OPINION Page 4 Thursday, January 19, 1989 The Michigan Daily e iriguu DaiIyj Edited and managed by students at The University of Michigan Bush and U.S.imperialism in Central America: Business as 420 Maynard St. Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Vol. IC, No.78 Unsigned editorials represent a majority of the Daily's Editorial Board. All other cartoons, signed articles, and letters do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Daily. What's next George. TOMORROW GEORGE Bush will be inaugurated as the 41st President of the United States. Already he has plans which indicate that the relationship his predecessors have established with the countries of Central America will not change. In the third week of February, Bush will authorize the deployment of 10,000 National Guard reservists - 1,200 at a time - for military exercises in Honduras. Though the U.S. gov- ernment consistently claims to be aid- ing developing countries, it is apparent that they are motivated by their own economic and military agendas. According to United Nations statis- tics, a child under the age of five dies every five minutes in Honduras. In the six year period from 1980 to 1985 U.S. economic aid to Honduras totaled $599 million. This amount is more than twice that of the thirty-four year period from 1946 to 1979. There is a direct relationship between increasing U.S. aid and increasing poverty for the ma- jority of the people in Honduras: it is not in spite of increased U.S. aid that conditions have grown worse for the people of Honduras, it is because of it. United States intervention in the two- thirds world is not motivated by the needs of the recipient countries. It is motivated by the "needs" of the United States. Military intervention In the early 1980s the United States needed Honduras to be the center piece of U.S. policy in Central America and it secured Honduras' compliance by increasing military and economic aid. The U.S. has clearly benefitted while Honduras has suffered. In response to the triumph of the Nicaraguan revolution in July, 1979, Uonduras became a base for aggres- sion against Nicaragua and a bulwark against the Salvadoran revolution. Twelve U.S. military bases now oc- cupy Honduras. They supply support services to the contras, are used as bases for reconnaissance flights over Nicaragua and El Salvador, and pro- vide support for tens of thousands of US. army and national guard troops that train in Honduras for possible de- ployment in Nicaragua or El Salvador. Additionally, Honduras is home to 12,000 armed contras. Between contra camps and U.S. bases, 350,000 acres of land have been destroyed and more than 10,000 people displaced. The acreage available for food production has decreased while the same number. of people still need to be fed. Moreover, with the war in Nicaragua winding down, the contra army, roughly equal in size to the Honduran army, is destabilizing Honduras by at- tacking rural populations for food and money. In an interview last November, Manuel Acosta Bonilla, lawyer and member of the Central Committee of the conservative ruling Nationalist Party, stated that Nicaragua has never been a threat to Honduras, but that the contras are a very real threat. Economic intervention Honduras has suffered from U.S. economic policy as well. The U.S. at- tempted to temper resentment over U.S. bases and contra camps by in- creasing economic aid. In the six year period between 1980 and 1985 aid to- talled nearly $600 million. In 1986 alone total aid was $129 million and in 1987 increased to nearly $200 million. Money from the Agency for Interna- tional Development (AID) has not helped Honduras to develop. It has, however, strengthened the orientation of Honduras' economy away from Honduras and toward production for the United States. In 1981 Honduras was unable to meet payments for its international debt. AID linked economic aid to Hon- duras' compliance with International Monetary Fund austerity measures. These measures, designed to increase exports and earn foreign currency, in- cluded higher taxes, devaluation of the local currency, social (but not military) budget cuts, tax incentives for foreign investors, and an end to price restric- tions on basic foods. The result was increased suffering for the poorest sec- tors of Honduran society. Devaluation hurt those who had the least money. Cuts in education and health services denied all but the richest access to schools and hospitals. And foreign in- vestment, focused on exports, ex- ploited cheap labor and took more land for export crops, reducing the amount available for food staples. In rural areas, 40 percent of the peo- ple are landless and 80 percent suffer rrom malnutrition. At the same time, 65 percent of the richest land is used for cattle grazing for export to U.S. fast food chains, 50 percent of all arable land is used for pasture and another 26 percent lies fallow.. In urban areas, cheap labor and tax incentives have brought more than 300 U.S. firms to Honduras. U.S. trans- national corporations (TNCs) own 100percent of the five largest busi- nesses in Honduras, 88 percent of the twenty largest and 82 percent of the fifty largest. Ann Arbor's Tom Mona- hagn, owner of Dominoes Farms, has not ignored this favorable investment climate, having established a factory to assemble men's slacks for export in San Pedro Sula. Since 1980, Honduras, like most of the two-thirds world, has suffered economic decline. U.S. aid has not stopped or reversed this trend. Rather, it has exacerbated it by exploiting Honduras militarily and economically. Hondurans of all political orientations are realizing close ties with the U.S. have hurt, not helped, Honduras. A child dies every five minutes in Hon- duras because U.S. aid is for the benefit of the U.S. government and U.S. businesses, not for the benefit of the people of Honduras. The United States supports political, economic and military structures con- trolled by and benefitting few Hon- durans, while excluding and exploiting many. Real development will come only when these structures change. By Mike Fischer On December 23, 1988, three