special feature the sunday daily by muzammel huq Number 50 Night Editor: Geri Sprungc Sunday, October 24, 1971 Bang desh: The anatomy of oppression EDITOR'S NOTE: The author, a graduate student in political science, is president of the Ann Arbor Bangladesh Association and serves on the executive committee of the national Bangladesh Defense League. IN SOME PARTS of Africa, there is a saying that "things done with- out you are done against you." East Pakistanis would undoubtedly agree. While composing about 55 per cent of the total population of Pakistan, the Bengalis have participated little in their country's political decision- making or its economic prosperity, al- though they have earned more than 50 per cent of the total foreign ex- change earnings of Pakistan since 1947 - the date Pakistan became in- dependent from Great Britain. At that time, the fusion of 60 mil- lion Muslims of East Bengal (Bangla- desh) with about 30 million Muslims of northwestern India (what is now West Pakistan) was heralded as a new experiment - governing a nation di- vided into two parts, and widely sep- arated geographically. Now, 24 years were the instruments of industrial and commercial progress, the wealthy Muslim migrants from all over India went to Karachi with their capital. Only a few went to East Pakistan, which was far ,removed from the seat of patronage. Only those whose for- tune was tied up in the jute trade went to East Pakistan. Economically, both East and West Pakistan were poor; which was poor- er is dificult to establish. On t h e whole, perhaps West Pakistan was better off, with much less population pressure. .In development potential, East Pakistan offered greater promise for agricultural development because its alluvial soil could give better yields, whereas water scarcity was a hurdle to West Pakistan's agricul- tural progress. And some Indian Muslim entrepre- neurs apparently realized this early. For in 1947, they came into East Pak- istan with hopes of extracting profit from the land, and raw materials there. cated earlier, Bengali participation had been marginal in the national power elite structure ever since Pak- istan's inception. A number of histori- cal factors led to nominal Bengali re- presentation in the civil-military bur- eaucrtic elite and entrepreneurial class. Only in the political elite, Bengali representation was substantial, and the Bengalis hoped to gain economic redress and equal representation in other sectors by dominating politics. The military coup, however, swept away the political elite and brought the civil-military bureaucracy to the foreground. The elimination of the political elite from the national power elite meant that Bengalis had little representa- tion in it. Bengali representation in the higher civil services, even after years of a quota system in recruit- ment, remained less than 40 per cent. As late as 1966, Bengali formed 34.1 per cent of the Civil Service of Paki- stan (CSP) and among Class I offi- cers' of the Central Secretariat they ricultural sector by improving i t s terms of trade. He made "parity" in per capita regional income a consti- tutional mandate and ushered in the era of economic "liberalism". He promised East Pakistan better treat- ment than it had received from the rulers of the earlier decade. Ayub's first five-year plan, Paki- stan's second, sought to maximize de- velopment in the less developed parts of the country without prejudicing national development as a whole. AYUB'S THIRD PLAN aimed at eli- minating disparity by 5 per cent. Public sector gross allocation for East Pakistan was 53 per cent of total public sector allocation. 50 per cent of the total private sector investment was the target for East Pakistan. Sub- santial allocation outside the P 1 a n was reserved for the Indus Basin Re- placement works in West Pakistan. Including this, tjal planned ex- penditure for East Pakistan m u s t have been lower than that for West Pakistan. At the end of the first three years of the Plan, only 22 per cent of the total private investment i Pakistan had taken place in the east. ern region. In spite of incentives like tax holi- days and reduced import duty on machinery, "the private sector in East Pakistan had not responded ade- quately to these incentives nor has a favorable climate been created for the flow of private capital to that region," according to the government plan- ning commission. But, considering the paucity of big business in the east, and the absence of central government to provide ini- tial loans, it is only natural that pri- If Plan (1960-65), and about one-third during the Third Plan (1965-70). Discussions on the deal East Paki- stan received from the Ayub regime can be overwhelmed with statistics. But the heart of the problems lies in the fact that East Pakistan had little say or choice in managing the af- fairs. If with equal participation by East Pakistan in the management of the economy, East Pakistan had ach- Statistics on Pakistan Approximate Total Development Expenditures (in millions dollars) 1955/56-1959/60 1960/61-1964/65 East C 540 26 1,940 31 West % 1,514 74 4,300 69 IN GENERAL, though the regime of Ayub Khan adopted some respon- sive policies toward East Pakistan, these were far from adequate, a n d failed to satisfy the Bengalis. In a highly elitist regime, the Ben- galis, have only nominal representa- tion (roughly 30 per cent in the high- er civil bureaucracy, 10 per cent in the army, and 10 per cent in the en=- trepreneurial class). This failure to give representation to the Bengali elite made mobilizational institution building imperative, Ayub's inability tp share power with his institutions made them his hand maidens. Ayub's economic and administrative policies did accommodate some Ben- gali demands. More attention W a s paid to the East Wing's economic de- velopment and greater efforts were made fQr administrative decentrali- zation. But the visible gains in both were marginal; and the regime's