SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1966 THE MICHIGAN DAILY PAGE T8 N SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1966 THE MICHIGAN DAILY PAGE THREE sian llies '0 Meet in Manila Six Nations To Gather at 'Viet Parley Johnson Flies To Philippines from Tour of Australia By WILLIAM L. RYAN Associated Press special Correspondent * * * * * * * * * * * * Roa tolanila:Historyof Vietlnvolvement EDITOR'S NOTE - The Manila conference convenes tomorrow to survey the situation in Viet Nam and the prospects for peace in a war that is really two wars. Be- sides the tactical problems the sev- en nations' leaders must consider the dilemmas that lie beyond mili- tary victory--the way to insure real MANILA (P)--Public excitement peace in a program centerinh heightened in this hot and humid the process called pacification. V are the factors this meetingr capital today on the eve of the consider? 'What is allied strat Manila summit conference on Viet Where are the gains and failu Nam which President Johnson, answ athee ths cothereabout flying in from a triumphal tour of on the eve of Manila, the Asso Australia, will attend. ed Press called upon a dozen Johnson meets tomorrow with Npeiand crespondentsitrace the heads of six other nations war's background, to show ho fighting the Communists in Viet is going today, and to discuss Nam in deliberations affecting the future of peace in Southeast Asia futreofperacte i SueastAsiaA llied world. Johnson had no public ap- pearances on his schedule afterI the welcoming ceremonies for his midafternoon arrival. Public Excitement MANILA OP)-What is th g on What must Iegy? ures? ; To ions ciat- ex- Viet the ow it the outlook. Their report is based on your government can serve to as- the best available information, in- Viet Nam in its present hour cluding front-line observation and ss reports from hundreds of official of trial." and unofficial sources. A handful of American military By The Associated Press men proceeded to Saigon as mem- One October day in 1954 Pres- bers of the training mission to ident Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote help the new country's army get tfb the little-known and little- into fighting trim. understood premier of an equally They were the first American little-known and little-understood advisers sent to a land smaller in country: area than Missouri, but entangled "I am, accordingly, instructing in political, military and economic the American ambassador to Viet chaos that grew and grew until Nam to examine with you in your it shook the world. capacity as chief of government, Those first steps, taken at a how an intelligent program of time when America was caught up American aid given directly to in an off-year election and con- cern over the cold war, aroused little attention. It is doubtful that any of the drama's future stars-Commu- nist and non-Communist alike- could foresee that in 12 years a motley collection of rice paddies,' jungle, mangrove swamps and mountains would be regarded as the gravest danger of touching off World War III. Government planners hardly could foresee that the few million dollars authorized by Eisenhower would grow to a cost of $12-24 bil- lion a year. Eisenhower's letter was to a coldly intellectual product of Asia's ancient and vanishhig Man- darin background - Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem, a Catholic in a predom- inantly Buddhist country, rose to power almost by default in the months that followed the French defeat at Lien Bien Phu and the Geneva convention that was sup- posed to bring peace to Indochina. Dien originally won American backing simply because he was considered the only pro-Western, anti-Communist strong man on the scene. North Viet Nam, above the 17th Parallel cease-fire line set down at Geneva, was under the grip of Ho Chi Minh, Communist chief of the revolt which crushed French colonialism in Asia. As U.S. officials saw it, an un- aided South Viet Nam could not survive as a free, non-Communist nation. By 1961, the threat of Commu- nist insurgency in the country- side was mounting rapidly. Diem's army lacked expertise or heart to crush or even blunt the maraud- ing bands of Viet Cong. President John F. Kennedy or- Conferenl out- In Viet Nam, each side seems to e dered "100 of America's toughest jungle fighters" to Viet Nam as advisers. They were to accompany ce: te wardPea e9OVietnamese units into the field e: StepTowardPeacerather than simply offer advice at headquarters. More combat advisers followed The optimists argument goes optimists say, the Communist They feel that the results of and then obsolete fighters and is way: cause will toboggan to oblivion. the U.S. election Nov. 8 will shock bombers were added. Helicopter As the allied offensive builds The chances for peace, the op- Hanoi into a reassessment of its units were sent to give the Viet- P, forcing the enemy troops ever ti mists believe, are good as soon stand. This in turn might clear namese army mobility. Nothing eeper into the jungle mountains as Hanoi becomes convinced that away the Soviet opposition and worked and the insurgency swell- nd swamps, the military threat the United States, unlike France, open up the way for a new Geneva ed. ay siniple fade away as it did has the determination and power peace conference. By mid-1963, there were 14,000, afore British arms in