new right-wing death squads announced their appearance in El Salvador with a hit list of political opponents "marked for death." The list included Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora, two of the leaders of the Democratic Convergence, a coalition of left-center opposition parties trying to participate in El Salvador's impending presidential elections. On December 23,1988, El Salvador's First Infantry Brigade responded to student demands that the government increase the budget for the University of El Salvador by lobbing six bombs into the Biology Department, killing a University em- ployee. The Brigade has since cordoned off the University and searches all who leave or enter the campus. On December 23,1988, Ronald Reagan announced that he was sending 1900 U.S. active duty troops to the Salvador-Hon- duras border in January for participation in the Big Pine V military "exercises" there. And in the third week of February, George Bush will authorize the deployment of 10,000 National Guard reservists - 1200 at a time - for similar "exercises" in Honduras. The current situation in El Salvador - and the U.S. government's all-too pre- dictable response to it - is a microcosm of the crises Bush will face and the re- sponses he will likely adopt throughout a region that has become a veritable hell of oppression and a damning indictment of U.S. foreign policy. The last ten years of U.S. "assistance" to Central America - more specifically, to the region's elites - have intensified already horrifying pat- terns of ecological devastation, malnutri- tion, bankrupt economies, and scandalous human rights abuses on the part of U.S. sponsored and trained military and security forces. In Honduras, three-fourths of the chil- dren are malnourished. This is in a country that once fed itself but whose best lands Mike Fischer is the Ann Arbor coordinator of Solidarity and a member of the Latin America Solidarity Committee . and used to produce cash crops like ba- nanas for export. Since 1979, between 150,000 and 200,000 campesinos have been murdered by U.S. backed governments in El Sal- vador and Guatemala. In Nicaragua, the U.S sponsored contra war and economic boycott have devastated the economy, for which, in a typical ex- ample of how the U.S. government's chief lackeys - the media - operate, the San- dinistas are blamed. And yet with Reagan leaving, the Sandinista Revolution lives on, an inspiring model for indigenous re- sistance movements throughout the re- gion. The strongest of those movements is in next-door El Salvador, where George Bush is the lucky heir of the whirlwind his predecessors have sown. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is on the threshold of vic- tory. Despite $1.5 million of U.S. aid to the Salvadoran military a day, the popular usual only way that makes sense given the twisted logic of U.S. foreign policy: when low intensity warfare fails to "stabilize" a situation, send in the troops. Questions as to why they are sent - let alone why the U.S. government continues to thwart the democratic aspirations of the world's peo- ples of color - can be asked later if at all. Protesting such policies from within the belly of the imperialist beast that per- petrates them is vital. Attendance at the Inauguration Day protest beginning at the Federal Building Friday afternoon at 4:30 P.M. is a way to voice opposition to the policies carried out in the name of U.S. citizens. It is important to remember as we protest the changing of the guard in Washington that Bush's predecessors are responsible for composing the Central American script he inherits at such a dra- matic moment. Democrats as well as Republicans have shaped this drama. It was Jimmy Carter who congratulated Somoza for his a{ 'Since 1979, between 150,000 and 200,000 campesinos have been murdered by U.S. backed governments in El Sal- vador and Guatemala.' 0i insurgency has expanded into all fourteen provinces of El Salvador. In the urban ar- eas, the people have overcome their fear following the state-sponsored massacres of 1979-1982 and again have taken to the streets for demonstrations of as many as 100,000 people against the Duarte regime. Bush's immediate predecessors were able to support corrupt Central American dictatorships like that in El Salvador without committing large numbers of U.S. personnel to the region; a few billion dollars -worth of lethal weapons, including napalm, a few hundred U.S. military ad- visers, a bit of training for indigenous se- curity forces in torture techniques, and a few pious pronouncements on our need to support "fragile democracies" (aka state terrorism) usually did the trick. But if Bush hopes to sustain the brutal logic of U.S. imperialism, such "help" for the region, and especially El Salvador, may no longer be enough. It is here that he will face his first major foreign policy crisis, and it is quite possible that he, like Johnson when confronted with a similar situation in Vietnam, will respond in the human rights policies as Somoza was bombing his own people. It was Michael Dukakis who pointed to the murderous regime in Guatemala as a shining example of the kind of democracy he would sup- port. No single figure can be assigned the blame for the U.S. perpetrated violence in Central America. Militant as Reagan has been, frightening as Bush is, they are no more so than their Democratic counter- parts are and have been. For Central Americans, U.S. Inauguration Day 1989 is no different than Inauguration Day 1981, or 1977, or 1961. All of them sig- nify business as usual in a region domi- nated by U.S. business. If we in the U.S. are to influence what happens in Central America, we must first understand the po- litical and economic systemic constraints that have determined how individual presi- dents approach the region. On Inaugura- tion Day 1989, let us inaugurate a renewed commitment to expanding the narrow U.S. political spectrum that makes busi- ness as usual in "our backyard" a grisly chamber of horrors. Puerto Rico still colonized: Democracy thwarted By Pedro Bonilla, Augustin Irizarry, Jose Matos, Raul Medina