OPINION Wednesday, October 18, 1989 Page 4 The Michigan Daily* .." Edited and managed by students at The University of Michigan The United States and Noriega: The dictator we created 420 Maynard St. Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Vol. C, No. 31 Unsigned editorials represent a majority of the Daily's Editorial Board. All other cartoons, signed articles, and letters do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Daily. Happy Anniversary FIFTY-THREE wEEKS ago James J. Dud- erstadt was inaugurated President of the University of Michigan. The pomp and circumstance with which the 1 lth Presi- dent took office seems to have set the tone for the year. Image and appearance have replaced substance and action. Though Duderstadt has spent much of his first year talking about pluralism and multiculturalism, he has shownlittle actual commitment to taking tangible steps to address the concerns he so proudly hails in his Michigan Mandate. -On October 6,1988, Duderstadt was inaugurated in an invitation-only cere- mony at Hill Auditorium. Some stu- dents gathered outside the auditorium to protest Duderstadt's selection - made through a series of closed-door meetings without any student input and in violation of the Michigan Open Meet- ings Act - and his record of participa- tion in laser weapons research for the Air Force. It was a non-violent protest that featured a skit, and it ended with four student arrests and one student go- ing to the hospital. Duderstadt never commented on what happened his first day on the job. But over the year he has increased po- lice presence on campus. An agreement was reached with the Washtenaw County Sheriffto deputize two University Public Safety officers, giving them the power to make arrests and to bear arms. The inauguration protest was the first time a University officer ever arrested a student. One month later campus se- curity forces were again called on to quell student protest of Duderstadt. On November 11, the Office of the President released the Annual Report on Minority Affairs, cataloguing the University's recruitment and retention of minority students. The report con- tained glaring errors and outright lies - touting committees which did not exist and making wild exaggerations about recruiting success. During a rally or- ganized by the Socially Active Latino Student Association (SALSA) to pro- .test the report, students attempted to limb the stairs of the Fleming building to talk with Duderstadt. They were locked in the stairwell by University security officers. Several students had '.their arms slammed in a door. Again, Duderstadt offered no apol- ogy and took no steps to correct the use of force. When he finally met with the students he spent less than a half hour with them, asking them to rewrite the report without ever taking responsibil- ity for the mistakes. -In January Duderstadt hired a new public relations consultant, upgrading the position to give it "high manage- ment priority." *January's big event was "Diversity Day," Duderstadt's clever cooptation of Martin Luther King Day that avoided acknowledging the manor the civil rights movement, and insulted people of color. Student activists had pressured the University to recognize the national holiday by giving the University com- munity the day off to celebrate and educate themselves on race issues. On Diversity Day, all University staff had to work. *In February, two women walking on the Diag were verbally sexually as- saulted by four members of the Uni- versity's hockey team. Once more, Duderstadt and the University admin- istration were silent, even though the off court conduct of athletes, particularly those receiving scholarships, has always been a "concern" of the University. *Later that month the new PR con- sultant brought CBS and the "This Mom- ing" show to campus. Anxious to co- operate with the University, CBS re- fused to let students speak out in ways that might tarnish the University's im- age. Instead, it featured top administra- tors cheerleading for the University's accomplishments. Prominent among these was the Michigan Mandate, a fa- vorite speech of the President's which has not really translated into direct ac- tion, and which - incidentally - Dud- erstadt continues to repeat and repeat, even at this late date, to audible groans from audiences who have heard the empty rhetoric too many times. In March, Duderstadt went public with a call for reason, tolerance and civility. Presumably this was designed to address the growing tension on cam- pus around numerous racist and violent attacks of individuals. Yet in spite of his gentle pleas to the humanity in all of us, Duderstadt has never specifically con- demned individual instances of racist and sexist harassment on this campus. But this fall Duderstadt proved that he is truly a man of action. Acting in renegade fashion, Duderstadtpulled Re- gental Bylaw 2.01 out of his hat, thereby skirting "democratic" process and insti- tuting a new harassment policy for stu- dents. Judging by Duderstadt's con- spicuous silence every time a racist, homophobic or otherwise violent attack has occurred in the community, and judging by the decrease in student of color enrollment in the incoming class it is hard to believe that the President has