Malaya. to get its way. Pessimists Believe Americans in Viet Nam, but Much of the public excitement seems to stem from a feeling of pride that the Philippines had been chosen for such important proceedings. Officials eased the perils of Ma- nila's traffic-clogged streets for conference participants. Traffic, including the thousands of multi- colored "jeepney" buses, fashioned from World War II vintage vehi- cles, as being routed away from main roads used by the visiting dignitaries. Advance teams of diplomats of the seven nations labored at pre- liminary spadework for the offi- cial opening of the conference in an atmosphere of agreement on fundamentals. But there were pints of misgivings on the part of some and shades of difference in the approach to peace in Viet Nam. Conference of High Power It was shaping up as a confer- ence of high power and low ex- .~pectations. One high-ranking delegate after another went out of his way to emphasize that this was a confer- ence concerning peace but also to caution that no miracles should be expected.of the meeting. But the conference also will be 14 the starting point of a new and determined U.S. peace drive, back- ed by the allies participating at Manila--South Viet Nam, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. Immediately after the confer- ence, U.S. Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman and William P. Bundy, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, will take off on journeys to at least nine Asian and European nations. They will report to those countries on the sessions here and listened to their views on what might be done next to bring peace and security to this part of the world. U.S. spokesman, from Secretary of State Dean Rusk down, vow that the aim .of the conference is to find some way out of the Viet Nam conflict. But they keep to a rather minor key, stressing that it takes two sides to make peace and that there has been little response from the Communist side to peace approaches. This stress on "some way" to peace appears to have engendered vague misgivings on the part of some of the participants. They ap- pear to wonder whether President Johnson is so eager for peace that he might accept a settlement on terms short of clear-cut victory. There are hints of this attitude from the delegations of Thailand, South Viet Nam and South Korea. Peace of Escalation South Korean Foreign Minister Tom Won Lee told reporters North Viet Nam must choose between negotiations toward peace or es- calation of the war. Something similar came from the South Viet- namese. Tai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said the conference should be dedicated to a just and equitable peace but one which would ensure the freedom of Asian people and insure the rights of South Viet Nam and other states who feel menaced by Communist aggression or subversion. To the readers and admirers of Atlas Shrugged & The Fountainhead Nathaniel Branden's recorded lectures on Objectivism the philosophy of AYN RAND and its application to psycholo. Begin Mon., Oct. 24, 8 P.M. 14 Ann Arbor Federal look, and what are the chances believe that it is fighting a war'th for peace? Obviously no answer to of attrition that will force the that can be as simple as the ques enemy to quit. Iu tion The conference to open here;de tomorrow may be the telling fac- Realism probably lies some- an tor. where between the views of those m Aside from the moral suasion who, for want of a better descrip- be that Secretary-General U Thant tion, may be called "optimists" has tried to offer, the United Na- and pessimists."er tions has shown no effective and Optimists on the allied side 'at sure route to the peace table. The both in Saigon and Washington pe United Nations is supposed to help believe North Viet Nam must real- te insure world security, but it is ize it has no hope of victory an not powerful enough to act in a against American firepower and ' situation that lines up two major troops. The belief is that Ho Chi vi powers-the United States and Minh dare not see his best unitsan the Soviet; Union-on opposite continue to be destroyed by bomb, thi sides. bullet, disease and low morale. be With an apparently stable gov-" 'nment in Saigon moving toward least limited popular rule, the easants will realize their in- rests will be served best by the nti-Communist side. The enemy must realize that ctory in the field is impossible nd that American troops are ere to stay. Once the allied side gins gathe.ring momentum, the They argue that as China in- creasingly isolates itself from the outside world, including the Com- munist bloc, a U.S. peace offensive will bear fruit. Their argument also includes the view that Hanoi has grossly misread student and other war protest movements in the United States as representing the na- tion's mood. WietNam Wary of PerpetualWr SAIGON (P1)-If the war is going better from the allied viewpoint,+ what is the mood of South Viet Nam itself? The single overwhelming emo- tion among South Vietnamese is{ one of wariness with fighting' which has washed across the na- tion nearly without letup since World War II. As far as can be' judged, much of the population- possibly a majority-is indiffer- ent to who holds Saigon if only. the fighting, the bombing, the ar- tillery would stop. About 80 per cent of Viet Nam's population are villagers. For two decades they have seen their sons and fathers lured or forced into uniform by one side or the other.