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Eighty-four years of editorial freedom
Edited and managed by students at the University of Michigan

52

Thursday, October 24, 1974

News Phone: 764-05

Who
By KENNETH STEIN
CINCE THE October w
last year the top i
Palestine and the Palest
has dominated the attent
all parties in the Arab-I
conflict. Where primary co
on the part of Egypt, J
and Syria after the June
war was for Israeli with
al from all occupied territ
the seemingly apparent p
now is for a just solution
Palestine problem. Anwa
dat in a recent interview
London Observer clearly
cated that from where he
as Egypt's president the
of the problem was not Go
Sinai, but the future ofF
tine and the Palestinians.
In contrast to the afterm
the June 1%7 war which
interpreted by Palestinian
rilla groups as a sign tha
ular armed conflict woul
get for them their legit
national aspirations, the l
military successes of Egy
Syria in the 1973 Octobe
have been interpreted by
guerrilla groups as m
that armed struggle can i
achieve for them their ult
purpose.
OTHER MORE moderat
ments of the guerrillar
ment, the Palestinians re
on Jordan's West Ban]
in the Gaza strip, and Pa
ians in Jordan appeart
willing to accept some fo
political accommodationv
Israel. Either ascenien
denial to control and rep
the Palestinians on the st
international diplomacy
caused further fissures i
figment of Palestinian
The massacres perpetrate
spring at Maalot andF
Shimona were unquesti
manifestations of conster
that a compromise over I
right to exist might be m
In the lexicon of diplom
the recognition by the A
summit conference in Nov
1973 of the Palestine Li
tion Organization (PLO)
equal nation state repres
Palestinians lent legitima
their cause. Furthering th
sire to have the intern
community debate their
tion, the Palestine Questi
pears on the UN Gener
sembly's agenda apart fr
usual place within the deb
the Middle East. And ag
urged and battered about
the Arab defeat in Pale
1948-49, the idea of estab
a Palestinian governme
exile had been raised. S
concept has been recent
dorsed by the Soviet Unio
President Sadat, but the i
tion of such a government
by necessity frighten and
some while pleasing
Hence in the absence o
sensus or compromisea
Palestinians this concept
been put at least temo
on the back priority bur
The difficulty in putti
gether a government in
betravs the existence of v
and diverse leaders who
to represent the Palest
There are at present at
three large groupings who
to be the rightful snokes
the Palestinians: The P
King Husayn of Jordan a
resident leaders on the
Bank. Each group hasa
extricable claim to some
of what was once Man
Palestine, is dependent o
side economic support f

well being, and wants asc
cy over its two rivals.
PERHAPS MOST onmpl
define is the PLO. Fon
1964 to embrace most of

