'JULY 6 -12, 1986 THE CITIZEN
9
terests of the region's European descendants were denied the African popula
tions. To survive economically, these nations are now forced to send those most
able to produce food and other commodoties to the mines and fields of South
Africa. .
The sovereignty of the nations of this region is regularly violated as their
borders are raided by South African troops. This was again demonstrated in
March 1986, when South Africa torcec the coup of Lesotho's president, calling
it punishment for his alleged harboring of members of South Africa's leading
anti-apartheid organization, the African National Congress (ANC). Even the
strongest (economically and militarily) of the black-ruled nations of the region
Zimbabwe-is incapable of providing any kind of challenge to South Africa.
One hope for the region, still in its embryoniC stage began with the 1979
Southern Africa Development and Coordinating Conference (SADCC). Commit
ted to fostering economic development in the region while reducing dependence
upon South Africa, SADCC participants (comprised of the majority-ruled nations
of southern Africa) are attempting to enhance their economic potential. However,
warfare and severe droughts throughout the region have signific811t1y limited
SADCC progress.
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-..._.._,. nder the Reagan administration, U.S. policy toward South Africa
been characterized by "constructive engagement." This policy
approach advances the-view that through private discussions, the
---_;��� South African government will accept concessions that would
ead to the gradual dismantling of apartheid.
This approach is generally acknowledged to have failed. Between September
1984 and April 1986, more than 1,200 people have been killed and 36,000 arrested.
Continued South African raids into neighboring countries is further evidence'
of the failure of this approach to the problems in the region.
C ton and ' ·
s citizens of a nation that prides itself on its democratic heritage,
.creators of U.S. foreign policy have been silent regarding clear
yarttcutated black South African demands for majority rule and
r-.....-JIF--..J the peaceful tactics to achieve it. Among these tactics have been
conomic sanctions.
Only after Congress agreed to institute punitive sanctions in 1985 did the
Reagan administration reconsider its position. But this position, in the form
of Executive Order 12532, is tepid when compared to the sanctions to which
Congress agreed, or with the sanctions imposed on Nicaragua, Poland and
Libya. Though the Executive Order is a welcome first step, it must be viewed
with caution as the president can rescind it at any time.
The goal of legislating sanctions is to provide a non-violent alternative toward
ending apartheid by reducing the finances necessary to perpetuate it. On April
2, 1986, Nobel Prize reclplent Bishop Desmond Tutu endorsed sanctions on
South Africa, stating: "Our children are dying. Our land is burning and bleeding,
and so I call on the international community to apply punitive sanctions against
this government to help us establish a new South Africa, nonracial, democratic,
participatory ar.:i just. This is a nonviolent strategy to help us do so." Rev. Leon
Sullivan, despite being the author of a code of conduct for U.S. businesses
operating In South Africa, supports sanctions such as divestment. He believes
that the Sullivan codes are only the "minimum" of what should be done on behalf
of black freedom.
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Sa ·0 co V II
1) divestment-removing stocks, bonds or other forms of investments in a
business, bank or other entity with investments in South Africa;
2) dis-investment-individualrbusinesses, banks or other entities withdrawing
their corporate activity in South Africa; and .
3) tradelflnancial-suspending public and private-sector trade, bank loans and
tax obligations to the South African government.
Another response related to hunger in South Africa is direct aid to the non
white population. United States or International aid is limited, however, since
South Africa is not eligible for most of it. At the regional level, diplomatic ap
proaches could include terminating all military and economic support for rebel
groups such as UNITA. The United Nations could use additional support for
its resolutions calling for the end of South Africa's illegal occupation and con
trol of Namibia. The United States also could support free and fair elections
in Namibia that would include all major forces involved in the conflict.
Other needed responses include: targeted development aid (via SA DCC); debt
relief and the reduction of trade barriers for countries in the southern Africa
region (e.g., Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana). Since
economic anctions are a form of economic warfare, Bread for the World sup
ports sanctions only as a last resort when other methods to force a severely
repressive regime to change its policies have failed. In the case of South Africa,
this is warranted. A major criteria to support imposing sanctions to combat
hunger and poverty is the support of the people we are attempting to help. Polls
indicate that an overwhelming number of black South Africans support sanc
tions. A key element of any U.S. response must be the support of sanctions
which can help to end apartheid-the chief obstacle to overcoming hunger in
South Africa and the region. Congress is likely to adopt increasingly strong sanc
tions until apartheid is ended. Bread for the World will support efforts to make
these sanctions as effective as possible.
The situation in South Africa demonstrates the need for Christian citizens
concerned about hunger to respond not only to the hunger that comes from
natural causes, such as drought, but also the hunger that is a result of oppres
sion, created by unjust human institutions and policies. In South Africa, the
source of oppression is apartheid.
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