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Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers
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SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1969

NIGHT EDITOR: DANIEL ZWERDLING

-4

Law School elitism:
Time for a change

The antiwar movement and how it grew

rHE BLACK Law Students Alliance de-
serves campus-wide support in its de-
mands on the Law Sclool. For too many
years the Law School has completely ig-
nored the black community. Now it acts
too slowly and too timidly in deference to
the interests of the alumni, the w h i t e
community and the faculty.,
And rather than letting the black stu-
dents assume the principle role in relat-
ing the Law School to the needs of the
black community, the faculty and admin-
istration have in the past pompously and
patronizingly assumed that role for them-
selves.
The necessity of increasing the number
of black students must be of tantamount
importance - meaningless elitest con-
siderations should be ignored. Matthew
McCauley, assistant dean for admissions,
argues that the University must compete
with Harvard and Yale for a small pool
of qualified blacks. This is nonsense. If
the University can't compete with these
schools it should obviously re-examine its
qualifications.
.JEANWHILE the Law School is patting
itself on the back for its liberalism
and generosity. Of the seventeen blacks
admitted this fall only five of them could
have been admitted under regular stand-
ards. The other twelve were special ac-
ceptances. This number could easily have
easily been thirty-five.
The regular standards, including t h e
LSAT, bear little relation to native intel-
ligence and maximum relation to one's
membership in t he white middle class.
The Law School should not compromise
with this racial bias by only admitting
some special cases. The Law School should
attempt to totally compensate for this
racial biasby ignoring LSATs and focus-
ing completely on the applicant's real po-
tential for functioning successfully in the
black community.
In this context the black law students
themselves are most capable of determin-
ing which blacks are qualified and which
aren't and should h a v e the dominant
voice in determining qualifications.
The six member student-faculty com-
mittee which considered the remainder of
the applications contained only one black
student.
And McCauley ruled out 60 of the 125
applications before they even reached the
selection committee. Apparently he was
positive those blacks couldn't cope with
the work load and should be spared the
needless suffering of trying to compete.

OBVIOUSLY some whites can effectively
evaluate the potential of black appli-
cants. But more obviously black students
who have lived in the black community
most of their lives can do it so much more
effectively.
T h e special admissions committee
should be reconstituted in compliance
with the demands of BLSA, three black
students and three faculty members in-
cluding one chosen by BLSA.
Financially, if the white alumni grow
paranoid over "reverse discrimination"
the Law School can find scholarship
funds somewhere else. Scholarship funds
for blacks will be located when the Law
School shows a real desire to reorder its
priorities in favor of racial justice rather
than physical plant facilities or faculty
benefits.
The twin problems of elitism and the
powerlessness of black students may be
at fault in the recruitment of black fac-
ulty and administrators. Theodore St. An-
toine of the faculty recruitment commit-
tee said that despite the most vigorous
efforts only three black faculty members
were approached; all three declined their
offers.
AGAIN THE LAW SCHOOL may h a v e
looked for black faculty with impec-
cable academic credentials. If that were
the case the "qualifications" should have
been lowered. Moreover, no b 1 a c k stu-
dents were on the recruitment committee.
The curriculum problem again reflects
a white elitist emphasis on churning out
qualified corporation and tax lawyers to
the exclusion of dealing with the needs
of poor and black people.
Two Law School courses dealing with
poverty law and race relations 1 a w re-
spectively were abandoned because the
professors left the Law School. Perhaps if
black faculty members had been succes-
sfully recruited those courses would still
be taught.
The BLSA has indicted the Law School
for racism, a charge which to many may
seem overly severe. But the Law School
is as racist as many other institutions in
America. Until recently the Law School
made no attempt at all to compensate for
the inevitable racial bias in its admis-
sions procedure. The faculty has appar-
ently admitted that its "fair and unbias-
ed admissions procedures" are a f a r c e
with regard to black students. But t h e
Law School must no longer nod its head
in recognition of the validity of black de-
mands. It must bend over backward to
meet them.
''HE BLSA DEMANDS entrance of a
substantial number of blacks regard-
less of their "qualifications." They aren't
prepared to wait twenty years for a suf-
ficient number of blacks to become "qual-
ified" for admission, under t h e totally
biased mechanisms of the p a s t or the
semi-biased mechanisms of the nearly
all-white special admissions committee.
Who can blame them?
-TOBE LEV