- Both sides have lied to them, gone back on promises and levied heavy taxes. Neither appears will- ing to let them raise rice and babies undisturbed. An American political expert, once said-only half in jest-that, in unregulated, honest electionsa the Viet Cong would win in the government areas and the govern-, Ment in Communist-held sectors. But elections, democracy, com- munism and other such terms are Vietnamese, ruled by emperors, practically indefinable to most Vietnamese, ruled by emperors,j French colonial regimes, the Jap-; anese, and then civil and military, dictators. South Vietnamese have no heritage in either of the two major conflicting ideologies vy- ing in their country., The Sept. 11 elections, hailed as a government victory in both Sai-; gon and Washington, brought to- gether 117 politicians to form a Constituent Assembly. Their job is to draw up a constitution and open the way for more elections1 to form a democratic government. So far the assembly has madeS little progress. The election was; not a clearcut test of democracy vs. communism.1 Traditionally monolithic, the Communist movement can more or less speak with one voice, But on the other side, what little con- cept of democracy that was lef over from the French among the educated elite has brought out di- visiveness of the sort that plagued French governments before De- Gaulle. Whatever the outcome of moves toward a popular government, powerful currents growing out of ancient pressures and prejudices flow through the land. There are sharp antagonisms be- tween South, Central and North Vietnamese who live in South Viet Nam. More than 600,000 Northern- ers came to the South following the Geneva convention and many, such as Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, have risen to authority. The Buddhist movement is deep- ly divided within itself except on one issue-fear and animosity to- ward Roman Catholics. One mil- lion mountain tribesmen - the Montagnards-are cadlled "moi" or savages by the lowland Viet- namese, and discrimination is sharp. Since the Diem dictatorship fell it has become evident that no re- gime can survive without support from key niilitary factions, them- selves often engaged in political warfare at the expense of the war against the Communists. Premier Ky, who runs the air force, appears stronger than at any time in his 15-month rule. He put down dissidents in the army and faced down Buddhist leaders who kept the government in tur- moil for nearly a year and a half. Runaway inflation has been stemmed, American sources say, but perhaps - temporarily. The government has yet to show itself capable of dealing with black marketing, war profiteering, cor- ruption within its own ranks and bottlenecks that have kept many Vietnamese who might support the government from enjoying a share of $600 million worth of American aid now being spent annually. Until President Johnson met with Premier Ky at Honolulu in February, critics of the war said too much emphasis was being laid on the shooting war and too little in the vital sector of pacification, the struggle for loyalty in the countryside. Johnson and Ky agreed that this area required more attention urgently. But willingness and cash so far have not meant much pro- gress. An axiom of the Viet Nam con- flict is that it is largely a politi- cal war. Even with a military vic- tory, the struggle could go to the Communists unless a viable gov- ernment reaches out into the countryside to win over the people. The program has gone through several evolutions, but basic stra- tegy remains the same. Regular troops launch opera- tions to clear a given area and se- cure it long enough for militia- men to take over. The government meanwhile sends in propaganda teams, police, administrators, tea- chers and medics to live with the people. The regular troops then sweep another area and the process is repeated, slowly expanding the safe perimeter. Ideally, the Viet Cong would shrivel and die as their support withers, denying them new recruits, food, infor- mation and hiding places. The most important area to be pacified is the lush delta. The pro- gram there so far has been a failure. Vietnamese clearing oper- ations are carried out half-heart- edly, and political action teams sent by the government soon move back to district or province towns for safety after the regulars leave. The Viet Cong reinfiltrate. Two or more divisions of Ameri- can troops may be sent to the delta soon to provide the muscle needed for effective clearing op- erations. Unless Vietnamese troops and government cadres follow up effectively, there is scant chance of success. Government action in pacification projects involving the U.S. Marines around Da Nang gives little ground for encourage- ment. Tens of thousands of local gov- ernment officials, police and tea- chers have been assassinated by the Viet Cong. Finding 2nen and women with enough courage and dedication to replace them is not easy. Even if they can be found, the pool, of trained teachers, propa- gandists, local police and medical personnel is far too small for the massive job ahead, U.S. aid per- sonnel report. Knowledgeable U.S. sources also say indifference and corruption by province and dis- trict officials severely hamper the work. U.S. troops