i

Glymirtigan Biy
Seventy-Sixth Year
EDITED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS

McNamara: Achieving World Peace

= 77;4

Where Opinions Are Free, 420 MAYNARD ST., ANN ARBOR, MicH.
Truth Will Prevail

NEWS PHONE: 764-0552

Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the inidividual opinions of staff writers
or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints.

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1966

NIGHT EDITOR: MEREDITH EIKER

James Meredith: The Headlines
Come Haunting Again

HE LAST THING James H. Meredith
wanted was publicity. He never looked
upon himself as a hero or martyr-he
just wanted to get a good education in
Mississippi, and he felt he had the right
to get it.
He never wished to be directly associat-
ed with any particular group in the fight
for integration. He merely wanted to see
Negroes get the rights that they should
have as citizens, and he insisted on going
about it in his own quiet way.
(WASHINGTON, Sept. 18, 1962 ( -
James H. Meredith, a 29-year-old Negro
seeking admittance to the all-white Uni-
versity of Mississippi, will be protected by
federal marshals when he enrolls some-
time this week, the Justice Department
announced last night.)
HE DID NOT even hate the men who
would deny him his rights. Speaking
on the Dearborn campus three years
ago, he emphasized that, in his opinion,
Governors Ross Barnett and George Wal-
lace were, "real people-not crazy peo-
ple." The problem, he said, was that they
had grown up under white supremacy.
(JACKSON, Sept. 19 (-The Missis-
sippi Legislature adopted a resolution
commending Governor Ross Barnett for
his opposition to integrating the univer-
sity and unsigned pamphlets were drop-
ped around university dormitories. Bar-
nett called last week for defiance of any
federal court school desegregation order
and called on all officials unwilling to go
to jail to resign if necessary.)
Perhaps his greatest asset was the
patience, often .tested to its limits, with
which he accepted the frustrations of
those first days at Mississippi. One would
expect that he would "learn better," that
he would pick up some hatred along the
way. If he did, it did not show then.
INDEED, the often tense, worried-look-
ing face of James Meredith among the
calmer hard faces of the contending
forces in the news pictures was the only
indication of whatever anxiety he might
have felt. There were no speeches or emo-
tional declarations of solidarity. In the
midst of the grimmer confrontations and
gestures of support or condemnation, he
seemed to be looking the other way, to-
ward some personal vision,
(JACKSON, Miss., Sept. 26 )WR-Gov.
Ross Barnett defied federal court orders
for the second time yesterday and refused
to allow Negro James H. Meredith to en-
roll at the University of Mississippi. A
source close to Barnett said the governor
would also go to Oxford today and would
again block Meredith's attempt to end 114
years of segregation at the University of
Mississippi.
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Published daily Tuesday through Saturday morning.

(Ole Miss Registrar Robert B. Ellis said
in Jackson that he would return to Ox-
ford and would accept Meredith under
orders from the State College Board if
Meredith appears.)
MIEREDITH DID TAKE one legacy with
him when he left the University of
Mississippi - bitterness, unspoken, quiet
bitterness that once prompted him to take
his family to Africa to do further study,
rather than remain in the United States.
Some of his comments at this time took on
more of an edge, yet he insisted that his
decision was based merely on interest in
new surroundings.
(WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 (-President
John F. Kennedy early this morning
placed the Mississippi National Guard un-
der federal control to provide whatever
enforcement measures are necessary to
carry out desegregation at the University
of Mississippi.
(He ordered Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara "to remove all obstructions to
justice in the state of Mississippi.")
FINALLY, in the last two years, Mere-
dith seemed to have achieved the ob-
scurity that he desired. He had become a
name that might someday be included in
history books but for the time being he
was only the one mentioned in passing
in articles on the course of integration
in the last few years. Meredith himself
started quietly to do work in various
civil rights activities such as voter reg-
istration.
(OXFORD, Miss., Oct. 2 (2i-Hordes of
combat-ready troops clamped rigid con-
trol on this seething Southern town last
night after James H. Meredith ended
segregation at the University of Missis-
sippi.
(Bent on' smothering continuing riots
which took two lives Sunday night and
led to yesterday's arrest of former Maj.
Gen. Edwin A. Walker, helmeted troops
patrolled with loaded rifles and fixed bay-
onets.)
As part of his work to encourage Ne-
gro voter registration, Meredith and a
small band of followers set out last Sun-
day from Memphis, Tenn., to march 225
miles to Jackson, Miss. At the outset of
the march Meredith told newsmen, "There
are two purposes for this trip. First, we
want to tear down the fear that grips Ne-
groes in Mississippi, and we want to en-
courage the 450,000 Negroes remaining
unregistered in Mississippi.
"Nothing can be more enslaving than
fear. We've got to root this out."
(HERNANDO, MISS., June 6, 1966 IAA -
James H. Meredith, who set out to
show Mississippi Negroes they have noth-
ing to fear, was shot from ambush Mon-
day as he walked along a highway.)
In Mississippi publicity, among other
things, is hard to avoid.
-CHARLOTTE A. WOLTER
Co-Editor

