Scanned image of the page. Keyboard directions: use + to zoom in, - to zoom out, arrow keys to pan inside the viewer.

Page Options

Download this Issue


Something wrong?

Something wrong with this page? Report problem.

Rights / Permissions

This collection, digitized in collaboration with the Michigan Daily and the Board for Student Publications, contains materials that are protected by copyright law. Access to these materials is provided for non-profit educational and research purposes. If you use an item from this collection, it is your responsibility to consider the work's copyright status and obtain any required permission.

November 04, 1983 - Image 4

Resource type:
The Michigan Daily, 1983-11-04

Disclaimer: Computer generated plain text may have errors. Read more about this.


Page 4 Friday, November 4, 1983 The Michigan Doily
Why the Soviets deployed the 55-20
The SS-20 was a natural. The Soviet Union
By Raymond L. Garthoff had developed the SS-11, a variable-range in- The fate of the United States, they say, canot
termediate- and intercontinental-range ~lm be decoupled from that of Europe. This is not'a
Third in a series missile. But, as a replacement for SS-4s and-- line calculated to play upon European fearsf
SS-5s, the SS-11 would have subtracted from, decoupling. Rather, it is intended:to
Soviet deployment of the SS-20 intermediate- weapons the nation was permitted under equal -rdiscourage what the Soviets fear is :an
range ballistic missile in the late 1970s was the SALT limits with the United States. Because American belief that we could wage a limited
main factor in precipitating the NATO Alliance of its shorter range, the SS-20 would not. The - nuclear war in Europe away from a sanctuAry
decision to deploy new American Pershing II SS-20 was mobile, less vulnerable, more
ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise reliable and responsive, and had less Finally, Soviet proposals in the INF
missiles in Europe. This move was intended to negotiations have been seen as unacceptable
fortify NATO solidarity against possible Soviet megatonage and throw-weight than thouted- by the U.S. government because of their in-
pressures on Europe based on the new by the Americans in their own force-planning. sistence on including British and French in-
capability provided by the SS-20. But the NATO THE SS-20 also had MIRVs which in- termediate nuclear forces in the balance.
decision has in fact become divisive within the creased the number of warheads on each Soviets see the British and French missiles as
affiance, especially now as the beginning of ac' missile. But again, the Americans had ben part of the Western alliance capability, not as
tual American missile deployments ap- justifying MIRVs in SALT as a "qualitative *-likely independent threats. In considering f*r-
proaches. improvement." - ces of the two sides, they insist on taking these
Moreover, the Soviets had agreed in SALT IIt ' capabilities into account - as we would surely
" . not to deploy the SS-16 mobile ICBM. Since the, t do in their place.
E uro m iss e SS-20 is based on the first two stages of the SS- Moreover, announced plans for equipping the
16, a production line was available to produce existing British and French forces with MIRVs
the SS-20. \ would in fact create a larger number of
Western thinking had tended to equate thewarheads on these forces alone than the entire
e600 Soviet intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missile force.
missiles with the American Thor and Jupiter Hence Soviet chief Yuri Andropov's new willing-
missiles of the same vintage. The United States, - ness in proposals in 1983 to count warheads on
In looking back to the original basis for the had briefly deployed these weapons in Europe - both sides in the INF totals.
NATO decision, it is necessary to ask: Why did in the late 1950s and early 1960s as an interim t- Inferring Soviet "iteenteoions" from such ac-
the Soviets deploy the SS-20? substitute until ICBM forces would provide a tion as the deployment of the SS-20 is not as
THE SOVIETS were not satisfied with the real strategic deterrent. Later, Soviet reten- reasy as many have assumed. It may be too late
status quo in intermediate-range missiles in tion of their intermediate-range missiles was to re-think the 1979 NATO decision, but it is not
Europe for the same reason we have notbeen interpreted as reflecting a Soviet propensity to rtoo late to think about serious arms control
satisfied with the status quo of our ICBM force. keep old systems. From that perspective, the proposals to deal with the problem of missiles
Both forces are seen by their respective owners decision to replace them with SS-20s was per- in Europe.
as meeting continuing military and deterrence plexing and disquieting.
requirements, but becoming vulnerable and IN FACT, the Soviets never regarded their portion of the force for a retaliatory strike, if tentions for a first strike or exerting political Garthoff is a retired ambassador and
urgently in need of modernization. SS-4s and SS-5s as an interim strategic NATO struck in a "first use" of nuclear pressure on Europe. Moreover, the evidence served on the U.S. delegation in SALfI
The Soviet Union has had 600 missiles facing deterrent, but rather as an integral link in a weapons. NATO doctrine, after all, does call that exists argues against the explanation that and in many other posts in the Departme,
Europe for 20 years. The question for them in chain of deterrent and contingent war-waging for use of nuclear weapons in response to Soviet the Soviet deployments are for the purpose of of State and in the Foreign Service cone
the late 1970s was not whether to create sucha capabilities. Moreover, while it has qualities conventional military action in Europe. political irtimidation.fdrrc
force, as sometimes has been thought in the that can be useful in a first strike (as does the Thus, there is a perfectly understandable The Soviets have been vocal and insistent in ned with Soviet affairs and nationual
West, but what to do about replacing obsolete Pershing II), one reason for the large numbers Soviet military rationale for modernization asserting that there can be no limited nuclear security issues. He is now a senior fellow W!
and vulnerable missiles. of SS-20s is to ensure survivability of at least a without resort to speculation about Soviet in- war in Europe leaving the United States aside. the Brookings Institution. {a
+i a '

