Ppge 4-Saturday, January 13, 1979-The Michigan Daily F '- "_ 'r, t4 .,,° . k x . " -.w 420 Maynard St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Eighty-Nine Years of Editorial Freedom Old blunders or a new course? Vol. IXXXIX, No. 86 News Phone: 764-0552 Edited and managed by students at the University of Michigan 14, -, k ti Et a n s i uem de tuna, pIted l gem the Sol t ways t eric 861tes, worries Asia - Tow skin aers' boh ar t ex1 influeni turned Soviet consist Union i Africa. fear its Ospecia Y 3Desp apologi b6en g ipereas dountr eopoli ill be cntizen ripaneu, lesser lfairdsh The eopoll i Sou K n" . Y mF r Na Cambo lnom rSe,,.-" vth , ti crest the Car WE afiecte "tnaj a poi p Vi t we b" :the lithe 1;oml w K,

m Sihanouk, was toppled by the crime. can-supported Lon Nol regime But to merely urge the United States rch 1970. Only months after - which claims to have some influence uk's demise, the United States among Vietnamese officials who bombing raids on Cambodia in desire trade agreements - and other ampt to massacre thousands of empathetic nations to pressure ng guerrillas who found refuge Vietnam out of Cambodia is side the border. insufficient. The Vietnam-Cambodia years later, shortly after the conflict is merely a symptom of a ication of Vietnam, another problem which pervades international iment, this one with Chinese relations and for which the United t, came to power in Cambodia. States shares responsibility. By Ervand Abrahamian While much of the world watched the United States blunder into the tragedy of Vietnam, only a few foreign policy experts were aware that the U.S. was quietly but persistently making parallel mistakes in Iran. In 1953, when the popular government of Dr. Mossadeq sought American support against Britain to obtain a more equitable oil agreement, Allen Dulles of the CIA destabilized and eventually overthrew Mossadeq on the grounds that those who are not 100 per cent pro-Western must be 100 per cent pro-Soviet. After the coup, the Eisenhower administration extended economic aid to bolster the shah's military regime; purged from Washington analysts who had sympathized withgMossadeq; dispatched to Tehran FBI agents to help create SAVAK-the dreaded secret police; and encouraged the shah to outlaw all opposition parties, including those that had openly supported the U.S. Not surprisingly, popular discontent began to take shelter within the sanctuary of the religious establishment. In the early 1970s, when the oil boom quadrupled Iran's income, Nixon and Kissinger appointed the shah to be their deputy sheriff in the Persian Gulf; encouraged him to build the fifth-largest military establishment in the world; increased their praises when he inaugurated a one-party totalitarian dictatorship; and dismissed as "alarmists" those experts who warned that the regime was unpopular and unstable. The height of absurdity was reached in 1977, when on the eve of the present crisis, when the CIA informed the White House that the "shah, who firmly holds the reins of power, will preside over a peaceful and prosperous Iran for the next ten or fifteen years." But if the present crisis had exposed the extent of past mistakes and shattered myths about the regime's stability, it has also forced President Carter, his national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to reconsider this country's special relations with the Shah. In reconsidering policy, their advisers have divided into two conflicting groups which, for convenience sake, can be labelled as the "hard-liners" and the "moderates." The hard-liners, headed by William Sullivan, the ambassador in Tehran, and supported by Henry Kissinger, insist that the U.S. must continue to give full support to the shah. They claim that the shah is a dependable ally, that his army is the only viable organization in the country, that the regime is the last bulwark against Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf, that desertion by the U.S. would undermine other allies, and that the opposition is led by fanatical Muslims, foreign infiltrators, and revolutionary subversives. Although the hard-liners temper their arguments with the claim that they will encourage liberalization once law-and order has been reestablished, their policy bodes ill for Iran. In the short run, it offers the shah a blank check to repress the opposition. In the long run, it encourages the generals, most of whom have been trained in the U.S., to carry out their own brand of repression-especially if they decide, sooner or later, that the shah is a liability rather than an asset both for America and the armed forces. In short, the hard-line policy threatens to Chileanize Iran. Meanwhile, the moderates-headed by George Ball, the former undersecretary of state and now the President's temporary consultant on the Persian Gulf-argue that the shah is already a major liability for the United states; that the U.S. can help reform the dictatorship into a parliamentary democracy-as the West European states did recently in Spain, Greece and Portugal; and that the administration must energetically reestablish ties with the opposition-especially with the National. Front led by Mossadeq's surviving colleagues. In other words, the moderates want a political solution rather than a royalist-military solution, and seek a solution in the National Front rather than in the palace or in the armed forces. The debate between hard-liners and moderates, therefore, boils down to the question: What is the National Front? Is it, as the hard-liners claim, ineffective politically, weak organizationally, and suspect ideologically? Or is it, as the moderates counter, the only force capable of reestablishing peace, inaugurating a parliamentary democracy, and at the same time safeguarding America's vital interests in Iran-notably the oil supplies? Formed in 1949, the National Front is a broad coalition of moderate liberal, secular reformist and social democratic parties whose aims have remained consistent over the years. In foreign affairs, they want to pursue a more even-handed policy towards the super powers. In the early 1950s, they nationalized the British-owned oil company. Now they hope to diminish the U.S. military presence, but have no intention of either