4 OPINION Page 4 Wednesday, November 23, 1983 The Michigan Daily 4 Subliminal Effects of Soviet Su By Eugene V. R ostow The. Soviet Union achieved an advantage during the 1970s in ground-based ballistic missiles - the most accurate and destructive of nuclear weapons, and the ones most nearly immune to defenses. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union were approximately equal in the number of warheads on ground-based ballistic missiles of intercontinental range. During the last decade, the United States IC- BM force remained stable, and we made no in- termediate-range missiles like those of the Soviet Union. By 1982, the Soviet Union had achieved a lead of three-to-one in ICBM warheads. If one adds the intermediate-range Eur ~~missile 4Debate Soviet missiles targeted on Europe, China, the Middle East, and Japan to this figure, the ad- vantage becomes even more formidable. MANY PEOPLE REMEMBER Henry Kissinger's famous ques'tion, "What in. Heaven's name can one do with nuclear superiority?" The answer is now obvious. The Soviet ad- vantage in ground-based missiles implies a theoretical first-strike capability, that is, a capacity to improve one's military position by undertaking a preemptive nuclear strike against the nuclear arsenal of one's adversary, and other imilitary targets.i When this dismal scenario is coupled with the Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range ground- based missiles, like the SS-20s which threaten Western Europe, Japan, China, and the Middle East, the rationale behind the Soviet arms buildup becomes all too clear. IT IS THE belief that Soviet numerical superiority in ground-based missiles creates a credible capacity for nuclear blackmail. The Soviet Union considers nuclear superiority as an ultimate paralyzing reserve, permitting it to pursue its policy of indefinite expansion based on the use of conventional forces, terrorism, and subversion without fear of American retaliation. The state of nuclear balance, as Helmut Schmidt has said, has a subliminal effect on the human mind. The Soviet advantage in ground- based missiles is the source of the nuclear anxiety which is having such a profound political influence throughout the Western world. The Soviet monopoly of modern inter- mediate-range ballistic missiles constitutes a threat to Europe, China, and Japan at a time of growing doubt about the credibility of the nuclear umbrella provided by our intercon- tinental forces. The Soviet leaders believe that the whip-saw effect of this twin pressure will sap the foundations of the American alliance system. Throughout the non-Communist world, this twin pressure is strengthening movements for neutrality and unilateral disarmament, on the one hand, and for policies of isolationism, militarism, and ultra-nationalism, on the other. IF THESE POLITICAL impulses are allowed to become fullblown panic, the structure of world politics would be transformed. Our troops would be withdrawn from forward bases and our alliances would be dissolved. Nuclear weapons would proliferate, and we should be unable to protect our most fundamental national security interests against Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggression. What is at stake in the nuclear arms talks, then, is whether the United States can have a foreign policy at all, or whether the political tides generated by the Soviet nuclear advan- tage will force us to policy of neutrality in For- tress America, as President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger suggest. Our goal for the arms control talks in Geneva, therefore, is to confine nuclear weapons to the defensive purpose of deterring aggression. To facilitate this goal, we are con- centrating in the first instance on the ground- based ballistic missiles. The essence of our position in Geneva is to negotiate agreements which would make each side equal in nuclear deterrent power at radically reduced levels. Obviously, the United States must eliminate the Soviet advantage in the most destabilizing class of nuclear weapons by agreement, by for- ce modernization, or by a combination of the two. Equally clearly, we should infinitely prefer that advantage to be eliminated by agreement rather than by increasing our present nuclear arsenal. SINCE THE EARLY 1950s, at least, the primary strategic goal of Soviet expansion has been to change the world balance of power by separating Western Europe from the United States and Canada. To achieve this goal, the Soviet Union has been following an old and familiar strategic doctrine. It has been seeking to outflank Europe from the north and south, thus bringing the entire Eurasian land mass under Soviet control, and, on that basis, taking control of the Middle East and Africa. That done, the Soviet leaders believe, Japan and the other nations of the Pacific basin would accept Soviet suzerainty as inevitable; the people of Europe would lose hope; and an isolated United States would have no choice but to acquiesce in Soviet dominion. Soviet conduct in the INF negotiations in Geneva, and in the active propaganda cam- paign accompanying those negotiations, is altogether compatible with this view. The main objectives of the Soviet Union in Geneva are to divide the United States from its allies, and to prevent the modernization of the American armed forces, and particularly the American nuclear forces. IN THE INF talks, the United States has proposed the abolition of the entire class of in- termediate-range ground-based ballistic missiles on both sides. In response, the Soviet Union has repeatedly denounced and reflected the American zero-zero proposal, and offered i /,f ' - .4 r 'r N periority stitute an aggressive threat to the Soviet Union in any possible sense, as Soviet officials freely admit. THE ARGUMENT is put forward as a bargaining device and a way of weakening European confidence in the American guaran- tee. The Soviet claim of a right to a nuclear for- ce equal to the sum of all other weapons in the world is a claim not to equality, but to hegemony. In July, 1982 the Soviet and American Am- bassadors to INF, with my full support, suggested consideration of a compromise, which