Address by Robert S. Mc-
Namara, secretary of defense,
before American Society of
Newspaper Editors, Jueen Eliza-
beth Hotel, Montreal, Canada,
May 18, 1966.
First in a two-part series
ANY AMERICAN would be for-
tunate to visit this lovely is-
land city, in this hospitable land,
But there is a special satisfac-
tion for a Secretaryof Defense to
cross the longest border in the
world-and realize that it is also
the least armed border in the
world. It prompts one to reflect
how negative and narrow a no-
tion of defense still clouds our
century.
THERE IS STILL among us an
almost ineradicable tendency to
think of our security problem as
being exclusively a military prob-
lem-and to think of the military
problem as being exclusively a
weapons-system or hardware prob-
lem.
The plain, blunt truth is that
contemporary man still conceives
of war and peace in much the
same stereotyped terms that his
ancestors did. The fact that these
ancestors-both recent and re-
mote-were conspicuously unsuc-
cessful at avoiding war, and en-
larging peace, doesn't seem to
dampen our capacity for cliches.
We still tend to conceive of na-
tional security almost solely as a
state of armed readiness: a vast,
awesome arsenal of weaponry. We
still tend to assume that it is
primarily this purely military in-
gredient that creates security. We
are still haunted by this concept
of military hardware.
BUT HOW LIMITED a concept
this actually is, becomes apparent
when one ponders the kind of
peace that exists between the
United States and Canada.
It is a very cogent example.
Here we are, two modern nations:-
highly developed technologically,
each with immense territory, both
enriched with great reserves of
natural resources, each militarily
sophisticated-and yet, we sit
across from one another, divided
by an unguarded frontier of thou-
sands of miles . . . and there is
not a remotest set of circum-
stances, in any imaginable time-
frame of the future, in which our
two nations would wage war on
one another.
It is so unthinkable an idea as
to be totally absurd. But why is
that so?
IS IT BECAUSE we are both
ready in an instant to hurl our
military hardware at one another?
Is it because we are both zeroed
in on one another's vital targets?
Is it because we are both armed
to our technological teeth that we
do not go to war? The whole no-
tion-as applied to our two coun-
tries-is ludicrous.
Canada and the United States
are at peace for reasons that have
nothing whatever to do with our
mutual military readiness. We are
at peace-truly at peace-because
of the vast fund of compatible
beliefs, common principles, and
shared ideals. We have our dif-
ferences and our diversity-and
let us hope for the sake of a
mutually rewarding relationship
we never become sterile carbon
copies of one another. But the
whole point is that our basis of
mutual peace has nothing what-
ever to do with our military hard-
ware.
Now this is not to say, obviously
enough, that the concept of mili-
tary deterrence is no longer rele-
vant in the contemporary world.
Unhappily, it still is critically rele-
vant with respect to our potential
adversaries. But it has no rele-
vance whatever between the Unit-
ed States and Canada.
We are not adversaries. We are

not going to become adversaries.