represents
undermine the legitimacy of the since th
tar of Hashemite Kingdom and i t s solution
c of right to the West Bank. In Ar- ceptance
inians ticle Two of the Palestinian Na- gime. N
inaof tional Covenant adopted by the saw the
Ionse first Palestinian Congress in ing for a
sraeli Jerusalem in May 1964, it was in the M
incern stated (and it has not been NOWI
ordan, amended as other articles of the change
1967 Coverant have been) that "Pal- PLO wa
draw- estine, with the boundaries it (above)
ories, had during the British M a n- tions no
riority date, is an indivisable territorial to exist,
to the unit." Even when not read with The PL
r Sa- Article One which says that point th
in the Palestine is an integral part of willing t
mdi- the greater Arab homeland, Ar- commun
stood ticle Two seems to question the of refu
core right of the Kingdom of Jordan to gain
Pales- to exist, at least on the West state. It
Bank. have R
Article 25 of the Palestine "achiev
ath of Mandate gave Great Britain the ment of
was right to postpone or withhold or "ach
guer- application of the provisions for tlement
t rnot a Jewish National Home from ple."
imate the "territories lying between Clearl
imte the Jordan (River) and the eas- maneuv
imited tern boundary of Palestine." verbal a
pt and This was an effort to placate the get the
r war Arab claim that they had been neva pe
some promised independence after the Sovi
eanig World War I and support for an States a
n fact independent Arab Kingdom for what if
imate their support of Great Britain what it
against Turkey. The recipient of due out
this kingdom was Husayn's what if
e seg- grandfather, King Abdllah. terests
move- t
sident the au
k and NOT ONLY was Husayn's iegi- the cen
lestin- timacy to the West Bank ques- Israeli a
tioned in the Palestine Ntional
to be Covenant, but the PLO's firt THER
rm of leader, Ahmed Shuqaidi, de- that wit
w ir clared in June 1964 that the lib- moderat
- oreration of Jordan from Husa n m
es.nt y. mentsin
e of was a necessary preliminary to selves
Sa s the liberation oftPalestine. Per- counter
ihae iodically since then, PLO lead- taking u
n the ers have challenged Husayn's tarfare
unity, existence both as a monarch and curs, p
as renresentative of an ?Arab litically
Kiryat state to the east of Palestine. deeper
onable The confrontation betwen to surfa
nation Hsayn and the PLO reached its sional d
srael's climax in Sentember 1970 when try. Re
ade. more than 2,000 Palestinians more n
natics, were killed in Jordan. Most -e-
A r a b cently, at the Palestine Na-
ember tional Council meeting in Cairo,
ibe".i- it was decided to keep political
as an ontions open as well as to con-
enting tinie the struggie against s-
Icy to rael and King Husavn. Certain?
eir de- segments of the. PLO believe
ational beyond any doubt that Husavn
situa- is a major obstacle to be hur-
on ap- led even before consideration of
al As- tackling the problem of Israel
on its can be made. (Palestine Af
ate on fairs, February 1974).
am as
2:nce THE UPCOMING debate on
tie in Palestine -at the UN will once
lishing again raise the question of Nu-
nt in sayn's legitimacy. If the PLO
uch a has its day, discussion w i I1
ly en- center around Resolution 242,
n and adoted nanimously by the Se-
forma- cnrity Council on 22 November
would 1967 as a broad working outline
arger for reaching a solution in 'he T
otners. Arab-Israeli conflict. That re-
f con- snhltion has at least three points ings of
among which apear open for contra- are also
:h s vrsv. Tbevare: 1) "withdraw- the Pal
orarily al of Israeli armed forces from ure to
er. territories occunied in the re- politica]
ng to- cent conflict (1967); 2) " r- would o
eile miation of all claims of belli- for the
arious gerenev and resnect for and not p
seek acknowledgement of the sover- bedfello
inians. einty and territorial integrity the We
least and political independence of Alrea
claim ererv state in the area;" and Israelis
nen of 3) "achievement of a j u s t thwart
? L 0 , settlement of the refugee prob- tine in
ad the lenm." I sami c
West Current debate in Israel is comtrie
an n- not, as previously, dominated reveali
or all by those who do not recognize -the disc
datory the existence of a Palestinian rope wh
>n out- neonle. ssraelileadership today will be
'r its is focusing on the meaniig of

ennen- Resolition 242 and its applica- tioniwil
tion to a settlement. For t h e the Rab
Israelis something short of the end
hex to peace agreement is found in clearly
ned in point two expressed in the con- claim t
ft~ie cept of non-belligerency, least be

e October war the Re-
has won conditional ac-
by the Damascus re-
lot surprisingly Jordan
Resolution as an open-
just and durable peace
[iddle East.
THE UN debate might
that possibility. T h e
nts to remove point two
as it would cast ques-
t only on Israel's right
but also on Husayn's.
O wants a change in
ree as it is no longer
o have the international
ity view it as a group
gees. Instead it wishes
the status of a nation
s hope then would be to
esolution 242 read the
ement of a just settle-
the Palestine problem"
ievement of a just set-
for the Palestinian peo-
y all this diplomatic
ering and attempt at
acrobatics is intended to
PLO a seat at the Ge-
ace conference of which
et Union and the United
re the co-chairmen. But
the PLO fails to get
perceives as its just
of the UN debate? And
local Arab national in-
overcome the claim that
se of the Palestinians is
tral core of the Arab-
conflict?
.E IS a strong likelihood
thin the PLO the 1 e s s
te, more radical ele-
ray seek to assert them-
by either establishing a
weight to the PLO or by
p arms in intra-guerrilla
If armed conflict oc-
articularly in already po-
unstable Lebanon. a
societal conflict is liable
ice between the confes-
ivisions within the coun-
newed attempts by the
nilitant guerrilla group-

the

Palestinians?

