HAVA k) s'tu Eighty-four years of editorial freedom Edited and managed by students at the University of Michigan Wednesday, December 11, 1974 News Phone: 764-0552 420 Maynard St., Ann Arbor, Mi. 48104 Vote: Let us leave lettuce Wh MA70R RAS0&)S FO WILTH CUBA? HAS M6UL O l? ADD 6~ RCAY .D TAB6 R W ~AS A }ATOS? CAVA QA 1&A& x 4«,h POW T YOU FWTT&T .B VUM OQUAIRAQ )( A OME 6 PAC56RU qO MiL$. OFF oOk CcA9 I Q MAY IQU Vtv A5 '3AY&X IHAT WHDHHWISM IN W CAR IB3EAN) t W (TH C FAI&) ACCEPTABLE5~ C(IGARS. /n FEEL- THAT 16~ SPIRIT OF XET&)Th HAS I PEOWGY AS AI'3 ISSUE 1k) NAVAL)A ,T3AS -7 r{HIS SEMESTER, as every semester, the University Housing Council (UHC) will be voting on whether or not the dorms should continue to boycott lettuce and grapes. (Wine is included in the general boycott, but in my two years in the dorm, wine did not flow from the cafeteria.) Students can vote to continue the boycott at the same time they early- register for winter classes at Water- man Gym, starting Wednesday, De- cember 11. Boycott pressure from the consum- er generated the first agricultural workers' union in California. Though progress is slow, the only way the migrant workers are ever going to see an improvement in the condi- tions under which they work, a un- ion, and some decent pay is if the consumers bring economic pressure to bear upon the men in charge. All the letters to the Editor, the well-meaning speeches, and the pro- mises on the part of the bosses to change the situation for the migrant worker are nice, but useless. The place to effect change has proven to be the market; only by refusing to buy and eat the products in ques- tion can we demonstrate our solidar- ity with the migrant workers who are not getting a fair deal. THE STUDENT VOTE is binding, that is, whatever the students vote UHC will put into practice. So take the extra two minutes at regis- tration -- you'll have to stand in line for at least that long - and vote to continue the boycott. -DEBRA HURWITZ HAVAMA CI5AR5, HIAVANA l ScIAR OR, C(SA5 AS(E, [WHAT Phi05-OPHA , MLTQ ~REASOk) S:Ak)J0 IVC 3VFOR Dit. Pubishers-Hall Syndicate .5io CAP, Norma lizing U. -Cuba re la tions: Liberalization? Rocky in, accountability out THE FINAL CURTAIN has rung down on Congressional consider- ation of Nelson Rockefeller's fitness for the vice-presidency. We now have an appointed veep to go with our ap- pointed president: a matched set. Only weeks ago, Rockefeller's dom- ination was challenged by strong statements about his past perform- ance in public office and about the way his wealth (and his family's) has been used in campaigning, and in wooing government officials. Ov- erwhelming confirmation from the Senate is puzzling, as is the praise "highly qualified," that is being bast- ed on him. Testimony in confirma- tion hearings has pulverized the credibility of all that. Perhaps one hand does wash the other in Washington. Rockefeller disclosed in testimony that in the past 17 years he has made contribu- tions, gifts and loans to the tune of $2 million to present and former pub- lic servants. The Rockefeller family pitched in $25 million for political campaigns over the years. Buying political clout is a repugnant con- cept, and apparent unconcern in the Congress about a third generation robber barons being second-in-com- mand in our own banana republic is doubly disgusting. WHILE THE COUNTRY prepares to receive the next heir apparent, it is appropriate to question just how common the practice of mutual back- scratching is in our nation's capital. It seems more than likely that a Con- gress which cannot perceive Rocky's shadiness has depths that are as murky as his. It is clear that "government of and by the people" is, to federal law- makers, a handy catchphrase to haul out for elections and merely gib- berish when real power is concerned. --CLIFFORD BROWN Rectitude and responsibility THE ANNOUNCEMENT that Wilbur Mills is stepping down from his position as chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee comes as no surprise. His actions during the last few months lead one to believe that his health has deteriorated to the point where he can no longer maintain his duties effectively. For most of the year he was absent from his post be- cause of a back ailment, which fore- ed him into the hospital and out of Ways and Means Committee control. His condition became known be- cause of an incident involving a now- famous Washington stripper who was found in his company in a car driv- ing along the Tidal Basin in the early TODAY'S STAFF: News: Dan Biddle, Dan Blugerman, Cindy Hill, Cheryl Pilate, C u r t Smith, Dave Whiting Editorial Page: Paul Haskins, Marnie Heyn, Debra Hurwitz, Wayne John- son, Steve Ross Arts Page: Ken Fink Photo Technician: Steve Kagan morning hours. 