allying with the Russians or cutting off oil supplies to the West. In internal affairs, they want to implement the constitutional laws of 1905-11: to hold free elections, bring the military budget under civilian supervision, and end the monarch's personal, and thus unconstitutional, control over the armed forces. . Almost all the leading figures associated with the National Front-especially Dr. Sanjabi, Mehdi Bazargan, Alayhar Saleh, Dariush Foruhar, and Sayyid Havadi - are Western-educated professionals who respect the national and religious traditions of Iran but are neither xenophobic nor fanatical. Despite 25 years of repressions, the National Front remains the main opposition organization. In recent months it has mobilized peaceful demonstrations of over two million in Tehran and over five million in the provincial cities. It enjoys the mystique of its founder, Mossadeq, and its co-founder, Dr. Fatemi, who was martyred by the shah in 1955. It is supported not only by many experienced politicians but also by numerous young, well-trained economists, technocrats and professonials. Moreover, it has received assistance from the many independent grass root organizations that have appeared in the last 12 months -including the. Oil Workers' Strike Committee, the Writers' Association; the Jurists' Association, the Teachers' Union and the Government Employes' Syndicate as well as the many bazaar guilds. No government will be able to persuade workers to return to work unless it has the support of these independent organizations. Although the National Front is a realistic: and a pragmatic organization, it.refuses to compromise with the shah, for it has learned from bitter experience that he cannot be. trusted, especially if he retains personal control of the military. Moreover, few opposition politicians dare to cross the wide gulf of blood that now divides the country from the shah. Since the bloody massacre of September, the National Front has demanded a national referendum to decide the fate of the monarchy. With the present mood of the country, there is no doubt of the outcome. The Front, however, may settle for a regency council if the shah agrees to abdicate and leave the country. The function of such a council would be to create a genuine constitutional monarchy, and, even more importantly, to reassure the officer corps that the new government will not dismantle the army. The inability of the National Front ,to compromise with the shah is now forcing Washington to choose between, on one side, the shah and his army, and, on the other side, the Front and the country. If the hard-liners prevail, the President will soon discover to his own cost that the opposition in Iran is too widespread, too deep-seated, and too organized to be repressed. The U.S. will find in its hands not another Chile, but another Vietnam. Ervand Abrahamian is associate professor of history at Baruch College of the City University of New York. He writes frequently on Mideast affairs for Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) reports and other publications. Z M 10TEWC--aiT AW c-Cr ' C i . Hp p F IS SWUR -MID 'CS ' iCN5 m'l PvNm -rT P co0 IHTXO air c'zosE. I" U 0/6 T Editorials which appear without a by-line represent a con- sensus opinion of the Daily's editorial board. All other editorials, as well as cartoons, are the opinions of the individuals who sub-, mit them. An open letter to University students l e + lltcl igttn ttil SPORTSSTAFF There has been a great deal of controversy and' misunderstanding concerning the question of the role taken by LS&A Student Government (LSA- SG) in the December 19 lecture by Yi:gal Allon at Rackham Amphitheatre. That LSA-SG was listed as a supporter of activities organized by a coalition of student groups in protest of Allon's appearance should be clarified: 1) LSA-SG does not condone disruption of speakers or educational forums in any instance, including that which took place during Allon's speech; 2) LSA-SG is in no position to understanding of the role of the University through its ties to corporations and government agencies in foreign policy relating to the Middle East, and the implications of this relationship to the perspectives presented in classrooms and University-sponsored forums; 4) In its support of the coalition activities, LSA-SG Asserts its traditional position that the University has no responsibility to provide broad informational and educational perspectives in the service of human rights. The relationship that exists between the University, corporations, and government consuming task for any group. For those organizations that have unpopular opinions, the task is yet more problematic, in that their bases of support are limited, and their ideas are often. given little credibility. LSA-SG has a long history of supporting a free exchange of ideas, both popular and unpopular, and consequently faces many risks. LSA-SG has pursued a strategy of activism in spite of the traditional role of student governments as mechanisms by which the administration may impose its policies on students. In attempting to go beyond the usual minutes and meetings of student SG has been wrongly identified with the disruptive, opportunistic tactics which surfaced at the Allon lecture activities which LSA-SG does not in any way support or justify. LSA-SG has discussed these questions at great length and formulated procedures by which these misunderstandings may be avoided in the future. We appreciate the concerns expressed to us by many students and hope to promote and continue an educational, constructive dialogue on these issues. LSA-SG has arranged a meeting for further discussion and comments on Sundav. EDITORIAL STAFF Editors-in-chief DAVID GOODMAN GREGG KRUPA Managing Editor M. EILEEN DALEY Editorial Director BOB MILLER ................................... Sports Editor PAUL CAMPBELL .................... Executive Sports Editor ERNIE DUNBAR ..................... Executive Sports Editor HENRY ENGELHARDT .............. Executive Sports Editor RICK MADDOCK ..................... Executive Sports Editor CUB SCHWARTZ ..................... Executive Sports Editor BUSINESS STAFF NANCY GRAU ............................. Business Manager nVmTQw r_11.ARnnwF . Sales Manager