Seventy-Seven Years of Editorial Freedom
EDITED AND MANAGED BY STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
UNDER AUTHORITY OF BOARD IN CONTROL OF STUDENT PUBLICATIONS

Under the Influence
Ten Years in Circulation
of Meredith Eiker

-
-

Where Opinions AreFree, 420 MAYNARD ST., ANN ARBOR, MICH.
Truth Will Prevail

NEWS PHONE: 764-0552

Editorials printed in The Michigan Daily express the individual opinions of staff writers
or the editors. This must be noted in all reprints.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 12, 1968

NIGHT EDITOR: WALLACE IMMEN

Sophomore Women's Housing

"WHEN THE HARVARD term came to an end, I gave
single lectures in a few other universities. Among
others I went to Ann Arbor where the president showed
me all the new buildings, more especially the library, of
which he was very proud. It appeared that the library had
the most scientific card-index in the world, and that its
method of central heating was extraordinarily up-to-date.
Whide he was explaining all this, we were standing in the
middle of a large room with admirable desks. 'And does
anybody ever read the books?' I asked. He seemed sur-
prised, but answered, 'Why, yes, there is a man over there
now reading!' We went to look, and found that he was
reading a novel."
-The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell
Chapter 7, page 328

SOPHOMORE WOMEN ARE currently
forced to shoulder the debt of the
University's housing system that is a
result of obligations to fulfill bonding
requirements with the federal govern-
ment. However, John Feldkamp, Director
of University Housing, believes that in
"a year or two" the system will be able
to operate without the financial aid of
sophomore women's rents,
While these bond obligations remain
outstanding, it will be necessary to make
University housing mandatory for sopho-
more women. But after this period sopho-
more women should be granted off-
campus housing permission, and thus
given an opportunity for freedom and
development.
S THE SITUATION exists now, many
women join sororities just to avoid
The Daily is a mnher of the Associated Press and
Colegiate Press Service
Fall and winter subscription rate: $4.50 per term by
carrier ($5 by mail): $8.00 for regular academic school
year ($9 by mail)
Daily except Monday during regular academic schoni
year.
Daily except Sunday and Monday during regular
summer session.
Second class postage pair at Ann Arbor. Michigan,
420 Maynard St. Ann Arbor. Michigan, 48'04.
Editorial Staff
ROGER RAPOPORT, Editor
MEREDITH EIKER, Managing Editor
MICHAEL HEFFER ROBERT KLIVANS
City Editor Editorial Director

dormitory life for their sophomore year.
Sophomore women who don't wish to join
sororities or co-ops are forced to submit
to a massive, impersonal housing struc-
tures designed for maximum efficiency
and minimum serenity.
Sophomore women certainly have the
maturity to assume the responsibility for
apartment living. While sophomore men
are allowed to live outside the University
housing system, sophomore women, who
dcn't have that freedom, are probably
better adaptable to apartment living.
Furthermore, if sophomore women were
allowed to live off-campus, the environ-
mental conditions in University housing
'would be improved. The University would
be forced to provide better services in its
housing structures to attract students
back to the dorms and keep its vacancy
rate down.
At tne same time, demand pressures
on the Ann Arbor housing market are
slackening sufficiently to handle the an-
ticipated influx of 500 sophomore women
without an increase in rental prices.
AT A UNIVERSITY which has become a
major arena for social change, the
protective values that have dictated pol-
icy toward women in the past are now
obviously outmoded. The University must
change this policy and grant sophomore
women a choice of residency as soon as
financial commitments permit.
-DAVID SPURR