And it is not mutual military de-
terrence that keeps us from be-
coming adversaries. It is mutual
respect for common principles.
NOW I MENTION this-as ob-
vious as it all it-simply as a kind
of reductio ad absurdum of the
concept that military hardware is
the exclusive or even the primary
ingredient of permanent peace in
the mid-twentieth century,
In the United States-over the
past five years-we have achieved
a considerably improved balance
in our total military posture. That
was the mandate I received from
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson;
and with their support, and that
of the Congress, we have been able
to create a strengthened force
structure of land, sea, and air
components-with a vast increase
in mobility and material - and
with a massive superiority in nuc-
lear retaliatory power over any
combination of potential adver-
saries.
Our capabilities for nuclear,
conventional, and counter-subver-
sive war have all been broadened
and improved; and we have ac-
complished this through military
budgets that were in fact lesser
percentages of our gross national
product than in the past.
FROM THE point of view of
combat readiness, the United
States has never been militarily
stronger. We intend to maintain
that readiness. But if we think
profoundly about the matter, it
is clear that this purely military
posture is not the central ele-
ment in our security, A nation
can reach the point at which it
does not buy more security for it-
self simply by buying more mil-
itary hardware - we are at that
point.
The decisive factor for a pow-
erful nation - already adequately
armed is the character of its re-
lationships with the world.
In this respect, there are three
broad groups of nations: first,
those that are struggling to de-
velop; secondly, those free nations
that have reached a level of
strength and prosperity that en-
ables them to contribute to the
peace of the world; and finally,
those nations who might be
tempted to make themselves our
adversaries. For each of these
groups, the United States-to pre-
serve its own intrinsic security-
has to have distinctive sets of
relationships.
FIRST, WE have to help protect
those developing countries which
genuinely need and request our
help, and which-as an essential
precondition-are willing and able
to help themselves.
Second, we have to encourage
and achieve a more effective part-
nership with those nations who
can and should share international
peace-keeping responsibilities.
Third, we must do all we real-
istically can to reduce the risk of
conflict with those who might be
tempted to take up arms against
us.
Let us examine these three sets
of relationships in detail. First,
the developing nations.
ROUGHLY 100 countries today
are caught up in the difficult
transition from traditional to
modern societies. There is no un-
iform rate of progress among
them, and they range from prim-
itive mosaic societies - fractured
by tribalism and held feebly to-
gether by the slenderest of politi-
cal sinews-to relatively sophis-
ticated countries, well on the road
to agricultural sufficiency and in-
dustrial competence.
This sweeping surge of develop-
ment, particularly across the whole
southern half of the globe, has no
parallel in history. It has turned
traditionally listless areas of the
world into seething cauldrons of
change.
On the whole, it has not been

a very peaceful process. In the

last eight years alone there have
been no less than 164 interna-
tionally significant outbreaks of
violence-each of them specifically
designed as a serious challenge to
the authority, or the very exist-
ence, of the government in ques-
tion. 82 different governments
have been directly involved.
What is striking is that only 15
of these 164 significant resorts to
violence have been military con-
flicts between two states. And not
a single one of the 164 conflicts
has been a formally-declared war,
Indeed, there has not been a for-
mal declaration of war-anywhere
in the world-since World War II.
THE PLANET IS becoming a
more dangerous place to live on
-not merely because of a poten-
tial nuclearholocaust-but also
because of the large number of
de facto conflicts and because the
trend of such conflicts is growing
rather than diminishing.
At the beginning of 1958, there
were 23 prolonged insurgencies
going on about the world. As of
February 1, 1966, there were 40.
Further, the total number of out-
breaks of violence has increased
each year: in 1958, there were 34;
in 1965, there were 58. But what
is most significant of all is that
there is a direct and constant re-
lationship between the incidence
of violence and the economic sta-
tus of the countries afflicted.
THE WORLD BANK divides na-
income, into four categories: rich,
tions, on the basis of per capita
middle-income, poor, and very
poor.
The rich nations are those with
a per capita income of $750 per
year or more. The current U.S.
level is more than $2700. There
are 27 of these rich nations. They
possess 75 per cent of the world's
wealth, though roughly only 25
per cent of the world's population.
Since 1958, only one of these 27
nations has suffered a major in-
ternal upheaval on its own terri-
tory.
But observe what happens at
the other end of the economic
scale. Among the 38 very poor
nations-those with a per capita
income of under $100 a year-no
less than 32 have suffered signi-
ficant conflicts. Indeed, they
have suffered an average of two
major outbreaks of violence per
country in the eight year period.
That is a great deal of conflict.
What is worse, it has been, pre-
dominantly conflict of a prolong-
ed nature.
The trend holds predictably con-
stant in the case of the. two oth-
er categories: the poor, and the
middle-income nations. Since 19-
58, 87 per cent of the very poor
nations, 69 per cent of the poor
nations, and 48 per cent of the
middle-income nations have suf-
fered serious violence.
There can, then, be no ques-
tion but that there .is an irrefut-
able relationship between violence
and economic backwardness. And
the trend of such violence is up,
not down.
NOW, IT WOULD perhaps be
somewhat reassuring if the gap
between the rich nations and the
poor nations were closing; and
economic backwardness were sig-
nificantly receding. But it is not.
The economic gap is widening.
By the year 1970, over one
half of the world's population
will live in the independent na-
tions sweeping across the south-
ern half of the planet. But this
hungering half of the human
race will by then command only
one-sixth of the world's total of
goods and services. By the year
1975, the dependent children of
these nations alone-children un-
der 15 years of age-will equal
the total population of the devel-
oped nations to the north.
Even in our own abundant so-