have won many friends by staffing civilian clinic stations with U.S. medics, by help- ing with drainage and sanitation projects and the traditional gifts of candy and chewing gum that have made the American GI fa- mous. But U.S. heavy artillery and bombers have made many enemies in villages where troops encounter opposition. On the other hand, the pes- simists believe the United States is being drawn into an ever-en- larging war that probably will end ih direct confrontation with Red China. Peking has staked its. in- ternational prestige on wars of national liberation as the true road of communism. The Chinese, the pessimists say, cannot afford to see North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong defeated because this could, mean perma- nent U.S. bases on the Asian mainland. The pessimists also argue that Hanoi's repeated rejection of U.S. peace overtures made directly and through other governments, shows it is convinced time is on its side and that a peace conference should be held only to accept the enemy's surrender. Even if the Communist side does enter into peace negotiations that halt the fighting in South Viet Nam, this view holds, the South will have to deal with a Communist political force that is the largest organized bloc in the country. Shaky Government Since peace talks would pre- sumably include removal of both American and North Vietnamese forces from the South, this could leave a shaky government and in- effective military 'to deal with a situation they have so far proved. incapable of handling. Those looking on the dark side think Hanoi will see it as a blow to Johnson's policies if his party loses a sizable block of congres- sional seats Nov. 8-even though such losses are a pattern in off- year elections. Another major theme among the pessimists is that even if there is no direct Chinese intervention in the war, and even if 750,000 American troops are committed, the job will take five- years to ac- complish. The optimists, including Premier Ky-at least publicly- say that the major -fighting and problems may be over next year. neither Waslington nor South Viet Nam was watching the war, Militant Buddhists, charging the Catholic-dominated government was discriminating against their faith, launched massive protest demonstrations that rocked the regime. When thin, shaven-head- ed monks began turning them- selves into human torches, they also burned away the last of of- ficial American support for the Diem government. Coup Topples Regime A coup by dissident generals toppled the regime. Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were killed. But the ruling clique of generals hardly had time to assume their new powers before they in turn were toppled by another coup. Political chaos became the order of the day. As the military wove its intri- cate plots and counterplots, North Viet Nam saw what it believed to be the decisive moment. Hanoi flooded the Ho Chi Minh TFrail with troops and ordered the of- fensive that was to have ended the war. By early 1965, the Communists' gamble was almost won. The U.S. mission in Saigon warned Wash- ington that only a massive com- mitment of U.S. troops could see Saigon safely into the summer. President Johnson order bri- gades and then entire divisions to Viet Nam to put out the fire. By this month the United States found itself with more regular troops committed to ,the fighting than Southt Viet Nam has-and deep in an Asian land war whose end was nowhere in sight. Caught Off Balance The commitment of American troops obviously caught the Com- munist high command of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap off. balance. His divisions continued to slash out at the Saigon government troops while avoiding the big U.S. units Months later there was a series of small ambushes and short but sharp clashes with American GIs. Then Giap's 325th Division be- gan its elaborate and bloody trap in the highlands west of Pleiku around the U.S. Special Forces camp at Plei Me. In furious fight- ing with government troops the Communists lost more than 500 men but were rewarded with see- ing troops of the untried U.S. 1st Cavalry Airmobile Division, thrown into the contest. The key to the Communist plan was to smash a sizable American unit. Maneuvering ends Days of maneuvering ended last fall in the Ia Drang Valley, an uninhabited jungle area where the first major U.S.-Communist show- down of the war was staged. The toll, 240 Americans killed in one week, still stands as a high for the war. The U.S. command estimated that up to 2,000 North Vietnamese were killed in the most ferocious display of American firepower seen in combat since Korean days. Hundreds of tons of shells and bombsdropped by jets spelled the difference. Learned from the Ia Drang Campaign One lesson was that more and better intelligence had to be gath- ered and acted on more quickly. The North Vietnamese divisions had to be hit while they were as- sembling-before they could throw the first punch. See REPORT, Page 6 V Hillel Graduate Student Committee Mixer TONIGHT at 8:30 1429 H ill Street Admission 35c III I I ASK HIM OUT to take you to the BRING-A-BUDDY MEETING FOR THE COUNCIL for Exceptional Children TUESDAY, October 25 University Elementary School Lunchroom 7:30 P.M. I I I 1 What? TWO KOSHER CORNED BEEF SANDWICHES . .' 5Il 111 -:44, - A- -:AA^- ^4- w 0 1 11 11 Il ,Q li1