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The ,Wilder
By
Governor Doug Wilder of
Virginia ha been much in the
• news lately, particularly be­
au e of hi higbly publicized
visits to tbe state of 10 a.
. � . A' the presidential poli tics
of 1992 begins to arm up,
Wilder's towa vi it have
fueled speculation that he
either has his eyes on a
pre idential bid or is po ilion­
ing himself to be included on
the '92 tic et as the
Democratic Party nominee for
Vice President.
I •
Governor WIlder's mes-
e of ·social responsibility
and fiscal con ervatism" is
being received ell among a
con iderable; number of
people in the Democratic
Party most notably the conser­
vative/moderate forces of the'
southern based Democratic
Leadership Conference.
Indeed Governor Wilder
has emerged a the preeminent
symbol of the ne breed of so
called "race neutral' Black
poli tician whose appeal to
white voters is based on
. moderation" and downplay-
ild. card in the politic
in identifyable "Biack issues
nd concern .
Governor Wilder' new-
found populari ty and I
prominence within the
Democratic Party will make
hi a major player in the
presidential politics of 1992.
The que tion bich African
Americans and progressives
m t pose is in bose interest
will Doug Wilder be playing?
' ... In who
Int r t wll/
Doug Wild r ,
b playIng l'
·The vast majority of
African Americans were un­
derstandably euphoric about .
Wilder' hi toric election as
the first African American
Governor since reconstruc­
non. However, Wilder's race
neutral, anti-labor, pro-death
penalty campaign w cause
for concern in ome circle .
Even more disturbing is
Wilder's embrace by and
seeming marr age to the
Democratic Leadership Con-
. terence (D.L.C.).
No sooner had Wilder been
elected then former Virginia
Governor Charles Robb
rushed Wilder off to a meeting
of the DLC. The DLC gave the
Governor elect a warm and en­
tbusi tic welcome. It was al­
most if they were saying
e've got our "boy".
The DLC's greatest fear is
a fello southerner from
South Carolina, Jesse Louis
Jackson. Since the t 988, the -
D.L.C. and other forces within
the party have been frantically
searching for a "Black" alter­
native to the liberal-progre -
sive politics of Jesse Jackson.
It was the D.L.C. wbich
conceived the idea of enhanc­
ing the role of outbern
Democratic and the conserva­
tive-moderate forces wi tbin
the party by concocting Super
Tuesday.
Super Tuesday, having 14
outhern tates hold their
primarie on a single day, wa
designed to propel southern
democrats into an unassail­
able po ition of power and in­
fluence witbin the party.
Their r cial arrogance and
bilders, however, lead them to
overlook one critical factor-
the Bl ck vote in the South.
Worst yet they overlooked or
refused to recognize tbe im­
pact of Jes e Jackson s voter
registration efforts in 1983-4
nd bis electrifying cru ade
for pre ident in 1984.
-t» DLC'
greate t fear
I a t, lIow
southerner from
South Carolln 1
-Ies e Lou/s
Jack on.'
These oversight proved
disastrous for the DLC's
de ign. Je e Jackson wrecked
the DLC's trategy on Super
Tuesday 1988 by winning five
southern states including
Doug Wilder' Virginia and
finishing a strong second in .
virtu lIy all the remaining
stales.
Unwilling to give up on
their grand de ign, the D.L.C.
wa forced back to the draw­
ing board. It would appear that
their conclu ions were ob-
"Why the Rai
c
By Dr. M Din M ra
The mo t progre sive
political leader at the national
level for the pa t decade has
been Jes e Jac on. Yet many
observer of Jackson's
Rainbow Coalition politics
are now wondenn whether
the historical opportunity has
been 10 t for creating more
progressive alternative in
politic.
When Jackson fir t ran for
the presidency. fe seriously
bel ieved tha t he would
chieve t he Democratic
party' nomination. His
campaign w�. a social protest
movement which used the
Democratic prrmarie to
increa e Blac voter turnout
nd to reinforce the power of
the liberal-left wing of the
Democratic Party.