"King Husayn can certainly do without the.
establishment of a Palestinian state on the
West Bank that would be as threatening to
him as it would be to the Israelis."
:.Sti :4:":S'1: i "..S iS' St l . " .N

strained. Likewise the associa-
tion with the British connection
and later with the United Siirtes
has tended to taint the monar-
chy's image in the eyes of fellow
Arabs who have sought to throw
off the dominant influence of
foreign presence in the Middle
East.
AFTER THE British e vacua-
tion of Palestine in 1948, whe
most Arab countries *uibbled
about strategy to be adopted -is
a vis Palestine, only King Ab-
dullah of Transjordan emerged
as the military and territorial
benefactor against Israel. Ab-
dullah's own ideology reflected
the concept of an Arab nation in
'Greater Syria,' a residual,
conceptual afterbirth of toe
World War I period. In contrast
to Abdullah's desires to unite the
entire Levant, Egypt's then King
Farouk wished to deprecate ai'y
attempt to take the center of
Arab affairs away from Cairo.
In order to consolidate his posi-
tion on the West Bank i, the
eyes of the local notables, he
adroitly appointed Palestinians
to take key nositions within his
kingdom. These appointments
were politically weighed to coun-
ter balance the government in
exile set up in Gaza by B-3jj
Amin al-Husayni and backed by
Egypt. Finally, before his as-
sassination by a partisan of the
former Grand Mufti in July of
1951, Abdulah formally annexed
the West Bank.
BETWEEN 1948 and 1967

but capable of offering politi-
cal and physical protection. In
the hill areas of the West
Bank's cities (such as Hebron,
Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, and
Tulkarem) local tax collectors,
religious leaders, and land own-
ers asserted themselves over a
peasantry that barely made a
subsistence living. This group,
more isolated from Zionist set-
tlement and land purchase dur-
ing the Mandate, became the
hard core of the Palestinian
Arab leadership. As during the
period of the Mandate this lead-
ership vanguard continues to be
plagued by traditional local riv-
alries between families for po-
litical dominance or denial of
strength to opposition factions.
WITHIN THE leadership
core today the merchants ap-
pear to have only transitory
political strength. They are con-
stantly at the mercy of having
their markets cut off by wars
or threats of belligerency. Their
economic punch is cyclical
varying with the ebb and flow
of tourism from both Israel and
Jordan. With Israel's inflation
at an all time high, the for-
merly very lucrative trade pat-
terns have tapered off. The lo-
cal religious leaders continue
to maintain their function as the
spiritual leaders of the West
Bank, but since the demise of
the former Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem their political pres-
tige has waned too.
Today the only really strong
religious - political leader on the

420 Maynard St., Ann Arbor, Mi. 48104


Economic Utopia, at last (gasp)

dERALD FORD RECENTLY recom-
mended that in order to beat the
high cost of medical care one need
simply stay healthy. While I will not
argue that being well is the best way
to avoid today's outrageous medical
costs, his statement leads one to con-
sider alternative methods for fighting
inflation that are equally profound.
For example, if the cost of food ap-
pears unbearable, one simply does
not have to eat!
One of the better proposals on the
subject came from Jonathan Swift,
the 17th century satirist, in his "A
Modest Proposal-".
"A young healthy child," he wrote,
"well nursed is at a year old a most
delicious, nourishing, and wholesome
food -- whether, stewed, roasted, bak-
ed, or boiled."
IN OUR TECHNOLOGICAL age I
suggest a more fitting and far
more humane method of curing our
economic malignities. Since the gov-
ernment has yoked the very vortex
of all human endeavor in order to
extract, expropriate, and encumber
it with every conceivable tax burden,
it is possible, with one intelligent fell
swoop, to forever efface such con-
temptible burdens from the face of
our country. In its place I would re-
sort to the very simple expedient of
putting a tax on every breath we
take.
Lest one laugh at this, let me
point out that, with the knowledge
that the average citizen inhales ap-
TODAY'S STAFF:
News: Glen Allerhand, Dan Biddle,
Cindy Hill, Lois Josimovich, D a n
Korobkin, Jim Nicoll, Cheryl Pilate
Editorial Page: Marnie Heyn, Wayne
Johnson
Arts Page: David Blomquist
Photo Technician: Steve Kagan