volumes that students used while in the building. Ten
years ago the UGLI's doors were open 100 hours a week-
last month student demands extended the library's cur-
few and its week is now 121 hours long.
THE STATISTICS don't tell the whole UGLI story,
however. More than an educational institution, the UGLI
is a social institution, complete with a built-in caste
system. History of art students find themselves gathered
together with the prints on the fourth floor; engineers
hover primarily on the third. Fraternities and sororities
have house annexes, setting up at the same group of
tables every night, and the koffee klatch meets from
9 to 9:30 p.m.
The UGLI is also a proving ground for the devious.
Students can't toss books out the window as they can at
theGeneral Library, but the check-out people haven't
checked purses or underwear for years. "Sgt Pepper"
album jacket enter empty and leaves the audio room
filled with Mozart. Incense was burned during finals
and who knows how many women have met their hus-
bands over the card catalogue.
MIRIAM THE librarian of "The Music Man" would
have found the University's facility hard to handle. Not

only would she have to put up with adamant students
demanding to know why they have had their credits
held during registration, but she might also find herself
confronted by activists looking for an administrator to
hang and protesting the evils of the Ugh system--it
forces them into the cold streets after midnight.
It would take a genious like D. W. Griffiths to tell
the whole story of "Birth of an Ugli" with all its drama
and impact, but in the meantime we will have to be
satisfied with the humble recantations of this column.
AND NOW THAT the second Ugh decade at the
University looms near we can look forward to more
crowded carrels; longer lines while waiting to check
out; less availability of necessary books during finals
time; increased frequency of stumbling over bodies in
the rear stairwell; and more romances being started
in the coffee room, where Ban could certainly take the
worry out of being close.
But for those who prefer to heed the call of Marshall
McLuhan and give up the Ugli's tomes of guttenburg
media for the more advanced technological message
that can be wrought from today's electronic means of
communication, this next decade will always offer
Thursday night at the movies.

WHEN BERTRAND RUSSELL visited the University
earlier in the century he probably saw the then new
General Library which has aged for a good many years
on the Diag and is currently having its insides rearranged
and expanded. What Bertrand Russell didn't see is the
Undergraduate Library which had an annual attendance
during 1967 of 1,949,694 and will celebrate its tenth birth-
day next Tuesday.
According to varioush rumors circulating along with
the books, the UGLI is the second busiest libary in the
country-second only to New York City's 42nd St. bib-
liotheque. Miss Faucher, head librarian at the UGLI, re-
ports that 806 course reading lists were serviced through
the library last year and 48,129 volumes were kept on
closed reserve.
The UGLI boasts 70,000 different titles and a total
of 135,000 books, had a home circulation of 267,088 during -
1967 and figures that library personnel reshelved 661,312

,~~ . . ....... .... . .. .** >::: .. ...W. Wt4....t ..::'< ,:':~::i:_ !_'>.rWt..,:::lflV. I:x a: ; VEs .. .. .A S ,:,. . . . ......a... .. ..a''# :7.<;vb ' :S" ..

.....".vn"!{:":":$'x;" k;";rdi":"::{:": d$+?}:": r.+"'r:"1.::";{r,".w. "' M1 T: "" '
..... ": Y.i iir.":":".:v,":::":":}}:"::v}.'u:":-0ti.}:"}:wia triiiuir:S:'.:".} ti : : .o'

The
By RHOADS MURPHEY
MR. CHAIRMAN, Congressmen
Whatever may be the mili-
tary prospects in Vietnam, the
problem there is primarily politi-
cal, tp which military force can
at best provide only a temporary
answer. The immediate issue of
insurgency has divertedsatten-
tion from the more fundamental
issues which are not, only key
factors in the insurgency but
which will remain after the fight-
ing stops, Unless we somehow
reach a workable political solu-
tilon, even the most complete
military conclusion will be of no
lasting effect.
There are two overriding poli-
tical issues. The first is Vietna-
mese nationalism. This is cer-
taihly the most important. The
drive for genuine independence
from all forms of outside domi-
nation. This is a very ancient
struggle, fought successfully for
many centuries against the Chi-
nese state, then against the
French and the Japanese.
The United States has now re-
placed the French as an outside
power attempting to exercise a
major influence. Although we may
have no wish to build a perma-
nent position of control, this is
not clearly seen by many, perhaps
most, Vietnamese, who see instead
the growth of the U.S. military
establishment in their country, the
permanent look of U.S. bases, and
the important American influence
on the government of Saigon.
The second of these two issues
is the need for a political order
which represents the aspirations of
the people and which makes at
least an honest effort to attack
the problems which result from
economic underdevelopment which
have been grossly magnified by the
destruction of a generation of
warfare.
Vietnam has been at war for at
least 25 years. But economic
growth cannot take place without
political stability, and without the
cooperation of most of the popu-
lation. Any successful government
must be broadly representative of
the people as a whole, and must
win their confidence through its
willingness to confront these long-
neglected problems.
IT IS NOT POSSIBLE to exam-
ine the nature of possible political
settlements at this point. It can
be realistically suggested, though,
that without a deescalation of
combat in the South, together with
the cessation of bombing in the
North, it will never be possible
for the combatants in Vietnam to
explore a durable political settle-
ment.
If the present course of combat

