8 | AUGUST 26 • 2021 

PURELY COMMENTARY

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policy in Xinjiang — will face 
new challenges. It is safe to 
assume that the Taliban will 
be wary, at least for a while, 
about hosting global terror 
networks such as al-Qaeda 
— the cost to them in 2001 
was too high and the lesson 
has probably been learned. 
But over time, Afghanistan 
may yet again become a hub 
of terror.
Meanwhile, at the symbolic 
level — namely, the sense 
that “the arc of history” now 
bends toward Islamist victo-
ry — the imprint of the scenes from Kabul 
may be devastating. The consequences for 
regional stability could be severe, and vul-
nerable regimes may feel the need to cast 
their lot with the winners, or even look to 
Iran for shelter.

WHAT CAN THE U.S. DO?
This damage of the images emerging from 
Kabul will not be easily undone; some of 
the scars of Vietnam are still with us still. 
The United States is implementing a large-
scale “exfiltration” plan for those marked by 
service to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Still, 
the scope of the brutal acts that will follow 
the Taliban’s victorious entry into Kabul is 
painfully predictable. As former U.S. allies 
are executed in a public way, and women 
are relegated to servitude, the message to 
the rest of the Muslim world, and beyond it, 
could be quite dangerous. Has the West, and 
specifically the United States, become what 
the prophet Isaiah called “a broken reed”?
To counter this message as much as 
possible, it is vital for the United States to 
demonstrate — elsewhere since the Afghan 
case is clearly beyond salvation — that it is 
not a spent force. It would also be of deci-
sive significance to reassure traditional U.S. 
allies, including Israel and other like-mind-
ed forces of stability in the region. This 
would require not only proactive diplomacy 
at the highest level but also actions that 
would reassert the American commitment 
to their security and survival.
Central to any such demonstration, given 
what we witnessed in Afghanistan, would 

be the way the United States (assisted by its 
key allies, Britain and France) deals with 
Iran’s defiant conduct. Provocations at sea; 
rocket fire by proxy into Saudi Arabia and 
Israel; regional subversion; and a rapidly 
advancing military nuclear project — all 
these require a robust response, not abject 
surrender at the negotiating table in 
Vienna.
True, the Afghan debacle (which 
amounts to a resounding failure of the U.S. 
“nation-building” concept) and the Iranian 
challenge are different in nature and only 
marginally related (there is some evidence 
that Iran, despite the Taliban’s brutality 
toward Afghan Shiites, was willing to help 
them defeat the United States). But their 
timing makes it even more important for 
the United States to use this opportunity 
to reverse the images of decline. Moreover, 
European Union-style appeasement of the 
murderous Iranian regime will not play 
well with U.S. public opinion, come next 
November. When necessary, the practice of 
punitive actions against terrorism and sub-
version needs to be reestablished.

REGIONAL COHESION IS NEEDED
One of the keys to the survival of the 
pro-Western forces in Southeast Asia after 
the fall of Saigon in 1975 was their ability 
to come together — despite deep historical 
differences and grievances — in the form 
of ASEAN. Created in 1967, it was given 
its present form and functions only by the 
TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation) 
in 1976. It was only during the mid-1990s, 

after the Soviet collapse, 
that the communist former 
enemies, including Vietnam, 
queued up to join it.
To some extent, and despite 
the obvious differences, this 
can serve as a general tem-
plate for those Middle East 
nations who fear the conse-
quences of American retreat. 
The Abraham Accords 
already reflect, in many of 
their overt and underlying 
aspects, this need to “hang 
together.
” What happened 
recently in Tunisia can 
be interpreted as a significant part of a 
pre-emptive campaign to blunt the influ-
ence of Islamist political movements across 
the region.
In addition to the highly proactive 
United Arab Emirates (and the quietly 
persuasive work of the king of Jordan), 
it would be Saudi Arabia and Egypt that 
would need to take the lead in organizing 
the response; an opportune moment for 
Riyadh to cross the threshold into open 
relations with Israel — and to collect their 
reward for it in Washington.
As for Egyptian President Abdul Fattah 
el-Sisi, his powerful message to the schol-
ars of al-Azhar University on Jan. 1, 2015 
(which they have yet to respond to in a 
coherent way) remains the most lucid 
clarion call against the scourge of Islamist 
totalitarian radicalism which has swept 
the Muslim world. His position should be 
propagated and upheld by other like-mind-
ed nations (it is bound to be reviled and 
rejected, however, by Erdoğan, Turkey and 
its ally, Qatar). Recent steps by his regime 
to back Sufi practices — abhorred by the 
Islamist “purists”— point in the right direc-
tion.
As external but adjacent anchors of such 
a regional response — given the doubts 
about America’s role, which will not soon 
fade even if the Biden administration does 
take firm action — work should be done to 
bring in both France and India. Both have 
taken firm stands against Islamist radical-
ism, both have a vested interest in the out-
come, and both already have strong bilater-

Afghanis run alongside a U.S. Air Force C-17 plane 
as it departs Kabul, Afghanistan, on Aug. 16.

SCREENSHOT/JNS