By BRUCE LEVINE
THIS WEDNESDAY, the nation will wit-
ness the largest anti-war action it has
ever seen. It will include students, workers,
businessmen, congressmen, college admin-
istrators, and professors. It will cover the
political spectrum from moderate right to,
left. It is not a phenomenon we should al-
low to pass without examination.
When John Kennedy took office in 1961,
there were about 600 U.S. troops in South
Vietnam - hangovers from the Eisenhow-
er years. The new administration regarded
the outgoing's foreign policy as ideological-
ly rigid, misguided, and "essentially mor-
alistic."
When asked to enlarge his military com-
mitment to Saigon in 1962, Kennedy was
firm. "They say it's necessary in order to
restore confidence and maintain morale,"
he confided in an aide. "But it will be just
like Berlin. The troops will march in; the
bands will play; the crowds will cheer: and
four days later everybody will have for-
gotten. Then we will be told we have to
send in more troops. It's like taking a drink.
The effect wears off, and you have to take
another."
Arthur Schlesinger relates Kennedy's
firm conviction that the war could be won
only so long as it was a Vietnamese af-
fair. "If it were ever converted into a white
man's war, we would lose as the French
had lost a decade ago."
By 1963, liberal and enlightened John
Kennedy had boosted troop levels in Viet-
nam to 16,000 - i.e., by a factor of 25. We
can examine o n e outstanding factor at
work in these years undermining J o h n
Kennedy's "hands off" resolve: his own
world view.
JUST WHAT WAS John Kennedy po-
litically? He was certainly not, on the one
hand, a reactionary. He had only contempt
for Dulles's platitudes and w a s honestly
concerned about the need for progressive
change in the world. On the other hand,
he was no radical, either.
John Kennedy felt the need for change,
but only for certain kinds achieved in cer-
tain ways. Neither reactionary nor radical,
he was instead the most prominent of the
self-styled pragmatists, the "tough-mind-
ed" liberals.
As a sympathetic man, he favored re-
forms. But more pragmatically, he s a w
their utility - they could help defuse rev-
lutionary movements in the world.
And as a pragmatist, Kennedy was pre-
pared for contingencies. Specifically, if re-
formism failed, he had other tools at hand
- one of them being the stick. He said as
much to Schlesinger in planning L a t i n
America's future:
"There are three possibilities in de-
scending order of preference: a decent
democratic regime, a continuation of
the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime.
We ought to aim at the first, but we
really can't renounce the second until
we are sure that we can avoid the
third."
When forced to choose between right-
wing reaction and leftist revolution, Ken-
nedy chose the former. Nor was this the
President's private quirk. On the contrary,