and Lisa Ruiz Cardona Coincident with the swearing in of the Governor of Puerto Rico, Rafael Hernandez Colon, a White House opera- tive, Andrew Card, arrived on the island. His mission was not to take a message of congratulations to Hernandez Colon, but rather to inform him of the order from Mr. Bush that in Puerto Rico there would be a plebiscite to decide the issue of political status. As is common in the United States' paternalistic relationship with Puerto Rico, Mr. Card did not say, "So, do you think the people of Puerto Rico desire a plebiscite?" He simply ordered one. The United States government's posi- tion has historically been that the question of status was resolved in 1953, when colonial status was reaffirmed. This justi- fies what the rest of the world viewed as a flagrant violation of international law in ignoring the United Nation Decolonization Committee's repeated orders to decolonize Puerto Rico. It is thus curious that suddenly this same United States government mandates a plebiscite. A plebiscite will probably not occur in the near future, and even if it did it would not be legal from an international perspective. It is nevertheless important to discuss the reasons for, and implications of, this sud- den maneuver of the United States. First, the discussion of the colonial sta- tus of Puerto Rico at the international level during the past two decades has been detrimental to the United States' image as a defender of the democratic ideal. It has always been an embarrassment that this so-called defender of democracy denies a population the most basic of democratic political crises that plague Puerto Rico mandates changes in the current political status of the island. While the upper class of the United States currently enjoys a pe- riod of economic bonanza, Puerto Rico continues to stagnate economically, affecting even its well-to-do. Puerto Rico suffers from a chronically high level of unemployment. Approximately one-third of the population lives under the level of poverty and more than half of the popula- tion receives some type of federal eco- nomic aid. The economic debacle of Puerto Rico results directly from the complete control that the United States exercises over the country in terms of economic interchange, laws of shipping, etc. Such conditions underscore the neces- sity to consider changes in economic and political structures. It is not surprising that the United States suddenly wants to discuss the issue of the political status of Puerto Rico, to calm the impending storm. Third, could a plebiscite resolve the colonial problem of Puerto Rico even if it were held? Very likely not. In 1967 the United States imposed another plebiscite which hardly solved the recurrent prob- lems. Moreover, according to the United Nations, plebiscites in occupied territories are invalid in the first place. On the occasion of the first plebiscite, the principal groups that represented the independence sector boycotted the plebiscite, making it irrelevant with regard to the question of independence. Of the two other alternatives offered by the United States (become a state or remain a colony), the Puerto Rican people clearly rejected the option of becoming a state. We know of no respected analyst that has claimed significant changes in the opin- ions of the Puerto Rican people since that time. Por the reenItm No a nlhkrito nver the can decide internally on the possible forms of government to be considered in a plebiscite. In sum, the United Nations does not recognize a plebiscite on the question of whether or not the United States should decolonize. The United States must decolonize first, and then a plebiscite can be fairly administered. It is relatively easy to guess the attitude that the Bush administration will assume- his campaign supported statehood for Puerto Rico during the primaries. Never- theless, we feel we may be at an important juncture, one which could begin a process leading to the solution of the colonial sta- tus of Puerto Rico. Clearly all people in- terested in a solution to this problem, U.S. citizens who wish their country to abide by international law, as well as Puerto Ricans who want their political status defined once and for all, should be on alert to watch the development of this process. One component of this new plebiscite, probably more important than the plebiscite itself, will be the intense propaganda campaign that will be waged. This campaign, as the many that have preceded it, not only will seek to have an effect on the people of Puerto Rico, but also on U.S. citizens and international opinion. Already statements from Puerto Rican leaders (or, more aptly, leaders of Puerto Rican descent) have appeared in the Spanish language media placing the "Puerto Rico people" in favor of state- hood, or, at most, lauding the present sta- tus from which we "benefit." Such propaganda is not intended to pursue an evaluation of the status alternatives, but rather is designed to reinforce one of the two alternatives that the Bush administration supports. As in administrations before him, it matters not whether the alternative is statehood or the current arrangement . oth imnlv cnntinedi 10 Help fig] Today, the Lesbian and Gay Rights Organizing Committee (LaGROC) is calling a second rally as part of the on- going struggle to fight AIDS. Follow- ing the rally, students will address the University regents and demand that the University take a leadership role in fighting AIDS. Renowned for its research facilities, and its immense research budget, he University should be a leader in the AIDS fight. But the University has re- fused to publicly disclose information ahot what AIDS research if anv is Iit AIDS ing, and policies on AIDS/HIV infec- tion. 2) Open an AIDS treatment center controlled by health care workers, clients, and the communities most af- fected. 3) Massive funding for AIDS re- search, treatment and support services under the control of health care work- ers, clients, and the communities most affected. 4) Mandatory gay-positive safer sex education for students, and for workers with naid time off. under the direction