Guest Column
Community View
Why Hawks Should
Back The Iran Deal
W
e both were elected to the
Senate in 1978 and privileged
to have served together on
the Senate Armed Services Committee for
30 years, during which we each held com-
mittee leadership positions of chairman or
ranking minority member. We support
the Iran agreement
negotiated by the
United States and
other leading world
powers for many
reasons, including its
limitations on Iran's
nuclear activities, its
strong inspections
regime and the ability
to quickly re-impose
sanctions should Iran
violate its provisions.
But we also see a
compelling reason to
support the agreement that has gotten
little attention: Rejecting it would weaken
the deterrent value of America's military
option.
As former chairmen of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, we have
always believed that the U.S. should keep
a strong military option on the table. If
Iran pursues a nuclear weapon, some
believe that military action is inevitable if
we're to prevent it from reaching its goal.
We don't subscribe to that notion, but we
are skeptical that, should Iran attempt
to consider moving to a nuclear weapon,
we could deter them from pursuing it
through economic sanctions alone.
How does rejecting the agreement
give America a weaker military hand to
play? Let's imagine a world in which the
United States rejects the nuclear accord
that all other parties have embraced.
The sanctions now in place would likely
not be maintained and enforced by all
the parties to the agreement, so those
would lose their strong deterrent value.
Iran would effectively argue to the world
that it had been willing to negotiate an
agreement, only to have that agreement
rejected by a recalcitrant America.
In that world, should we find credible
evidence that Iran is starting to move
toward a nuclear weapon, the United
States would almost certainly consider
use of the military option to stop that
program. But it's highly unlikely that
our traditional European allies, let alone
China and Russia, would support the use
of the military option since we had under-
mined the diplomatic path. Iran surely
would know this, and so from the start,
would have less fear of a military option
than if it faced a unified coalition.
While the United States would certainly
provide the greatest combat power in any
military action, allies and other partners
make valuable contributions – not just
in direct participation, but also in access
rights, logistics, intelligence and other
critical support. If we reject the agree-
ment, we risk isolating ourselves and
damaging our ability
to assemble the stron-
gest possible coalition
to stop Iran.
In short, then,
rejecting the Iran deal
would erode the cur-
rent deterrent value
of the military option,
making it more likely
Iran might choose
to pursue a nuclear
weapon and would
then make it more
costly for the U.S. to
mount any subsequent military operation.
It would tie the hands of any future presi-
dent trying to build international par-
ticipation and support for military force
against Iran should that be necessary.
Those who think the use of force
against Iran is almost inevitable should
want the military option to be as cred-
ible and effective as possible, both as
a deterrent to Iran's nuclear ambitions
and in destroying Iran's nuclear weapons
program should that become necessary.
For that to be the case, the United States
needs to be a party to the agreement
rather than being the cause of its col-
lapse.
In our many years on the Armed
Services Committee, we saw time and
again how America is stronger when
we fight alongside allies. Iran must con-
stantly be kept aware that a collective
framework of deterrence stands resolute,
and that if credible evidence evolves
that Iran is taking steps toward a nuclear
arsenal, it would face the real possibility
of military action by a unified coalition of
nations to stop their efforts.
The deal on the table is a strong agree-
ment on many counts, and it leaves in
place the robust deterrence and cred-
ibility of a military option. We urge our
former colleagues not to take any action
that would undermine the deterrent value
of a coalition that participates in and
could support the use of a military option.
The failure of the United States to join
the agreement would have that effect. 7
Former Sen. Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan,
and former Sen. John Warner, Republican of
Virginia, both served as chairmen of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
The Vanishing Green Line
ave you seen the Green
Line lately? If you're an
Israeli or American Jew,
the answer is probably not.
The Green Line once marked
the armistice of Israel's 1948 war
for independence and became the
internationally recognized boundary
of the State of Israel, constituting
78 percent of formerly Mandated
Palestine. But after the 1967 War —
when Israel captured the West Bank,
Gaza Strip, east Jerusalem and the
Golan Heights — the Green Line
became the boundary between Israel
and occupied territory.
Though Israel
has since annexed
east Jerusalem and
withdrawn from
Gaza, the line still
marks the boundary
between Israel prop-
er — where Arabs
and Jews are entitled
to citizenship and
Toby Citrin,
equal rights — and
occupied territory —
where Jewish settlers
enjoy all of the benefits of citizen-
ship, but their Palestinian neighbors
cannot vote or even protest peace-
fully. Instead, they are subject to
Israeli military rule.
Despite these critical differences,
the Israeli government, since 1977,
has eliminated the Green Line from
all official maps. The Knesset reject-
ed an effort in 2007 to return the
line to Israeli textbooks; today, the
U.S. State Department reports that
more than three-quarters of Israeli
maps lack any distinction between
Israeli and Palestinian territory.
Israeli maps label the West Bank as
Judea and Samaria, evoking the bib-
lical names of what is now referred
to as "Greater Israel:'
The omission of the Green Line is
also occurring in Jewish institutions
in the U.S. Maps displayed in many
synagogues, Jewish community cen-
ters, Hebrew day schools and other
Jewish organizations are increas-
ingly removing the Green Line.
Moreover, Jewish communal fund-
ing rarely distinguishes between
Israel and occupied territory, allow-
ing our federation dollars to fund
West Bank settlements and other
obstacles to peace.
Why should American Jews care?
There are several significant rea-
sons.
Most of all, the absence of the
Green Line suggests that Israel is
no longer pursuing a two-state
solution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. While earlier negotiations
and statements by international and
regional bodies have recognized
that the ultimate boundaries of a
future Palestinian state will adjust
the Green Line through agreed-
upon land swaps, virtually all of the
realistic models of achieving a two-
state solution have boundaries based
more or less on the Green Line.
When we refuse to recognize the
boundary between Israel and the
land where the Palestinians hope to
establish a state, we send a message
that we are not serious about
ending this terrible conflict
or making the compromises
necessary for peace. And we
turn a blind eye to Israel's
undemocratic treatment
of Palestinians in the West
Bank — policies that deserve
our attention.
The absence of the Green
Line also parallels the
unfortunate missing bound-
ary on some Palestinian
maps. Israeli dreams of establishing
Greater Israel parallel Palestinian
dreams of eliminating Israel once
and for all. Thus, the absence of the
Green Line, in some ways, fosters
attempts to delegitimize the very
existence of the State of Israel.
This is particularly true when it
comes to Israel's democracy. If Israel
considers the West Bank to be part
of Israel, then it must either grant
full citizenship to its Palestinian
inhabitants — jeopardizing the
state's Jewish character — or allow
a Jewish minority to rule over a
Palestinian majority — and cease to
be a democracy.
Therefore, to preserve Israel's
democracy and Jewish character, we
must keep alive the two-state solu-
tion and make clear the boundaries
on which such a settlement will ulti-
mately be based.
For those of us who care about
Israel's future, this is our responsi-
bility, and we can make a difference,
no matter how small.
So the next time you are inside
a synagogue or federation office,
check out their maps of Israel. If
they don't prominently show the
Green Line, ask why and offer to
provide a replacement map. J Street
will be happy to oblige.
❑
Toby Citrin is co-chair of J Street,
Ann Arbor.
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