7N THE PAST, the media would probably have hushed this affair. Representative Mendel Rivers was an alcoholic, a fact not revealed un- til his death, though it impared his ability to perform his professional duties. The Mills affair was publiciz- ed because the post-Watergate press has decided to 'go after' public of- ficials more aggressively and Mills' actions were so out of character. According to an article in Sunday's Detroit Free Press, the reason for Mills' dramatic change in behavior may be physiological. According to a doctor, Mills is suffering from a spin- al ailment which causes behavior changes and could require the use of painkillers. Unfortunately this incident has been used to degrade Mills, who for most of his career, was the leading government expert on taxes. How- ever, it has brought out the fact that he is physically unable to perform as chairman of his committee. --STEVE ROSS Editor's note: This is the conclud- ing article of a two-part series. By PAUL O'DONNELL AIX-EN-PROVENCE, FRANCE: The Bay of Pigs incident and the Cub- an missile crisis bring out another his- torical debate to which international journalists and historians still devote considerable newsprint: was John F. Kennedy a liberal, humanitarian politic- ian, or the "coldest of the cold war- riors?" What was Kennedy's role in the Bay of Pigs invasion? When John F. Kennedy entered t h e White House in January, 1961, the Bay of Pigs operation was already being pre- pared under the code name "Must Go," furthermore, thousands of voluntary warriors and mercenaries were training for the attack in the jungles of Guate- mala and Nicaragua. Officially, Wash- ington was only going to provide air sup- port for the invasion, but many of the Cuban trainees thought they would re- ceive full military backing from the U.S., and therefore allowed the C.I.A. to do the planning for them. Many his- torians now claim that if the "rebels" and mercenaries had planned their own invasion, the attack would have been more carefully executed and would have had greater chances for success. Arriving at the White House in early 1961 Kennedy consulted his advisors who were divided on the issue of whether military intervention in Cuba was a worthwhile gamble. The C.I.A. and the Pentagon, perhaps still confident from their successful Guatemalan invasion (June, 1954) thought a similar plan might work in Cuba. The State Department was against military intervention, and Kennedy, having decided to give ita try, was caught between going too far and not going far enough. After the spectac- ular failure of this operation, Kennedy chose not to send the Marines in, and admitted America's involvement on July 24. The day after making this admis- soin, Kennedy announced the economic embargo, and the Cold War entered a new phase, at least in Latin America. According to one New York Times ar- ticle, the operation cost the U.S. 45 mil- lion dollars. THUS KENNEDY, and through Amer- ican pressure, most of Latin America, refused to help or trade with a socialist dictator, while givnig aid and assistance to "classic" (i.e. capitalist) dictator- ships elsewhere in Latin America. The Cuba case, and more recently the Chil- ean tragedy, show America to be the defender of economic interests rather than "the defender of democracy" in many cases. Some evidence indicates, however, that negotiation with Castro would have been easier under the Ken- nedy administration than when Johnson became president. A kind of Kennedy idealism is also evidenced by Spanish- American relations: Vazquez Montalban writes "There has been no lack of ob- servers who consider the moves towards liberalization which took place in Spain starting in 1962 to be a consequence of pressure exerted by the Kennedy ad- ministration. It is as possible as it is impossible to prove . . . The deepest and darkest secrets are those of the bed- room and those of behind-the-scenes poli- tics; therefore, Kennedy took his "idea of Spain" to the grave with him. FROM THE END of the Bay of Pigs incident until the present, the influence of the Soviet Union in Cuba has increas- ed continuously, except possibly during the era immediately following the mis- sile crisis. Between November, 1960, and November 1961 this incra wes- (O.R.I.), which according to certain sources represented another step towards "hard-line Communism" and another step away from the original revolution- ary program. All this happened after the Bay of Pigs invasion; it is worth noting that only a few months earlier Cuba and America still had diplomatic relations. The "Russian Betrayal" As mentioned in the previous article, many Cubans considered that the Rus- sians had betrayed them by removing the missiles which caused the 1962 crisis. Even Fidel had some bitter words about his Russian "friends;" some university students went so far as to raise the chant, "Nikita, Nikita, lo que se da, no se quita!" Which means, roughly, "Ni- kita, Nikita, what you give you can't take back!" While the incident was ano- ther black mark on the record of 'U.S.