proximately 10,000 breathes per day,
an unbounded cornucopia of reve-
nue exists.
The method of tapping this bound-
less source of revenue is very simple.
No documentations, forms, or reports
would ever have to be filed with the
government. Congress would only
have to pass a simple law requiring
every citizen from the age of 21 and
up to wear a scientifically - designed
BREATH-O-METER around his neck,
a sort of permanently installed, and
forever irremovable chain-lockingI
device.
ONCE THE CITIZEN is so chained,
Congress could then decree the
amount of money each citizen would
be required to pay for every breath.
Like all forms of taxation the govern-
ment, in its beneficence, would start
out with a small rate. With time
and need this could progressively in-
crease. Unlike today, a citizen would
never be found guilty of fraud or
chicanery. Once thus permanently
shackled, one could find respite only
in decapitation or in demise.
Should there ever be a shortage of
tax revenue in some, unforeseeable
future, an order would be issued to
the police or to the National Guard,
depending upon the extent of popu-
lar resistance, to give chase to the
populace. This would increase their
respiration level commensurate to the
government's need. Recourse to this
measure could be avoided if the gov-
ernment would offer incentives for
the public to breath more.
JF, BY CHANCE, the Lord of the
Universe should look down upon
our earth and at once perceive this
new form of human justice and equi-
librum, He or She will proclaim in a
loud voice that henceforth homo sap
should be born with much larger
lungs and at least three nostrils.
-ALAN RESNICK

King Husayn
attacks against Israel
ilikely. Most ominous for
estinians would be fail-
reach concensus on a
l accommodation. That
only open the door wider
triangle of estranged but
olitically uncomfortable
ws of Israel, Jordan and
st Bank leadership.
dy we have seen that the
will not be able to
the UN debate on Pales-
view of the Third World,
and Eastern Block
es who support it. Most
ng in the debate will be
iplined but uneasy tight-
ich the Jordonia delegate
walking. Jordan's posi-
l be made clearer after
bit summit scheduled for
of this month. Jordan is
tryingto protect i t s
e the West Bank and at
te the spokesman of the

Jordan was bedeviled by prob-
lems which accompanied t h e
West Bank's annexation. Agri-
culturally poor and industrially
lacking, the West Bank was an
economic liability. Abdullah's
land grab brought the Hashe-
mite monarchy not only the in-
digenous West Bank population,
but also those Arabs who were
fleeing to the East and W e s t
Banks after the 1948 war. In ad-
dition to doubling. Jordan's pre
1948 population, the West Bank's
annexation also brought to Am-
man a plethora of ideological
groups who in one fashion or
another did not show a keen
liking for the monarchy. Pales-
tinian nationalists, Communists,
Pan-Arab nationalists, and Is-
lamic fundamentalists injected
new political activity into a po-
litical climate that had 'prev-
iously only known the status
quo.
The first task at hand for the
young Husayn, not yet twenty
when he ascended the throne,
was to consolidate his position
both in Amman and among the
West Bank leadership. In 1956
he removed British dominance
over his Bedouin dominated
Arab legion; in 1957 he outlawed
all political parties; and in 1963
and 1966 he quelled opposition to
his throne in Nablus, Hebron,
and Jerusalem.
After the first Arab summit
in Cairo in 1964, the PLO be-
came Husayn's foremost threat
to hegemony over the W e s t
Bank and to Jordan as wel. in
the meantime Husayn continued
the practice of appointing West
Bank natobles to positions in his
Cabinet. By so doing he has cur-
ried sifficient favor with the
West Bank for there to be a
strong political core inwilaing
to see the PLO fill the vacuum
that might be created b any
Israeli withdrawal. The cracR-
down of the guerrillas in Sep-
tember 1970 had a two edged
effect: it weakened the PLO on
the East Bank, particularly the
more militant groups; and it
saw a number of Palestinimans on
the West Bank view Husavn at
last as an equal nemesis as
Israel's occupation.
In the triumverate that seeks
to represent the Palestinians,
the most critical is the small
yet powerful elite which com-
prises the West Bank leadership.
It is a group of landowners, re-
ligious leaders, merchants, en-
trepreneurs, and vocal intelle-
gentsia. As in the past the large
landowners who hold political
and social sway over the vil-
lages of the West Bank have the
most political clout. Their as-
cendency to political control has
come from more than a hund-
red years of forming traditional
societal bonds with the local
Arab agriculturist. Certainly
their sway is wavering as more
and more West Bank. laborers
find better pay by working :n-
side Israel, but nevertheess
they continue to hold the reigns
of influence.
AS COMPARED to the rest of
Palestine, the hill regions of