By 1988, Jackson b d
shifted closer to the center,
and permitted BI c official
bo h d campaigned
vi orou Iy again t him four
year before to do inate
municipal nd tate ide
mobilizations.
The ainbo failed to
develop a coherent national
apparatus, witb a national
DC paper. regional poli tical
or nizers, and trained cadre
on campu es and in
communities. Local activis
dra into the Jackson
c aipaings eren't
encouraged to develop
utonomo coalitions hich
were independ nt of the
national electoral effort.
Jackson's frenetic,
Iarger-than-Jife personali ty
nd his chaotic organizational
style, consisting largely of a
coterie of loyalist. who rarely
di gree with t boss, work
against genuinely democratic
deci ion making.
PART OF THE problem
wa the bitterly ironic
relation hip bich developed
unexpectedly between
Jack on and the newly
prominent Black politician
ali i n h�·-
like Doug Wilder.
Jackson's Rainbow had
been respon ible for elevating
Black politics to the national
arena, illustrating tbat a Blac
candidate could compete
succes fully, winning
pre idenri I caucuse nd
elections in tates witbout
sizeable minori ty group .
It wa . Jackson nOI David
Dinkin , who proved that
Black candidate for high
office could in a plurality of
votes again t more
conserv rive, white
candidate in New York City.
Jackson' c ndidacy forced
the Democratic Party to
liberalize its po ture toward
women and minority
candidate.
------------------------...., Jack on's c ndidacie
opened the political space for
Black offici I eeki ng
tale ide and mayoral
. po ition , although running
challenge wbich were more
conservative than J ck on's.
Doug Wilder' victory
Virginia's governor wa
based pertially on Jac on'
trategy, holding on to the
Black vote hile winning
about ODe third of all wbite
vote. But hi poJi tical
program was clearly more
conservative than Jack on' .
• . , lltr..,.-
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ftAGe �A ,
�UI�WA«J,
O�···,-
•
ANDREW YOUNG'S
. guber-natorial campaign in
Georgia, in hich he. ha
endorsed tbe death penalty,
faithfully foUo t Wilder
model, not J coon's.
Jackson' continuing
flirtation witb pre idential
Co tI ed 0 P e II
PA 5
f'92
iou. }
Do not overlook or di -
count the Black vote in tbe
South and find an acceptable
Black alternative to Je e
Jack on; an alternau e ho .
could hold the Ia-yalty of
Blac based on race nd p­
peal to white b ed on tbe
projection of a race neutral
con ervative - moderate
poli tical philosopby.
For tbe DLC Doug Wilder
mu t eern like a ad end. A
mod rate at th top fo the tick­
et with Doug Wilder the
vice presidential e ndid te
would be a dream ticket for
the DLC and many within the
party.
• n the cenario Doug
Wilder would be ed to effec­
tively dimini h th inftucnce
of Je e Jack on once and for
all.
A the' 92 r ce he up we
ca expect that Dou Wilder
ill be the wild card, the
t p card that the DLC and
the conservative - moderate
forces within the Democratic
P rty will attempt to play in.an
effort to cut their way through
the rcater prominence and
po er within lh party.
It is a cooptation trategy
prcurcatcd on the a' .umption
thai Afri an Americans will
tolerate white folk electing
nd projc tin "leader" for
Bla pe pie. It is a tr t gy
� h c 1 arro antly pre sumc
tha Blac vot r ill blindly
lin' up behind a�y ace th i '
Bla . whether or not th t
Bla k face i. a voice for th
Bla k a end or not.
The OLe and their aJlie
within the D rnocratic Party
may be in for yet another rude
awakening. Th y m y di -
cover that Wilder Wild c rd
will only ut It In 1992 if
AI ncan American Gover­
nor Doug Wilder a omeone
who i committed to playing
In the i nte re t of -Afric n
Americ n and other di ad­
vantaged people within t
society.
Ron Daniels er es a
Pre.fident of the Institute for
Community Organizatioll and
Del'elopmellt ill Youllgstown.,
Ohio. He a1 b� cOlltacted t
. (216) 746-5147.
Write y
Micbi D Cilize
P.O. 80s 03560
Hipland Park, MI 48203