- Soviet relations, tensions had also de- veloped between Russian and Cuba. An independent-if-socialist Cuba could have been in a better position to negotiate an end to the trade embargo, but the John- son administration, in the Caribbean as in Asia, wanted to "hold the line against Communism." And the economic em- bargo was beginning to take hold . .. Starting in 1963, Cuban sugar produc- tion, with the help of Soviet technology, began to increase rapidly. If Cuban sug- ar exports increased considerably in 1963, so did Cuban efforts to export the revolution. Ernesto "Che" Guevara left Cuba in 1965, after having served as Fidel's Secretary of Industry, and in 1967, he was in Bolivia directing guer- rilla actions. It was in Bolivia that "Che" was captured, tortured, and killed; he thus becomes a legendary figure. In Cuba, 1968, was declared "The Year of the Heroic Guerilla Fighter." PARADOXICALLY, many sources choose 1968 as the date when Cuba stop- ped trying to create new revolutions; ac- cording to the International H e r a d Tribune, "it is openly conceded by U.S. officials that since 1968 Havana has abandoned her efforts to export the re- volution." Elsewhere in the same news- paper, the statement can be found that since 1968, thererhas been a "tightening of the Soviet grip on every aspect of Cuban life . . ." Castro, it seems, was being converted over to a "peaceful coexistence" point of view, whether he liked it or not. The 1968 elections, and the victory of the virulent anti-Communist Richard Nix- on, are viewed with some concern in Cuba. It was well known that Nixon had many ties with the Cuban community in America, and that he had, in 1960, call- ed the Castro regime "an intolerable cancer." Veiled threats were made by Nixon when he spoke of Cuba: ". . . We will keep and reinforce the economic blockade," and look for "other ways..." The Cuban response was predictable: closer ties with Russia. When Russian tanks occupied Czechslovakia Castro didn't protest ... would he have if Che had been alive and still in the Cuban government? OTHER EVENTS shaped the course of Latin American history: in 1970, Salva- dor Allende was elected president of Chile, and a campaign of "democratiza- tion" took place in Cuba; 2 million workers vote for union delegates. While visiting Chile in 1971, Fidel declared that there is more than one road to economic development." The declaration would not be surprising or even notable if it had not come from the mouth of the bearded revolutionary who was once a kind of Robin Hood in the eyes of the world. ferred Ford to Nixon, which isn't sur- prising. The past year has provided num- erous indications that a "normalization" of relations might be in the making; Nixon's departure was only one of these signs. IN LATE 1973 and in January of 1974, the Cuban government issued indirect indications that it was ready to consider making contacts with Washington if the U.S. first agrees to end the economic boycott. Included in these indications were comments that a settlement of the Guantanamo base issue and the recogni- tion of Cuba as a sovereign state would be matters for negotiation. Since that time numerous other signs of improve- ment have appeared: January 29: Breznev visits Cuba; the two countries are in favor of a closer diplomatic, political, and economic rela- tionship. The Soviet leader takes the oc- casion to criticize "exportation of the revolution." February: Millionaire Cyrus E a t o n visits Cuba, declares that the situation is favorable for a renewal of relations. February 26: Argentina ships g o o d s made in American factories to Cuba, some claim that the embargo has tech- nically, if not officially, ended. March 27: Monsignor Agostino Casar- o, representative of the Vatican, visits Cuba. July: Pat Holt, fact-finder for the State Foreign Relations Committee, vis- its Cuba and is given the "red carpet" treatment. September 27: Two U.S. senators (Jav- its and Pell) visit Cuba; meanwhile, Cas- tra criticizes U.S. policy in Chile. November, 1974: The organization of American States (OAS) votes in favor of continuing the economic embargo against Cuba, America abstains from voting. ALTHOUGH THE OAS vote against Cuba's re-entry into the "American fam- ily" seems to be a step backwards, and many consider it a detrimental factor for the future of the Organization, other in- dications show that America is ready to end its hostile