West Bank is the Mayor of He-
bron, Sheikh Muhammad al-Ja'
bari who has had close connec-
tions with the Hashemite house
in the past. The younger intelli-
genisia, comprised of writers,
publicists, and intellectuals, is
perhaps the least willing to
compromise with either King
Husayn or the Israelis. Like the
younger generation of Arab na-
tionalists in Palestine during
the Mandate this group finds
more ideological compatability
with doctrine that can seek to
undermine the power of the
traditional land - owning elite.
Its inclination is more toward
the various views expressed
within the ideologies of the
PLO.
SINCE 1970 the PLO has not
been successful in garnering
strength on the West Bank. The
Israelis have cracked down
hard on guerrilla cells in the
occupied - administered terri-
tories. Husayn's crackdown of
the guerrillas forced them to be
more geographically distant
from Israel and the West Bank
and hence their effectiveness
and influence suffered. In the
municipal elections held on the
West Bank in March 1972, the
PLO did not keep candidates
from running or the large num-
ber of electors from turning out
to vote. The very small turnout
of Arabs in East Jerusalem
during the Israeli elections held
last December is attributable
more to the resident Arabs' own
aversion to Israeli occupation
and less to any overt attempt
by the PLO to keep the voter
turnout low. Certainly the in-
spirational aftermath of the Oc-
tober war's results played a
large role in the decision of
many not to go to the polls.
E C O N O M I C A L L Y
the West Bank labor force and
merchants are better off than
they were prior to Israeli occu-
pation. If economic determinism
is the key, then the West Bank
leadership will probably go in
whatever direction least upsets
traditional economic and politi-
cal relationships. King Husayn
can certainly do without the
establishment of a Palestinian
state on the West Bank that
would be equally as threatening
to him as it would be to the Is-
raelis. Certainly the Israelis and
other powers for that matter,
would much prefer not to have
a Palestinian state on the West
Bank supported by Moscow.
Barring any sudden change of
regimes in the Middle East or of
the ultimate political objectives
of the PLO, the PLO seems less
likely to represent the Palestin-
ians over the long haul.
In the short term they will
get their chance at the UN and
perhaps at the Geneva peace
talks when they resume. The
possibility, however. cannot be
totally excluded that certain
less extreme segments of the
PLO are weary of the political
battle. These groups led by Ya-
,sir Arafat are less committed
ideologically to the communist
doctrine of George Habash's
Popular Front for the Libera-

"The difficulty in putting together a government in exile is betray-
ed by the existence of diverse leaders who 'seek to represent the Pal-
estinians. There are at present at least t h r e e large groupings who
claim to be the rightful spokesman of the Palestinians."
assasumsgammmaisimt s S:-e~smsassaaasim sesasseammsosms~sim nsoes

then existent guerrilla organi-
zations, it is now the umbrella
organization for more or less
a dozen separate guerr'lla
groups. Some groups within the
PLO tend to represent a parti-
cular Arab government's inter-
est such as Egypt, Syria or
Iraq while others are ideologi-
cally and philosophically inde-
pendent. They all seem to agree
on their goal which is their legi-
timate national aspirations or
the establishment of a democrat-
ic secular state in Palestine.
The strength of each guerrilla
group varies in size, but most
recruitment is done through the
existing Palestinian refugee
camps in Jordan, Syria, a n d
Lebanon. Financial resources
come from -various Palestinian
groups, countries and individuals
on the Arabian peninsula. Miii-
tary, political and some econom-
ic support comes from China,

The Israelis appear wilng to
return part of the te:ritories
they occupied in return for
agreements of non-belligerency.
Not only will this in a de facto
manner force Egypt, Jordan,
and perhaps Syria to sign an
agreement which will tacitly
recognize Israel's right to exist,
but the Israelis will have made
Resolution 242 operative and
not susceptible to reinterprera-
tion or revision.
SINCE ITS adoption, A r a b
circles have viewed Resolution
242's reference to occupied ter-
ritories as meaning all the oc-
cupied territories. In support of
that view the French transla-
tion of the Resolution is the text
used by the Arab countries as
it says, "des territoires." In
February 1973 in a discus.,ion I
had with Lord Caradon, the au-
thor of the Resolution, he clearly

Palestinians in its now truncat-
ed kingdom.
JORDAN WANTS the n e x t
stage of negotiations on disen-
gagement to be between her and
Israel, an obvious affront to
Palestinian guerrilla claims to
the West Bank. For Israel the
question is not if Jordan will
declare readiness to negoti te
with her. Knowing that Jordan
wants and needs a political ac-
commodation has afforded Israel
the chance to negotiate f i r .s t
with Egypt, the perceived locus
of Arab policy making in he
crisis. Giving more territory
back to Egypt, the reas-aing
goes, makes it less likely and
potentially more costly far Pre-
sident Sadat to renew hostilities.
The time lag in waiting to deal
with the Jordanians also gives
Israel the option to wait and Eee
how the tussle over who reore-
- m1..:..

I