it is the tried-and-true standard of twen-
tieth century liberalism. A n d it is quite
logical if you accept its assumptions:
First, contemporary American society is
seen as the pinnacle of human civilization
and the principle source for further pro-
gress. The foundation of tlh is society is
capitalism. While one w o u l d prefer his
capitalism in as sweet a form as possible
(a "decent democratic regime"), one must
defend even its less attractive forms (e.g.,
Trujillo) so the entire social order would
not be overthrown.
NOW HOW WOULD such an outlook ap-
ply itself to Vietnam? First, it would look
for reformers. John Kennedy looked. And
in the mid-1950s he found Diem. With the
benefit of hindsight, everyone can now see
what a poor choice this was. But the point
is that in i the Vietnamese context, Diem
was just about the best anyone could come
up with.
In those days he was a nationalist (of
sorts) and relatively honest. That these
traits were rare among t h e Vietnamese
ruling classes is demonstrated by the suc-
cession of pimps, puppets, and playboys
which have followed him. What Diem was
by 1960, he was forced to become by his
position. The Saigon regime which he
headed was a landlord regime; when the
people demanded land, the regime had to
refuse. To do otherwise would have been
to commit class suicide: what is a landlord
without land?
The people wanted exactly what the re-
gime could or would not give, so reform-
ism-as-stopgap was an illusion. And once
committed to the Vietnamese counterrev-
olution, he (like Diem) was left only with
escalating levels of force. So the war rolled
on, got ever more bloody and costly, and
rolled on some more.
And then John Kennedy died. A mess
created by a liberal president and born of
scupulously liberal politics w a s dumped
unceremoniously into Lyndon Johnson's
lap. For liberals now wincing under the
weight of the war's responsibility, the new
situation was optimal. It would be child's
play to make a Southern conservative ap-
pear the only villain of the piece. With his
elephantine clumsiness and dripping hy-
procrisy, Johnson was the perfect patsy.
Wayne Morse could now inform his col-
leagues that - had John Kennedy lived -
he would have ended the war in short or-
der. It was a thesis somewhat difficult to
test, and was therefore perfectly suited to
the liberal establishment's needs.
THE SHIFT from uncomfortable sup-
port to relieved opposition did not take
place all at once, of course. It was a slow,
tedious process - with the participants
constantly testing the political waters be-
fore venturing further. No one was ever
really sure how openly and militantly the
dissent ought to be conducted.
Thus in 1964, we find Senator J. W. Ful-
bright (in his "Old Myths and New Reali-
ties" speech) promising Johnson his sup-
port even if "the war is carried to the ter-
ritory of North Vietnam with a view to ne-
gotiating a reasonable settlement." Some
months later Fulbright made good on his
promise by personally shepherding the

Tonkin Gulf resolution through the Sen-
ate. Throughout this period, Fulbright's
goal is "the independence of a non-Com-
munist Vietnam." And he constantly re-
veals his underlying fears: E v e n if we
should toy with negotiations, he warned,
don't get us wrong! "It should be clear to
all concerned that the United States will
continue to defend its vital interests with
respect to Vietnam."
In March of 1965, a Kennedy man from
the State Department, Roger Hilsman, lec-
tured a House subcommittee on the need
for negotiations. But he repeated Ful-
brights caveat. "We cannot bluff. If the
Communists refuse to come to the nego-
tiating table and insist on total victory, we
must fight- and fight on the ground as
well as in the air."
IN THE MEANTIME popular anti-war
sentiment began growing. While student
activists attacked imperialism and de-
manded complete and unilateral US troop
withdrawal, the corporate liberals decried
strategic errors and requested negotiations.
The difference involved more than tem-
perament. The anti-war movement w a s
casting a jaundiced eye at the social sys-
tem which created the war. The corporate
liberals had a stake in that system and
were simply quarreling over the way it
should be managed. The difference is clear
from the reasons the establishment dissi-
dents gave for opposing further escalation:
-- General James Gavin (ret.) : "My
concern for Vietnam first became aroused
when I found us cutting back out global
commitments in the realm of economics,
for I began to suspect that the escalation
in Southeast Asia would begin to hurt our
world strategic position."
- Marriner Eccles, formerly of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, now chairman of Salt
Lake City's First Security B a n k: "The
Vietnam war is responsible for the most
serious economic, financial, and political
problems in this country. It is responsible
for the huge federal deficit . . . the de-
ficiency In o u r international balance of
payments . . . inflationary pressures . . .
increasing strikes and exhorbitant de-
mands by union labor . .
- John M. Mecklin, JFK's public affairs
officer in Saigon, now on Fortune's board
of editors: "Quite apart from the risk of
holocaust, the "cost-effectiveness" of the
war as it is now being waged . . . is be-
coming debatable, especially since the
Pueblo incident so dismayingly revealed
the weakness of our posture elsewhere,"
AS THE WAR escalated still further, so
did the energy of the liberal opposition.
Now Eugene McCarthy and Robert Ken-
nedy took the field against the ogre. And
throughout their efforts, their distinctively
liberal approach shone through.
McCarthy entered the fray with the ex-
plicit purpose of undermining the radical
anti-war movement. He was out to save
middle class children from "third or even
fourth parties." He was determined to draw
the war's opposition back into "legitimate"
channels - such as the Democratic Party.
And his rhetoric was chalculated to dis-
courage "extremist" solutions.