Edited and managed by students at The University of Michigan


Vol. XCIV-No. 51

420 Maynard St.
Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Editorials represent a majority opinion of the Daily's Editorial Board
Applauding Polish abuses

---- --
, -
' '
_ ' - -
t, -7+
y '. '
r ,.
-. .
uR l
Y f
.. r

AM~cpJtj vA
qENAPA --1



e~ou t

BY EASING economic sanctions
against Poland, the Reagan ad-
ministration has sidled away from its
censure of the human rights abuses of
martial law and sent a scrambled
message of American resolve toward
the Polish leadership.
Reagan imposed the-restrictions in
December, 1981, during the early days
of martial law, to protest the Polish
government's oppressive policies.
On Wednesday the White House
eased some of the curbs in response to
"very modest improvement in the
human rights situation in Poland." To
confuse the matter, Reagan accompanied
the move with a sharp attack on the
Polish government for what he called
"continuing human rights abuses in
that country."

This rather odd combination of sen-
timents puts the administration in the
uncomfortable position of rewarding a
lack of progress toward the
humanitarian ideals it so vigorously
defended two years ago.
Certainly the restrictions were only
symbolic, but that is precisely the
point: However misguided the san-
ctions may have been, they represen-
ted Americans' outrage at the Polish
Government's suppressions of human
rights. The repeal of those measures -
even in part - amounts to America's
condoning of Poland's malfeasance.
Instead of signalling American
willingness to normalize relations, as
Reagan intended, the limited retrac-
tion of economic restrictions has mud-
died this country's humanitarian








'The idiot' respondsi

AM, r ''

To the Daily:
There has been a good deal of
discussion in these pages about
Alexander Haig's recent visit.
This has already made many of
the important points: People
who came to see and hear
General Haig deserved the op-
portunity to see and hear him.
And people who wished to object
to his views deserved an oppor-
tunity to be seen and heard. I
agree with both points and will
not comment on them further.
Nor do I wish to comment on
the bad manners of some of those
who limited opportunities to
make the most of his visit; bad
manners that prevented General
and Mrs. Haig from spending
their three days here in East
Quad whereydialogue with
students on an informal basis
might have occurred; bad man-
ners that interrupted his Thursday
evening lecture with the result
that any chance of a coherent
presentation was lost; bad man-

Frankly, it was easy. Anyone
who has invited guest lecturers
has had the experience of expec-
ting hundreds and seeing dozens
show up, and vice versa. Neither
University President Harold
Shapiro nor retired Admiral
Hyman Rickover had filled
Rackham, and I didn't think Haig
would draw in the way Hans
Kung did. I'd welcome advice
from my critics as to how many
people I should expect for Ram-
sey Clark's visit next March 8.
Michigan Stadium is still
available if I act fast.
What I am truly sorry about is

to Haig
our failure to have
available for an overflow
(We spend several h
dollars providing it f
Rickover lecture and it
needed.) The good news
the session was taped by
and those who wish to h
distinct from see or par
in) the session will ha
I found that ThursdayE
both difficult and unpleas
we - and freedom of sp
survived it. The next
seminars were, by all acc
real success and gave

audio faculty and students a chance to
crowd. talk with a former secretary of
undred state about past and current
'or the issues in foreign policy. I am
wasn't sure the University benefitted
is that from this visit, as it does from
WUOM those of other public figures. I
ear (as apologize to Vivian Shapiro, Anne
ticipate Mancour, and the hundreds,. of
ve that you who were shut out, g.or
discomfitted by the much larger
evening than expected crowd. I wish I
sant but could promise it will never hap-
eech - pen again.

t day's
ounts, a

- Peter O. steine;
October 31
Steiner is LSA dean.


We encourage our readers to use this space to discuss and respond to issues of
their concern. Whether those topics cover University, Ann Arbor community, state
national, or international issues in a straightforward or unconventional manner, we
'feel such a dialogue is a crucial function of the Daily. Letters and guest columns
should be typed, triple-spaced, and signed.

11.1. 1 IFAWM- iswro-_v__ 11, -

u~~~~ R~~LtfM COUINTY k7~Um*m

hV RPAcP Rraatl P


Back to Top

© 2021 Regents of the University of Michigan