ietnam
uation of possible alternative op-
tions must be rigorously pursued.
We should not be bemused by
the newly-found vigor with which
optimistic projections of "victory"
are now presented to us. We can-
not suppress our skepticism inter-
minably nor shrink from the des-
truction that persists because of
our doubts.
In a choice between the opti-
mistic southsaying of Administra-
tion and the general welfare of
the suffering Vietnamese, we
must not be too credulous about
official claims of skill at playing
the numbers game.
TO WHAT EXTENT does the
present government of South Viet-
nam meet either of these issues?
The United States has in effect
put all its money on the Saigon
government, as the sole vehicle
through which American objec-
tives in Vietnam are to be achiev-
ed.
But that government's role as a
leader of Vietnamese nationalism,
which I think is the key factor,
is compromised by its dependence
on American military assistance
and influence. And it falls far
short of representing, in its com-
position or its actions, more than
a small sector of the country's
people.
Despite its announced policies
and despite a great deal of Amer-
ican effort, it has accomplished
next to nothing in promoting eco-
nomic development or in pursu-
ing the vital job of land reform,
as Congressman Riegle made clear
in his discussion with Mr. Poats of
AID before the Foreign Opera-
tions Subcommittee last May.
It has not won substantial po-
pular support. Even its army is at
best half-hearted in meeting the
emergency military demands of
defense against insurgency. There
seems little doubt that if Ameri-
can support were withdrawn, the
Saigon government would not only
be unable to continue the war but
would quickly collapse.
THE ELECTIONS OF last Sep-
tember 3 which have been vari-
ously interpreted but have their
most important message in reveal-
ing the weakness of the Saigon
government.
With the powerful leverage of
office - holding, the elimination
from the contest of the strongest
candidates and of all politically
suspect voters (suspect is inter-
preted to mean "neutralist" as
well as "leftist" although these
things were not defined) and the
virtually automatic votes of the
armed forces, the official ticket
received only about one third of
the total ballots.

Con lict-IL A Political Settlement?

The following article, the third in a six-part
series, is an analysis of the political situation in
Vietnam by Prof. Rhoads Murhpey of the Univer-
sity's Geography Department. It was originally pre-
sented on Nov. 28, 1967, in Washington before a
19-man Congressional study group. The hearing
was initiated by Rep. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., a Re-
publican from Flint who requested the testimony
f rom five Asian scholars, four from the University,
headed by Prof. Alexander Eckstein, director of
the University's Center for Chinese Studies.
Prof. Murphey is a member of the Executive
Committee of the Center for Chinese Studies and
is on the Board of Directors of the Association of
Asian Studies. He has published three books on
China, lived and worked for six years in different
parts of Asia, and visited Saigon and Southeast
Asia in 1964.