'McCarthy's reasons for opposing the war
were quite clear. He had decided "about
the middle of 1966," he said, that "the pro-
portion between what it was going to cost
to win a victory and what would come of
victory came at that point out of balance."
On that principled basis, McCarthy
dumped Johnson. His prescriptions were
similarly inspiring. "I think there should
be a phased withdrawal over a period of
several years." Hadn't even Johnson prom-
ised withdrawal within six months of set-
tlement? Said McCarthy: "I would advise
him against moving that fast. I would put
the time limit at five years." As for uni-
lateral withdrawal, of c o u r s e: "I don't
think it's desirable."
Nor did McCarthy allow h i s Vietnam
views to color the way he viewed the rest
of the world. "We are now in Thailand. I
think we could remain there for some time
even though we did withdraw from South
Vietnam." Why? Because we had a "strong
base" there which discouraged "Chinese
expansion."
KENNEDY WAS Tweedle-dunm. Stating
in no uncertain terms that he "supported
the objectives of the Administration" in
Vietnam, Kennedy saw three roads to
achievement: victory, negotiation, with-
drawal. As for the first - "If we can de-
feat them without paying a great price, an
overwhelming price, then that's what I'd
like to do." Bobby's worry was that the job
was getting too costly. It seemed useful,
therefore, to try negotiations instead.
But the road of "military victory" was
by no means closed. "Despite all the dan-
gers, we may yet come to this course. The
intransigence of our adversaries may leave
us no alternative." One alternative t he y
were leaving us, of course, was immediate
withdrawal. But that was simply beyond
the pale.
It "would be catastrophic for American
interests," for one thing, "would mean a
repudiation of commitments," for another,
and in stum "would injure, perhaps irre-
parably. the principle of collective secur-
ity "
THESE WERE the men who promised,
in the n a m e of American liberalism, to
chart the nation a new course.
All of which brings us down to the pres-
ent. Johnson's out, the Republicans are in,
and it's open season for liberal Democt'ats
on "Nixon's war."
Wednesday this campus, like many,
many others, will shut down in protest.
Make no mistake - this is a milestone.
But let us go even further. Let us learn
some lessons from this war: in particular,
how to prevent the next one.
We will not accomplish that by "letting
bygones be bygones." Nor will we do it by
dismissing the differences between the real
war protesters and the corporate liberals.
The latter stand with us now not out of
principle, but out of convenience.
Our job, it seems to me, is to set about
building a movement which will fight
against all imperialist wars, not just the
long, expensive, and politically-embaras-
sing ones.

HENRY
STEVE NISSEN
City Editor

GRIX, Editor
RON LANDSMAN
Managing Editor

.\ARCIA ABRAMSON .... Associate Managing Editor
PHILIP BLOCK ... .Associate Managing Editor
CHRIS STEELE............... Associate City Editor
STEVE ANZALONE ......... Editorial Page Editor
JENNY STILLER ...Editorial Page Editor
JOAN GRAY........................ Literary Editor
LESLIE WAYNE ....................... Arts Editor
LAWRENCE ROBBINS.Photo Editor
LANIE LIPPINCOTT.A istant to the Managing Editor
WALTER SHAPIRO .Daily washington Correspondent
MARY RADKE .. . Conributing Edittr

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Mathematics professors support moratorium

