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October 20, 2022 - Image 8

Resource type:
Text
Publication:
The Detroit Jewish News, 2022-10-20

Disclaimer: Computer generated plain text may have errors. Read more about this.

8 | OCTOBER 20 • 2022

PURELY COMMENTARY

opinion
Creative Diplomacy Yields Wins for
Lebanon and Bigger Wins for Israel
C

reativity is underrated
in diplomacy. But
when deployed
effectively, it can turn a hopeless
stalemate into an unexpected
opportunity. The key is that
all parties must
embrace what it
offers.
Through
more than a
decade of U.S.-
brokered attempts
to resolve the
Israel-Lebanon
maritime boundary dispute,
little had changed, and nothing
had moved. It was an essentially
zero-sum negotiation over
how much of a sliver of the
Mediterranean Sea would be
included in each country’s
Exclusive Economic Zone.
There were potential gas
deposits in the area, which
made each side press for the
maximum share it could get.
But no deal was ever reached,
denying both sides certainty,
and Lebanon any ability to
develop its gas resources, even
as its economy plummeted and
all of its Eastern Mediterranean
neighbors produced gas at will.
President Joe Biden’s special
envoy, Amos Hochstein,
a veteran of some of the
frustrating earlier rounds, came
with a different approach.
Armed with unique knowledge
of energy production protocols
in other regions, he suggested
each side focus not on what
they were giving up, but on
what they most needed.
Lebanon needed a chance
to drill for gas in its waters.
Considering the economic,
energy and humanitarian crisis

Lebanon is facing, failure was
not an option. No international
gas producers would drill in
waters subject to dispute and
potential conflict. So a deal
was imperative, one in which
Lebanese leaders could also
claim to their public that they
had not relinquished Lebanese
territory and energy resources.
What Israeli leaders decided
they needed was the certainty of
quiet in the Mediterranean, and
protection of its economic and
security interests. Quiet comes
from Lebanon’s own incentive
to ensure there is no conflict, so
its gas (assuming commercially
viable deposits are found) in
the Qana field that straddles the
border can flow, while Israeli
gas can flow unmolested in the
adjacent Karish field, which is
nearly ready for production.
In addition to heading off a
potential conflict in the north,
the agreement ensures Israel
will receive its proportionate
share of royalties from the
shared Qana field, protecting its
economic interests.
In fact, there is a strong
argument that not only did
Israel protect its interests, but,
by ensuring Lebanon has its
own gas resources, it advances
them in two key ways.
The best articulation I have
heard of this idea came from
Israel’s former National Security
Adviser Yaakov Amidror. In
an interview on Radio 103 FM
in August, recounted by Ben
Caspit in Maariv, he said that
Israel has no interest in having
a humanitarian crisis on its
northern border. He might have
gone further and reminded his
listeners what happened the last

time there was a total collapse
of the Lebanese state: a 15-year
civil war that killed tens of
thousands, destroyed millions of
lives and, among other disasters,
resulted in the rise of Hezbollah.
Second, he said Israel has
a strong interest in Lebanon
having its own gas rigs so that
Lebanon will be motivated to
maintain quiet at sea because it
will have something to lose. If
Hezbollah ever attacked Israel’s
rigs, he said, it is perfectly clear
what the response would be.
That means enhanced Israeli
deterrence.
Amidror found the mutual
interests argument far more
compelling than the question
of the angle at which a line
is drawn from the coast to
determine Exclusive Economic
Zones. (There is more than one
legitimate way to draw the line.)
He judged the government
capable of balancing these
questions, understood that

in a negotiation no side gets
everything and rejected claims
of a blow to Israeli sovereignty.
The sliver of sea that Israel
no longer claims, he pointed
out, is not holy land. It is not
even land. So the requirements
for approval of territorial
withdrawals do not apply.
In addition to its economic
and security gains, under the
agreement, Israel achieves
something it never has before:
effective Lebanese recognition
of the security border Israel
asserts in the first 5 kilometers
from the shore with the buoy
line in its territorial waters.
Lebanon will deny this, but
it is very clear that this line is
now accepted as the status quo
and will be treated as Israel’s
legitimate maritime border by
the international community.
Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah was relatively
restrained in his remarks on
the deal. But, in time, he will

continued on page 10

In this photo released by Lebanese government, Lebanese President
Michel Aoun, right, meets with U.S. Envoy for Energy Affairs Amos
Hochstein, center, and U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea,
left, at the presidential palace in Baabda, east of Beirut, Lebanon, Feb.
9, 2022.

Daniel B.
Shapiro

DALATI NOHRA/LEBANESE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT VIA AP

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