceive at the time that narrow minds would make
shallow friends. However, the fervent search for a
neighboring client state by the Pakistanis has prece-
dent in the past.
The quandary in the Pak-Afghan relation stretch-

religious differences with new weapons brought
with the international aid that is likely to flow in the
economy, for there is a thriving black market of
arms in the region.
Undoubtedly, a contingency plan is required in
the case of the Northern Alliance gaining power, for
that is a possibility, whether Pakistan and the U.S.
like it or not (the U.S. has asked the Northern
Alliance to not enter Kabul once it breaches the Tal-