DECEMBER 8 • 2022 | 57 imprecisely, to mean a moral problem, a difficult ethical decision. But a dilemma is not simply a conflict. There are many moral conflicts. May we perform an abortion to save the life of the mother? Should we obey a parent when he or she asks us to do something forbidden in Jewish law? May we desecrate the Shabbat to extend the life of a terminally ill patient? These questions have answers. There is a right course of action and a wrong one. Two duties conflict and we have meta-hala- chic principles to tell us which takes priority. There are some systems in which all moral conflicts are of this kind. There is always a decision procedure and thus a determinate answer to the question, “What should I do?” A dilemma, however, is a situation in which there is no right answer. It arises in cases of conflict between right and right, or between wrong and wrong — where, whatever we do, we are doing something that in other circumstances we ought not to do. The Talmud Yerushalmi (Terumot 8) describes one such case, where a fugitive from the Romans, Ulla bar Koshev, takes refuge in the town of Lod. The Romans surround the town, saying: Hand over the fugitive or we will kill you all. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi persuades the fugitive to give himself up. This is a complex case, much discussed in Jewish law, but it is one in which both alternatives are tragic. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi acts in accordance with halachah, but the prophet Eliyahu asks him: “Is this the way of the pious? [Vezu mishnat haHasidim]” Moral dilemmas are situa- tions in which doing the right thing is not the end of the matter. The conflict may be inherently tragic. Jacob, in this parshah, finds himself trapped in such a conflict: on the one hand, he ought not allow him- self to be killed; on the other, he ought not kill someone else; but he must do one or the other. The fact that one principle (self-defense) overrides another (the prohibition against killing) does not mean that, faced with such a choice, he is without qualms, especially given the fact that Esau is his twin broth- er. Despite their differences, they grew up together. They were kin. This intensifies the dilemma yet more. Sometimes being moral means that one experiences distress at having to make such a choice. Doing the right thing may mean that one does not feel remorse or guilt, but one still feels regret or grief about the action that needs to be taken. A moral system which leaves room for the existence of dilemmas is one that does not attempt to eliminate the complexities of the moral life. In a conflict between two rights or two wrongs, there may be a proper way to act — the lesser of two evils, or the greater of two goods — but this does not cancel out all emotional pain. A righteous individual may some- times be one who is capable of distress even while knowing that they have acted correctly. What the Midrash is telling us is that Judaism recognizes the existence of dilemmas. Despite the intricacy of Jewish law and its meta-halachic principles for deciding which of two duties takes priority, we may still be faced with situations in which there is an ineliminable cause for distress. It was Jacob’s greatness that he was capable of moral anxiety even at the prospect of doing something entirely justified, namely defending his life at the cost of his brother’s. This characteristic — distress at violence and potential blood- shed even when undertaken in self-defense — has stayed with the Jewish people ever since. One of the most remarkable phenomena in modern history was the reaction of Israeli sol- diers after the Six-Day War in 1967. In the weeks preceding the war, few Jews anywhere in the world were unaware that Israel and its people faced terrifying danger. Troops — Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian — were massing on all its borders. Israel was surrounded by enemies who had sworn to drive its people into the sea. And yet, it won one of the most stunning military victories of all time. The sense of relief was overwhelming, as was the exhil- aration at the reunification of Jerusalem and the fact that Jews could now pray (as they had been unable to do for 19 years) at the Western Wall. Even the most secular Israelis admitted to feeling intense religious emo- tion at what they knew was a historic triumph. Yet, in the months after the war, as conversations took place throughout Israel, it became clear that the mood among those who had taken part in the war was anything but triumphal. It was somber, reflective, even anguished. That year, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem gave an honorary doctorate to Yitzhak Rabin, chief of staff during the war. During his speech of accep- tance, he said: “We find more and more a strange phenomenon among our fighters. Their joy is incom- plete, and more than a small portion of sorrow and shock prevails in their festivities, and there are those who abstain from celebration. The warriors in the front lines saw with their own eyes not only the glory of victory but the price of victory: their comrades who fell beside them bleeding, and I know that even the terrible price which our enemies paid touched the hearts of many of our men. It may be that the Jewish people has never learned or accus- tomed itself to feel the triumph of conquest and victory, and therefore we receive it with mixed feelings. ” These mixed feelings were born thousands of years earlier, when Jacob, father of the Jewish people, experienced not only the physical fear of defeat but the moral distress of victory. Only those who are capable of feeling both, can defend their bodies without endangering their souls. POINTS FOR DISCUSSION • Do you think Jacob’s fear about Esau at the beginning of our parshah is justified? Would Esau be justified if he did feel that way? • Would Jacob have been justified if he had killed Esau? • Do you believe it is ever ethically right to kill? If so, when? • What impact do you think killing can have, even when morally justified, on a person emotionally and spiritually? • What lessons do you think soldiers in an army could learn from this week’s parshah?