position. The Senate Sub- committee on Foreign Relations recent- ly published a report which stated, among other conclusions, that the "Cub- ans are on the verge of making their system work . . ." and that, according to certain figures, Cuba has the highest per capita gross national product of all Latin American countries, with the pos- sible exception of Venezuela. Coming from a Senate subcommittee, this is a way of admitting that America's polic. ies of isolating Cuba, and thereby mak- ing economic failure accomplish what military might couldn't, is a failure. Vazquez Montalban once wrote that though the Cuban "exportation of the revolution" was a failure, Cuba now ex- ports "a model of social improvements that are not within the reach of most Latin American countries." Some of these "social improvements" are t h e following: -Educational improvements which in- clude giving Cuba the lowest rate of il- literacy in all of Latin America. -In 1959, Cuban laws decreed that rent prices be lowered 50 per cent, and that in general, rent prices should not exceed 10 per cent of the family income. Cuban housing continues to be the lowest priced in Latin America. -Between the years 1958 and 1973, the number of hospitals quadrupled in Cuba. TO TALK ONLY about the favorable points of Cuba would be misleading, es- pecially since post-revolutionary Cuba is often considered to be a kind of "Rus- sia in the western hemisphere" by a large sector of the American public. Indeed, Castro's Cuba has many of the characteristics of what some call "bar- racks socialism." One criticism is that the regime has eliminated illiteracy, but has also taken away the right to read whatever one chooses. As one French journalist put it, "the press is extreme- ly boring, and the state-run publishers focus their efforts almost totally upon the production of school books." Shortly after the Bay of Pigs incident, Fidel explained that there would be no more elections in Cuba, that the revolution was the people's means of expressing itself, and that in his country there were elec- tions every day, not just every four years. Some time after the Bay of Pigs incident, the country's prisons were still fill, and according to Hugh Thomas, there are now more political prisoners in Cuba than there was when Batista was in power. There are signs, however, that Cuba may be changing . . . The creation of a system of popular representation called "Poder Popular," which is supposed to establish a kind of democratic structure that Fidel h a s long hoped for, may be an indication of a certain degree of liberalization within the limits of Cuban socialism. Castro's speeches themselves reflect a desire for communication between the government and the people: he has tried to make his public appearances become dialogues with the crowd, and he has even made a number of important decisions during these discussions. ON JANUARY 2 of this year, Cuban Vice Prime Minister Raul Castro an- nounced that experimental elections would take place in the Cuban province of Matanzas; on June 30, Cuba had its first elections since 1950. The meaning of these elections is less important than it might seem: Cuban "democracy" may be similar in nature to the type of "democracy" which exists in the Soviet Union. Some claim that the only real communication which takes place be- twveen the regime and the people takes place through Castro's public discussion- speeches, and that the regime has pro- vided no system of succession for the after-Castro era. Indeed, Castro's rela- tion with the people falls in the category of "baudillismo," a kind of hero-wor- shipping which is typical of Spain and Latin America. The hope remains that the Cuban revolution, unique in nature and inspired by years of struggle for Cuban independence, will choose a dif- ferent path than the ones traced by the Soviet Union and China, and that Cuban socialism will some day be {pore hu- mane and less authoritarian than the other "socialist models." Much evidence points to the conclus- ion that the American economic em- bargo not only failed to weaken and de- stroy the Castro regime, but also made Cuba seek protection by forming close alliances with Russia, and provided a number of dictatorial reactions by the Cuban government. One Spanish mag- azine expresses the problem this way: "Some have even gone so far as to say that if America's reaction to the Cuban revolution had not been as violent, this revolution would have been more open and liberal." If nothing else, America's economic and diplomatic policy concern- ing Cuba is outdated and inefficient. More and more people in the Congress, the State Department, and elsewhere in the government seem to be realizing N hi \ I e 4011- It -N- '1 k e if f ' * 9