would involve low equal limits for both sides in and near Europe and in the Far East. That approach could make a major con- tribution toward the security of both countries, and of the world, by moving the nuclear ar- senals toward a position of deterrence, and im- proving the credibility of United States nuclear guarantees for its allies and other vital in- terests. In March, 1983 President Reagan publicly announced our acceptance of the prin- ciple of the Ambassadors' compromise, which the Soviet Union had vehemently rejected last fall. The Soviet approach to the problem of these talks is hardly surprising. The Soviet advan- tage in ground-based ballistic missiles was not achieved by accident. It cost the Soviet Union a great deal of money, and years of effort on the part of the most advanced sectors of its economy. That advantage will not be given up unless the alternatives present unacceptable risks. But even so, the implications of the fact' that a brilliant Soviet Ambassador, Yuri Kvit- sinskiy, joined Ambassador Paul Nitze in spon- soring the Geneva trial balloon last July should be carefully and fully explored. Rostow is Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs at Yale Law school. He was Director of the US. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the first two years of the Reagan Administration. in its place an ingenious plan which would permit the Soviet-Union to keep at least a por- tion of its present SS-20 forces in and near Europe. Under the Soviet plan, the United States would not be permitted to deploy any com- parable weapons in Europe. I do not know of any Western expert on the subject who regards the Soviet INF proposal as serious. The Soviet position is based not only on some athletic arithmetic about the weapons on each side which should be counted as intermediate-range nuclear weapons, but on the proposition that the British and French nuclear weapons should be included in the agreement as American. This claim is entirely specious. The British and French weapons are not under American or NATO control. They exist for the ultimate Y __ i E a a tudnsatThUnvt y Edited and managed by students at The University of Michigan LaBan Vol. XCIV-No. 67 ; . 420 Maynard St. Ann Arbor,MI 48T09 Editorials represent a majority opinion of the Daily's Editorial Board I The University gender gap HE NEW JERSEY court system recently made a startling discovery about itself. A special task force in that state reported that many cases in- volving women judges or lawyers are being biased by "stereotyped myths, beliefs, and biases" against women. Roughly 1,000 miles away and cen- tered around very different issues, the University finds itself making the very same discovery about its hiring and promotion practices. The University needs to head off this prejudice if women are ever going to comprise a significant portion of the faculty and administration. For the second straight year, the number of women professors on cam- pus has dropped. Last year alone, the University suffered a net loss of 23 women professors, or a percentage drop from 19.2 percent to 17.9 percent. The reasons for the decline are numerous and complicated. Women, more often than men, marry fellow academics whom the University often can- not find jobs for. Women are also often under pressure to follow spouses to other colleges. Some women professors leave to accept a better of- fer at other-universities. These are significant factors which in a broad sense are not the result of prejudice or stereotyping. But under- neath all these factors and rational ex- planations for the decline, prejudice and stereotyping seems to hide, if ever so subtly. The one place it seems to surface most glaringly- is the University's tenure review process. Last year, of all the faculty eligible for promotion 17.3 percent were actually reviewed. Only 12.5 of the eligible women were reviewed, however, according to University figures. Although charges of prejudice are difficult, and sometimes impossible to substantiate, this is what seems to lie behind the statistics. There appears be pockets within the University where prejudice and stereotyping do play a significant role in deciding if and when women are to receive tenure. The University needs to seriously look at how significant a factor prejudice is in the tenure process, as the New Jersey judicial system has done in its courts. We're betting it's a very significant factor, and the sooner the University community is aware of that, the easier the problem will be to solve._______ / i~v ~uD WAY To oMNJ I -,,4 gfo*("WnM 11 V BETTR , I ' / ' _ _ 1_ e ---- -.. ° R s , L ___.-- __-- a ,,, zas MEAN i !DOW HAM \ PAY MY ? I. NB FEE" r ,,..,o.. w hh -",1 U I .....-- t1r ICHNtAD AILl LETTERS TO THE DAILY: A2 should back nuclear free zone To the Daily: .I support the Ann- Arbor Nuclear Free Zone Act, It would prohibit "the design, research, development, testing, or produc- tion of nuclear weapons; delivery systems for such weapons; command, control, and com- munications systems for such weapons" in the City of Ann Arobr. Nuclear Weapons development is in direct opposition with my values and threatens my security work whose primary purpose is the destruction of human life. This acknowleges that human life takes precedence over academic freedom. Second, academic freedom is more restricted, economically, by the way funds are allocated to military research. Will the act eliminate jobs? All nuclear arms work in Ann Arbor is done by fewer than 300 people, BLOOM COUNTY many work as consultants and have other work. The high- technology nature of weapons work means it creates the fewest jobs per dollar spent than almost all other economic activities. In addition, the act will collect materials to help people doing nuclear weapons work find funds for civilian industries and socially productive research. Friends back from traveling in Europe say people there think most Americans support President Reagan's military policies. Please,'for yourself and your children, sign a petition soon and vote yes April 2nd for the Ann Arbor Nuclear Free Zone Act. - Brian Wanty November 12 by Berke Breathed ---------------