any serious commitment to combatting discrimination and harassment. In all, Duderstadt's year has been a facade of action and democracy. He has used corporate media, bogus reports, and meaningless committees to stifle the studentvoices mosttruly responsible for institutional change. By Shane Green October 3rd's failed coup attempt in Panama has brought severe criticism of the Bush Administration for its lack of ac- tion, organization, and clear-cut policy. But little has been said of the longstanding relationship between Gen. Manuel Noriega and the U.S. or how the U.S. previously supported an unpopular military dictator- ship in Panama. While the media has la- beled Noriega everything except a child killer, it has neglected to show how the U.S. helped this man rise to power. Con- sequently, much of the U.S. public does not understand why Washington has been unable to topple him from power as well. Noriega's ties to Cuba made him valu- able to U.S. intelligence by 1966, when he was put on the C.I.A.'s payroll. In 1968, the U.S. supported Gen. Omar Tor- rijos Herrara's coup against a popularly elected president, because it saw military rule as a key to stability in Central Amer- ica. Shortly thereafter, when he became chief of intelligence for Torrijos, Nor- iega's role grew tremendously. But he would fulfill his most important function for the C.I.A. following the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979, when money was needed to buy arms for the contras in Hon- duras. Without sufficient legal sources, contra supporters began trafficking drugs to raise money. Noriega, who had worked with the drug trade in the past, was key in facilitat- ing the network between Colombia and the U.S.; Panama was an excellent depar- ture point for drugs going to the U.S., and its international banking system was ideal for laundering drug money. At the same time, Noriega entrenched himself even more firmly in power, cul- minating with the death of Torrijos in a plane crash in 1981. Many suspected that Noriega (and the C.I.A.) was involved, but he escaped attention by allowing others to assume formal command, even though he was now the most powerful. His political methods, however, did not escape the criti- cism of the opposition newspaper La Prensa, which had dedicated itself to over- throwing Noriega. In 1985, an outspoken leader of the newspaper, Dr. Hugo Spadafora, was viciously killed. When Noriega was subsequently linked to the murder, the Panamanian people's shock was only outdone by their fear of his bru- tality. Nonetheless, Noriega remained on the C.I.A. payroll, and U.S. money for aid to Panama was now being controlled by a dictator concerned with suppressing his people in order to remain in power. In 1987, he was brought up on charges of drug trafficking by the Justice Depart- ment, much to the dismay of the State Department, which feared exposure of its long and somewhat dubious ties to Nor- iega. Failing to stop the charges with pleas of "national security," the White House was forced to oppose Noriega . throw with Col. Eduardo Herrara, an exiled leader in Miami. However, because the plot might end in Noriega's death, Rea-40 gan stopped the coup, fearing political repercussions as a result of an Executive Order in the early 1970s disallowing U.S. involvement in assassinations. (Outrage over the C.I.A.'s murder of Chile's Presir dent Salvadore Allende caused the order. Ironically, the other man the C.I.A. was soliciting permission to kill at that time was a young officer in Panama- Manuel Antonio Noriega- feared because of his deftness in the heroin trade). Following elections earlier this year, it is clear that Panamanians do not want Noriega. Unfortunately, there was no such referendum pertaining to the U.S. In 1968, Washington gave Panama a military estab- lishment and made sure it stayed in power. Consequently, the U.S. cannot escape re- sponsibility for this man's rise to power or the fact that he was supported even after his brutality became evident. The U.S. has@ 'When Noriega was subsequently linked to the murder, the Panamanian people's shock was only outdone by their fear of his brutality. Nonetheless, Noriega remained on the C.I.A. payroll...' The following year, sentiment grew stronger against Noriega. He dismissed the puppet president and assumed complete power, leading to a call by Reagan for him to step down. Harsh economic sanctions were imposed, but he resisted the domestic pressures through further repression, a tac- tic that had become commonplace over the past ten years. This repression has in- cluded falsification of elections, violent dispersals of legal protests, and mass cen- sorship, all of which had been overlooked by the U.S. previously. The C.I.A., forced to change its rela- tionship with Noriega, plotted his over- not supported democracy in Panama, but a dictatorship. Its victims are the people of Panama, caught between a "strongman" that the U.S. created and the U.S. itself, with all of its self serving policies. The U.S. has a responsibility to help the people of Panama get rid of this dictd- tor, but not through intervention; U.S. involvement was the problem in the first place. Shane Green is an RC sophomore and an opinion page staff writer. 0 090 t~,t.* . r... . N \\ 4