U.S. mili ry
Media and Foreign Intervention
For veral wee . leading up to the U.S. military intervention into
Som lia, the m media (televi ion, radio and n w pri nt) conti nually
bombarded the public with notions and images of a ghastly situation
getting worse. Television scenes of starving children prepared the wortd
public for the inevitability of American military i nvolvem nt in So­
malia.
This i not the first time that the American media has b n able to
shape public opinion involving military intervention in a o-called third
world country.
In 1990, with the massive air bombings and military land ault
against Iraq, the media played the role of legitimizing U.S. war policy
in the Persian Gulf. In all of these operation in recent years beginning
with Lebanon in 1982 and continuing with Grenada (1983), Libya
(1986), Persian Gulf (1988), Panama (1989), the Persian Gulf again in
1990-91, aoo Somalia (1992-93), the mass media' role has been to
convey the supposed "humanitarian" basis for the military occupation
of these regions of the southern hemisphere.
Yet the res�lt of � _ {l\iljtary j �,io� a oc�u�atio
resulted in the irnpro emehi of OOrl4 0 fqr t majority 0,
I in th . 'Ibe- ame-wttl be 1me for matt as U. . 'trOOps
further destabilize the political and social climate of the country.
This can be seen quite clearly with the eruption of anit-American
rebellions in the capital of Mogadi hu beginning in the latter part of
February.
As American mili tary personnel has been cut by 50 percent since the
initial intervention in December, the individual soldiers involved in thi
operation have openly que tioned the efficacy of the U.S. operation in
Somalia. After a three month stint in Somalia, the American forces are
constantly attacked by the Somali people with stones, sniper fire and
hostile taunts.
It is obvious that the military policing operations of the American
marines and their allies have fomented deep hatred toward this operation
among the Somalian masse from a broad spectrum of political constitu­
encies.
How Can U.S. Intervention Be Halted?
\
Since the will of the U.S. to intervene in Africa has been demonstrated
in Somalia, it portends much for the future of African tates who are today
incapable of challenging American military involvement of the continent.
The ituation 1n Somalia represents the cri is in the po t-colonial
African state. Having inherited the European state in Africa colonial
outpo ts, the problems of the bureaucratic.undemocratic and oppres ive
colonial tate. has not been olved by the political elite in Africa.
For example, th Organization of African Unity; (OAU) was virtually
silent on the U .. military invasion of Somalia and the ongoing efforts by
th American g vernment 'to construct a mas ive military airbase in
Botswana. In the outhern region of the continent rdering the raci t
Republic of South Africa.
Such a ituation requires the formation ofa new continental organiza­
tion of African people that i committed to the right of sovereignty for
African territory from outside force , especially the world It uperpower'',
th United Stat of American.
In regards to the United Nations, the arne situation exists as it relates
to U.S. control of thi "world body". Suce ive American regimes have
hijacked the U:N. Security Council �n order to cl.o� it acti�� in
"international legality" while in actuahty th� real objective for military
intervention is to advance the economic and political influence of the U.S.
Therefore, ubstituting American military invol ement with an obstensi­
ble U.N. occupation i by no mears a olution to the problems of the
post-colonial African nation- tate.
Thi area kn as the' "Hom of Afri a", encompas ing Dji outi,
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia i strategicallr ignificant ?ecause? its
proximity to the Gulf of Aden, which I ads into the Arabian penni ula,
one of th world' largest centers of oil reserves and production.
In addition it will neees ary f r th 'U.S. and other European
imperiali t eountrie to tabli h bea heads uch Somalia in 'order t�
better facilitate future military interventions in other areas of the conti­
nent, uch Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, South Africa and po ibly
Sudan and Egypt.
Therefore the neees ity for creating CAn All-Afncan military force on
th conrin nt i imperative in order to avoid the potential for re-eoloniza­
tion by the United Stat and its European allies.
Kwam Nkrurnah, who advanced thi idea during the United Nati?ns­
United Stat en ineered Congo cri i in 1960, forsaw th Am�ncan
geo-political d ign for Africa in th twenty-f�rst ntury. Until, the
po t-colonial tate i transcended and. the creatlo� f an All-Afncan
Union Gov rnment i realized, the continual cycle ot underdevelopment,
famine and civil war will further weaken the African. ocieties makin
them ripe for U.S. imperiali t intervention and occupation.
Or. : Th above article was a portion of a p ch deliv r d by the
author at th frica 2000 Summit Con� rence.1I on F�bruary 24,1?9
at Wayn tat Univer ity. The aut�r IS me direct?r of the Pa�-AfTlcan
Research and Documentation Pro) ct and the chair vI the Africa 2000:
Task Force in Detroit.
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CIVIL
RIGt:iTS
JOURNAL
HRl HANI bad t b t ere­
dentia . to succeed el on Mandela.
ot only bad held everal promi-
n nt leadership po itions in the
ANC, but he also d the mo t char­
i matic appeal to angry, young
Bla . He earned credibility for t
FOREIGN
MERCHANTS
• I
o
Black people had better learn some entrepreneurial skills ... and quick!
•
By DANNIE M. MARTIN
S.n Fr.ncl.co
It 100 as if the hy teria sur-
rounding the drug war has come to
thi : the uncorroborated word of one
utter creep i going to be enough to
put a 000 around orneone' n k.
Or, in the cas of lethal inj tion, a
humane needl in the vein.
The drug war h wluttled away
at civil right. Poll e pr e utors
and th courts have b n given an
increasingly wide berth in going af­
ter people accused 0 trafficking in
dru s. .
I' P NT28yearsinjailsaoo
state and Federal pri oDS for po
ion of narcoti , burglary, dru
muggling and bank robbery. (1 was
paroled in 1 2.) I've known everaJ
men who have ended up on death
row. But I'v n v r known any n
who ould agree on who gets th
ultimate an ti n.
What 1 do know i that we've
created a lethal combination by mix­
In drug death penalty, which per­
mit the execution ofpeopl wh a
c nvicted of killing in drug deal or
who po and ell large quannti
of dru , with the pra lice of r lying
on the te tim ny of inform : peo­
pI who have themselves been for­
given crim , including murder, for
t timony against an 0 iate.
Under th p perty forfeiture
law of the I t 20 years informers
an b n (it from th impounded pro-
ds of th th Y m . In-
f rm ing i an mdu try that has grown
In pr portion to the dru war.
Unli real Dru Enforc rnent
A ney a en and oth r law en­
f rcement p rsonncl, th e en rally
upper I t 01 pi eoru re under
n m ralor thical r tramts � pla
the gam rdin to Hoyle. Therr
r' wn need only. healthy porn DS
f vice nd crimin lity al ng WIth
en ugh con to tal m r d PI-
m
goon into entering a drug deaJ con­
piracy .
Thi rty years ago, th uncorrobo­
rated t timony of an a mplice
w n t ufficientto tain a convic­
tion, much I put m n t death.
But under pressur of pubJi ut­
rag • Federal courts hav been more
wilJm to permit convictions on th
b i 0 informant t timony. It i
n t unusual for a judge to tell a jury
that the uncorrob rated w rd of an
accomplice, if th
en ugh to convi t.
lieve it, 1
TIlE