cieties, we have reason enough to

worry over the tensions that coil
and tighten among underprivileg-
ed young people, and finally flail
out in delinquency and crime.
What are we to expect from a
whole hemisphere of youth where
mounting frustrations are likely
to fester into eruptions of vio-
lence and extremism?
ANNUAL PER CAPITA income
in roughly half of the 80 under-
developed nations that are mem-
bers of the World Bank is rising
by a paltry one per cent a year or
less. By the end of the century,
these nations-at their present
rates of growth-will reach a per
capita income of barely $170 a
year. The United States, by the
same criteria, will attain a per
capita income of $4,500.
The conclusion to all of this is
blunt and inescapable: given the
certain connection between econo-
mic stagnation and the incidence
of violence, the years that lie
ahead for the nations of the
southern half of the globe are
pregnant with violence, This
would be true even if no threat
of Communist subversion existed
as it clearly does.
Both Moscow and Peking -
however harsh their internal dif-
ferences - regard the whole mo-
dernization process as an ideal
environment for the growth of
communism. Their experience
with subversive internal war is
extensive; and they have devel-
oped a considerable array of both
doctrine and practical measures
in the art of political violence.
What is often misunderstood is
that communists are capable of
subverting, manipulating, and fi-
nally directing for their own ends
the wholly legitimate grievances
of a developing society.
BUT IT WOULD be a gross
oversimplification to regard com-
munism as the central factor in
every conflict throughout the un-
derdeveloped world. Of the 149
serious internal insurgencies in
the past eight years, communists
have been involved in only 58 of
them-38 per cent of the total-
and this includes seven instances
in which a Communist regime it-
self was the target of the uprising.
Whether communists are invol-
ved or not, violence anywhere in
a taut world transmits sharp sig-
nals through the complex ganglia
of international relations; and
the security of the United States
is related to the security and sta-
bility of nations half a globe
away.
But neither conscience nor san-
ity itself suggests that the United
States is, should, or could be the
Global Gendarme.
QUITE THE CONTRARY, ex-
perience confirms what human
nature suggests that in most in-
stances of internal violence, the
local people themselves are best
able to deal directly with the sit-
uation within the framework of
their own traditions.
The United States has no man-
date from on high to police the
world, and no inclination to do so.
There have been classic cases in
which our deliberate non-action
was the wisest action of all. Where
our help is not sought, it is sel-
dom prudent to volunteer.
Certainly we have no charter to
rescue floundering regimes,. who
have brought violence on themsel-
ves by deliberately refusing to
meet the legitimate expectations
of their citizenry. Further,
throughout the next decade ad-
vancing technology will reduce
the requirement for bases and
staging rights at particular loca-
tions abroad, and the whole pat-
tern of forward development will
gradually change.
BUT-THOUGH all these ca-
veats are clear enough-the irre-
ducible fact remains that our se-

curity is related directly to the

security of the newly developing
world. And our role must be pre-
cisely this: to help provide secur-
ity to those developing nations
which genuinely need and request
our help, and which demonstrably
are willing and able to help them-
selve.
THE RUB COMES in this: we
do not always grasp the meaning
of the word security in this con-
text. In a modernizing society,
security means development.
Security is not military hard-
ware-though it may include it.
Security is not military force -
though it may involve it. Security
is not traditional military activity
- though it may encompass it.
Security is development. Without
development, there .can be no se-
curity.


A DEVELOPING nation that
does not in fact develop simply
cannot remain "secure." It can-
not remain secure for the intract-
able reason that its own citizenry
cannot shed its human nature."V
If security implies anything, it
implies a minimal measure of or-
der and stability. Without internal
development of at least a mini-
mal degree, order and stability are
simply not possible. They are not
possible because human, nature
cannot be frustrated beyond in-
trinsic limits. It reacts-because it
must.
Now, that is what we do not al-
ways understand; and that is also
what governments of modernizing
nations do not always understand.
But by emphasizing that security
arises from development, I do not
say that an underdeveloped na-
tion cannot be subverted from
within; or be aggressed upon from
without; or be the victim of a
combination of the two. It can.
And to prevent any or all of these
conditions, a nation does require
appropriate military capabilities to
deal with the specific problem.
But the specific military problem
is only a narrow facet of the
broader security problem.
MILITARY FORCE can help
provide law and order-but only
to the degree that a basis for law
and order already exists in the
developing society; a basic will-
ingness on the part of the people
to cooperate. The law and order
is a shield; behind which the cen-
tal fact of security-development
-can be achieved.
Now we are not playing a se-
mantic game with these words.
The trouble is that we have been
lost in a semantic jungle for too
long. We have come to identify
"security" with exclusively mili-
tary phenomena; and most par-
ticularly with military hardware.
But it just isn't so. And we need
to accommodate to the facts of
the matter if we want to see
security survive and grow in the
southern half of the globe.