Rhoads Murphey


chantment with the war, but it
reinforces the need to begin think-
ing now about Vietnam's political
future.
If the United States is to achieve
its aims in Vietnam, it must direct
its efforts toward increasing the
chances for a viable and stable
government once the American
presence is withdrawn. No solu-
tion which depends on permanent
American military involvement
would be acceptable to either the
American or the Vietnamese peo-
ple, nor could it be made to work.
THE POLITICAL landscape of
Vietnam is highly complex. In
addition, to the interests repre-
sented in the Saigon government,
there is a variety of Buddhist sects
with an equal variety of political
orientations, a Catholic group in-
digenous to the south plus the
roughly one million largely Cath-
olic refugees from the north, a
bewildering assortment of non-Vi-
etnamese tribal and mountain peo-
ple ("Montagnards" as the French
called them), and a substantial
number of Khmers, closely related
to the people of Cambodia, and,
like the Montagnards, not Vietna-
mese, although they are all inclu-
ded within the present borders of
the Vietnamese state.
The Khmers are down here, in
this delta landscape, which I have
visited twice, and which I would
maintain, in response to the point
raised earlier, does present a seri-
ous military problem for any at-
tacking force. It is not just that
the area is heavily cultivated and
densely settled, but that it is in-

thickets and other tree clumps for
village use) provide in addition
'excellent cover, especially once
the crop is reasonably higlU for
guerrilla action.
To try to put a military force
of tanks, airplanes, or ground
troops alone into such a landscape
is, I think to invite the kind of,
bloody stalemate which guerrilla
operations are ideally suited to
create, and to maintain a sticky
military situation from the point
of view of an attacking force al-
most indefinitely.
Most of the groups I have men-
tioned above, and many other
smaller ones, have little or no rep-
resentation in the present govern-
ment. But no government which
does not take at least some ac-
count of their interests can rest on
a secure basis without massive out-
side support.
FINALLY, THERE IS the Na-
tional Liberation Front, which still
controls most of South Vietnam's
area (by one definition or another,
it depends on how you want to
read this word "controls") and
has the enforced, willing, or tacit
support of a large share of the
population as a whole.
It is, without much question,
politicaly the strongest and most
effective group in the country. Re-
sentment of the American pres-
ence, the ugrency and bitterness
of the socio-economic problems,
and dissatisfaction with the Sai-
gon government's ineffective re-
sponse to those problems have in-
fluenced large numbers of the
normally indifferent masses of the

but, despite these handicaps, it
has captured the political leader-
ship in South Vietnam, as the
principal head of what is increas-
ingly seen as a nationalist effort
against American intervention on
the one hand and against reaction
and corruption in Saigon on the
other.
To produce from this complex
assortment of divergent groups a
stable representative, and effective
government is in effect the task
which we have undertaken as a
result of our intervention. There
is. no need to underline its diffi-
culty. But there can be no hope of
permanent success unless the po-
litical arena is opened to all po-
litically important groups.
This is not just something they
can subscribe to on the basis of
arising out of our belief in the
democratic process, but it seems to
be an essential condition for the
emergence of an essentially stable
political solution.
This would result, at least to be-
gin with, in a good deal of disorder
and confusion. It would be at best
an uncertain situation in which a
variety of groups jockeyed for
power, and there could be no as-
surance that violence would be
absent.
But I don't think there is any
need to assume that the presently
most effective group, the NLF
would automatically win out un-
opposed. In a contest for political
power, efforts would have to be
concentrated on winning the
widest possible support. Given the
political variety of South Vietnam