To the Editor:
EVERY DAY, the Vietnamese
people watch helplessly as their
country is defoliated by American
chemicals and devastated by
American bombs. Every day, in-
nocent men, women, and children
are crippled and killed by Amer-
ican napalm and anti-personnel
weapons.
It is the conviction of the under-
signed members of the Depart-
ment of Mathematics at the Uni-
versity of Michigan that the con-
tribution of the United States to
the destructive war in Vietnam
must stop immediately and com-
pletely.
On Wednesday, Oct. 15, in co-
operation with the nation-wide
moratorium on "business as
usual," we will cancel our usual
activities at the University. We
consider that it is our duty, as
citizens and educators, to so dem-
onstrate our conviction, and to ap-
peal, by our example, to our fellow
citizens to join the opposition to

-Peter G. Hinman
-Noel J. Hicks
-Thos. Storer
--R. Gariepy
-J. D. Halpern (on leave)
-Arthur J. Schwartz
-Raymond F. Goodrich
-Clifford 0. Bloom
-William J. Haboush
-B. A. Taylor
--C. L. Dolph
Anti-strike
To the Editor:
WE THE UNDERSIGNED are
members of the University of
Michigan Law School faculty. We
speak here as individual members
of the larger University and na-
tional communities. For a variety
of reasons all of us feel that the
"mandatory suspension of Uni-
versity classes on Oct. 15" would
be wrong, and some of us feel that
any suspension of classes on that
date is imnroner. However, we are

We feel that the piecemeal
withdrawal of unspecified numbers
of American troops is an inade-
quate response to the need for
peace in this area. We urge the
President to commit our nation to
withdrawing all its troops from
Vietnam in as short a time as pos-
sible. We hope that a cease fire
will be arranged while this with-
drawal is in progress.
-Francis A. Allen, Dean
-Layman Allen
-Olin L. Browder, Jr.
--Paul D. Carrington
-David Chambers
-Alfred F. Conard
-Roger A. Cunningham
-Charles Donahue
-Whitmore Gray
-Carl S. Hawkins
-John H. Jackson
-Douglas Kahn
-Yale Kamisar
-Frank R. Kennedy
-Robert L. Knauss
-Richard 0. Lempert
-Alan N. Polasky

fully endorse and encourage sup-
port of the national moratorium
on Oct. 15 to end the war in Viet-
nam. We support this action as a
legitimate means of expressing de-
sire to obtain an immediate with-
drawal of all American troops in
Vietnam.
We make this endorsement sole-
ly in the interest of promoting
world-wide peace and strongly en-
courage all concerned citizens to
join in our support.
-Herbert W. Johe
Assistant Dean,
-William A. Lewis
Associate Dean
-Student Faculty Committee
Dept. of Architecture
Oct. 7, 1969
No endtorsement
To the Editor:
AN ADVERTISEMENT in the
Daily for October 8 indicated that
the Anthronnltiv n inninaim

action to "endorse," as a group
the Moratorium. Each decided to
follow, in effect, the guideline set
out by the Assembly resolution of
October 6, and we should like to
put the record straight.
-William D. Schorger
Chairman
Anthropology Dept.
-William E. Porter
Chairman
Journalism Dept.
Oct. 9
Political purity
To the Editor:
STEVE NISSEN and Bruce
Levine seem to miss the major
reason for the success which the
anti-war movement has had thus
far. In their editorial suggesting
that people should support the
Oct. 15 Moratorium ". . . with sec-
ond thoughts" they appear to ad-
vocate a purist, sectarian policy
of eyhluing lihernl from the anti-

platform in the past and if he
represents a constituency he is
welcome to speak there again.
Political purity excuses none of us
from acting to end the war.
-David Gordon
Oct. 9
Smash Newberry
To the Editor:
THE SITUATION at Helen New-
berry Hall cannot be tolerated any
longer. The oppressive atmosphere
of the place is out of our control,
but the flagerant violation of the
Constitution of the United States
of America must cease.
People may not be aware that
prayers are ritually said before
meals at H.N., and to attend a
meal one must be present during
prayers. Lateness at a meal means
that you miss it.
Effectively this comes to mean