DEVELOPMENT means econo-
mic, social, and political progress.
It means a reasonable standard of
living-and the word "reasonable"
in this context requires continu-
al redefinition. What is "reason-
able" in an earlier stage of de-
velopment will become "unreas-
onable" in a later stage.
As development progresses, se-
curity progresses; and when the
people of a nation have organiz-
ed their own human and natural
resources to provide themselves
.with what they need and expect
out of life-and have learned to
compromise peacefully among
competing demands in the larger
national interest-then, their re-
sistance to disorder and violence
will be enormously increased.
Conversely, the tragic need of
desperate men to resort to force
to achieve the inner imperatives
of human decency will diminish.

li I

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I

Tomorrow: Measures for
Development

Time Running Out for Non-Military Space

By DAVID KNOKE
FfHE MILITARIZATION of out-
er space, wrote Bertrand Rus-
sell, would be "a kind of impiety'";
we should not defile the heavens
with our squabbles: to do so would
be tomregress from Copernicus to
Ptolemy.
It has been almost a decade
since President Eisenhower in his
State of the Union address de-
clared his willingness to enter in-
to agreement to "mutually con-
trol the outer space and satellite
development". During the last
month, both the President and
the Soviet Union issued a call for
treaties internationalizing the
moon and other celestial bodies
and banning them from use for
military purposes.
BOTH PROPOSALS contained
almost identical four points. Three
of these dealt with international-
ization, disclaimers of sovereign-
ty and the sharing of scientific
knowledge gained from explora-

troduction of the arms race into
a new media and to regulate the
exploitation of space under the
rule of law has been recognized
for a long time. The willingness
of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to
disclaim sovereignty of the moon
and to prevent the spread of nu-
clear weapons to outer space may
prove to be either the greatest
achievement of international law
or the gravest turn in the arma-
ments race.
The precedent of internationali-
zation exists today in Antarctica,
on the high seas and under UN
trusteeship territories. The vistas
of voluntary arms control have
been opened up by the nuclear
test-ban treaty. The problems of
inspection and enforcement in the
absence of an empowered inter-
national body will leave the outer-
space dilemma to be worked out
by mutual willingness to comply.
WITH THE 1970 deadline for
landing a man on the moon ap-

detriment of domestic problems.
The United States has already
emmitted itself to a $20 billion
program to place a man upon the
moon by 1970. To assert that the
military does not benefit from
being privy to the technology de-
veloped during this race would be
an absurdity; indeed, the military
aspects of space conquest may be
a major reason for priority now
given this "non-military" project
over crying domestic social wants.
A workable treaty to limit the
military uses of space could do
much to ease the drift toward
these situations.
THE MILITARY strategy of the
nuclear cold war era should prove
the concept of "deterrance" and
"ultimate detertance" upon which
the national defense has been fix-
ated will likely want to exploit this
field to its own uses as it has done
with education, civilian defense
and currently the clamor for anti-
missile missile systems.

has become the ultimate threat.
The possibility of breaking up
the first wave of attack with anti-
missile systems now puts military
strategists in the position of op-
ening up a secondary line of de-
terance to offset such a stalemate.
Into this ever-spiraling, never
ending vista of ultimate deterran-
ces, there are strong attractions
for stationing weapons of mass
destruction on celestial bodies. A
rocket base upon the moon would,
in theory, mean that the enemy
must launch a synchronized all-
out attack to knock out all bases
before the adversary can retalite.
BUT THESE ARE not the only
problems confronting a treaty
banning military use of space. The
legal aspect of air space has nev-
er been cleared before an interna-
tional body of law, resulting in
some absurdities that claim sover-
eign jurisdiction over anything
that passes through a nation's
airspace, no matter how high up.

The problem of inspection could
styrmie any treaty efforts in a
manner similar to the inspection
of underground nuclear tests. The
pinpointing and identification of
origins of launched satellites can
easily be done by any country pos-
sessing the necessary hardware.
But the identification of contents
can be carried on only on the
ground by expensive, trained in-
spection teams. The enforcement
of penalties for violations and the
provocations caused by violations
are unpredictable but very real
problems.

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THE ADVANTAGES of an Un-
militarized outer space are much
simpler and less expensive and
dangerous than its alternative.
The deadlock of power politics
thinking has diminished the
chances of achieving such a goal,
however. One hopeful sign in the
spring air is the abandonment of
the Soviet's claims that disarm-
ament of overseas terrestial mili-
tary bases must accompany such #