rhist and other non-communist
groups currently outside the gov-
ernment could also be counted on
to exert influence on any solution.
IF AN INTERNATIONAL frame-
work of guarantee and supervision
could be established, then a free
political field in South Vietnam
might be ensured. Here the
American role would be vital, but
would be most effectively exercised
in cooperation either with rep-
resentatives of the Geneva powers
or with a newly appointed inter-
national commission.
The outcome of any free political
choice in Vietnam would almost
certainly be, in international
terms, some shade of neutraliza-
tion. Such an outcome, and the
opportuity of free political choice,
have already been accepted, expli-
citly or in principe, as compatible
with U.S. objectives in Vietnam,
and they also coincide with the
interests and wishes of the great
majority of the Vietnamese people.
Nevertheless, it would probably
be necessary to obtain in advance,
through private discussions, the
agreement of the Soviet Union,
China, and North Vietnam to ac-
cept where they cannot actively
support the opening of the political
arena in South Vietnam and the
ultimate neutralization of the
country.
From both the Russian and the
Chinese points of view, as from
our own, these should be accepta-
ble solutions, threatening no vital
national interests and providing a
viable means for the disengage-
ment of the present pattern of,
multiple intervention and conflict.
China's reaction is of course the
most problematical; but it is far
from inconceivable that even now
the Chinese could tacitly accept
the neutralization of Vietnam and
the consequent- removal of Amer-
ican forces whose active role close
to China's borders contains as
much embarrassment from the
Chinese point of view as it does
propaganda value.
As Professor Eckstein has al-
ready pointed out the Chinese
state is militarily weak, especially
in terms of any conflict with U.S.
power, and it has been unwilling
to respond to what are clearly
provocative actions, from its point
of view.
FREEDOM OF POLITICAL ma-
neuver in South Vietnam and the
emergence of some form of coali-
tion government could lead to
overtures to the Hanoi govern-
ment, or even to participation of
that government in the southern
political arena.
We might be confronted with a
situation which in some respects
resembled that in 1954 at the
conclusion of the Geneva Confer-

artificially divided. The division
is unstable, given the uniformity
of Vietnamese national aspira-
tions; even now as I am sure you
gentlemen are well aware, many
northerners including Marshall
Ky, occupy prominent positions in
the Saigon government and its
army.
If the division can be resolved by
any means short of war, long-run
stability will be ensured as it can
by nothing else. For a variety of
reasons, the Korean case is not
parallel; and no Korean type solu-
tion can be imposed on Vietnam
except at the, cost of continued
violence.
A unified Vietnam would leave
many questions open as far as
internal political alignments were
concerned, but the issue of neu-
tralization externally would not
be in serious doubt. Whether a
unitary government of Vietnam
were communist, anti-communist,
or based on a broad coalition, and
whatever its formal relations with
China, it would focus its external
relations on the maintenance of
independence from China and
freedom of Vietnamese political
maneuver. All of the long course
of Vietnamese history testifies to
this, including the history and
actions of the present government
in Hanoi.
WHATEVER REGIME emerged
from the political process in Viet-
nam, under the supervision of an
international commission, could
be offerred military guarantees by
the United States, or preferably
by an international alliance of
powers, to protect the present
borders of Vietnam against outside
aggression. A m e ri c a n and/or
United Nations economic and
technical assistance could also
be. powerful asset for the succes
of any Vietnamese government,
but outside military commitments
to the internal support of any
given regime could only be coun-
terproductive of the long-run
stability and progress which are
our aims in Vietnam.
Theresisnsome risk that a left-
dominated government in the
south, or in a unified Vietnam,
might take reprisals especially
against the million or more reli-
gious and political refugees who
fled south in 1954 and later. The
effort to command the widest pos-
sible support would presumably
militate against any such action.
But if the risk became real, the
United States would have a clear
obligation to arrange external
sanctuary for all who saw them-
selves in jeopardy, since they be-
came refugees originally on the
strength of an American guar-
antee.
IN SUM, we must give primary
attention to the political aspects
of what is above all a political

>
k
;,
,: .
.
<:
:" "
Y;-
tti:
'.":'
l
h
' 4,
t} :
!}e
} i
': f:
ate
*s
{ %
i
,{
:}J
: j
:
"1
-:{
K' :
~ ?
'fi'r
r:
r.i
r
?:;'r
ytfs
rrS
;,c
Y"
}
$}
;:",:;<
#Cy
tik
i ' .
.SJj
r. "4,
"i4
::M
j '{.
F.ti
t?
{:';
+Y:
r;
h{,
r
v:
v::
°{:, f
:4:
f .
r1
i: 4'
. {.
J. ' .

I