pub- licity about East Pakistan's progress created a classic case of rising ex- pectations and rising frustration of the Bengalis. Moreover, to the extent that Ayub's economic policies succeeded, they led to increased social mobilization. But the new forces, generated as a result of his economic policy, were denied participation in the system. It has been this mobilization that has fueled the Bengali autonomy de- mands of ShaikhMajibur Rahman - the Bengali leader who was over- *M 4 Representation of East Pakistanis in the Armed Forces in 1963 Officers later, it appears the partnership has failed conclusively. Why? THE SETTING for the East-West partnership was stacked against the Bengalis to begin with - large- ly as a result of the favored treat- ment the British gave West Pakistan for their unabiding loyalty to t h e crown. Politically, the .East Pakistan Mus- lim League had a strong hold on peo- ple, but in all Pakistan politics, it was a minor partner, at least in leader- ship, despite the fact that it repre- sented the majority of the people. Administratively, the relative back- wardness of the Bengali Muslims was clearly manifested by the fact that almost the entire administration of the central government, the admin- istration of the provincial secretariat and most of the divisional and dis- trict headquarters of East Pakistan lay in the hands of non-,East Pakis- tanis. West Pakistan, on the other hand, was fully administered by West Pakistanis. Karachi became the nation's capital and the seat of decision-making ma- chinery. Since licenses and permits But their profit was not to remain in East Pakistan - when they dis- covered the seat of government was located in Karachi, and that capital, licenses and trained manpower offer- ed far better prospects for industrial commercial progress in the W e s t, they transported the riches of East Pakistan to Karachi's business con- cerns, thereby robbing the Bengalis of approximately $5 billion in po- tential income. THE ABOVE setting had its logical consequence in the decade to fol- low. West Pakistan experienced much greater economic development where- as East Pakistan stagnated. T h e administration pursued a policy of maximum economic growth for the country - East Pakistan had only a minor part in administering and de- veloping the country. But the trag- edy of Pakistan's development was that in the setting of economic part- nership the concept of the "country" did not have the same connoation as he concept of the "people". With the Military Coup of 1958, led by General Ayub Khan, the pow- er elite structure in Pakistan under- went further modification. As indi- were less than 30 per cent. In the military elite, in the absence of a quota system in recruitment, Bengali representation remained nearly as poor as it had been in the 1950's. And, of the 20 families who reportedly benefited most from Ayub's economic policies and monopolized the wealth in the country, none were Bengali. THUS, STRUCTURALLY, the n a - tional power elite under the Ayub regime had hardly any visible Bengali representation. This had a tremend- ously negative effect on economic de- velopment during the decade of Ayub's rule. As I have mentioned earlier, E a s t Pakistan had little say or choice in the affair of its economic develop- ment. It had only one asset: its poli- tical force. It exercised this force in the election of 1954, and annihilated the local collaborators of the central power. But this asset was made com- pletely ineffective by a change from the system of democracy to something called "basic" by President Ayub Khan. In the 1960's, East Pakistan's poli- tical force could not fully express it- self in elections, but it could not be contained for long. It expressed itself violently in the winter of 1968/69 and threatened the very foundation of the country. President Ayub Khan, find- ing no other alternative, quickly ab- dicated by handing over the power to General Yahya Khan - who was responsible for the massacres, start- ed last spring. WITHIN TWO WEEKS after the mil- itary takeover, Ayub visited East Pakistan and promised that hence- forth East Pakistan would no longer he dominated hv West Pakistan. The 1. a. Army b. Medical corps 2. Air Force 5% G 23% 16% Junior Comm. Officers 7.8% X 17.0% Chief Petty Officers 5.0% Warrant Officers .X x Petty Officers 10.4% Other Rinks 7.4% X 30.0% Leading Seamen 28.8% Branch Officers 10%C/ 3. Navy vate initiative in East Pakistan would be at a poor level. THE UNBALANCED resource allo- cation between East and W e s t Pakistan is also reflected in the dis- tribution of foreign aid, which h a s been one of the prime movers of Paki- stan's economic growth in the 1960's. Estimation of net inflow of external resources to the regions is rendered difficult by conceptual problems and lack of appropriate statistics. How- ever, an analysis of. the available data indicates that East Pakistan's share in the total net foreign resources was also one quarter during the Second ieved the same results it has, the crisis of trust would not have develop- ed. It has often been argued that there has been no deliberate policy of dis- crimination against East Pakistan. This may or may not be true; one could doubt the validity of this as- sertion because economists of East Pakistan gave their opinions and re- commendations in various discussions, but the administration ignored them. It appears that what the intellec- tuals of East Pakistan failed for many years to communicate, the up- rising of the people in the country- side in the winter of 1968/69 express- ed quite convincingly. 4' whelmingly elected last year, but whose victory was never recognized by the Khan regime. And the mobilization among t h e Bengalis, coupled with the govern- ment's repressive policies, not only created the present crisis, but p r o- bably signals the end of Pakistan as it now exists. For all practical p u r- poses, Pakistan is buried under the dead bodies of the Bengalis. At R: ;<